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On Nov. 19–20, 2014, forty-five scholars, from nine different countries, gathered
at Pitzer College in Claremont, California, for the third International Conference
of the Nonreligion and Secularity Research Network (NSRN). The theme of the
conference was “Explaining Nonreligion and Secularity in the U.S. and Beyond,”
and the scope of the papers presented was impressively broad: from Lori Bea-
man’s keynote address on church-state battles in Quebec, to Catherine Cald-
well-Harris’s talk on low levels of religiosity among college students in Turkey,
and from Penny Edgell’s look at anti-atheist sentiment in the United States, to
Kevin Lenehan’s analysis of secularization in Australia – various aspects of non-
religion and secularity were explored, both theoretically and empirically, and
from a multiplicity of disciplinary lenses.
But one topic at the conference definitely stood out: collective, organized
nonreligion and secularism. Amidst the historical narratives, political analyses,
sociological data, psychological models, and meta typologizing, there was a
clear prominence of papers at the conference that looked at how and why non-
religious, anti-religious, and/or secular people – of varying shades and hues –
come together collectively. The common concerns underlying these papers
were along the following lines of inquiry: what social movements and communal
institutions are secular or nonreligious individuals coming together to create in
order to serve their social, communal, and/or political needs and interests? And
just what exactly are those needs and interests? How are they being met?
Given the deep interest in organized secularism that was evident at the con-
ference – and given the recent growth of social movements created by and for
nonreligious people – it was clear to meeting participants Christel Manning,
Ryan Cragun, and Lori Fazzino that a book bringing together and publishing
those papers presented at the conference addressing these issues within the
study of secularity, secularism, and nonreligion would be timely.
Hence, this volume.
Organized Secularism in the United States brings together thirteen papers looking
at different aspects and angles of collective secularity. It is a welcome addition to
the burgeoning field of secular/nonreligious studies, an interdisciplinary en-
deavor which seeks to understand the lives, worldviews, beliefs, opinions, val-
ues, challenges, and activities of nonreligious people. The scholarly focus of sec-
ular/nonreligious studies is placed upon the meanings, forms, relevance, and
impact of political secularism, philosophical skepticism, and personal and cul-
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tural secularity – and all of these matters, in one manifestation or another, and
in varying degrees – are delved into in the chapters ahead.
Since Barry Kosmin established the Institute for the Study of Secularism in
Society and Culture at Trinity College in 2005, and Lois Lee and Stephen Bulli-
vant founded the Nonreligion and Secularity Research Network in 2008 while
at Cambridge University and Oxford University respectively, scholarly attention
to the secular/nonreligious has been blossoming. Significant developments in-
clude the following: in 2011, the open-access, peer-reviewed academic journal
Secularism and Nonreligion was launched; also in 2011, a Secular Studies depart-
ment was established at Pitzer College; in 2012, the Anthropology Department of
the London School of Economics launched a “Programme for the Study of Reli-
gion and Non-Religion;” also in 2012, New York University Press launched a Sec-
ular Studies book series and Palgrave Macmillan launched a book series on “His-
tories of the Sacred and the Secular, 1700–2000;” in 2014, De Gruyter launched a
book series on “Religion and Its Others: Studies in Religion, Nonreligion, and
Secularity” (of which this volume is a part); in 2016, the University of Miami en-
dowed a chair in the study of atheism and secularism.
Subsequent to the NSRN conference of 2014 at Pitzer College, from which
this book springs, an abundance of academic conferences have been held with
a focus on the secular, including: “Approaching Nonreligion: Conceptual, me-
thodical, and empirical approaches in a new research field” (2016) at the Univer-
sity of Zürich, Switzerland; “The End of Religion?” (2016) at the University of San
Diego; “Secularisms and the Formations of Religion in Asia: Pluralism, Globali-
zation, and Modernities” (2016) at Queen’s University, Belfast; “Varieties of Sec-
ular Society” (2015) at the Institut Francais de Londres, United Kingdom; “Secu-
larism and Religion in Modern Europe” (2015) at the Escuela Espanola de
Historia y Arqueologia, Italy; “Women’s Religious Agency: Negotiating Secular-
ism and Multiculturalism in Everyday Life” (2015) at Uppsala University, Sweden;
“Old Religion and New Spirituality: Continuity and Changes in the Background
of Secularization” (2015) at the University of Tartu, Estonia.
In sum, the academic study of secularity, secularism, and non-religion is
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Introduction
What would happen to a high school senior deep in the bible belt of the United
States if they told their high school administrators that they would contact the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) if the school had a prayer at his high
school graduation? This isn’t a hypothetical scenario – it happened in 2011.
Damon Fowler, a senior at Bastrop High School in Louisiana, informed the su-
perintendent of the school district that he knew school-sponsored prayer was il-
legal and that he would contact the ACLU if the school went ahead with a plan-
ned, school-sponsored prayer at the graduation ceremony. Damon’s threat was
leaked to the public. What followed were death threats from community mem-
bers and fellow students, weeks of harassment, and eventually his parents dis-
owning him and kicking him out of their home.
One more thing happened, which is why we recount this story at the begin-
ning of this book on organized secularism: the secular community came together
to support Damon. As his story made its way into the local, national, and even-
tually international press, nonreligious¹ and/or secular individuals made offers
of a place to stay, protection, and transportation, and a college fund was set
up for Damon since his parents had cut him off financially. Various secular or-
ganizations explicitly offered Damon help. The Freedom From Religion Founda-
tion gave him a $1,000 college scholarship and other organizations volunteered
to help him legally.
Damon’s story should be surprising in a country that prides itself as a melt-
ing pot of races, ethnicities, cultures, and religions. Yet, it is also a not entirely
uncommon scenario in the United States, where atheists’ morality is esteemed at
about the same level as is rapists’ (Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan 2011) and
only about 50% of Americans would vote for an atheist for President (Edgell,
Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006). Damon’s story also serves to highlight several im-
portant characteristics of the organized, secular community in the US. First, per-
haps to the surprise of many Americans, there actually is an organized secular
community in the US.While the numbers are still quite small (see below) relative
to the total proportion of the US population that is nonreligious, those involved
in the community are not insignificant. Second, the response of the organized
secular community to Damon’s situation also illustrates that organized secular-
 Many people use the terms non-religious and secular interchangeably, but scholars continue
to debate their precise meaning.
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ism in the US is often reactive. Many of the formal organizations exist specifically
because they are reacting to the privileging of religion in American culture and
the law (Blumenfeld, Joshi, and Fairchild 2008; Schlosser 2003). Likewise, many
of these organizations spring into action precisely when religious privilege
moves from the abstract or implicit into the concrete and blatant, undermining
the rights of secular individuals. Third, secular organizations in the US share a
common goal: to normalize nonreligiosity. In other words, the aim of many of
these organizations is to make it so people who are not religious, whether
they are atheists,² agnostics,³ or those who are unaffiliated with any religion,
can live ordinary lives without fear of unequal and discriminatory treatment.
While in many ways Damon Fowler’s story is a tragedy – a failure of public
schools to follow the law and protect minorities and a tragic failure of parental
support – his story also helps delineate the characteristics of organized secular-
ism.
Before we go much further, we should be clear in what we mean by “organ-
ized secularism.” The term “secular” originated to distinguish the things of this
world (e.g., work, food, sex) from religious things (e.g., prayer, heaven, god).
Secular can most simply be defined as “not religious” (though how we determine
what is religious and what isn’t remains a matter of debate). “Secularism,” in its
primary meaning, is a theory, philosophy, or ideology that distinguishes the sec-
ular from other (usually religious) phenomena.⁴ In its most common use, secu-
larism refers to a political philosophy that there should be a separation between
religions and government (Berlinerblau 2013). The logic behind such a separa-
tion is that, when government and religion are intertwined, typically there is fa-
voritism toward certain religions and therefore implicit or explicit discrimination
against other religions and those with no religion. Secularism can and does man-
ifest itself in many ways around the world, from French laïcité (Bowen 2013), to
Turkey’s unique restrictions on Islam despite being a predominantly Muslim
country (Hurd 2013), to the supposed “wall of separation” that exists in the
US (Smith 2013). Regardless of the particular manifestation of secularism, the
idea remains that the safest way to manage religiously pluralistic populations
is with a government that is separate and distinct from religion.
Secularism in the sense described above is a neutral term. Over time, how-
ever, partly in reaction to cultural and/or state resistance to such neutrality, sec-
 By “atheist” we mean those who do not have a belief in a god.
 By “agnostic” we mean those who do not believe there is any way to gain knowledge about a
god.
 See the Oxford Dictionary of Atheism for more detailed discussion of these and related defi-
nitions.
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ularism has acquired a second, more ideological meaning: not just the separa-
tion of religious and non-religious phenomena, but the celebration and promo-
tion of the secular as a worldview or value system that is the functional equiv-
alent of religion. Secularism, then, is what nonreligious people believe and
practice. Just as religion comes in a variety of different flavors such as Christian-
ity, Hinduism, or Islam, there are different kinds of secularism including Human-
ism, Atheism, and Freethinkers. And just as religious people tend to see their
particular worldview as the truth, or at least the most sensible way to live, so
do secular people. The difference is that secularism, at least in the United States,
is a minority worldview. It is secularism in this second sense that is of interest in
this volume.
By combining “secularism” with “organized,” we are making explicit refer-
ence to the many ways that individuals have come together around one common
interest – their shared desire to celebrate that they are not religious and find
ways to normalize their nonreligiosity. Specific aims of secular organizations
may vary (see Chapter 7, Schutz), as some bring secular individuals together to
socialize and others gather for educational purposes or for political action.
But all secular organizations in the US have at least one shared goal: the normal-
izing of nonreligion in the US (Cragun 2015b). Thus, by “organized secularism”
we are referring to groups of people who have some sense of togetherness and
are organized around their shared desire to be openly and safely secular in
the US. All of the chapters in this volume relate to organized secularism in
this sense, though how individual authors define secularism varies slightly
and is explained in those chapters.
As just noted, organized secularism takes many forms – from regular meet-
ings in bars to discuss philosophy to secular parenting groups and charitable or-
ganizations. While Damon Fowler’s story illustrates how organized secular
groups in the US can come together, there is another side to organized secular-
ism in the US. Many of the now prominent, national secular organizations have
been around for decades, and their relationships with other prominent secular
organizations have not always been amicable (see Chapter 4, Fazzino and Cra-
gun). There is a long and somewhat sordid history of infighting, competing
over donors, splintering, and tension among these organizations (see Chapter 3,
Rechtenwald). Perhaps still the most well-known leader of a secular organization
in the US – at least among a certain generation of Americans – was Madalyn
Murray O’Hair, who for a period in the 1980s was billed as “the most hated
woman in America” (O’Hair and O’Hair 1991). O’Hair gained fame (and notoriety)
for her involvement in a court case, Murray vs. Curlett (later combined with
Abington School District v. Schempp), which banned school official led Bible read-
ing in public schools. O’Hair later created several organizations to fight for the
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rights of atheists and other nonreligious Americans. O’Hair literally disappeared
from the organized secularism movement when she was abducted by an employ-
ee, along with one of her sons and a granddaughter, extorted for money she had
raised through her secular organizations, and then murdered along with her son
and granddaughter (LeBeau 2003). Yet her legacy lives on in the secular organ-
ization she founded, American Atheists, which is widely known as the secular
organization that places prominent billboards espousing secular values around
Christmas, among other provocative actions. Several chapters in this volume
(Chapter 2, Richter; Chapter 3, Rectenwald, and Chapter 4, Fazzino and Cragun)
provide detailed information on the tensions that have existed among secular or-
ganizations since the term “secular” was first coined in the mid 19th century.
The goal of this volume is to address a lacuna in the scholarly study of or-
ganized secularism. While organized secularism in its various forms is close to
200 years old, to date there is very little social scientific research on the topic,
though there is a growing body of historical research (Hecht 2004; Jacoby
2005; Royle 1980;Warren 1966). The aim of this volume is to expand early efforts
to theorize the discussion of organized secularism (see Campbell 1971), from or-
ganizational theory to social movement and social identity theory, as well as to
present fresh empirical data.We hope the various chapters in this volume further
our understanding of this growing and important movement.
Organized secularism has gained more visibility in recent years, but it is dif-
ficult to put actual numbers on its growth.While surveys show the nonreligious
population has grown significantly in the last two decades (Pew Forum on Reli-
gion 2014), many secular individuals do not join organizations (see Chapter 9,
Langston et al.). To date, there is no nationally representative survey with a
large enough sample of nonreligious individuals that has asked whether such in-
dividuals are part of a secular organization. The closest thing there may be to this
is a question asked by the Pew Forum on Religion in a 2012 survey which asked
survey participants how important it is for them to belong to a community of
people who share their beliefs and values; 49% of the nonreligious said it
was very important (Pew Forum on Religion 2012). If we overlay that number
onto the nonreligious population in the US (which was the population of interest
in that Pew survey), that would correspond to about 32 million adult Americans
who would be interested in being part of a secular organization. If we limit the
potentially interested population to just atheists in the US,⁵ the corresponding
number would be about 4 million atheist Americans who consider it very impor-
 Roughly 3% of adult Americans are atheists based on the 2014 General Social Survey (Smith,
Marsden, and Kim 2012).
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tant to belong to a community of people who share their beliefs and values.
Based on interviews with leaders of the most prominent secular organizations
in the US,⁶ the actual number of members of these organizations or subscribers
to their various magazines totals somewhere in the range of 50,000 to 100,000
individuals. These disparate numbers are not all that surprising when you
think about them from a social movements perspective. All social movements
have varied constituencies. There are core members⁷ – those who are actively in-
volved in the day-to-day activities of the various social movement organizations.
Then there are the members who support the movement – often financially, but
potentially in other ways – and are involved when they can be. There is also a
sympathetic public – individuals who would support the movement but are ei-
ther not aware of it, too busy with other things, or simply free-riding (i.e., getting
the benefits from the social movement without doing any of the work). Finally,
there is the unsympathetic public, or those who actually oppose the aims of
the movement. For organized secularism in the US, the core leaders likely num-
ber in the hundreds, the members number in the tens of thousands, and the sym-
pathetic public number in the tens of millions. However, the unsympathetic pub-
lic numbers in the hundreds of millions. Organized secularism may be growing,
but there is still a proverbial mountain to climb.
While organized secularism is a global phenomenon, we necessarily had to
limit the scope of this volume. As a result, almost all of the chapters focus on the
US. There are two exceptions. A chapter that compares the US and Germany
(Chapter 6, Mastiaux), and a chapter that discusses the organizational dynamics
in England at the time the terms “secular” and “secularism” were coined (see
Chapter 3, Rectenwald) which has significant implications for later develop-
ments in the US. The decision to focus on the American context resulted from
several factors. On the surface, there is the practical reason that the idea for
this book grew out of an international conference held in California in 2014
and various papers about organized secularism in America that were presented
there. But there’s a more important theoretical reason, which was reflected in
that choice of venue for the conference, and that is a perception of change in
the American context. The US has long been seen as atypical in its relatively
high levels of religiosity compared to other wealthy, industrialized societies, es-
pecially those in Europe. The recent dramatic increase in those claiming no reli-
 See Chapter 4 for more information on the study that serves as the basis for this estimate.
 Some of these individuals refer to themselves as “professional atheists,” though not all do.
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gion (often dubbed the “Nones”),⁸ from between 4 and 7 percent of the US pop-
ulation in the mid 20th century to around 25 percent today, represents a dramatic
shift from the past.While not all individuals who decline to affiliate with religion
are secular and, among those who are, not all of them affiliate with secular or-
ganizations, they constitute a large and growing audience and pool of potential
members for secular organizations. This means organized secularism in the US
faces a very different environment than it did in the past, which is worth study-
ing.
Limiting our focus to the US also has a methodological benefit. It enables a
multi-perspective, multi-dimensional analysis of organized secularism in one
particular geographical setting, which deepens our understanding and enables
a richer comparative framework in the future. By focusing on the US, we don’t
mean to suggest that the secular movement is more highly organized in the
US or that what is happening with organized secularism is more important in
the US than in any other part of the world. To the contrary, there is a lot that or-
ganized secularism in the US can learn from other countries (Cragun 2015a), and
there is a great deal that scholars have learned from the study of organized sec-
ularism elsewhere (e.g., see Engelke 2012, 2014; Lee 2015; Kosmin & Keysar 2007;
Mumford 2014; Quack 2011; Wohlrab-Sahr 2012, 2015). We strongly encourage
more research on organized secularism in other countries around the world.
This volume is organized into three sections. The first is primarily historical
and theoretical. The aim is to provide some background both on the history of
organized secularism but also on the terminology that is often used when de-
scribing those who would consider themselves part of the organized secular
movement. The chapters in the second section offer fresh empirical data about
a variety of secular organizations with an aim to better understand what they
do, how they function, and what their aims are. The final section provides
some insight into what secular and nonreligious individuals need and how or-
ganized secularism can help fulfill those needs. In a sense, the last section is
pointing out that becoming nonreligious does require some reconfiguring of
one’s life. How does one manage important life transitions, like marriage and
death, without the trappings of religion? Obviously it is possible, but more can
 A growing number of publications refer to the nonreligious as “nones.” This label comes from
a response to a survey item that asks people, “What is your religion, if any”? One of the options
was “none.” Those who chose this option were labeled as “nones.” In line with suggestions in
various publications on the nonreligious, we generally refrain from using the term “none” as it
implicitly suggests that these individuals are lacking something (see Cragun and Hammer, 2011;
Lee, 2012).
6 Ryan Cragun & Christel Manning
be done by secular organizations to provide secular alternatives to religious rit-
uals for those individuals who want them.
The first chapter, by Charles Richter, takes readers on a trip through history,
illustrating that definitions of terms like “secular” and “humanist” are compli-
cated. They are complicated by the time period, the context, and, in particular,
by who is using the term, as all people bring biases and agendas into discus-
sions surrounding these topics. Questions raised in this chapter are further illu-
minated in the following chapter, by Michael Rectenwald, which describes the
origins of the terms “secular” and “secularism” in mid 19th century England by
George Jacob Holyoake. His chapter goes on to illustrate that, shortly after the
terms were coined, debate over what they should mean arose, and – foreshadow-
ing much of the history of organized secularism – what followed was divisions,
tensions, and splits within the fledgling secular movement. The history Recten-
wald describes, as well as that in the chapter by Lori Fazzino and Ryan Cra-
gun, makes it clear that organized secularism is, like most social movements,
contentious, with significant internal divisions. As Fazzino and Cragun point
out, internal division can be but often is not a definitively negative characteristic
of a social movement, as conflict has the propitious effect of making room for
people of varied perspectives within a movement. This is true even if conflict
may, in some sense, distract the focus of the movement from the change it
wants to instead focus on what it wants to change.
The final chapter in this section, by John Shook, questions the way in which
scholarship has conceptualized organized secularism in the past. Shook shows
how previous research in secular studies has often allowed itself to be defined
by theology and religion. In contrast, Shook argues that the secular predates
that which is religious, supercedes it, and that those studying it (whatever “it”
is) should set out their own agenda separate from religious studies, the study
of religion, and theology. As Shook argues, the domain of the secular should
not be contingent upon its “otherness” from religion, but rather can and should
be a self-chosen collection of topics that secular scholars and scholars of secu-
larism choose to include within this area of inquiry. To do otherwise is to contin-
ue to allow religion to control the study of that which religion should not control.
Shook also illustrates that predetermined secular categories may not represent
reality, and that those studying the secular need to be careful that they do not
reify the realities they have created. By recognizing that the secular is not con-
tingent upon the religious, Shook is then able to develop the ideas of ‘polysecu-
larity’ and ‘polysecularism’, which reflect the many ways people, organizations,
and nations can be secular and the varied interests and agendas that may be es-
poused by secularism, respectively. Shook is not the first to suggest there is va-
riety within secularism (see, for example, the Diversity of Non-religion Project,
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http://www.nonreligion.net/or the Multiple Secularities Project, http://www.
multiple-secularities.de/ ), but the terms he coins offer a fresh way to frame the
idea that what is secular is not singular; it is many.
The next section offers much needed new empirical data illustrating the va-
riety of contemporary forms of organized secularism, how they build group iden-
tity and structure, and the activities in which they engage. Amanda Schutz’s
chapter looks inside the growing diversity of organizations that exist within
the larger movement. While earlier research often depicted atheists who attend
atheist groups as old, crotchety, white men (see Hunsberger 2006), Schutz’s
chapter illustrates that the nonreligious are far more diverse than that stereo-
type. Drawing on organizational theory, Schutz shows that nonreligious individ-
uals are increasingly aware of and accepting of the fact that secular people are
diverse and have varied needs. Some want to get together with other nonreli-
gious people to have fun, while others are more interested in education or vol-
unteering. As the number of nonreligious people grows in the US, it seems likely,
based on Schutz’s research, that the variety of secular organizations in any given
location will continue to grow to meet the demands and interests of the nonreli-
gious.
A number of previous studies have noted the importance of the internet for
atheist and secular activism. Aislinn Addington’s chapter adds to this growing
body of research by describing in detail how atheist identity construction, find-
ing support for often newly adopted and marginalized secular identities, and
secular organizing all rely upon the internet, at least for a sizable proportion
of atheists.
A relative newcomer to organized secularism, the Sunday Assembly (SA) gar-
nered significant media attention when it launched in 2013. Jesse Smith’s chap-
ter describes the origins of the SA and argues that these “atheist churches” func-
tion to shape secular identities (at the individual and communal level), to
demarcate boundaries between the secular and the religious, and to create sec-
ular communities. Of particular interest is how Smith draws connections be-
tween the structure, rituals, and functions of religious congregations and their
corresponding manifestations in Assemblies.
Jacqui Frost’s chapter provides a different perspective on SA, focusing on its
role in helping individuals forge a secular identity. SA is attractive to many sec-
ular Americans who want to move beyond rejecting religion and build a “posi-
tive” secular community. Yet, as Frost shows, there are inherent tensions in
this quest that can be difficult to reconcile. SA’s explicit goal is to be “radically
inclusive” while simultaneously drawing boundaries that keep spiritual and su-
pernatural rhetoric out of the assembly. SA also engages in selective appropria-
tion of the institutional form of “church” that eschews the hierarchy and dogma
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found in a religious church while attempting to replicate its ritualized, emotion-
ally engaged communality.
The final section shifts the focus to the personal and social needs of nonre-
ligious individuals who join these organizations. The chapter by Joseph Lang-
ston, Joseph Hammer, and Ryan Cragun provides some valuable quantitative
data on the question of why some nonreligious and secular individuals belong to
secular, humanist, atheist, or freethought groups and others do not. Langston et
al. find that a number of factors influence membership in organized secularism,
from age and sex to general opinions on what the movement should be doing.
However, one of the more important findings is that there are many nonreligious
and secular individuals who would be involved in organized secularism if there
were groups in their local area, suggesting that there is unmet demand for organ-
ized secularism.
Bjorn Mastiaux’s chapter explores the motives of individuals who do affili-
ate with secular organizations. Drawing on qualitative data from affiliates in Ger-
many and the United States, he analyzes both their primary motives (e.g., the
need for belonging or the desire for political change) and their dominant behav-
ioral patterns (e.g., self oriented or other oriented), resulting in a typology of
eight ideal types of organized atheists.
Religion has long offered the cultural toolkit for individuals and families to
celebrate life passages such as marriage, childbirth, or death. These religious
structures are so dominant in American society that even nonreligious people
will often use them, either by default or because of cultural pressure. In some
societies, such as Denmark, the national Church is a fairly successful provider
of such resources for nonreligious individuals (Zuckerman 2008). Yet research
shows that, in the US, organized religious structures often do not adequately
meet the needs of and may sometimes even cause harm to nonreligious people
(c.f. Smith-Stoner 2007). In recent years the nonreligious are increasingly looking
to create their own symbols and meaning systems that authentically reflect their
secular value systems and secular organizations can help them do that. Dusty
Hoesly’s chapter explores how secular couples use the Universal Life Church
(ULC) to create nonreligious wedding ceremonies. Yet ULC’s status as a secular
organization is ambiguous. Though it’s teachings and practices appear to be sec-
ular, it identifies as a religious organization, albeit for entirely pragmatic rea-
sons: US law favors religious organizations when it comes to recognizing mar-
riages. This suggests that the rights of secular organizations in the US may still
lag behind those of some of their European counterparts. The chapter by Nick
MacMurry and Lori Fazzino examines how secular individuals understand
death and dying and the resources they draw on to help them manage that proc-
ess. The final chapter of the book, by Barry Kosmin, offers some concluding re-
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flections on the issues raised in the volume and outlines an agenda for future
research.
Collectively, the chapters in this volume offer a variety of insights and theo-
retical perspectives that can help those of us interested in organized secularism
to understand more about the roots of the movement, how it currently functions,
and what the future will bring for organized secularism in the US.While there are
still a number of challenges for this small but growing movement to overcome,
that the movement has grown to the point that it warrants serious scholarly at-
tention suggests that organized secularism in the US has come of age.
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“I Know It When I See It:” Humanism,
Secularism, and Religious Taxonomy
1 Introduction
When Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart defined “hard-core pornography” in
1964’s Jacobellis v. Ohio with the phrase “I know it when I see it,” he may as well
have been talking about religion (378 US 197 (1964)). Anyone who has taken or
taught a religion course in the Humanities or Social Science disciplines is likely
familiar with the conceptual difficulties in defining “religion” (or “a religion,” for
that matter). While it often feels like a simple matter to recognize religion when
one sees it, it is just as often a challenge to justify that identification. A room of
students struggling to come up with the perfect definition of religion—not too
broad, not too limiting, not dependent on essentialist claims, etc.—is an illumi-
nating classroom activity. The fact is, though, that most people have not taken
such a course, let alone taught one, and public discourse on religion rarely rec-
ognizes the ambiguity of religion as a discursive category. Indeed, many people
do not see the project of defining religion as problematic at all. They simply
know it when they see it.
For most Americans, “religion” and “church,” when used as descriptive
terms, retain Christian connotations of structure, belief, practice, and commun-
ity. These connotations are retained when they attempt to describe quasi-reli-
gious or non-religious philosophies or movements in terms of religion. The con-
struction in the public consciousness of “secular humanism” as a political
bogeyman and threat to American religion demonstrates this propensity to use
Christian forms. By examining how people outside the academic study of reli-
gion have wrestled with the relation of various forms of irreligion – especially
secular humanism – to religion, we can see how the idea of secular humanism
is conceptually disruptive by illuminating normative pitfalls in colloquial defini-
tions of religion.
Ironically, Justice Stewart’s legal reasoning could be held at least partially
responsible for secularism being thought of as a religion. His claim, “I know it
when I see it,” with its colloquial, common-sense language, has been a popular
and oft-cited phrase in both federal court decisions and everyday speech. Al-
though in later cases he did attempt to further define pornography, Stewart ulti-
mately settled on the “I know it when I see it” standard as the best solution when
attempting to define the undefinable (Gewirtz 1996, 1027). Earlier in his tenure
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on the Supreme Court, Stewart had used a similar yardstick when it came to re-
ligion. In his lone dissent to School District of Abington Township v. Schempp
(1963), he described the majority’s decision to ban Bible readings in public
schools “not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment
of a religion of secularism” (374 US 203 (1963)). Stewart did not attempt to define
religion, but he knew it when he saw what he called “government support of the
beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in
private.” While Stewart did not elaborate further on what he meant by “religion
of secularism” beyond the claims made in the oral arguments, he most likely did
not imagine secularism to be a religion in the same sense that he would consider
Christianity or Buddhism to be. Rather, it was a rhetorical flourish countering the
charge that Bible reading in schools violated the Establishment Clause. This par-
ticular turn of phrase happened to fit in neatly with a longstanding tradition of
attempting to delegitimize the idea of secularism by framing it as an anti-reli-
gious religion, subject to the Establishment Clause, and contrary to American
ideals.
2 Defining Religion and nonreligion
Scholars of religion have to acknowledge that no matter how much they might
balk at it, in some circumstances, a working definition of religion is necessary.
As Talal Asad reminded the academy in a 2014 interview on the twentieth anni-
versary of his book Genealogies of Religion:
To define “religion” is (…) in a sense to try and grasp an ungraspable totality. And yet I no-
where say that these definitions are abstract propositions. I stress that definitions of reli-
gion are embedded in dialogs, activities, relationships, and institutions that are lovingly
or casually maintained—or betrayed or simply abandoned. They are passionately fought
over and pronounced upon by the authoritative law of the state. (Martin and Asad 2014,
12– 13).
When the courts are called upon to rule on matters of religious exercise or estab-
lishment, they need to be able to inform their decisions with a reasonable defi-
nition of religion. Likewise, when courts must deal with organized irreligion,
they need to be able to speak meaningfully about their relations to religion in
order to apply First Amendment protections equally. Historically in the United
States, humanism has been among the thorniest of these beasts. There is
much confusion about what exactly it is: is it, following the framers of the orig-
inal Humanist Manifesto of 1933, a new religion to replace the old (Kurtz 1973, 8)?
Is it, following Paul Kurtz, an expression of values and a method of inquiry
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(Kurtz 1983, 8)? Is it, as a federal judge recently decided, simply a religion for the
purposes of the establishment clause (American Humanist Assoc. v. Bureau of
Prisons, et al., 3:14-CV-00565-HZ (2015))? Representatives of the American Hu-
manist Association today would have different ideas of what the term connotes
from, for example, Jesse Helms and Francis Schaeffer in 1979. Complicating mat-
ters is the problem of terminology: particularly when employed to attack irreli-
gion, the terms “humanism,” “secularism,” and “secular humanism,” have
been used interchangeably to describe a wide range of irreligious practice and
thought (see the Introduction of this volume for a discussion of some of these
terms). A historical perspective on how Americans have dealt with nonreligion
that looks something like religion since the 1920s can help to make sense of
the confusion surrounding the use of humanism. Writers of catalogues of reli-
gions, activists, and legislators and judges have all tried to nail down this slip-
pery concept, and in doing so have illuminated their own prejudices as to what
does and does not constitute a religion.
3 Cataloguing nonreligion
The twentieth century, with its increases in globalization, in religious pluralism,
and in proliferation of new religions, saw the creation of a market for books that
attempted to make sense of the diverse religious landscape. These catalogues of
religions, adhering to no academic rigor, comprise a particularly interesting
genre, especially those volumes that focus on religions the author sees as
cults, heresies, or otherwise unorthodox. They bring to mind Tomoko Masuza-
wa’s observation that “the modern discourse on religion and religions was
from the very beginning (…) a discourse of secularization; at the same time, it
was clearly a discourse of othering” (Masuzawa 2005, 20). Masuzawa has
shown how the language of religious studies developed in conjunction with Eu-
ropean colonialism, reading the cultural practices of non-European peoples
through the lens of Protestant Christianity. Further, Tracy Fessenden has dis-
cussed the “unmarked” nature of Christianity in discourse on religions, especial-
ly in the United States, which often implicitly conflates “Christian” and “reli-
gious” (Fessenden 2007, 4). Indeed, both the discourse of secularization and
the discourse of othering are at play in these catalogues of religions. The cata-
logues treated religion as a category with identifiable traits held in common;
in this view, a taxonomy of religions can easily be derived by identifying not
only the genealogies of religion, but also how religions fulfill particular traits.
Even (or especially) when written from an explicitly sectarian viewpoint, the
catalogues evaluated movements, organizations, or institutions as religious inso-
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far as they could fulfill the same criteria as the so-called world religions, most
particularly Christian traditions. The writers of these catalogues were conscious
of religious pluralism, and they understood that their own religion was not the
only option in the spiritual marketplace. It is this recognition of secularism and
pluralism that prompted some of these authors to embark on their projects in the
first place; many of the catalogues are polemic in their condemnation of “alter-
native” religions. This deliberate othering of minority religions served to validate
the author’s favored tradition, but also, in the case of humanism, secularism, or
even agnosticism and atheism, to apply the conceptual frameworks of religion
onto non-religious phenomena. These catalogues were the product of both an
environment of rampant religious pluralism as well as the discomfort such a fer-
tile field for new religious movements provoked among the dominant traditions.
Complicating matters further was the ever-changing international flow of ideas
and ideologies; although the Cold War with its threat of godless Soviet Commu-
nism is the emblematic period of moral panic over atheism, Americans consis-
tently associated nonreligion with the foreign bogeyman of the day, whether
that was anarchism, fascism, or socialism (Richter 2015).
In 1928, Charles Ferguson, the former religion editor for Doubleday, Doarn,
and Company, published The Confusion of Tongues: A Review of Modern ‘Isms’,
also printed under the title The New Books of Revelations. In its pages, he de-
tailed more than twenty so-called cults ranging from New Thought and Mormon-
ism to the Dukhobors to Kukluxism. Ferguson had been inspired in this project
by the increase in new religious movements since the World War. “America has
always been the sanctuary of amazing cults,” he said, but recently they had been
claiming all of the growth in a rich field of religious sentiment (Ferguson 1929, 4).
These “isms”— an enormously popular term of the time for any religious, polit-
ical, or social movement out of the mainstream—were gaining so many adher-
ents due to what he called democracy’s disintegrating influences on orthodox
faiths. Ferguson saw the “true temper” of the American people displayed in
these new movements:
We find the genuinely religious type of mind, not in the orthodox churches, but rather in
the cults; the willingness to break with home and old alignments signalizes the true faith in
the spiritual mirage. The cults stand for creative religion in the hands of the people. We
shall not know America until we know the religions that America has made and created
(Ferguson 1929, 9).
“Cults” represented to Ferguson the enterprising spirit of the nation and accord-
ing to him, there was “no more evangelical cult in modern times than the Amer-
ican Association for the Advancement of Atheism” (Ferguson 1929, 13).
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The American Association for the Advancement of Atheism (4A, hereafter)
was the first serious atheist organization in the United States, and in the 1920s
inspired a short-lived burst of college atheist clubs. For a few years, its president
and co-founder Charles Lee Smith gained notoriety through media stunts de-
signed to shock religious Americans. They held a “Blamegiving” service in
1931 to replace Thanksgiving, and Smith enjoyed an extended blasphemy trial
in 1928 courtesy of the state of Arkansas – the last successful conviction for blas-
phemy in the United States (Schmidt 2011, 219). The 4A and its affiliated groups
were very successful at getting attention, but never actually had significant num-
bers¹. Ferguson took them very seriously, however, and saw them as “the most
clear-cut example of how a religion gets formed, what it does, and how it oper-
ates” (Ferguson 1929, 427). He examined the 4A’s materials and saw in their
structure a familiar form: that of a religion. The 4A professed its own five “fun-
damentals” to match those of the Fundamentalists: Materialism, Sensationalism,
Evolution, the Existence of Evil, and Hedonism. “It is as though the apostles of
the 4A had gone carefully through the catalogue of theology and set down the
opposite of every conventional doctrine,” Ferguson wondered (Ferguson 1929,
431). And certainly that is what Smith had done in a conscious act of satire,
which speaks to a familiar or colloquial way of defining religion: both Smith
and Ferguson saw religion as understandable if it could fit into a neat grid
with boxes for such criteria as “holy book,” “nature of the universe,” “core be-
liefs,” or “hierarchy.” Smith’s stated intent was not to establish 4A as a new re-
ligion, but rather the eventual elimination of all religions. But Ferguson argued
that the organization was indeed a religion for three reasons.
First, he considered the very act of Smith’s inversion of every aspect of fun-
damentalism to be religion-formation in its essence. Regardless of Smith’s inten-
tions, he had assembled a religion from its components. Second, Ferguson be-
lieved that the 4A’s “solemn denial of God” produced for its adherents the
same “psychic kick” that affirming God did in believers (Ferguson 1929, 432).
If religion was in part an embodied phenomenon, then there was no difference
between 4A and the religious fundamentalism it mocked. Rather, it offered a
new, yet familiar, avenue by which to access religious experience. Finally,
there was the social program of the 4A, including a campaign to remove “In
God We Trust” from coins, to eliminate the military chaplaincy, and eventually
to eliminate religion worldwide. Dismissing the likelihood of these plans actually
 It is unclear how many members the 4A had at its height, but there is no evidence that their
actual membership was more than a few thousand, even though their literature frequently
claimed millions of atheists in America.
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bearing fruit, Ferguson stressed that there was “a vast gulf between the irreli-
gious and the Atheistic” (Ferguson 1929, 435). Someone who simply professed
no religion was, for him, not religious, while those who loudly proclaim their
lack of religion are, ironically, participating in the religion of Atheism as estab-
lished by the 4A.
A decade later, in 1938, Jan Karel Van Baalen published The Chaos of Cults,
which, like its predecessor, would go on to multiple editions and printings over
the following years.Writing just before World War II, Van Baalen was concerned
with the growth of non-Christian religions in the United States, and what he be-
lieved to be the lack of teaching of orthodox Christianity. In a new edition of his
text published in 1944, he worried that religious “isms” would lead to political
“isms,” eventually producing an American Hitler (Van Baalen [1938] 1944, 11).
One of the most insidious of these cults, he maintained, was modernism, espe-
cially in what he called its humanist form.² Van Baalen saw modernism as essen-
tially humanist, and thus open to an easy slide away from even nominal Chris-
tianity. What most alarmed him was how humanist hymns – that is, modernist
hymns that focused on social issues – could be quickly modified to apply to
any other religion, nationalism, or other ism. William George Tarrant’s hymn
“My Master Was a Worker” was particularly problematic for him; aside from
its themes of labor and shared burden, the titular “My Master” could be replaced
by any person or concept of three syllables or less, such as “Old Bismarck was a
worker,” “Our Lincoln was a worker,” or even “Mohammed was a worker” (Van
Baalen 1944, 216–17). In this way, Van Baalen feared, modernist hymns quietly
promoted worship of man rather than of God. Humanism disguised as modernist
theology, he believed, was eating away at Christianity from the inside.
By the 1960s, Humanism, atheism, and other non-religious worldviews were
finding prominence in both the courts and the public eye (see Fazzino and Cra-
gun, this volume). Richard R. Mathison’s Faiths, Cults, and Sects of America:
From Atheism to Zen catalogued a variety of irreligious expressions along with
other new religious movements and interlopers on the American religious
scene. While Mathison suspected many of his cults of simply seeking a quick
buck, he saw humanism as offering an honest if empty appeal to the leftist in-
tellectual. Although he dismissed the idea that the “quasi-religious” movement
of humanism could be “called a religion in the formal sense” without providing
any reasoning for this judgment, he saw its appeal to the extreme left in its “be-
 Since the 1920s, Fundamentalists defined themselves largely in opposition to theological
modernism, a term that for them included the higher criticism of the Bible. In popular usage,
“modernism” often encompassed all Christian denominations that were not strictly Fundamen-
talist. See Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture.
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lief in man’s moral obligation to use his intellectual and moral endowments in
such a way that man everywhere can ‘develop to his fullest capacity’” (Mathison
1960, 22–23). In stark contrast, he presented an account of an American Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Atheism meeting, in which a dour group meets on
a Saturday night to hear a speaker coldly rail against God, the Bible, and super-
stition until the allotted time is up:
The speaker has finished. The notebooks are closed. The ritual has been completed. There is
neither joy nor laughter as the grim cultists sip tea and discuss the virtues of the lecture.
Next Saturday night they will meet again. Another speaker will give a lecture much like the
one tonight. Meanwhile, the unhappy rebels will study the Scriptures to justify their empty
creed. It is, after all, a Holy Cause – even if each of them is alone in eternity (Mathison 1962,
122).
The fact that the 4A had been virtually disbanded for decades mattered little
when it came to its value as anti-atheist propaganda. The organization’s very ex-
istence in the 1920s and 1930s left a lasting impression in the imaginations of
those concerned about the creeping threat of secularization. Surviving copies
of 4A pamphlets popped up well into the 1960s as evidence of the secular threat
to Christian America. In 1964, for example,WSB-TV in Atlanta cited the 4A plat-
form in a news broadcast discussing the latest exploits of Madalyn Murray
O’Hair and her organization American Atheists.³ The irony of this conflation
was that American Atheists has been immeasurably more successful than the
4A in its impact on the legal status of atheism.
4 Nonreligion and the Law
In 1961, the year after Mathison’s book was published, the Supreme Court pro-
duced one of its most quoted footnotes regarding humanism in the case Torcaso
v. Watkins. The case itself held that the states as well as the federal government
could require no religious test for public office. But for those interested in the
religious status of humanism, footnote eleven was the important part of the de-
cision: “Among religions in this country which do not teach what would gener-
ally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture, Secular Humanism and others” (367 US 488 (1961)). The fact that a foot-
note has no legal power of precedent could not stop legions of Americans from
 WSB-TV (Television station: Atlanta), Mr. Birch Warns of the Evils of Atheism, March 13, 1964,
http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/news/id:wsbn46298.
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believing that the Supreme Court had ruled that secular humanism was a reli-
gion. Torcaso, along with Engel v. Vitale the next year, led even US Senators to
this conclusion, as when Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia argued during
Senate discussion of Engel on August 25, 1962 that “the Supreme Court had set
up atheism as a new religion.” Absalom Robertson, the Senator from Virginia
and father of Pat Robertson, agreed: “Atheism is a religion. It is a religion that
denies god. Buddhism is a religion. Mohammedism⁴ is a religion. Shintoism is
a religion. There are many religions. Of course atheism is a religion. The Unitar-
ians do not believe in the Trinity. They have a religion.”⁵ Robertson’s impromptu
Senate floor discourse on the nature of religion is illuminating in its recapitula-
tion of the evolution of scholarly thought on what makes a religion. He recog-
nized that Christianity no longer had sole claim to the status of “religion” in
the West – that belief in the Trinity could not be the defining criterion for a re-
ligion in a pluralistic world – and listed a handful of what were considered
“world religions” at the time. Articulating a theory of religion in this way has
often been an effective method of displaying a limited acceptance for religious
pluralism without recognizing the complexities in the modern religious land-
scape. The landmark Supreme Court rulings regarding religion in the 1960s
made nonreligion and secularism hot button political issues to be seized upon
by groups such as the Heritage Foundation and the Moral Majority. The Heritage
Foundation fired one of the foundational salvos in a 1976 pamphlet by Onalee
McGraw: “Secular Humanism and the Schools: The Issue Whose Time Has
Come.” In this tract, which school reformers mailed out to school districts and
parents by the thousands, McGraw argued that “humanistic education” had re-
placed traditional teaching in America’s public school system. The fifth grade
humanities program, “Man: A Course of Study” (MACOS), exemplified this
trend in curriculum. McGraw used the words of Peter Dow, one of its developers,
to condemn MACOS as challenging “the notion that there are ‘eternal truths’
(e.g., the Ten Commandments) that must be passed down from generation to
generation” (McGraw 1976, 5). This challenge to essential truth lies at the heart
of the fears of secular humanism and irreligion in general – the concern that
if transcendent sources of morality are removed, people will have no reason
not to act on their every base impulse.
In 1978, two lawyers provided comprehensive legal argument that the reli-
gion of secular humanism had been established in the public schools of the
United States. John W. Whitehead, later the founder of the Rutherford Institute,
 I.e., Islam.
 Senator Robertson, Congressional Record, 108 (August 25, 1962): S 13, 17590.
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and John Conlan, who had just lost a re-election bid for a third term in the US
House of Representatives, published a long paper in the Texas Tech Law Review
in which they laid out the history of the Supreme Court’s changing definitions of
religion to reflect an increasingly secularized culture, leading to, in their view, a
de facto establishment of Secular Humanism in violation of Abington Township v.
Schempp, in which the Supreme Court had ruled that “the state may not estab-
lish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing
hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe’” (Whitehead & Conlan 1963, 1).Whitehead and Conlan in-
terpreted an absence of explicitly Christian textbooks as “affirmatively opposing
or showing hostility to religion.” Further, they interpreted the court’s phrase “re-
ligion of secularism” literally, imagining that it was a plain description of an an-
alogue to theistic religions, rather than a metaphor for overreaction by the state:
“Secularism” is nontheistic and “humanism” is secular because it excludes the basic tenets
of theism. Therefore, Secular Humanism is nontheistic. However, while Secular Humanism
is nontheistic, it is religious because it directs itself toward religious beliefs and practices,
that are in active opposition to traditional theism. Humanism is a doctrine centered solely
on human interests or values. Therefore, humanism deifies Man collectively and individu-
ally, whereas theism worships God (Whitehead & Conlan 1963, 30).
For their historical context, Whitehead and Conlan relied almost exclusively on
Rousas John Rushdoony, the father of modern Christian Reconstructionism,
and this comes out in their repeated dismay that the foundations of law had
moved away from theistic absolutes and toward sociological relativism. Citing
Rushdoony fourteen times in their paper, they adopted his position that all
law is “inescapably religious,” and thus “a fundamental and necessary premise
in any and every study of law must be, first, a recognition of this religious nature
of law” (Rushdoony and North 1973, 4). Therefore, Whitehead and Conlan imag-
ined a clash between religions – Christianity was not merely being edged out of
the government in favor of religious neutrality, but rather being replaced by a
rival religion that denied any transcendent source of morality. This position al-
lowed them to use the Establishment clause as a wedge, arguing for the expul-
sion from the governmental sphere of anything that could be interpreted as con-
stituting the religion of secular humanism. Dozens of law review articles cited
this paper, with many continuing the argument to return American jurisprudence
to Christian underpinnings and disestablish secular humanism (e.g. Eigner 1986;
Melnick 1981; Schmid 1989).
The Whitehead and Conlan paper also became a foundational document for
many culture warriors of the late seventies and eighties. Homer Duncan quoted
extensively from it in his book Secular Humanism: The Most Dangerous Religion
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in America, which featured an introduction by Jesse Helms. Duncan again relied
on a fill-in-the blanks format to define “religion,” identifying secular human-
ism’s “adherents…central doctrine…rosary…and…last rites” as evidence that it
fit neatly into the category of religion (Duncan 1979, 15). Duncan had a great
deal of evidence from early humanists to support his claims, but conflated the
desires of humanists like Charles Francis Potter and John Dewey to instill the
values of a new humanist religion via the public schools with the realities of
modern schooling. Like many critics of humanism, Duncan frequently used
the two Humanist Manifestos as damning evidence, but never mentioned the
changes from 1933 to 1973 in the authors’ approach to humanism as a religion.
The second Manifesto no longer proposed the creation of a new religion or de-
scribed humanism as a religious movement; instead, it explicitly disclaimed
the articulation of “a new credo” (Kurtz 1973, 13). According to Duncan, secular
humanism was dangerous because its goal was to destroy Christianity; because it
was inherently deceptive; and because it was propagated through public school-
ing (from kindergarten through university), the media, the courts, and govern-
ment agencies (Duncan 1979, 18). The prime example of the insidiousness pos-
sessed by humanism was in Madalyn Murray O’Hair’s success, as “one
atheistic woman” to convince the Supreme Court to end school prayer in Abing-
ton School District v. Schempp, which Duncan believed would have been impos-
sible if the courts had not been “strongly biased by Humanism” (Duncan 1979,
102). Duncan also relied on an idea that would be familiar to viewers of Bill
O’Reilly today: the notion that Christianity is more than just a religion, and
thus not subject to the same restrictions of the establishment clause as mere “re-
ligions” like secular humanism would be.⁶ This line of argument interprets the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as only prohibiting the establish-
ment of any particular Christian denomination; it absolutely rejects the idea that
the clause even considers non-Christian religions or nonreligion. Duncan read
the Constitution as the blueprint for a Christian nation and could not imagine
it standing in the way of a Christian state. But according to Duncan, Christianity
no longer held its traditional role in America. He argued that Schempp “not only
violated the right of free exercise of religion for all Americans; it also established
a national religion in the United States – the religion of secular humanism”
(Duncan 1979, vi), In an appendix to his book, Duncan listed the most prominent
organizations promoting humanism; in addition to the usual suspects such as
 On the November 28, 2012, episode of The O’Reilly Factor with guest David Silverman, presi-
dent of American Atheists, O’Reilly argued, “Christianity is not a religion; it is a philosophy,”
and thus acceptable for the government to promote.
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American Atheists and the American Humanist Association, the “most powerful
and effective means for promoting Humanism” was the United States Govern-
ment itself (Duncan 1979, 121).
Duncan’s position on the status of secular humanism became for a brief time
the law, when in 1987, Judge William Brevard Hand of the United States District
Court in Alabama ruled that not only was secular humanism a religion, it had in
fact already been established in the public schools, and thus he ordered forty-
four suspect textbooks removed from use in Alabama schools in the middle of
the school year. Although the decision would be quickly overturned by the 11th
Circuit, the Center for Judicial Studies published Judge Hand’s decision with
an introduction by Richard John Neuhaus, who expected that most of its readers
would agree that secular humanism was a religion under either a substantive or
functional definition of religion (in Hand 1987, vi).⁷ Testimony in the case indeed
brought out numerous definitions, ranging from Tillich’s “ultimate concern” to a
meandering version of Durkheim’s definition. Judge Hand found the most expan-
sive definitions of religion helpful to his cause, in particular that of Dr. James
Kennedy, who acknowledged that the commonplace first approach to defining
religion – that it involves belief in God – does not include the various non-the-
istic religions of the world, and thus a capacious definition like Tillich’s would
be most useful (Hand 1987, 30). This stance allowed Judge Hand the leeway he
needed to consider secular humanism, for all its nebulous nature, to be a reli-
gion for the purposes of the Establishment Clause. For the second half of his ar-
gument, that it had already been established in the nation’s public schools, he
compiled an exhaustive list of quotations from textbooks used in Alabama, cat-
egorizing them as examples of “Anti-theistic Teaching,” “Subjective and Person-
al Values Without an External Standard of Right and Wrong,” “Hedonistic, Pleas-
ure, Need-Satisfaction Motivation,” and “Anti-Parental, Anti-Family Values”
(Hand 1987, 71–96). Not one of the allegedly anti-theistic quotations Judge
Hand selected contained any directly negative language about religion or God.
Instead, he objected to them because of their lack of religious language. One text-
book included the statement: “Even though you are a special, one-of-a-kind
human being, you share certain basic needs with all people. These needs are
physical, emotional, mental, and social,” which Judge Hand deemed an anti-the-
istic teaching on the basis that it did not acknowledge religious or spiritual basic
needs (Hand 1987, 71). The rest of his examples were no more damning. One of
 Substantive (or essentialist) definitions of religion define the phenomenon in terms of what
Peter Berger has called its “meaning-complexes,” while functional definitions describe what it
does in its relationships to other human systems. See Berger (1974).
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the key points in the case was John Dewey’s goal in the thirties of replacing a
watered down established Christianity with a religion of humanism (Kurtz
1973, 8). Because Dewey and the other signatories of the 1933 Humanist Manifes-
to had agreed to this religious language, Judge Hand had all the evidence he
needed to rule secular humanism as a religion, and the public schools, inspired
as they were by Dewey’s reforms, as their humanist churches.
The argument that secular humanism was an established religion carried
weight even in Congress.While still a US representative from Arizona, Conlan in-
troduced two amendments to a 1976 education appropriations bill in order to
prevent public schools from falling into secular error. The first of these dealt spe-
cifically with “Man: A Course of Study,” and was heavily influenced by Onalee
McGraw’s pamphlet for the Heritage Society. To section 302 (g) of H.R. 12835,
the General Education Provisions Act, Conlan added the following amendment:
“No grants, contract, or support are authorized under this or any other Act for
any purpose in connection with the Man: A Course of Study (MACOS) curriculum
program or materials, or in connection with the high school sequel to MACOS,
Exploring Human Nature.”⁸ Conlan argued that MACOS was “a subtle but sophis-
ticated attack on Judaic-Christian values.” The curriculum used examples from
many world cultures, some of which seemed to have value systems alien to
American Christianity. For example, one unit described certain Netsilik Inuit
practices such as wife-stealing and euthanasia as necessary for the Netsilik to
survive in the far north of Canada. Conlan and others interpreted the curriculum
as asserting a moral equivalency between all value systems, from which he in-
ferred an endorsement of absolute moral relativism. Conlan entered into the re-
cord numerous statements from concerned parents, teachers, and conservative
activists who raised objections to the content and agenda of the curriculum. Pa-
rents in the Wallkill school district in New York protested to their Board of Edu-
cation that the proposed implementation of MACOS was based on “Humanism…
a system of belief which teaches that man is all there is and that there is no
God.”⁹ Although a social studies teacher took pains to explain that humanism
and the humanities had nothing to do with belief or unbelief in God, neither
the Wallkill parents nor Conlan were buying it. The controversy over MACOS
in Wallkill led to the ousting of an incumbent school board member in favor
of Donald W. Richter, an outspoken opponent of the new curriculum. The
 Representative Conlan, speaking on H.R. 12835, on May 11, 1976, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., Con-
gressional Record, 122 pt. 11:13419.
 “Wallkill Humanism Course Protested,” Newburgh Evening News (New York), May 1, 1976, en-
tered by Representative Conlan, speaking on H.R. 12835, on May 11, 1976, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Congressional Record, 122 pt. 11:13424.
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local victory was ammunition for Conlan to use in getting his amendment attach-
ed to the House bill, which passed comfortably.
Conlan’s second amendment of the day prohibited “grants, contract, or sup-
port … for any educational program … involving any aspect of secular humanism
unless there is also a fair and equal teaching of the world and life view of Judaic-
Christian principles set forth in the Old and New Testaments.”¹⁰ On a second
reading, the provision to include the “fair and equal teaching” of Biblical prin-
ciples was stripped out, although Conlan’s argument hinged on secular human-
ism’s supposed declaration that there is no God. Again relying on Hugo Black’s
footnote in Torcaso v. Watkins, the Congressman defined secular humanism as a
religion for the purposes of the law and Constitution. He complained that teach-
ers “advocating a secular humanist view” consistently excluded religious moral
perspectives from their lessons, constituting a de facto establishment of the reli-
gion of secular humanism rather than harmless “scientific neutralism.” To Con-
lan, the idea that ethics could be anything other than absolute was an inherently
religious belief. Citing Abington v. Schempp, he reminded Congress that the Su-
preme Court had ruled that the government could not establish a “religion of sec-
ularism.” Following Onalee McGraw’s logic, Conlan saw any discussion of ethics
divorced from explicitly Christian sources as necessarily, in the words of the
Court’s ruling, “affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion.” His im-
passioned arguments notwithstanding, Conlan saw his second amendment that
day rejected without even a recorded vote. The entire bill would go on to rejection
by the Senate, so his MACOS amendment never gained force of law either.
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah succeeded in banning federal education fund-
ing for “secular humanist” curriculum in one of his amendments to the Educa-
tion for Economic Security Act in 1984, although what that actually meant, no
one was quite sure. Without any grandstanding about the evils of secularism
on the Senate floor, he simply inserted a prohibition against grants for magnet
schools going toward “courses of instruction the substance of which is secular
humanism.”¹¹ With strong bipartisan sponsorship from leaders of both conserva-
tive Republicans and liberal democrats, no debate over the provision ensued,
and the amendment became part of the education spending law. Indeed, no
real understanding of the meaning of the phrase “secular humanism” was
 Representative Conlan, speaking on H.R. 12851, on May 11, 1976, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., Con-
gressional Record, 122 pt. 11:13427.
 Amendment 3162 to Education for Economic Security Act, Title V, Sec. 509, on June 6, 1984,
98th Cong., 2nd sess, Congressional Record, 130 pt 11:15027. In the United States, “magnet
schools” are public schools that provide specialized curriculum and draw students from beyond
typical geographic boundaries.
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agreed upon or even discussed at that time. For Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
of New York, another sponsor of the bill, the Hatch amendment was simply a
minor concession to secure 75 million dollars for magnet schools in desegregat-
ing districts—the “price [he] had to pay to get school desegregation money.”¹²
Asked what secular humanism meant, Moynihan said, “I have no idea what sec-
ular humanism is. No one knows.” Although he admitted that he might have
pushed the issue harder, and that he would be “more aware” if the issue were
to come up again, he maintained that “there is much less here than meets the
eye.” Hatch acknowledged that he was essentially testing the waters for further
legislative action against secular humanism. He described his motivation as
being “tired of seeing the dumbing down of textbooks and schools to ignore
all reference to religion and patriotic values,” but also said that he “personally
didn’t feel very strongly about secular humanism.” Hatch recognized that secular
humanism, regardless of its nebulous meaning to Americans, could be used as a
wedge to maintain a level of commitment to the idea of America as a Christian
nation. Conlan had made the mistake of overstating the threat of secular human-
ism at a time when it had not yet become a watchword for a politically active
religious right. Twelve years later, after the Moral Majority and other conservative
Christian organizations had succeeded in imbuing the phrase with a host of neg-
ative associations, Hatch had no trouble in passing his prohibition.
The federal Department of Education’s response to the Hatch amendment
was to push the responsibility for defining secular humanism to the local school
districts, effectively enabling parents to decide that a given curriculum has sec-
ular humanist elements and is therefore vulnerable to challenge. Even though
the legislation and the Education Department rule only applied to particular ear-
marked funds for magnet schools, for those primed with an antipathy toward ir-
religion, the prohibition easily read as blanket federal disapproval of secular hu-
manism. A legal aid to Hatch confirmed this aim of the amendment: “It has put
the federal government on record saying that federal funds should not be spent
on propagandizing an atheistic philosophy to our kids. If Mr. Lear doesn’t like it,
tough noogies.”¹³
Norman Lear certainly did not like the government taking steps against hu-
manism of any kind, although he considered the idea of an organized secular
humanism, a right-wing hoax.¹⁴ The television producer and founder of advoca-
 “Of ‘Secular Humanism’ And Its Slide Into Law,” New York Times, February 22, 1985, A16.
 Felicity Barringer, “Department Proposes Rule to Curb Teaching of ‘Secular Humanism’: Con-
troversial Term Remains Undefined,” Washington Post, January 10, 1985, A19.
 Judy Mann, “What’s Secular Humanism?” Washington Post, January 30, 1985, B3.
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cy group People for the American Way had just published an exchange of letters
with Ronald Reagan over what he saw as the President’s “endorsement of the so-
called Christian Nation movement.”¹⁵ In these letters, a remarkably candid Rea-
gan explained a number of key positions regarding his interpretation of the re-
lationship between religion, the state, and culture. Lear presented Reagan with a
selection of quotations from televangelists and senior White House staffers who
advocated for what Lear described as a “Christian nation” movement. His evi-
dence included Pat Robertson claiming, “the minute you turn the [Constitution]
into the hands of non-Christian people and atheistic people they can use it to
destroy the very foundation of our society. And that’s what’s been happening.”
He also cited Reagan’s own liaison for religious affairs, Carolyn Sundseth, who
had called for “all saved Christians” to pray that her fellow White House staffers
“get saved or get out” of government. Reagan suggested that these and other sen-
timents were not in fact indicative of an aggressive Christian nationalism, but
rather defensive reactions to remarks derogatory of religion made in the Human-
ist, the magazine of the American Humanist Society. Describing statements pub-
lished by a magazine with only a few thousand subscribers as a threat worthy of
panicked action on the part of religious Americans as a whole was characteristic
not only of Reagan’s approach to irreligion, but also of the broader conservative
Christian movement of the eighties.
5 “I Know It When I See It” Revisited
Today, amid the latest iteration of the “New Atheism” (a term that has emerged
several times since the beginning of the twentieth century; see Fazzino and Cra-
gun, this volume, for more on New Atheism), the visibility of atheists, agnostics,
humanists, secularists, the nonreligious, and the non-affiliated has reached un-
paralleled levels. And yet the “I know it when I see it” approach to defining re-
ligion is still in ubiquitous use.
Perhaps the best recent example is found in reactions to the Sunday Assem-
bly, a “godless congregation” founded in 2013 by British comedians Sanderson
Jones and Pippa Evans, which consciously uses organizational models derived
from Christianity, but divested of revealed doctrine or deity (see Smith’s and
Frost’s chapters, this volume). The idea of a church-like community that uses
a congregational model, but without theistic belief is not new; the Sunday As-
sembly has its precursors in the Ethical Societies, the 4A, Unitarian Universal-
 “A Debate on Religion Freedom,” Harper’s, October 1984, 15.
“I Know It When I See It:” Humanism, Secularism, and Religious Taxonomy 27
ism, and even Madalyn Murray O’Hair’s American Atheist Church, all of which
used the form of churches without incorporating belief in a god.¹⁶ None of the
early organizations had the benefit of the Internet; the Sunday Assembly has
leveraged online communities to seed local communities very effectively. The
first meetings of the initial Sunday Assembly group in London got some media
attention, but it was when the founders announced a world tour to seed new
congregations in November of 2013 that the organization got widespread atten-
tion as an “atheist megachurch,” in the words of salon.com reporter Katie Engel-
hart (Engelhart 2013). As other media outlets took notice, including a widely re-
published Associated Press piece, they also picked up on this language,
regardless of the fact that the founders intentionally avoided calling their move-
ment either an atheist organization or a church. The “megachurch” label is also a
misnomer – all the Sunday Assembly attendees worldwide might fit into one
good-sized American mega-church.
And yet the “atheist church” label sticks because, again,we know it when we
see it. Observers of the Sunday Assembly see a group with a set of beliefs about
humanity and the world, a familiar form of celebration, a peculiar form of rev-
erence, and a community built on local congregations linked in a global body.
It fits into the grid. So the Sunday Assembly, like secular humanism, is a disrup-
tive element; it seems to fit the category of religion, but there is cognitive disso-
nance preventing it from fitting too neatly. Here is something we can learn from
colloquial approaches to defining religion: a disruptive element like secular hu-
manism betrays the observer’s biases and shows how tightly intertwined religion
is with politics and culture. The interpretation of secular ways of knowing as in-
herently and necessarily anti-religious or anti-theistic also shows the normative
quality of both religiosity and Christianity in American culture. Sometimes it is
not politically expedient to call it as one sees it, and in this, the study of nonre-
ligion can help us better understand religion.
 Secularist organizations have also claimed religious status under the law to gain equal foot-
ing with religious organizations. See the American Humanist Association’s religious tax exemp-
tion (Fazzino and Cragun, this volume) and the Universal Life Church’s authority to perform mar-
riages (Hoesly, this volume) for examples.
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In the early 1850s, a new philosophical, social, and political movement evolved
from the Freethought tradition of Thomas Paine, Richard Carlile, Robert Owen,
and the radical periodical press. The movement was called “Secularism.”¹ Its
founder was George Jacob Holyoake (1817– 1906) (Grugel 1976, 2–3).² Holyoake
was a former apprentice whitesmith turned Owenite social missionary, “moral
force” Chartist, and radical editor and publisher. Given his early exposure to
Owenism and Chartism,³ Holyoake had become a Freethinker. With his involve-
ment in Freethought publishing, he became a moral convert to atheism. Howev-
er, his experiences with virulent proponents of atheism or infidelity and the hos-
tile reactions to them on the part of the state, church, and press induced him to
develop in 1851– 1852 the new creed and movement he called Secularism.
In retrospect, Holyoake claimed that the words “Secular,” “Secularist,” and
“Secularism” were used for the first time in his periodical The Reasoner (founded
in 1846), from 1851 through 1852, “as a general test of principles of conduct apart
from spiritual considerations,” to describe “a new way of thinking,” and to de-
fine “a movement” based on that thinking, respectively (Holyoake 1896a,
 The foundational texts of Secularism include Holyoake (1854) and Holyoake (1870).
 In addition to Grugel’s biography, for biographical sketches of Holyoake, see Royle (1974, esp.
at 3–6, 72–74, and 312); and McCabe (1908).
 Chartism was a working-class movement that emerged in 1836 and was most active between
1838 and 1848. The aim of the Chartists was to gain political rights and influence for the working
classes. Chartism got its name from the formal petition, or People’s Charter, that listed the six
main aims of the movement. These were: 1) a vote for all men over twenty-one, 2) the secret bal-
lot, 3) no property qualification to become an MP, 4) payment for MPs, 5) electoral districts of
equal size, 6) annual elections for Parliament.
The movement presented three petitions to Parliament – in 1839, 1842 and 1848 – but each
of these was rejected. The last great Chartist petition was collected in 1848 and represented, it
was claimed, six million signatories. The Chartists planned to deliver the petition to Parliament,
after a peaceful mass meeting on Kennington Common in London. The government sent 8,000
soldiers, but only 20,000 Chartists turned up on a cold rainy day. The demonstration was
deemed a failure, and the rejection of this final petition marked the end of Chartism. Many ex-
cellent works on Chartism have been published, including Chase (2007) and Royle (1996).
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45–49). In using these new derivatives, he redefined in positive terms what had
been an epithet for the meaner concerns of worldly life or the designation of a
lesser state of religiosity within the western Christian imaginary. His bold claims
for the original mobilization of the terms are corroborated by the Oxford English
Dictionary. Never before Holyoake’s mobilization had “secular” been used as an
adjective to describe a set of principles or “secularism” as a noun to positively
delineate principles of morality and epistemology, or as a movement to carry
them forth.
Like Thomas H. Huxley’s later agnosticism, Holyoake’s Secularism deemed
that whatever could not be “tested by the experience of this life” should simply
be of no concern to the science practitioner, progressive thinker, moralist, or pol-
itician. The “Secularist” was one who restricted efforts to “that province of
human duty which belongs to this life” (Reasoner 1852, 12: 34). But, as in Hux-
ley’s agnosticism, atheism was not a prerequisite for Secularism. Secularism rep-
resented “unknowingness without denial” (Holyoake 1896a, 36–37). Holyoake
did warn against the affirmation of deity and a future life, given that reliance
on them might “betray us from the use of this world” to the detriment of “prog-
ress” and amelioration, but belief in the supernatural was regarded as a matter
of speculation or opinion to which one was entitled, unless such beliefs preclud-
ed positive knowledge or action.
It is important to distinguish Holyoake’s brand of Secularism from that of his
eventual rival for the leadership of the Secularist movement, Charles Bradlaugh.
Unlike Bradlaugh, for Holyoake the goal of Freethought under Secularism was no
longer first and foremost the elimination of religious ideology from the public
sphere. While Bradlaugh maintained that the primary task of Secularism was
to destroy theism – otherwise the latter would impede the progress of the new
secular order – Holyoake envisioned Secularism as superseding or superintend-
ing both theism and atheism – from the standpoint of a new scientific, educative,
and moral system. Holyoake insisted that a new, secular moral and epistemolog-
ical system could be constructed alongside, or above, the old religious one.⁴
Mid-century Secularism thus represents an important stage of nineteenth-
century Freethought – an intervention between the earlier infidelity of Richard
Carlile and “Bradlaugh’s rather crude anti-clericism and love of Bible-bashing”
(Lightman 1989, 287–88). While he inherited much from the earlier infidelity
of Carlile and Owen, Holyoake offered an epistemology and morality independ-
ent of Christianity, yet supposedly no longer at war with it. By the term “secular,”
 Colin Campbell (1971, 54) referred to these two approaches as the “substitutionist” (Holyoake)
and “eliminationist” (Bradlaugh) camps.
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Holyoake did not mean the mere absence or negation of religion or belief, but
rather a substantive category in its own right. Holyoake imagined and fostered
the co-existence of secular and religious elements subsisting under a common
umbrella.
In this essay, I examine the development of Secularism as a movement and
creed, but also connect it to modern notions of the secular and secularity. I begin
by briefly sketching Holyoake’s periodical and pamphleteering career in the
1840s, distinguishing it from that of another prominent freethinker, Charles
Southwell, and showing how Holyoake eventually developed Secularism as a
moral program – to escape the stigma of infidelity, but more importantly to
move Freethought toward a positive declaration of principles as opposed to
the mere negation of theism. I treat Holyoake’s Secularism in terms of class con-
ciliation between artisan-based Freethinkers and middle-class skeptics, literary
radicals, and liberal theists. I continue by outlining the principles of Secularism
as sketched by Holyoake in several formats and across four decades, which also
amounts to a brief word history of the associated term. I then distinguish Holy-
oake’s branch of Secularism from that led by Bradlaugh, especially on the ques-
tions of atheism and sexual policy. I conclude with further remarks regarding the
significance of mid-century Secularism as a historic moment inaugurating mod-
ern secularity.
2 From Infidelity to Moral Philosophy
A series of freethought periodicals from whence Secularism emerged began as
working-class productions aimed at working-class readers and others with inter-
ests in the condition of the working classes. By the early 1850s, the policies of
Secularism changed that exclusive basis. In 1841, the former Owenite Social Mis-
sionary, Charles Southwell – with Maltus Questell Ryall, “an accomplished icon-
oclast, fiery, original, and, what rarely accompanies those qualities, gentleman-
ly,” and William Chilton, a radical publisher and “absolute atheist” – founded in
Bristol, England, a periodical that its editors claimed was “the only exclusively
ATHEISTICAL print that has appeared in any age or country,” entitled The Oracle
of Reason, or Philosophy Vindicated (Oracle 1842, 1: ii).⁵
Charles Southwell might, with important exceptions, be thought of as the
Ludwig Feuerbach of British infidelity in the early 1840s, at least as Karl Marx
 Holyoake (1892,Vol. 1, 142) described Chilton as “a cogent, solid writer, ready for any risk, and
the only absolute atheist I have ever known.”
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and Friedrich Engels characterized the latter in The German Ideology (1845).⁶ In
this work, contemporaneous with the founding of The Reasoner (founded in
1846), Marx and Engels argued that the Young Hegelian Feuerbach was merely
substituting one kind of consciousness for another, “to produce a correct con-
sciousness about an existing fact; whereas for the real communist it is a question
of overthrowing the existing state of things” (Marx and Engels 1988, 65). Marx
and Engels wrote:
The Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of con-
sciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men […]
it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of con-
sciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings,
their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians
logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for
human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations (Marx
and Engels 1988, 36).
An atheist martyr, the criticism cannot be applied to Charles Southwell without
qualifications. His writing constituted a political act with material and political
consequences. However, the end he hoped to effect was in fact a revolution in
ideas, which would, he thought, eventuate a change in material circumstances
– precisely what Marx critiqued in Feuerbach (Oracle 1841, 1: 1).
My aim is not to engage in an extended comparison of English infidelity and
post-Hegelian German philosophy, but rather to underscore the irony of South-
well’s abstraction of atheistic materialism from its socio-historical context in
order to contrast it with the direction Freethought was soon to take under Holy-
oake. In warring strictly on the level that Marx referred to as ideological, seeing
religious ideas as the real “chains of men,” Southwell insinuated that atheism
was a purely intellectual affair, the proclamation of a truth that has arisen at dif-
ferent times in places, including ancient Greece, but that has been continually
thwarted by priests of all ages (Oracle 1841, 1: 28).
Soon growing impatient with the lack of response to his philosophical dis-
quisitions (Oracle 1841, 1: 2–4, 19–21, 27–9, 35–7),⁷ however, Southwell opened
the fourth number of The Oracle with a caustic and belligerent article entitled
 The differences were many, such as the fact that Southwell was an artisan-class radical, not a
university-educated philosopher trained in German philosophy. But Robertson (1930, Vol. 1, 75)
compares the atheism in The Oracle to positions developed by Feuerbach. For biographical
sketches of Southwell, see Royle (1974, 69–73); and Robertson (1930, Vol. 1, 73).
 As Charles Southwell and William Carpenter noted (1842, 2–7), several of these articles (“Is
There A God?”) were also cited in the indictment as counts of blasphemy.
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“The Jew Book.” Here, he took aim at sacred text, which proved more dangerous
and thus more effective for his purposes:
That revolting odious Jew production, called BIBLE, has been for ages the idol of all sorts of
blockheads, the glory of knaves, and the disgust of wise men. It is a history of lust, sodo-
mies, wholesale slaughtering, and horrible depravity, that the vilest parts of all other his-
tories, collected into one monstrous book, could scarcely parallel! Priests tell us that this
concentration of abominations was written by a god; all the world believe priests, or
they would rather have thought it the outpouring of some devil! (Oracle 1841, 1: 25).
On the date of its publication, Southwell was arrested for blasphemy and taken
to Bristol Jail.⁸ His trial became a cause celebre in the liberal press (Southwell
and Carpenter 1842, iii-iv). His self-defense was unsuccessful, however, and on
January 15, 1842, he was fined 100 pounds and sentenced to a year’s imprison-
ment (Southwell and Carpenter 1842, 102).
With Southwell incarcerated and unable to manage the publication, George
Jacob Holyoake became the editor of The Oracle. Under Holyoake’s editorship, a
change in rhetoric and tone was immediately evident. Holyoake would not
change The Oracle’s purpose – to “deal out Atheism as freely as ever Christianity
was dealt out to the people” (Oracle 1841, 1: 1) – but he refrained from such odi-
ously provocative and offensive language as Southwell’s “The Jew Book” (Oracle
1842, 1: 67). Eschewing incendiary rhetoric, Holyoake sought sympathy for athe-
ism on the basis of the conditions of poor workers and the failure of the Christian
state to remedy them. Conditioned by personal loss from material want and its
connection to religious observation, Holyoake had been predisposed to lose
his faith in divine providence. For instance, Holyoake’s daughter died while he
served a sentence for blasphemy in Cheltenham Jail in 1841–42. His continual
exposure to worldly want and suffering eventually spelled the end of whatever
faith he may have had.
When Southwell declined to resume editorship of The Oracle upon his re-
lease from Bristol Jail, Holyoake and company decided to fold the publication.
But a new periodical, The Movement And Anti-Persecution Gazette, was founded
on December 16, 1843, allegedly to continue the mission of The Oracle and to re-
port the activities of the Anti-Persecution Union.⁹ Central to The Movement was
 He remained there for seventeen days until an offer of bail was finally accepted.
 The Anti-Persecution Union was formed primarily in response to the imprisonment for blas-
phemous libel of Charles Southwell and grew out of the “Committee for the Protection of Mr.
Southwell.” Subscriptions for the Union and its establishment were announced in The Oracle
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its departure for freethinking journalism. Not only did the editors maintain the
tonal and rhetorical moderation characteristic of The Oracle after Southwell
was removed but also The Movement launched the “third stage” of Freethought.
As Holyoake saw it, the first two stages, free inquiry and open criticism of theol-
ogy, were essential, but not constructive. The third stage, however, involved the
development of morality: “to ascertain what rules human reason may supply for
the independent conduct of life” (Holyoake 1896a, 34). The difference in empha-
sis marked what Holyoake later referred to as the “positive” side of Freethought,
which would not simply destroy theism, but replace its morality with another,
superintending system. With this, Holyoake echoed Auguste Comte, who held
that “nothing is destroyed until it has been replaced” (Holyoake 1896a, 34).¹⁰
3 The Upward Mobility of Freethought
The successor to The Movement, The Reasoner was founded in 1846 by Holyoake
with the fifty pounds he won for his five entries into the Manchester Unity of
Oddfellows contest for the best new lectures, to be read to graduates into the
Oddfellowship (Holyoake 1892, Vol. 1, 204–8). The publication became the cen-
tral propagandist instrument for Freethought. By the time he began the new
weekly, Holyoake was a leading freethinker. In The Reasoner, Holyoake was
not only interested in distancing himself from the old infidel rhetoric but he
also had another kind of Freethought movement in mind. While maintaining
his right to the profession of atheism, he came to advocate the accommodation
of other than atheistic views within a broader movement. Unbelievers, deists,
monists, utilitarians, and liberal theists might all cooperate, provided that to-
gether they promoted a morality, politics, economics, and science of worldly im-
provement.While a seemingly contradictory position that alienated and angered
some within the Freethought community, it represented the differentiation of a
religious public sphere, within which belief and unbelief coexisted by means
of an overarching secularity. Secularism marked a new stage in secularity itself,
evincing a recognition that religious belief was unlikely to disappear.
After publishing The Reasoner, Holyoake soon became involved with George
Henry Lewes and Thornton Hunt and connected with middle-class literary and
political radicals, and budding scientific naturalists. They met in a group called
(1842, 1: 72). Maltus Q. Ryall was its first secretary; Holyoake became its secretary by 1843; see
Movement (1843, 1: 5–7).
 See also George Holyoake and Charles Bradlaugh (1870, iv).
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a “Confidential Combination.” Francis W. Newman, whose book The Soul, its Sor-
rows and Aspirations (1849) greatly impressed Holyoake, was among those who,
including Hunt and the pantheist William Maccall, encouraged the formation of
such a club (Royle 1974, 158). William Ashurst bankrolled The Reasoner and
under the pseudonym “Edward Search,” suggested the words “secular” and “sec-
ularist” to describe Holyoake’s new branch of Freethought. Holyoake responded
in the same issue of The Reasoner by calling the new movement “Secularism.”
The connections initiated the cross-pollination of working- and middle-class
Freethought that resulted in the development of Secularism proper. Adherents
included W.H. Ashurst, Francis Newman, Thornton Hunt, George Henry Lewes,
Harriet Martineau, Herbert Spencer, Louis Blanc, and others. (McCabe 1908,
Vol. 1, 145; Royle 1974, 154–55; Blaszak 1988, 17; and Ashton 2008, 8–9). A
few of these heterodox thinkers would even contribute articles to The Reasoner.
Many from this same circle of London writers also met at 142 Strand, the
home and publishing house of John Chapman, the publisher of The Westminster
Review, the organ of philosophical radicalism (Ashton 2008, 8–9).¹¹ Contributors
to the periodical included Lewes, Marian Evans (formerly Mary Ann Evans and
soon to adopt the penname of George Eliot), Herbert Spencer, Harriet Martineau,
Charles Bray, George Combe, and, by 1853, Thomas Huxley. Many of theWestmin-
ster writers showed an interest in the writings of Auguste Comte “and in his plat-
form for social improvement through a progressive elaboration of the sciences”
(White 2003, 70). Marian Evans reviewed for the Westminster Robert William
MacKay’s The Progress of the Intellect (1850), a work of Comtean orientation
(Westminster Review 1850, 54: 353–68). Holyoake came to know Comte’s ideas
through his association with Lewes and Evans, as well through Harriet Marti-
neau, who was then preparing her translation of his Positive Philosophy. Holy-
oake’s contact with Comtean ideas was essential for the step that he was contem-
plating – to take Freethought in a new direction (Royle 1974, 156). Like Comte,
Holyoake believed that religion had to be either substituted with or superintend-
ed by a “positive” creed rather than being simply negated by atheism. Martineau
approvingly noticed the new direction that Holyoake was taking Freethought:
The adoption of the term Secularism is justified by its including a large number of persons
who are not Atheists, and uniting them for action which has Secularism for its object, and
not Atheism… [I]f by the adoption of a new term, a vast amount of impediment from prej-
 Another, overlapping circle centered on W. J. Fox and the Unitarian South Place Chapel. See
Barbara Taylor (1993, 60–74).
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udice is got rid of, the use of the term Secularism is found advantageous (Martineau 1853,
Boston Liberator, quoted in The Reasoner 1854, 16.1: 5).¹²
In 1853, The Westminster Review ran an article that included a discussion of Sec-
ularism, stressing that with Secularism, Freethought had “now abandoned the
disproof of deity, contenting itself with the assertion that nothing could be
known on the subject” (Westminster Review 1853, 60: 129). In 1862, the Westmin-
ster claimed, as evidence of the failure of Christian orthodoxy, that Secularism
had become the belief system of the silent majority of the working classes, what-
ever the number of those who subscribed to its periodicals or associated with its
official organizational structures (Westminster Review 1862, 77: 60–97). Here, the
author echoed the earlier remarks about Secularism by Horace Mann in his In-
troduction to the 1851 census on religious worship (1854, 93), albeit with fewer
histrionics.
By the early 1850s, the cross-pollination between the middle- and working-
class Freethought movements was well underway. Holyoake’s reviews and noti-
ces of the works of Francis Newman, Lewes, Martineau and others in The Rea-
soner, together with his work at the Leader and the notices of his Secularism
in the Westminster, completed a two-way circuit of exchange.
4 The principles and word history of secularism
Within two decades of its inception by George Jacob Holyoake in 1851– 1852, al-
though Holyoake was widely recognized as Secularism movement’s founder and
first leader, Secularism had come to be identified with the much more charismat-
ic and bombastic speaker, Charles Bradlaugh, and the National Secular Society
(NSS), of which Bradlaugh was the first president at its founding in 1866. Previ-
ous to the founding of the NSS, Secularism had been a loose federation of local
branches headed by Holyoake. By the late 1860s, Holyoake had ceded, some-
what unwittingly, his former centrality in the movement. Further, he no longer
maintained exclusive control of the term Secularism,which he had coined to rep-
resent the movement.¹³ Secularism, both the movement and the word, had slip-
ped from Holyoake’s grasp for several reasons. First, Holyoake alienated staunch
 The quote circulated widely and was found as far afield as the Scripture Reader’s Journal
(1856: 363–64).
 Holyoake’s inability to hold sway over his neologism may be seen as parallel to Huxley’s
later difficulty with “agnosticism”, which Huxley had coined in 1869 to represent his own
creed in the context of the Metaphysical Society.
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freethinking atheists, who essentially refused his construal of Secularism, while
they nevertheless operated under the rubric and remained important advocates
for the movement. Confidence in Holyoake’s leadership was undermined as his
disputed business practices, aversion to centralized organization, and compara-
bly measured rhetorical approach were criticized and challenged (Grugel 1976,
54–55). The founding of the secularist National Reformer in 1860,with Bradlaugh
as co-editor, along with the establishment of the NSS in 1866 with Bradlaugh as
president, did much to officially reduce Holyoake’s prominence within Secular-
ism. Further, the Knowlton affair of 1877 (discussed below) calcified the rift be-
tween the Holyoake and Bradlaugh camps, evoking the censure of the latter by
the former.¹⁴ Yet this disapprobation was a consequence of the significant media
attention paid to Bradlaugh and Annie Besant on the occasion of their trial for
obscenity, which further associated Secularism with Bradlaugh. Bradlaugh’s
election to the House of Commons for Northampton in 1880 and his eventual
seating in 1886 augmented his renown (Crosby 1997, 177–78).
After the critical early years, Holyoake intervened on the behalf of Secular-
ism on many occasions, for example to write the Principles of Secularism Briefly
Explained in 1859, to pen The Principles of Secularism in 1870, to debate Bra-
dlaugh in March of 1870, and with Charles Watts (Sr.), G. W. Foote and others,
to (unsuccessfully) challenge the presidency of the NSS in the wake of the
Knowlton affair (Holyoake 1859; Holyoake 1870; and Holyoake and Bradlaugh
1870). Despite these efforts, Secularism was often regarded in the terms provided
by the older infidelity, as reintroduced by Bradlaugh. That is, it was understood
as the equivalent of atheism. Yet, as I show elsewhere (Rectenwald 2013, 46.2:
231–254; Rectenwald 2016, 107– 134), it was to Holyoake and his version of Sec-
ularism that the scientific naturalists looked for a respectable and useful exam-
ple of Freethought as they named, developed, and promoted their cosmology.
Late in the century, Holyoake sought to reassert his priority where Secular-
ism was concerned – to solidify his legacy as its founder, and, yet again, to insist
upon its original principles. In 1896, in English Secularism, A Confession of Belief,
he left a retrospective index of ten documents that he regarded as foundational
for Secularism’s inception and establishment (Holyoake 1896a, 45–49). Other
than the first two articles, the Preface to The Movement and the lectures to the
Manchester Order of Odd-fellows, the documents had been published in The
Reasoner. Holyoake clearly demonstrated that The Reasoner had been at the cen-
ter of the movement. He reminded readers that he wrote all of the foundational
texts, other than those that were addressed to him: “These citations from my own
 See The Secular Review and Secularist (1877, 1: 22–23, 65–66, 77, 78, 85–86, 93, 142, and 189).
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writings are sufficient to show the origin and nature of Secularism” (Holyoake
1896a, 48–49).While an exclusive textual focus is by no means sufficient for un-
derstanding the cultural meaning and significance of Secularism, these texts
nevertheless testify to the essential character of the Secularist creed as Holyoake
saw it. Further, such a reading represents an exercise in “word history” or “his-
torical semantics.” As Gowan Dawson and Bernard Lightman point out, drawing
on Thomas Dixon’s The Invention of Altruism (2008), “the relation between words
and concepts is never simply neutral, and the changing fortunes of a term have
significant implications for the construction and communication of the ideas it
might entail” (Dawson and Lightman 2013, 3; Dixon 2008). In the case of Secu-
larism, the fate of the word involved its appropriation by others in the Free-
thought movement and especially the larger Secular camp headed by Bradlaugh.
This appropriation had significant implications concerning the meaning and un-
derstanding of Secularism proper, and has impacted the meaning and signifi-
cance of modern secularism in general. It has led to confusion such that modern
secularism is understood primarily as the absence or negation of religion and be-
lief.
The first principle of Holyoake’s Secularism was materialism, as enunciated
in The Movement: “Materialism will be advanced as the only sound basis of ra-
tional thought and practice” (Movement 1843, 1: 117), which “restricts itself to the
known, to the present, and … to realise the life that is” (Reasoner 1846, 1: i). The
remaining points were made in The Reasoner, and included some of the first
usages of the words “Secular” and “Secularism” as denoting and describing a
new system of knowledge and morality. The twelfth volume of The Reasoner
opened with an article entitled, “Truths to Teach,” which undertook to “indicate
some of the objects which this journal endeavors to explain and enforce.” The
first two points had been made in The Oracle and The Movement, and in earlier
volumes of The Reasoner:
1. To teach that Churches, in affirming the existence of a Being independent of Nature, af-
firm what they do not know themselves – that they who say they have discovered Deity as-
sume to have found what he has evidently chosen to conceal from men in this life by en-
dowing them with finite powers … – that whoever bids us depend upon the fruition of a
future life may betray us from the use of this world.
2. To teach men to limit, therefore as a matter of truth and certainty, their affirmations to
what they know – to restrict, as a matter of self-defence, their expectations to that
which their experience warrants (Reasoner 1852, 12: 1).
In this article, later recognized as foundational to the incipient Secularism, one
of The Reasoner’s stated aims was to set limits on knowledge claims. Such limits
would involve the restriction of knowledge to “that which experience warrants.”
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Theology was deemed a “science of conjecture” in affirming what can only be
believed without knowledge, given the “finite powers” of the human faculties.
With these principles, Holyoake sought to remove Freethought from the field
of conjecture, and to confine it, as stated in the second point, to matters of “cer-
tainty,” or what could be known given our limited faculties. Under this principle,
science was deemed the sole “Providence of Man,” which could be relied upon
as an insurance against “false dependencies” (Holyoake 1854, 5–6).
With this announcement of aims, The Reasoner did not make the denial of
deity necessary for the would-be Secularist. Knowledge for the benefit of human-
ity was separated from conjecture, which had not proven its benefits in the realm
of experience. The Reasoner did warn against the affirmation of deity and a fu-
ture life, given that reliance on them might “betray us from the use of this world”
to the detriment of “progress” and amelioration. However, it warned only that
such conjecture should be left behind for the purposes of pursuing knowledge
and improving material conditions. Likewise, belief was not a disqualification
for the pursuit of knowledge or progress, only a possible obstacle. One’s belief
in the supernatural was a matter of speculation or opinion to which one was en-
titled, unless such belief precluded positive knowledge or action. This rhetorical
and philosophical turn represented the cleanest break hitherto from the previous
dogmatism of earlier Freethought considered as equivalent to atheism, while
also marking the nascent Secularism as a precursor of agnosticism and scientific
naturalism (Rectenwald 2013, 46.2: 234; Marsh 1998, 240). While Holyoake was
inconsistent on this point and included atheism as the “negative aspect” of Sec-
ularism as late as 1854, he reiterated the distinction between Secularism and
freethinking atheism often. For example, in March of 1858, he argued that:
[t]o make Atheism the Shibboleth of the Secular party would be to make Secularism an
atheistic sectarianism as narrow and exclusive as any Christian Sectarianism. The princi-
ples of Secularism are distinct both from Atheism and Theism, and there can be no honest,
useful, wide, and liberal party without keeping this point well understood (Reasoner 1858,
23: 81).
He later suggested that Secularism considered both theism and atheism as “be-
longing to the debatable ground of speculation” with their “theories of the origin
of nature.” Secularism “neither asks nor gives any opinion upon them, confining
itself to the entirely independent field of study – the order of the universe.” Holy-
oake could note in hindsight that similarly, “Huxley’s term agnosticism implies a
different thing [than atheism] – unknowingness without denial,” but “unknow-
ingness without denial” was fundamental to Secularism from its inception.
(Holyoake 1896a, 36–37).
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With the third object of “Truths to Teach” – “to teach men to see that the
sum of all knowledge and duty is secular – that it pertains to this world
alone” (Reasoner 1852, 12: 1) – Holyoake could rightly claim to have been an in-
novator, if not a neologist; “this was the first time the word ‘Secular’ was applied
as a general test of principles of conduct apart from spiritual considerations,”
Holyoake claimed (1896b, 51). The Secular principle was in effect an ontological
demarcation stratagem, dividing the metaphysical, spiritual, or eternal from
“this life” – the material, the worldly, or the temporal: “Secularity draws the
line of demarcation between the things of time and the things of eternity” (Rea-
soner 1852, 12: 127). The “secular” for Holyoake designated the only domain
where knowledge could be gained and effective action taken (Reasoner 1852,
12: 34). Like Karl Popper’s later demarcation of science from pseudoscience
and metaphysics in the Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Secularism deemed
that whatever could not be “tested by the experience of this life” should simply
be of no concern to the scientist, moralist, or politician. The “Secularist” was one
who restricted efforts to “that province of human duty which belongs to this life”
(Reasoner 1852, 12: 34). According to Holyoake (1896a, 47), this was the first time
the word “Secularist” was used to denote an adherent to a “new way of thinking”
– to represent one who avowed Secular principles. In fact,W. H. Ashurst, writing
to The Reasoner under the pseudonym “Edward Search,” first suggested the
words “Secular” and “Secularist” to describe the new branch of Freethought
that Holyoake was developing, and one who aligned with it. In the same article,
Holyoake coined the term “Secularism” to describe “the work we have always
had in hand” (Reasoner 1851, 11: 88).
Secularism was advanced not only as an epistemology but also as a morality
and politics. With his fourth aim, Holyoake argued for the “independent origin”
of morality. Rather than being based on religious doctrine, the source of morality
was nature – “the real nature” of human beings – and its warrants were to be
found in the consequences of actions, “natural sanctions of the most effective
kind” (Reasoner 1852, 12: 1). Never a strict Benthamite, and harking back to
the social environmentalism of Godwin and Owen, Holyoake based morality pri-
marily on the purported goodness of human nature itself, and only secondarily,
in conjunction with practical results.Without a basis of natural goodness, a sec-
ular system would be unable to warrant motives for right actions (Holyoake 1854,
6). Intelligence, an aspect of human nature developed by knowledge, was re-
quired in order to discriminate between good and deleterious effects. The results
were evaluated by intelligence according to utilitarian ethics, which in turn re-
sulted in moral knowledge that influenced future actions. Politics was simply
morality writ large. Thus, a moral and political science was advanced, comprised
of a guiding principle and a scientific method.
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In its claims for a political science based on human nature, Secularism was
similar to the Positivism of August Comte. However, Holyoake never suggested,
as did Comte, that once discovering the social laws, human beings must subject
themselves to those laws in an act of acquiescence, which has been seen as Posi-
tivism’s conservative character. For Comte, the laws for conduct were not neces-
sarily in human nature alone, but in a “social physics” based on human nature.
Comte avowedly aimed at establishing a “social physics” in order to avert social
and political chaos by positing a social lawfulness consistent with physical reg-
ularity.¹⁵
The fifth point urged the trust of nothing but “Reason” for the establishment
of all knowledge. The concept of reason was, as usual, a very slippery one. Its
meaning could really only be completely understood by reference to what it ex-
cluded – in all cases, religious and other metaphysical speculation. It was not
primarily distinguished from imagination as in Romanticism, but rather from
the unsubstantiated belief of theology. Reason was figured as the logical treat-
ment of experience, relying on “nothing which does not come within the
range of phenomenon, or common consciousness, or assumes the form of a
law” (Reasoner 1852, 12: 130). The point was to derive knowledge by means of
the intellectual processing of empirical data as opposed to accepting a priori
convictions.
Free inquiry and discussion comprised the sixth aim. Only those statements
withstanding the test of “universal free, fair and open discussion … the highest
test of vital truth … can be trusted, “ Holyoake argued (Reasoner 1852, 12: 1). “[O]
nly that theory which is submitted to that ordeal is to be regarded, as only that
which endures it can be trusted” (Reasoner 1852, 12: 130). In the requirement that
all propositions stand the test of criticism and “testing,” the sixth object resem-
bles Popper’s criterion for science – the subjection of statements to possible dis-
qualification or falsification in an agnostic field of testing and discourse.
These principles represented the “positive aspect” of Secularism. At least
until 1854 and possibly later, Holyoake wavered slightly on the dividing line be-
tween Secularism and earlier Freethought; Secularism’s “negative side,” which
was to “protest against specific speculative error” (theism), was occasionally re-
vived. The two sides sometimes remained together under Secularism as a “double
protest” (1854, 5). However, the tendency of the Holyoake camp was to jettison
the protest and to emphasize Secularism as a new kind or stage of Freethought
– that is, to assert Secularism’s limitation to the field of positive knowledge and
 In an introduction to her compilation of Comte’s major works, Gertrude Lenzer (1975, xxxiii),
described Comte’s form of materialism as an “anticipatory conservatism.”
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to posit a substantive morality, as opposed to or exclusive of the negation of
deity and theology.
5 Atheism, sex, and secularism
On 5 April 1877, as was widely reported in the press, Annie Besant and Charles
Bradlaugh were arrested and charged with printing and publishing “a certain in-
decent, lewd, filthy, bawdy, and obscene book, called ‘Fruits of Philosophy,’
thereby contaminating, vitiating, and corrupting morals” (Mills, Stone, Wilson,
and Bulwer 1878, 607). Besant and Bradlaugh would stand trial for the publica-
tion, a trial that would gain enormous publicity and bring significant, and for
some, unwanted attention to the Secularist movement. For Besant and Bra-
dlaugh, the Knowlton affair, as it came to be called, represented a test of a
free press, as well as the defense of “a discussion of the most important social
question which can influence a nation’s welfare” (Knowlton, Bradlaugh, and Be-
sant 1877, vi). This discussion involved the doctrine of population and the right of
a free people to critically examine the issue of birth control. Although the trial
ended in February 1878 in an acquittal on the grounds of a technicality exploited
by Bradlaugh, the savvy former legal clerk, the trial put contraception onto the
breakfast tables of the middle class and associated it with Secularism.
Dr. Charles Knowlton wrote and first published Fruits of Philosophy, or the
Private Companion of Young Married People in 1832 in Massachusetts. The pam-
phlet was a neo-Malthusian pro-birth-control manual detailing the physiology of
human sexuality and the means of couples for limiting the size of their families.
In the “Philosophical Proem” introducing the text, Knowlton argued that the
practice of sex was a physiological and moral necessity; he reasoned from Ben-
thamite principles that any moderate expression of sexual passion that did not
result in misery added a net pleasure to the world and thus was to be encour-
aged. Furthermore, the sexual instinct would not be curbed in the mass of hu-
manity according to Malthusian abstentionism. Only practical measures to
limit procreation – new methods of contraception – could solve the predicament
resultant from the sexual instinct on the one hand and the tendency of popula-
tion growth on the other (Knowlton, Bradlaugh, and Besant 1877, 9– 11). Al-
though the pamphlet was released anonymously, Knowlton was arrested, tried,
and convicted of obscenity, serving three months of hard labor in East Cam-
bridge jail.
Fruits of Philosophy was imported into Britain and published by the radical
disciple of Richard Carlile, James Watson, who took over Carlile’s publishing
ventures while Carlile was in Dorchester jail. Watson also became Holyoake’s
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publisher and in 1853 Holyoake bought Watson’s stock and sold it under the Sec-
ularist banner. As noted by Bradlaugh and Besant in their chronicling of the
Knowlton affair in the Publisher’s Preface of their republication of the work,
Fruits of Philosophy was listed in Holyoake’s “Freethought Directory” in 1853
(Knowlton, Bradlaugh, and Besant 1877, iii). The Reasoner had sometimes listed
the birth control pamphlet among the books sold by Holyoake’s Fleet Street
House for Watson (although Holyoake had never explicitly supported the publi-
cation).¹⁶ Fruits of Philosophy was published for a time by Austin Holyoake,
George Holyoake’s brother, in conjunction with the National Reformer, and
when Watson died, the plates for all of his publications, including Fruits of Phi-
losophy, were purchased from Watson’s widow by Charles Watts, who published
the work until 23 December 1876 (Besant, 1885, 83).
As a publisher of Fruits of Philosophy, it was Watts who, in January 1877, was
first charged with printing and publishing an obscene book. The legal attention
attracted by the work was probably due to several factors, not the least of which
included new drawings inserted by Watts, and his lowering of the price (Besant
1885, 31). But another factor was the passage in August 1857 of the Obscene Pub-
lications Act, which made a court’s interpretation the new test for obscenity. Ac-
cording to the new Act, a publication could be deemed obscene if it demonstrat-
ed – as argued successfully by Lord Chief Justice, Sir Alexander Cockburn in
1868 in the celebrated case of Regina v. Hicklin – a “tendency … to deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall” (Green and Karolides 2005,
232). Obscenity, that is, was now legally in the eye of the beholder, rather than
based on something “objective” in the text itself. The law apparently embold-
ened prosecutors and facilitated arrests. Further, given this new definition of ob-
scenity, the accused was effectively guilty until proven innocent (Dawson 2007,
116–61).
After his arrest, Watts met with Bradlaugh and Besant, who agreed to sup-
port him in his defense and to raise money for his trial. But upon further reflec-
tion, once out of Besant’s and Bradlaugh’s company,Watts decided not to defend
the right to publish the book and to recant his not-guilty plea and enter a plea of
guilty as charged. Upon his trial, Watts was fined 500 pounds and released (Be-
sant 1885, 81). Besant and Bradlaugh not only immediately cut their business ties
with Watts, who had been their publisher for the National Review and other
works but also they decided to republish Fruits of Philosophy under the banner
of their newly formed publishing partnership, the Freethought Publishing Com-
 See, for example, the advertisement “Books on Free Inquiry” (Reasoner 1854, 17: 95 and 256).
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pany (Besant 1885, 80). While they found much wanting in Fruits of Philosophy,
the right of publication, they argued, was a matter of principle. Bradlaugh and
Besant reasoned that if they failed to assert “The Right of Publication” of a
book that was not obscene but was also a scientific text, then the Freethought
movement would be damaged and the cause of a free press severely compro-
mised (Besant 1885, 82).
Not everyone in the Secularist movement agreed with this decision to repub-
lish, least especially Holyoake, who (unsuccessfully) attempted to remove Bra-
dlaugh and Besant from the Executive Committee of the National Secular Society
(NSS) (Besant 1885, 133). In 1877, in the midst of the Knowlton affair, Holyoake
was invited by Freethinkers to chair a committee charged with reviewing the
rules of the NSS. The commission challenged the position of president itself, a
position that Bradlaugh had held from the beginning of the organization. The
failure to rid the NSS of the presidency and thus to unseat Bradlaugh led to
the formation of the British Secular Union (BSU) in August 1877, a new organiza-
tion of the Secular movement established in opposition to the Bradlaughian NSS
and supported by the new periodical The Secular Review as its official publica-
tion (Royle 1980, 18).¹⁷ This organization, I suggest, was the result of more than
the Knowlton affair; it registered a long-standing alienation between Holyoake
and Bradlaugh and their respective camps. But the secession of George Holy-
oake, Charles Watts, and other Secularists from the NSS, and their founding of
the BSU in the wake of the Knowlton affair, solidified an already significant
breach within the Secularist movement, one that now appeared to ossify around
the issue of sexuality.
In his study of Darwin and respectability, Gowan Dawson devotes a chapter
to obscenity legislation in connection with Darwinism, treating in some detail
the relationship between the Darwinian scientific naturalists and the two
branches of Freethought, which Michael Mason has referred to as the “anti-sen-
sual progressive” (Holyoake) and the “pro-sensual” (Bradlaugh) Secularist
camps (Dawson 2007, 116–61; Mason 1994). Dawson suggests that the primary
division between the Secularist camps was predicated on differences over sexual
policy and birth control. According to Dawson, Bradlaugh and Annie Besant’s
republication and legal defense in 1877– 1878 of Knowlton’s Fruits of Philosophy
became the primary reason for the split between the Holyoake and Bradlaugh
 The final division of the Secularist camps as a result of the Knowlton affair is at quite odds
with Laura Schwartz’s assertion (2013, 200) that Holyoake “remained neutral on the question” of
the republication and defense of the Fruits of Philosophy. In fact, Holyoake wrote specifically to
disavow the text in the press and seceded from the NSS to form a new secular union, the British
Secular Union (BSU) in the aftermath of the controversy.
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camps. Birth control and sexual policy, Dawson argues, “were by far the most
divisive issue[s] within the British Freethought movement in the nineteenth cen-
tury” (Dawson 2007, 119).
In figuring sexual policy as the fault line dividing the two Secularist camps,
Dawson overlooks the well-documented, fundamental division within Secular-
ism. This division, as Royle points out, not only took hold between the major
two camps of Secularism, but also within them (1980, 120). The primary split
dated to the early 1850s and went to the definition of Secularism itself. Differen-
ces in sexual policy may be understood in large part in terms of this fundamental
split. From the beginning of the movement and creed, Holyoake had differenti-
ated Secularism from the older Freethought movement, shifting its emphasis
from a “negative” to a “positive” orientation. Philosophically, this entailed
what he and others sometimes called a “suspensive scepticism,” which included
not only denying atheism as a requisite commitment but also definitively disa-
vowing any declarative assertion on the question of deity (Grant and Holyoake
1853, 56 and 200). As Holyoake argued (rather misleadingly) in the celebrated de-
bate with the Reverend Brewin Grant in 1853, “[w]e have always held that the ex-
istence of Deity is “past finding out, and we have held that the time employed
upon the investigation might be more profitably devoted to the study of human-
ity” (Grant and Holyoake 1853, 8). In terms of strategy, as we have seen, this po-
sition meant cooperation between unbelievers and believers; the invitation to
join the Secularists extended not only to Christian Socialists such as Charles
Kingsley and his ilk but also to liberal theists with reformist politics, such as
Francis M. Newman and James Anthony Froude. In terms of principle, it
meant that Holyoake’s Secularism, as opposed to Bradlaugh’s, was specifically
not atheist.
Many leading Freethinkers rejected the construction that Holyoake had put
on Freethought with his Secularism, as well as his aversion to centralized organ-
ization and purported failures in organization. These included, as we have seen,
Charles Southwell; but the defectors also included Holyoake’s brother Austin,
Robert Cooper, and most importantly, Charles Bradlaugh.
With Bradlaugh’s meteoric rise to prominence in the Secular field in the
1860s, the divide between the Secularist camps became more pronounced. In
1850, Holyoake had chaired a Freethought meeting and invited the young Bra-
dlaugh, at the mere age of seventeen, to speak on “The Past, Present, and Future
of Theology” (Courtney 1920, 105). By the late 1850s, Bradlaugh had found in the
Investigator a vehicle for his trenchant atheism. In 1858, he had been elected
president of the London Central Secularist Society, assuming the position Holy-
oake had held for nearly a decade. By 1860, he had become founder and co-ed-
itor of the National Reformer.Yet in an attempt to close the ranks of the Secularist
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body, in November 1861, Bradlaugh invited Holyoake to join the National Reform-
er as a special contributor. Holyoake accepted, and even signed a letter entitled,
“One Paper and One Party,” published in the periodical. Beginning in January
1862, he was responsible for curating three pages – either of his own writing,
or from his associates. But in February, a correspondent to the paper complained
of the paper’s diversity of opinion and asked what the National Reformer defin-
itively advocated regarding religion. Bradlaugh’s answer effectively marked the
end of Holyoake’s involvement: “Editorially, the National Reformer, as to reli-
gious questions, is, and always has been, as far as we are concerned, the advo-
cate of Atheism.” The consequence was a fall-out between Bradlaugh and Holy-
oake that included a financial dispute, with Holyoake apparently demanding a
year’s salary, after having only served three months in his capacity as “chief con-
tributor” (Bonner 1895, 128–30).
By 1870, the lines were even more severely drawn. In a debate between Holy-
oake and Bradlaugh (chaired by Holyoake’s brother, Austin, by then an acolyte
of Bradlaugh’s), the topic was the place of atheism within Secularism. In effect,
George Holyoake denied that Bradlaugh was a Secularist at all. Further, Bra-
dlaugh admitted that, according to Holyoake’s definition – a definition, he sug-
gested, that the founder of the movement had a right to maintain – Holyoake
was right that he should not be called a Secularist (Holyoake and Bradlaugh
1870, 10). Nevertheless, by then the President of the NSS, Bradlaugh asserted
that Secularism necessarily amounted to atheism – “I hold that Atheism is the
logical result to all who are able to think the matter out” – and that Holyoake’s
reasoning was simply flawed (Holyoake and Bradlaugh 1870, vii). Holyoake, for
his part, remained as firm as ever that Secularism did not “include” atheism, but
concomitantly, that it did not “exclude” atheists (Holyoake and Bradlaugh 1870,
19–20), a point which Bradlaugh considered illogical (Holyoake and Bradlaugh
1870, 11). Holyoake further suggested that making atheism a condition of Secular-
ism was to delay the work of Secular improvement indefinitely, while atheism
made its clean “sweep” of theological notions:
Mr.Watts [then still a Bradlaugh supporter] goes on to state [in the National Reformer], “The
province of Secularism is not only to enunciate positive principles, but also to break up old
systems which have lost their vitality, and to refute theologies which have hitherto usurped
judgment and reason.” Here is an immense sweep. None of us will live to see the day when
the man who has made it, will be able to give us the secular information which we are wait-
ing to receive now (Holyoake and Bradlaugh 1870, 19, emphasis added).
Instead of advocating the undertaking of such “an immense sweep,” Holyoake
contended that Secularism should be established independently of theology as
a creed having positive principles of its own, and that the work of secular im-
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provement should be undertaken at once. He quoted a contributor to the Nation-
al Reformer (again, his brother, Austin), who had asserted that it was “impossible
to advocate Secular principles apart from Atheism … There is no man or woman
who is willing to listen to Secular views, knowing they are intended to set up a
system entirely apart and devoid of all religion.” George Holyoake did not spare
his brother criticism:
You set up Secular principles for their own value. Many persons are Secularists who can see
religion even in this. The provision is not to set up a thing “devoid of all religion,” but to set
up a thing distinct in itself, and you have no more right to say it is set up apart from the
religion, than the clergyman has a right to say, when you set up Secular knowledge
apart from his creed, that you intend thereby to set it up devoid of religion or public
piety (Holyoake and Bradlaugh 1870, 8–9).
We see here that by Secularism Holyoake meant a substantive doctrine, not the
mere absence or negation of religion or religious belief. For this reason, it could
(logically or otherwise) stand parallel to (or above) religious systems. Moreover,
he was even willing to allow Secularism to be construed as a religion in its own
right. This was a more acceptable option than including atheism as a necessary
element of Secularism.
Furthermore, whenever the question of sexual policy was raised, the issue of
atheism was never far removed. In the 1870 debate between Bradlaugh and Holy-
oake, for example, Holyoake had distinguished between what he called “posi-
tive” and “negative” atheism. While the former was “a proud, honest, intrepid,
self-respecting attitude of the mind,” “Negative Atheism” consisted of “mere ig-
norance, of insensibility, of lust, and gluttony, and drunkenness, of egotism or
vanity” (Holyoake and Bradlaugh 1870, 47).With this distinction, which he regis-
tered seemingly out of the blue, Holyoake was in fact acknowledging a long-
standing association of atheism with immorality, in particular with sexual prof-
ligacy and other sensual licentiousness. His definitions represented a not-so-
subtle chastisement of the Bradlaugh camp for its neo-Malthusian advocacy in
the National Reformer – its recommendations of preventive checks to procreation
(birth control). Moreover, Holyoake also apparently commented on the position
of his brother, Austin, whose own neo-Malthusian pamphlet, Large or Small
Families, had appeared in 1870. While Bradlaugh denied knowledge of any
such “Negative Atheism” or anyone who practiced it (Holyoake and Bradlaugh
1870, 56), given his well-known neo-Malthusianism, it must have been clear to
those familiar with the contentious field of Secularism what Holyoake meant
by the phrase “Negative Atheism.”
In the Publisher’s Preface to the 1877 edition of Fruits of Philosophy, the ed-
ition that led to the obscenity indictments brought against Bradlaugh and Annie
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Besant, Bradlaugh and Besant charged Holyoake and company with hypocrisy,
suggesting that he and Watson had sold and profited by the book for decades.
If they had considered the book obscene all the while, then they had carelessly
“thus scattered obscenity broadcast over the land” (Knowlton, Bradlaugh, and
Besant 1877, iv). Likewise, why did they not stand behind the republication of
the book? Holyoake’s disapproval of the decision by Bradlaugh and Besant to re-
publish and defend the book had been registered by the time they wrote their
publisher’s preface, given Holyoake’s disavowals in the press (Royle 1980, 92).
It was clear that Bradlaugh and Besant were already acutely aware of Holyoake’s
position.
Neo-Malthusian doctrine necessarily involved Secularists of the Holyoake
camp in a moral quandary. Should birth control apply strictly to the moderation
of family growth within the confines of marriage? If not, might it encourage sex-
ual profligacy? Given his concern for Secularism’s respectability, Holyoake had
always recommended moral discipline and reservation. Although possibly hav-
ing some sympathy for neo-Malthusian practices within marriage, having sup-
ported more liberal laws for divorce, and despite his contact with Hunt and
Lewes, he had for decades effectively skirted the issues invoked by Freethought
in connection with sexual policy.¹⁸ Further, with roots in the communitarianism
of Owenite socialism, the implications of Malthusian political economy had al-
ways been unpalatable. Thus, the Knowlton affair thrust him into a confrontation
he would have rather avoided. The Knowlton affair had connected Secularism
with neo-Malthusianism, potentially embarrassing Holyoake, and not only for
the associations with immorality that he feared. Not only did neo-Malthusian
doctrine, per se, conflict with his socialist predilections but also the problem
of sexual conduct exposed theoretical and practical contradictions within his
kind of Secularism; Holyoake’s refusal to place primary importance on the elim-
ination of Christian theology and morality, his insistence on suspending judg-
ment regarding Christian values that supposedly did not conflict with secular
progress – this abdication of normativity was impossible where sexual conduct
was concerned. To be strictly consistent theoretically, a Utilitarian and neo-Mal-
thusian moral code for sexuality would have signified widespread use of contra-
ceptives and such extensive sexual activity as afforded a net pleasurable return
for all concerned, regardless of the legal status of the partners. Yet Holyoake
never advocated such a position. Certainly, as Michael Mason has observed,
“[t]he exalted status of rationality in the advanced thought of the eighteenth cen-
 The debates in The Reasoner in 1855 over George Drysdale’s The Elements of Social Science
(1854) reveal Holyoake’s equivocation.
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tury had a lasting influence on all radical and reforming creeds in the nine-
teenth,” including Secularism (Mason 1994, 284–85). But, arguably, the utilita-
rianism of Holyoake’s Secularism was buttressed by and dependent upon pre-
vailing Christian values, what Mason refers to as “classic moralism,” at least
where human sexuality and social reproduction were concerned. Arguably, Holy-
oake’s position on sexuality owed less to anti-sensualist rationalism inherited
from the Enlightenment than it did to the observance of Christian-based propri-
ety. As John Stuart Mill put it to Holyoake in a letter in 1848:
[T]he root of my difference with you is that you appear to accept the present constitution of
the family & the whole of the priestly morality founded on & connected with it – which
morality in my opinion thorough[ly] deserves the epithets of “intolerant, slavish & selfish”
(Mill, Mineka, Priestley, and Robson 1963, 741).
That is, Holyoake’s Secularism had not established an entirely unalloyed social
science in place of or independent of religious systems. Rather, in his attempt to
erect a substantive creed alongside (or above), but not necessarily in contradic-
tion to Christianity,¹⁹ his Secularism had implicitly assumed standards for sexual
conduct having little or nothing to do with its own stated principles. In terms of
secularity, this meant that Holyoake’s version of Secularism never entirely differ-
entiated itself from the religious sphere.
6 Conclusion: Secularism versus the standard
secularization thesis
Secularism, as Holyoake conceived it, opened up a space where working-class
and genteel radicals, atheists, theists, and, anachronistically speaking, agnos-
tics, could potentially cooperate for the material improvement of humanity, espe-
cially the working classes. But many Freethinkers, both those of his own gener-
ation and those to follow (see Richter and Shook, this volume), differed with
Holyoake’s conception of Secularism and either rejected it outright, or modified
it for their own purposes. As I have suggested, the major division between the
Holyoake and Bradlaugh camps was based primarily on the question of atheism,
but also included differences over Malthusian political economy and a pro-birth
 Secularism did include the contradictory ambition of replacing religious belief and morality
with secular values. This tension is explored in the epilogue of my book (Rectenwald 2016, 197–
201).
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control sexual policy derived from it. Sexual policy and atheism were not so easi-
ly disentangled; the mere mention of one often implied the other. Finally, sexual
policy represented a contradiction within Holyoake’s Secularism and, thus, illus-
trated the extent to which Holyoake had failed to establish a secular system as
fully differentiated from the religious sphere.
Remarkably, the two different senses of Secularism that I have discussed, at
least where the primary distinction is concerned, survive to this day in the forms
and understandings of general modern secularism (and, so does confusion be-
tween them; see Langston et al. this volume). Under Bradlaugh’s model, the mis-
sion of secularism is evacuative, the category of the secular is negative, and sec-
ularization is understood as progressive and teleological. Secularism amounts to
a gradual, but eventual emptying of religion from the public (and in some cases,
even the private) sphere. That is, Bradlaugh’s Secularism amounted to a belief in
what we now understand as the standard secularization thesis.²⁰ On the other
hand, under Holyoake’s model, Secularism is constructive, the category of the
secular is positive and substantive, and secularization is understood as an in-
creasingly developing, complex plurality of belief, unbelief, and suspension be-
tween the two, along with other creedal commitments. As we have seen, Holy-
oake represented Secularism as a pluralistic, inclusive, and contingently
constructed combination of willing theists, unbelievers, and agnostics. He did
this by positing improvement in this life as a common aim of believers and un-
believers, leaving metaphysical questions largely out of the question. In this, I
argue, Holyoake tacitly acknowledged the unlikelihood that Enlightenment ra-
tionality, extended into the nineteenth century, would utterly eradicate religious
belief. As he put it in the 1870 debate with Bradlaugh, the complete evacuation
of religiosity would require such “an immense sweep” that to attempt it was tan-
tamount to insanity and resulted in the gross negligence of pressing secular mat-
ters. Holyoake grasped a sense of secularity as involving recognition and coop-
eration between religion and its others, a vision of the public and political
spheres not unlike that which Jürgen Habermas has recently described as
“post-secular” (2008, 25.4: 17–29). Rather than (or even while) expecting its dis-
appearance according to a model of secularization (or Secularism), that is, the
secularist had best accommodate religious discourse within a public sphere no-
table for its uneven and forever incomplete secularization. In fact, secularization
and Secularism represented just this incomplete and permanent unevenness.
 David Nash (2004, 1: 302–25) suggests that such a belief is in fact common among contem-
porary sociologists and others who maintain the standard secularization thesis, regardless of
empirical evidence and theoretical disputation to the contrary.
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Once Freethought entered this positive phase, however – one of positing a
substantive moral and epistemological value system, as opposed to merely an-
tagonizing religious believers and negating theism – it could develop into a
new, more inclusive, sophisticated creed and movement. Edward Royle (1974,
160–62) has suggested that this development should be understood in terms
of a kind of limited ecumenism, as the transformation of a religious sect into
a denomination. However, such an interpretation fails to grasp the secular as
a category distinct from and yet necessarily related to and dependent upon
the religious (see Shook, this volume).With Holyoake’s Secularism, Freethought
was not, or was no longer, an entirely religious movement per se. Instead, by vir-
tue of a demarcation principle that removed from consideration Christianity’s
metaphysical convictions, the secular began a process of differentiation from
within the religious sphere. With Secularism, Freethought no longer contended
for metaphysical sovereignty precisely on the grounds of theology itself. Or to
put it another way,with mid-century Secularism, some Freethinkers began to un-
derstand secularity differently. Rather than positing the category of the secular
as the mere negation or absence of religion and belief, thus keeping it securely
within the religious ambit, secularity (called Secularism by Holyoake and com-
pany) was understood and described as a distinct development, a new stage re-
sulting in an overarching condition that embraced unbelief and belief, the secu-
lar and the religious, and not the negation of one by the other.
Laura Schwartz puts it thusly for the benefit of contemporary historiography:
Once secularism is approached as a substantive rather than a negative category – as some-
thing more than simply an absence of religion – it becomes possible to see how religion
may indeed play a role within a secular worldview without simply collapsing secularism
into the wider category of religion (Schwartz 2013, 20).
Schwartz is of course speaking to our understanding of secularity, invoking
Charles Taylor’s rejection of and alternative to the standard secularization thesis
– of secularization as continual “subtraction” (Taylor 2007) – and applying this
new conception to the period. However, this understanding of secularity should
not only guide our research but also should be recognized as precisely the con-
ception that was dawning on Holyoake by the late-1840s, and what he conscious-
ly understood as developing with Secularism. This was in fact how Holyoake had
envisaged Secularism proper at mid-century.





Our Corner: A Monthly Magazine of Fiction, Poetry, Politics, Science, Art, Literature
The Republican
Scripture Reader’s Journal
The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review
The Oracle of Reason, or Philosophy Vindicated
The Reasoner And Herald of Progress (Various subtitles hereafter)
The Secular Review and Secularist
The Westminster Review
Weekly Dispatch
Primary and Secondary Sources
Ashton, Rosemary. 2008. 142 Strand: A Radical Address in Victorian London. London:
Vintage.
Berger, Peter L. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World
Politics. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center.
Besant, Annie. 1885. “Autobiographical Sketches,” Our Corner: A Monthly Magazine of
Fiction, Poetry, Politics, Science, Art, Literature 5: 83.
Blaszak, Barbara J. 1988. George Jacob Holyoake (1817– 1906) and the Development of the
British Cooperative Movement. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Bonner, Hypatia Bradlaugh and John M. Robertson. 1895. Charles Bradlaugh: A Record of His
Life and Work. London: TF Unwin.
Bush, M. L. 1998. What Is Love?: Richard Carlile’s Philosophy of Sex. London: Verso.
Campbell, Colin. 1871. Toward A Sociology of Irreligion. London: Macmillan.
Chase, Malcom. 2007. Chartism: A New History. Manchester and New York: Manchester
University Press.
Courtney, Janet E. H. 1920. Freethinkers of the Nineteenth Century. New York: E.P. Dutton.
Crosby, Travis L. 1997. The Two Mr. Gladstones: A Study in Psychology and History. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Dawson, Gowan. 2007. Darwin, Literature and Victorian Respectability. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dawson, Gowan and Bernard V. Lightman. 2013. “Introduction.” In Victorian Scientific
Naturalism: Community, Identity, Continuity, edited by Gowan Dawson and Bernard V.
Lightman, 1–23. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Dixon, Thomas. 2008. The Invention of Altruism: Making Moral Meanings in Victorian Britain.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grant, Brewin and George Holyoake. 1853. Christianity and Secularism: Report of a Public
Discussion between Brewin Grant… and George Jacob Holyoake, Esq. London: Ward.
54 Michael Rectenwald
Green, Jonathon and Nicholas J. Karolides. 2005. Encyclopedia of Censorship. New York: Facts
on File.
Grugel, Lee. 1976. George Jacob Holyoake: A Study in the Evolution of a Victorian Radical.
Philadelphia: Porcupine Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2008. “Notes on Post-Secular Society.” NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly
25.4: 17–29.
Holyoake, George Jacob. 1854. Secularism, The Practical Philosophy of the People. London:
Holyoake & Co.
Holyoake, George Jacob. 1859. Principles of Secularism Briefly Explained. London: Holyoake &
Co.
Holyoake, George Jacob. 1870. The Principles of Secularism Illustrated. London: Austin & Co.
Holyoake, George Jacob. 1892. Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life, 2 vols. London: T. F. Unwin.
Holyoake, George Jacob. 1896a. English Secularism: A Confession of Belief. Chicago: Open
Court Pub. Co.
Holyoake, George Jacob. 1896b. The Origin and Nature of Secularism; Showing that Where
Freethought Commonly Ends Secularism Begins. London: Watts.
Holyoake, George Jacob and Charles Bradlaugh. 1870. Secularism, Scepticism, and Atheism:
Verbatim Report of the Proceedings of a Two Nights” Public Debate between Messrs. G J.
Holyoake & C. Bradlaugh: Held at the New Hall of Science … London, on the Evenings of
March 10 and 11, 1870. London: Austin.
Huxley, Thomas H. February 1889. “Agnosticism.” The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review
25.144: 169–94.
Huxley, Thomas H. March 1889. “Agnosticism: A Rejoinder.” The Nineteenth Century: A
Monthly Review 25.145: 481–504.
Huxley, Thomas H. June 1889. “Agnosticism and Christianity.” The Nineteenth Century: A
Monthly Review 25.148: 937–64.
Knowlton, Charles, Charles Bradlaugh, and Annie Besant. 1877. Fruits of Philosophy: An
Essay on the Population Question. Rotterdam: v.d. Hoeven & Buys.
Lenzer, Gertrude. 1975. Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings. New York:
Harper & Row.
Lightman, Bernard. 1989. “Ideology, Evolution and Late-Victorian Agnostic Popularizers.” In
History, Humanity and Evolution: Essays for John C. Greene, edited by James Moore,
285–310. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lightman, Bernard. 2002. “Huxley and Scientific Agnosticism: the Strange History of a Failed
Rhetorical Strategy.” British Journal for the History of Science 35.3: 271–89.
Mann, Horace. 1854. Census of Great Britain, 1851: Religious Worship in England and Wales.
London: G. Routledge.
Marsh, Josh. 1998. Word Crimes: Blasphemy, Culture, and Literature in Nineteenth-Century
England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Marx, Karl. 1998. The German Ideology: Including Thesis on Feuerbach. Amherst, N.Y.:
Prometheus Books.
Mason, Michael. 1994. The Making of Victorian Sexual Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
McCabe, Joseph. 1908. Life and Letters of George Jacob Holyoake, 2 vols. London: Watts &
Co.
Mid-Nineteenth-Century Secularism as Modern Secularity 55
Mill, John Stuart, Francis E. Mineka, F. E. L. Priestley, and John M. Robson. 1963. The
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. (f.e.l. Priestley [Subsequently] J.M. Robson, General
Editor.) (Vol. 12, 13. the Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848. Edited by F.E.
Mineka.), 33 vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Mills, William, Arthur P. Stone, Arthur Wilson, and James Redfoord Bulwer. 1878. The Law
Reports, Vol. 3. London: Printed for the Inc. Council of Law Reporting for England and
Wales, by W. Clowes and Sons.
Nash, David. 2004. “Reconnecting Religion with Social and Cultural History: Secularization’s
Failure as a Master Narrative.” Cultural and Social History 1: 302–25.
Owen, Robert Dale. 1875. Moral Physiology, or, a Brief and Plain Treatise on the Population
Question. Boston: J. P. Mendum.
Popper, Karl. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books.
Rectenwald, Michael. 2013. “Secularism and the Cultures of Nineteenth-Century Scientific
Naturalism.” British Journal for the History of Science 46.2: 231–54.
Rectenwald, Michael. 2016. Nineteenth-Century British Secularism: Science, Religion and
Literature. Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Robertson, John M. 1930. A History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century. New York: G P
Putnam’s Sons.
Royle, Edward. 1974. Victorian Infidels: The Origins of the British Secularist Movement,
1791– 1866. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
Royle, Edward. 1980. Radicals, Secularists and Republicans: Popular Freethought in Britain,
1866– 1915. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
Royle, Edward. 2014. Chartism. New York: Longman.
Schwartz, Laura. 2013. Feminism: Secularism, Religion and Women’s Emancipation, England
1830– 1914. Manchester, U.K.; New York: Manchester University Press.
Simpson, J. A., and E. S. C. Weiner. 1989. The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon
Press. Print.
Southwell, Charles and William Carpenter. 1842. The Trial of Charles Southwell: (editor of
“the Oracle of Reason”) for Blasphemy, Before Sir Charles Wetherall [i. e. Wetherell]
Recorder of the City of Bristol, January the 14th, 1842. London: Hetherington.
Taylor, Barbara. 1993. Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism and Feminism in the Nineteenth
Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press.
Warner, Michael J., Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig J. Calhoun, eds. 2010. Varieties of
Secularism in a Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
White, Paul. 2003. Thomas Huxley: Making the “Man of Science.” Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
56 Michael Rectenwald
Lori L. Fazzino and Ryan T. Cragun
“Splitters!”: Lessons from Monty Python
for Secular Organizations in the US
Aside from a handful of books from secular authors like Susan Jacoby (2004,
2009) and David Niose (2012) and even fewer scholarly publications (Cady
2010; Blankholm 2014; LeDrew 2016; Turner 1986), little is known about the ori-
gins and evolution of American secularism or the factors that contributed to the
proliferation of secularist organizations (though see Rectenwald, this volume, for
the origins of secularism in the UK). In this chapter, we begin by recounting
some of the history of organized secularism in the US, including some emphasis
on the tensions and the splits that occurred.
We then turn our attention to two specific figures in the movement – Paul
Kurtz (1929–2012) and Madalyn Murray O’Hair (1919–1995) – and argue that,
while these individuals were obstinate, autocratic, and even over-bearing at
times, they were arguably the very types of personalities that were necessary dur-
ing the Cold War in the US to maintain a small, but vocal movement of stigma-
tized nonbelievers. We conclude by arguing that the divisions and the tensions
have transformed organized secularism in the US into a de-centered, segmented,
polycephalous movement (see Gerlach and Hines 1970). While the movement
may be more diffuse than some think is in its best interest, we argue that
there are potential advantages to such an arrangement.
1 Introduction
While we came to the study of organized secularism for different reasons – Faz-
zino worked for several secular social movement organizations (SMOs); Cragun
was asked to speak at the conventions of some of the organizations – both of
us were initially under the impression that the secular movement in the US
was contentious and fractured. It was with this understanding – that there
was significant conflict between the various social movement organizations
(SMOs) – that the second author (Cragun) began a project to better understand
the relationships between the various secular movement organizations in 2013.
He teamed up with the first author (Fazzino) shortly after the project began. Cra-
gun’s initial conception – that there were tensions between the various secular
movement organizations – is why this chapter derives its name from the dialogue
in a scene from Monty Python’s The Life of Brian. In the scene, the members of a
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revolutionary Jewish organization that opposed the Roman occupation of Israel,
the People’s Front of Judea (PFJ), are seated in an arena watching a gladiator bat-
tle while they discuss the aims of their social movement organization. During the
conversation, the following ensues:
PFJ Leader: Listen, the only people we hate more than the Romans are the fucking Judean
People’s Front!
PFJ Members [in unison]: Yeah, yeah!
PFJ Member #1: And the Judean People’s Popular Front.
PFJ Members [in unison]: Oh yeah, yeah!
PFJ Member #2: Splitters!
PFJ Member #3: And the People’s Front of Judea…
PFJ Member #2: Splitters!
PFJ Leader: What?
PFJ Member #3: People’s Front of Judea…SPLITTERS!
PFJ Leader: We’re the People’s Front of Judea!
PFJ Member #3: Oh. I thought we were the Popular Front…
PFJ Leader: People’s Front!
PFJ Member #3: Whatever happened to the Popular Front?
PFJ Leader: He’s over there…
PFJ [in unison]: SPLITTER!
The takeaway from this scene is that social movement organizations can be
schismatic. Competing logics of action can often generate factions that lead to
in-fighting; likewise, differing visions for the movement often lead to splits
and divisions (Gamson 1990; McAdam 1998). There is a great deal of truth to
this for American secularism.
A later scene in the same movie depicts how competing social movement or-
ganizations can end up working at cross-purposes. In this scene, the People’s
Front of Judea and another revolutionary Jewish movement organization, Cam-
paign for Free Galilee, both sneak into a Roman palace in the middle of the
night and encounter each other. Once they realize they are there with the
same end (to kidnap Pilate’s wife and demand that the Romans leave as a ran-
som), a physical fight ensues between the members of the two organizations. The
movie’s main character, Brian (who is regularly mistaken for Jesus throughout
the film), makes explicit the irony of the two groups fighting each other:
Brian: Brothers! Brothers! We should be struggling together.
Fighting Revolutionaries: We are!
Brian: We mustn’t fight each other. Surely we should be united against the common enemy.
Fighting Revolutionaries: The Judean People’s Front?
Brian: No! No! No! The Romans!
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In this scene, Brian tries to stop the fight, fails, and watches as all of his revolu-
tionary comrades collapse in their struggle with each other. The implication at
this point is quite obvious: social movement organizations are sometimes inef-
fective because they end up fighting each other rather than working together
for a common cause. This tension was confirmed in some of the interviews we
conducted for this project. In what seems like it could be a direct quote from
The Life of Brian, Frank Zindler of American Atheists (AA) described in an inter-
view a similar degree of tension between founder, Madalyn Murray O’Hair, and
Anne Nicol Gaylor, co-founder of the Freedom From Religion Foundation:
We saw Madalyn many times, and she would always have disparaging things to say about
Ann Gaylor. I later found out the same thing was happening on the other side. Ann was
really, really scathing about Madalyn. It really, you know, it sounds corny, but it breaks
my heart to see this or to recall all this because I so firmly am of the opinion that the
enemy is religion. It shouldn’t be each other. It should be other people who have, at
least nominally, committed to a life of reason, an evidence-based life. To see these divisions
just depresses me.
In our interviews, we found other examples of this kind of tension. But we also
quickly realized that the current situation for secular SMOs in the US is more
complicated than just tension and conflict. We have two quotes from our inter-
views we want to use to help frame our argument in this chapter. One quote il-
lustrates just how serious the conflict and tension was at times in the secular
movement. The other quote shows that the movement has changed, the tension
has eased, and there is now evidence that secular SMOs are working together.
Numerous scholars have argued that American secularism is fractured and is
better understood as “disorganized secularism” than “organized secularism”
(Baker and Smith 2015; Cimino and Smith 2014). There is certainly reason to be-
lieve this was the case during the 20th century. Tom Flynn, the editor of Free In-
quiry, the freethought and humanist magazine published by the Council for Sec-
ular Humanism or CSH (now a subsidiary of Center for Inquiry or CFI), recounted
an incident during an interview that illustrated the very frosty relationship that
existed between the founder of CSH, Paul Kurtz, and Madalyn Murray O’Hair, the
founder of another prominent secular movement organization, American Athe-
ists (AA):
This is going back into the late 80s or very early 90s when we were on the east side of Buf-
falo. For some years we had been maintaining a membership at AA so that we would re-
ceive AA’s magazine. What we ordinarily did is we would have a different staff member
send in a personal check, because if you thought Paul [Kurtz] was into the zero-sum
game model, Madalyn Murray O’Hair was way out ahead of him. One year our then-exec-
utive director made a mistake and forgot to arrange for someone to send in a personal
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check, and sent in a Council for Democratic and Secular Humanism¹ check, which came
back, scrawled on it in magic marker with as large as you could fit this many words, in Ma-
dalyn Murray O’Hair’s handwriting, “Fuck you, Paul Kurtz.”
There is a lot worth noting in this short quote, but we will leave most of the anal-
ysis for below. In the early stages of movement building, as Tom Flynn notes,
there was a sense that secular organizing was a “zero-sum game,” meaning
that any gains made by one organization detracted from the success of the
other organizations. There was no collective identity to mobilize action toward
a common goal. As a result, there was limited communication between the var-
ious secular movement organizations and a significant amount of competition
over donors, nasty frame disputes,² and an overarching culture of organizational
and interpersonal distrust. There was not, at that time, a sense that all of the sec-
ular organizations in the US were working together for some clear purpose (e.g.,
normalizing nonreligion in the US).
Contrast the incident described above by Tom Flynn with this account of the
2012 Reason Rally from David Silverman, the President of American Atheists:
The biggest part of the Reason Rally, the biggest victory of the Reason Rally was getting all
of us together in one place at one time, including the Freedom From Religion Foundation,
with money, a common cause, behind a common leader, which in this case was me, but
next time it won’t be. But it was the first time that that had actually happened and it
was huge! It was a massive success and the members loved it and the members told us
loud and clear that they want more. So, when you’re talking about unifying big groups,
don’t forget about the Reason Rally Coalition.
This quote suggests cooperation between the various secular SMOs. Cooperation
does not mean that the leaders of the various secular SMOs are all now friends
who regularly get together just to hang out. But it does indicate that the acerbic
and caustic relationships that existed in the 20th century between the various
secular SMOs have given way to detentes, more amicable relations, and a grow-
ing sense of unity in the secular movement in the US. While the 2012 Reason
Rally was a fairly notable success with an estimated 25,000 nonreligious individ-
uals in attendance, it was actually the result of decades of effort by various peo-
ple and organizations to try to bring a greater sense of coherence to organized
 This was the original name of what is now the Council for Secular Humanism.
 “Frames” refer to the ways that social movement organizations explain their purpose and de-
sired changes to their followers. Thus, “frame disputes” would be conflict between the various
secular movement organizations in what their collective purpose was as secular movement or-
ganizations.
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secularism in the US (see also the introduction in Cimino and Smith 2014 and
LeDrew 2016). Towards the end of the chapter we proffer an explanation for
how we got from “Splitters!” and “Fuck You, Paul Kurtz” to a co-sponsored Rea-
son Rally and more amicable relations between the various secular SMOs.
2 Taking Organized Secularism Seriously
Colin Campbell ([1971] 2013) called for a sociology of irreligion over 40 years ago.
But it was the emergence of public atheism (otherwise referred to as “New Athe-
ism”) in the early 21st century that finally put American secularism³ on the radar
of scholars across various social science and humanities disciplines. Philoso-
phers and theologians wasted no time examining the ideological components
of non-theistic worldviews. Political scientists and religious studies scholars fol-
lowed suit, reevaluating the intertwining of religion, nonreligion, and politics in
the public sphere. As for sociologists, our primary concern was with the implica-
tion of public atheism on broader trends of secularization. Eventually, studies of
the nonreligious began diversifying as scholars from subfields like gender/sex-
ualities (Brewster 2013; Foster et al. 2016; Linneman and Clendenen 2009; Miller
2013; Schnabel et al. 2016; Stinson and Goodman 2013), family (Manning 2015;
Merino 2012; Zimmerman et al. 2015), deviance (Fazzino, Borer, and Abdel
Haq 2014; Cimino and Smith 2007), and communications/media (Cimino and
Smith 2011; Smith and Cimino 2012) conducted research, expanding what had
been a nearly non-existent body of literature. There is still, however, much
work to be done.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the lack of research on the organized
American Secularism Movement by social movement scholars.⁴ There are those
who utilize a movements lens to examine the contours of nonreligion in the US,
however, they: (1) are often not movement scholars, (2) do so narrowly, focusing
on just one ideological segment, rather than being inclusive to the much larger
nonreligious constituency, and/or (3) use concepts like collective identity, collec-
tive action, and framing in their analysis, but do not explicitly apply the social
movement label to their findings or treat different ideological sentiments as dis-
tinct but related movements (Cimino and Smith 2007;Cimino and Smith 2007;
 When discussing secularism in this chapter,we are referring to intentional efforts to normalize
nonreligion.
 A handful of scholars have used a social movement lens to examine issues such as commun-
ity, identity politics, collective action, organizational dynamics, and the strategies and goals of
activism.
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Guenther, Mulligan, and Papp 2013; Kettell 2014; McAnulla 2012; Schulzke 2013;
Smith 2013).
This ambiguity – Is it a movement? Is it not a movement? – has been connect-
ed to characteristics, such as ideological diversity, movement infighting, compet-
ing strategies, tactics, and goals, and the lack of an agreed upon set of doctrines/
beliefs that unify all nonbelievers (Cimino and Smith 2007). Although internal
dissension and conflict are very common in contemporary American movements,
schisms and splits in the secular movement are often understood as a sign of
movement decline/demise (Gamson 1990). Such perspectives have an overly-nar-
row conception of effective structural dynamics and ignore how factionalism and
splitting can be beneficial to movements. The seminal work of Gerlach and Hines
(1970) examined the structure of a handful of American movements in the post
1960s era, including Pentecostalism, Black Power, and “Participatory Ecology”
and found that the most common type of organizational structure was not cen-
tralized, bureaucratic, or amorphous, but rather movements that had a segment-
ed (multiple diverse groups), polycentric (decentralized authority; multiple lead-
ers/centers of leadership), and reticulate (form a loosely integrated network)
structure. In other words, social movements are rarely single organizations
with a clear vision and goal; social movements are messy.
It’s not often that scholars try to pinpoint the exact moment when collective
efforts become a legitimate social movement. Movement origins are often con-
tested, making them difficult to trace. Because movement scholars are rarely his-
torians, sociological approaches to social movements can sometimes yield a
structurally essentialist view of movements, creating a biased perception that
sees a diffuse and decentered structure as a symptom of dysfunction, rather
than as an outcome of movement growth, change, and institutionalization. Con-
trary to the obituarist view of some scholars, we argue that ideological and or-
ganizational diversity does not make American secularism disorganized – it
makes it dynamic. It makes it a movement!
In what follows, we identify key events, leaders, and dynamics that facilitat-
ed the evolution of a handful of very small nontheist and freethought organiza-
tions on the verge of collapsing into the segmented, polycentric, reticulate move-
ment it is today.
3 Methods
This chapter is based in part on data derived from interviews with 15 past and
present leaders of various secular SMOs in the US (see Table 1 below). The inter-
views, lasting between one to three hours, were conducted either via phone or in
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person by Cragun, recorded, and later transcribed by Fazzino. Because all of the
individuals who participated are public individuals, the identities of our partic-
ipants are not anonymous.
Table 1. Interviewees.
Participant Organizational Affiliation Position(s) Held Term














Secular Student Alliance Founder & Executive
Director
–
Bette Chambers American Humanist Association Board Member
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Fred Edwords American Humanist Association
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Roy Speckhardt American Humanist Association Executive Director –
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Table . Interviewees. (Continued)
Participant Organizational Affiliation Position(s) Held Term
Todd Stiefel Stiefel Freethought Foundation






















Michael Werner American Humanist Association President –





The chapter also draws on internal organizational records and previously pub-
lished material. As we describe aspects of the history of the various groups,
we have done our best to confirm what our informants shared with us by trian-
gulating interview data with archival and textual data. We analyzed organiza-
tional materials, such as board meeting minutes, websites, news media, and bi-
ographical works. Where there are conflicting accounts of events, we have
described events in a general way or noted the differing accounts. The aim of
the project was not to develop a comprehensive history of the movement but
rather to gain a better sense of the dynamics of organized American secularism
in the 21 century.
4 A Brief History of Organized Secularism in the
United States
While there are dozens of organizations that would fall under the umbrella of
atheist, humanist, secularist, and freethought activism and advocacy, there are
just a handful that are very large and particularly prominent in the US today:
the American Humanist Association (AHA), American Atheists (AA), Freedom
From Religion Foundation (FFRF), and Council for Secular Humanism (CSH).
There are other notable organizations, like the American Ethical Union, Society
for Humanistic Judaism, and the Atheist Alliance of America, among many oth-
ers. While each of these other organizations is important in its own right, we
focus primarily on the four largest organizations in this chapter.
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4.1 American Humanist Association
The origins of modern humanism⁵ in the US, which is now often referred to as
“secular humanism,” can be traced back to Britain circa 1915, when positivist
Frederick James Gould wrote an article introducing a non-theistic conception
of “humanism.” A couple of years later, in 1917, at the Western Unitarian Confer-
ence, two Unitarian ministers – John H. Dietrich, who read Gould’s article, and
Curtis W. Reese – joined forces and began discussing and advocating religious
humanism, an idea that gained some popularity amongst philosophers, liberal
religionists, and freethinkers alike. One of the earliest efforts to organize human-
ism began at the University of Chicago in 1927 when a group of scholars and Uni-
tarian theologians with a shared interest in humanism started an organization
called the Humanist Fellowship.
The fellowship began publishing The New Humanist in 1928, the magazine in
which the first iteration of the Humanist Manifesto would appear. The manifesto
was to be a short and simple overview of how humanists understood the world.
Edwin H.Wilson, also a Unitarian minister and the editor of The New Humanist,
was one of the manifesto’s lead authors, and the final document, endorsed by 34
of the leading intellectuals of the time, was published in the magazine in 1933
(Wilson 1995). The American Humanist Association was formally established
in 1941 and took over publication of The New Humanist, the publication of
which had lapsed, renaming it The Humanist. The Humanist remains the primary
publication of the AHA up to today (2017).
At roughly the same time as the American Humanist Association was being
organized, (i.e., in 1939), a group of ex-Quakers formed the Humanist Society of
Friends in Southern California and adopted Humanist Manifesto I as their official
doctrine. The Humanist Society of Friends became an adjunct of the American
Humanist Association (AHA) in 1991, and contributed the foundation for Human-
ist Celebrant training that is now run by the recently (2003) renamed group, The
Humanist Society, which continues as an adjunct to the AHA.⁶ Celebrants are
 We refer to this as “modern humanism” rather than simply “humanism” here to distinguish it
from other forms of “humanism,” such as the version of humanism that developed during The
Renaissance that encapsulated a vision for how to educate students in universities, which now
serves as the root of the term “humanities” (Kraye 1996). This is a very different conception of the
word “humanism” than how it is used in the secular movement in the US today in reference to a
set of naturalistic – as opposed to supernaturalistic or religious – philosophical principles used
to provide guidance for making moral decisions.
 As an interesting side note, the AHA maintained a religious tax exemption for years, in part
because of the AHA’s relationship with the Humanist Society of Friends and their training of Hu-
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secular individuals trained to officiate during important life milestones, like mar-
riages or funerals. They are, in a sense, a secular equivalent to clergy.
One of the first splinters that occurred out of the AHA came from one of its
founders – Edwin H.Wilson.Wilson had developed a policy which was effective-
ly an agreement between the Unitarian Church and the AHA that the AHAwould
not form organizations that were the functional equivalents of congregations.
Wilson eventually relaxed his position on this and allowed a Los Angeles
based chapter of the AHA to form, which resulted in Wilson being fired from
the position of Executive Director of the AHA in 1962. He later founded an organ-
ization titled the Fellowship of Religious Humanists, which was later renamed as
the HUUmanists, encapsulating the close relationship between Unitarian Univer-
salists and Humanists. As of 2016, there are 61 local HUUmanists groups in the
US.⁷
As it will become relevant shortly, it is worth noting that Paul Kurtz was
hired by the AHA in 1968 to edit The Humanist. Kurtz was highly recommended
by several well-known humanist philosophers in part because Kurtz had an im-
portant humanist pedigree, having studied philosophy under Sidney Hook (who
studied under John Dewey) at Columbia University. Under Kurtz’s leadership,
subscriptions to The Humanist increased substantially, drawing greater interest
in the AHA. Kurtz also founded Prometheus Press in 1969 and his first skeptical
magazine, Zetetic, which eventually became The Skeptical Inquirer, during his
tenure at the AHA (the first was independent of the AHA, while the second
was not, but was made independent at the request of Kurtz). While the precise
number of members of the AHA or subscribers to the organization’s magazine
are not known, according to Executive Director Roy Speckhardt, as of 2016 the
AHA prints and distributes approximately 84,000 copies of The Humanist annu-
ally.
4.2 American Atheists
The second oldest national-level group is American Atheists, founded in 1963.
Contemporary atheism in the U.S. can trace its history back before WWI to nota-
ble figures like Thomas Paine, Robert G. Ingersoll, known as “the Great Agnos-
tic,” sociologist W.E.B. DuBois, founder of the Harlem Renaissance, and Emma
manist Celebrants. They have since dropped the religious exemption and now have an educa-
tional tax exemption.
 http://huumanists.org/local-groups/list.
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Goldman, a Jewish anarchist who would later be deported. The first explicitly
anti-religious example of organized American atheism was the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Atheism (4 A), founded in 1925 by Charles Lee
Smith (see also Richter, this volume). Contrary to the idea that public atheism
in 21st century America is somehow new, Charles Lee Smith was a strident anti-
theist, among the earliest to publicly parody religion, and fought for removing
“In God We Trust” from the currency and revoking the tax-exempt status afford-
ed to religious institutions. Charles Lee Smith founded The American Association
for the Advancement of Atheism, which took over publication of The Truthseeker,
one of the oldest atheist magazines in the US (founded in 1878). The association
outlived its founder and passed to James Hervey Johnson in the 1960s, along
with The Truthseeker. Johnson’s views and mismanagement drove membership
in the organization down dramatically. It is unclear when the American Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Atheism ended, but it did not outlive James Hervey
Johnson. However, The Truthseeker has continued to be sporadically published,
with a new run of the magazine beginning in 2014. There is a vestige of 4 A left,
though it is indirect. James Hervey Johnson left a $14 million dollar estate when
he died. His estate became the James Hervey Johnson Educational Charitable
Trust, which is now used primarily to fund various secular movement activity.⁸
While 4 A was still extant when Madalyn Murray O’Hair gained prominence
due to her legal battles over bible reading in public schools, O’Hair’s organiza-
tion quickly became more influential than 4 A. O’Hair noted in one of her biog-
raphies that she requested help from a variety of secular organizations during
her lawsuit (including from 4 A), but found little support. She did join the
AHA board of directors at one point, but her participation in the organization
was short-lived, due largely to her brash personality and unapologetic rhetoric.
She founded American Atheists in 1963 as an advocacy group for atheist civil lib-
erties but also as a way to continue her advocacy work on behalf of atheists, pro-
viding her with the necessary funds and resources for such efforts. As noted
above, O’Hair gained prominence in the US as a result of the Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp (a.k.a. Murray v. Curlett, 1963) Supreme Court case in which
O’Hair and her older son, William Murray, filed suit against compulsory Bible
reading and reciting prayers in public schools. The court found these religious
activities to be unconstitutional, and as a result, school official led bible reading
was no longer allowed in public schools (though, of course, student-led bible
reading that is not compulsory is still allowed).
 More information can be found about the trust on its website: http://jamesherveyjohnson.
com/trust.html.
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American Atheists experienced a period of significant turmoil when O’Hair,
along with her younger son, John Murray, and granddaughter Robin were ab-
ducted by a former employee, David Waters, and several accomplices in 1995.
Robin was held separate from the other two while the abductors forced O’Hair
and her son to empty various AA bank accounts. After the abductors had extract-
ed as much money as they could, Madalyn, John, and Robin were killed and bur-
ied in a field in Texas.While they were still alive, but after they had disappeared,
they were still in contact with various members of the AA board. O’Hair was un-
able to tell her staff why she had disappeared, but indicated they were on impor-
tant business. For many AA insiders, that important business could have in-
volved an important financial bequest that had been rumored to be coming to
AA. As a result, despite concerns among AA board members, it took a significant
amount of time (over a month) for the AA board to begin trying to put people
into place to take on the day-to-day management of the organization as they be-
lieved Madalyn, John, and Robin would be returning from this “important busi-
ness.” Eventually, contact with Madalyn, John, and Robin was lost completely
and rumors spread that they absconded with the money themselves. It wasn’t
until 2001 that their bodies were discovered, making it clear what had happened.
While others have provided the details about this incident (LeBeau 2003; Sea-
man 2006), we note it here as it resulted in serious difficulties for AA moving for-
ward. As Frank Zindler, an AA board member at the time and former interim
President noted in an interview:
Well, we figured we had probably lost about 60% of our membership after the disappear-
ance. In fact, things were so horrible, I was running AA Press entirely out of my own pocket.
Other members of the board who were moderately affluent were helping pay the salaries of
the staff we still had working there.We had a printer still and had somebody working in the
shipping and, you know, book selling…that sort of thing. But it was a gruesome road back
up. I don’t know if we ever fully recovered, but it’s just been a very difficult time.We really
took it on the chin. So you know, we have gradually come back.
Like the AHA, it is uncertain how many members the AA have nor the number of
subscribers to the magazine, but from what we have been able to discern, AA is
currently the smallest of the four organizations we are detailing in this chapter in
terms of membership and magazine subscriptions.
4.3 Freedom From Religion Foundation
The largest national-level group in the US in terms of membership is the Freedom
From Religion Foundation (FFRF), which was co-founded in 1976 by Anne Nicol
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Gaylor, her daughter Annie Laurie Gaylor, and John Sontarck. Both Anne Nicol
Gaylor and her daughter, Annie Laurie Gaylor, contributed to The American Athe-
ist magazine, and along with John Sontarck, were on the masthead for a period
of time until early 1978. Sontarck was also, at one time, the treasurer for O’Hair’s
trusteeship, the Society of Separationists.
Anne Nicol Gaylor was a high-profile feminist activist who focused on abor-
tion and women’s reproductive rights. Numerous accounts indicate that FFRF
was founded as a response to the role of religion in hindering women’s reproduc-
tive rights. FFRF was originally affiliated with O’Hair and American Atheists, but
sometime between February 1978, when Annie Laurie Gaylor appeared on the
cover of the American Atheists magazine, and April of that same year, there
was a falling out between Anne Nicol Gaylor and Madalyn Murray O’Hair that
resulted in a significant degree of animosity between these two women. It was
after this schism that Anne Nicol Gaylor made FFRF a national secular organiza-
tion in its own right. In our research we came across explanations for the split
that included: accusations over mailing lists, anti-Semitic attitudes from O’Hair’s
youngest son, Jon Murray, Anne Nicol Gaylor’s loyalty to the atheist cause, and
O’Hair’s misappropriation of organization donations. We have been unable to
confirm any of these specific details. What we have been able to discern defini-
tively is that a serious and contentious split occurred, and that the tension be-
tween the two organizations continued for decades.
FFRF is led today by Annie Laurie Gaylor and her husband, Dan Barker.
FFRF has been very public about their membership growth, noting it in their
publications and on their weekly radio show. As of 2016, they have just over
20,000 dues paying members. Membership has been spurred by a number of
successful court cases the FFRF has fought on behalf of secular individuals as
well as their willingness to help secular individuals when there are clear viola-
tions of the separation of church and state in the US.
4.4 Council for Secular Humanism
The Council for Secular Humanism (CSH) is another large, national-level organ-
ization that was founded in 1980 by Paul Kurtz. The CSH is part of a larger organ-
ization, Center for Inquiry (CFI), which was founded in 1991. CFI is the umbrella
organization for CSH and a division devoted to skeptical inquiry, the Committee
for Skeptical Inquiry (CSI, but formerly known as CSICOP, which Kurtz started
while at the AHA, but spun off the AHA).
CSH is also the result of a split. Paul Kurtz worked for the AHA as the editor
of the organization’s magazine The Humanist from 1968 until 1978. While it is
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possible Paul Kurtz might remember things differently (he died before we began
our interviews), we think we have been able to verify sufficiently what led to
Kurtz’s split from the AHA. Most accounts suggest that Paul Kurtz wanted to
wrest control of The Humanist from the AHA, both editorially (something he
largely already had) and financially. The board of the AHA was unwilling to
agree to this arrangement and members of the board were already upset about
his financial (mis)management of the magazine.⁹ According to then AHA Presi-
dent, Bette Chambers, Kurtz was reticent to share financial information with the
board, was misrepresenting the circulation numbers which could have resulted
in legal problems for the AHA, and he was unwilling to allow AHA oversight
of the finances of The Humanist. All of this came to a climax at a board meeting
in July of 1978 just after taking a sabbatical from his editorial duties, during
which Lloyd Morain was appointed acting editor.
What was not at issue were Kurtz’s editorial skills; his tenure at the helm of
The Humanist was widely applauded by the board of the AHA.What was at issue
was financial transparency, which Kurtz likened to censorship. The minutes from
the meeting suggest that Kurtz was to be given complete editorial and manage-
rial control of The Humanist, but financial control would be overseen by a com-
mittee (one that included Kurtz, but also others). According to Bette Chambers,
this was unacceptable to Kurtz. The minutes from the meeting do not include a
record of votes, but Bette Chambers, who chaired the meeting (and Fred Edwords
who has listened to the audio recording of the meeting), recalled that the motion
to reinstate Kurtz as the Editor-in-Chief of The Humanist after the end of his sab-
batical failed to pass. The first two votes were tied, but the vote swung against
Kurtz on the third ballot. Paul Kurtz did not take the decision well. The tension
over financial oversight of The Humanist between Kurtz and the AHA Board was
what led Paul Kurtz to leave the AHA.
Splits can sometimes lead to the formation of new organizations when peo-
ple take resources and reputation with them (Zald and McCarthy 1980), as ap-
pears to have occurred when Kurtz was ousted from the AHA. As Bette Chambers
recalled, Kurtz quickly contacted their largest donor, Corliss Lamont, who was
giving tens of thousands of dollars every year to the AHA and to The Humanist:
 While Kurtz was on sabbatical from his editorial duties at AHA in 1977–78, internal conflict
erupted when then president Bette Chambers and acting Editor-in-Chief Lloyd Morain discov-
ered irregularities having to do with unethical business transactions between Prometheus
Books and the AHA under Kurtz’s leadership and his true intentions for the magazine. These is-
sues ultimately divided the AHA board into pro-Kurtz and anti-Kurtz factions.
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So that in that instance [after the motion failed to pass] Kurtz was out. Then Kurtz sometime
that day called Corliss Lamont and told him that he had been summarily dismissed as ed-
itor of The Humanist without a hearing. Lamont called me and asked me what in the hell
went on. And of course I immediately corrected that point of view, I said Kurtz was there.
He was there the entire meeting, he heard everything. He voted! … I corrected this and told
Lamont what happened and then in a matter of days within the first couple of weeks after
this event, Kurtz wrote to the people that he knew as his major donors who gave money
every year to support the magazine, and he told them he had been dismissed without a
hearing. I think that the whole thing in terms of loss… Of course he sent out a few hundred
statements like that, it got to the membership in general… I calculated – the next year I
compared the membership data with one year later compared to what it had been in Oct
1978 – and I figured that the lying about what had actually had taken place had cost us
about $240,000.
This event triggered extreme discontent (Kemper 2001), which Kurtz internalized
and refused to let go, using these emotions as motivation to maintain rigid social
boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002) between himself and the AHA from that
point on. While there is no place that we know of where Kurtz explicitly stated
his desire to “destroy the AHA” after he left the organization, numerous people
told us that they had heard him indicate as much.
Following his split, Paul Kurtz built one of the largest, most well-funded sec-
ular, freethought, and skeptical organizations in organized secularism. Today,
Free Inquiry, the magazine published by CSH, has the largest number of sub-
scribers of the various secular magazines and the umbrella company, CFI, has
one of the largest budgets of the four organizations we examine in this chapter.
5 Personality as Catalysts of Growth and Change
in Social Movements
Paul Kurtz and Madalyn Murray O’Hair were two of the most notable leaders of
the movement during the late 20 century. To date, we have seen no research de-
scribing their personalities, which we believe were remarkably similar. In this
section of the chapter, we describe the personalities of Madalyn Murray O’Hair
and Paul Kurtz and argue that their personalities: (1) were shaped by both
their social context and the larger cultural context, (2) influenced their interac-
tions with other movement actors, and (3) were not only at the core of the organ-
izational splits discussed above, but also created an organizational culture
which contributed to an attitudinal shift among a new cohort of secular activists
with different political consciousness at the end of the 20 century (see Whittier
1997).
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To discuss the personalities of Paul Kurtz and Madalyn Murray O’Hair, we
turn to the impressions they left on others. Without the availability of direct
data, such as personality test scores, we rely on how those personalities were in-
terpreted by those who knew and worked with these people. While this method
does not capture their personalities in full, it does provide pictures of their per-
sonalities, even if they are a bit fuzzy.We are interested in these personalities as
we believe they inform the organizational splitting observed during that time pe-
riod.
Paul Kurtz and Madalyn Murray O’Hair both possessed the authority and
charisma to push boundaries and blaze new trails for organized secularism in
the 20th century. This authority, however, came at the cost of harmonious inter-
personal dynamics.
Paul Kurtz was something of a conundrum. Kurtz is widely recognized by
many in organized secularism as the “Father of Secular Humanism.”¹⁰ He is re-
membered as brilliant, hardworking, and an instinctive empire-builder. His rep-
utation as a charismatic visionary is widely recognized among those who knew
him. Yet, at the same time, there was a part of Kurtz that wasn’t pretty. Kurtz
could be disingenuous, vengeful, petty, and manipulative. Some of our inter-
viewees referred to this as Kurtz’s “dark side.”
Part of this “dark side” were Kurtz’s autocratic tendencies. Paul Kurtz was
rarely willing to compromise. When he found himself at odds with an executive
board, he was willing to strike out anew, founding another organization that
would allow him the control he demanded (as he did when he left the AHA in
the 1970s and later when he left CFI). Though he claimed that his voluntary de-
parture from CFI in 2009 was under duress, these claims along with many others
are disputed. One of our interviewees, August Brunsman, had personal experi-
ence working under Kurtz, as he, along with several others, branched out of
CFI’s college campus initiative, CFI on Campus, to form the Secular Student Al-
liance. August described Kurtz’s autocratic tendencies like this,
“Paul’s total approach to humanist organizing is that he wanted to own it, he wanted to be
in charge and run it, and he just didn’t trust anybody else to do anything worthwhile that
[he] didn’t control.”
 Kurtz began to describe the Council for Secular and Democratic Humanism – later just the
Council for Secular Humanism – as adhering to “secular humanism” in order to distinguish his
new organization from the American Humanist Association. This was, in large part, a marketing
ploy as it could then be suggested that the AHA was more favorable toward “religious human-
ism” (which, in fact, was true at the time), while Kurtz’s new organization was not.While Kurtz
did not coin the term “secular humanism” (see Richter’s chapter, this volume), he did work hard
to co-opt the term and embraced it as being descriptive of his organization’s views.
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Another illustration of Kurtz’s “dark side” was his tendency to hold grudges.
When Kurtz lost the vote at the AHA to be reinstated as the editor of The Human-
ist, he didn’t forgive and forget or move on. This is not an uncommon practice
among social movement leaders who seek to create symbolic hegemony in
their respective movement (Zald and McCarthy 1980). Kurtz’s actions also suggest
that was his intention, which was confirmed by several of our interviewees. Here
is what Bette Chambers recounted of the relationship between Kurtz and the
AHA after the 1978 board meeting:
Fred [Edwords] and I, at the time that Michael Werner was president of the AHA in, I think,
early 1990s, Fred and I pressured him and the board to ‘Get the hell out of dodge;’ to move
out of Amherst¹¹ and to someplace else. The harm that Kurtz was doing even then to the
AHA never stopped. He had a coterie of sycophantic friends who were doing all sorts of
peculiar things like jamming the locks on the office doors… I mean, you know childish
tricks like that. Now Kurtz himself wasn’t doing them, but these were… When I say syco-
phants they really were. You could hear them say they would follow Paul Kurtz to hell
and back if they had to. And that always struck me as so strange, because if there is any-
thing I know about Humanists they are not followers. If I run into one that’s a follower of
something I get very nervous because it just doesn’t seem right.
From the information we have gathered, it appears that Paul Kurtz was an auto-
cratic leader who wanted to have complete control over organized secularism. To
this end, he actively worked to undermine the other secular SMOs, particularly
the AHA. We also find it somewhat ironic that Kurtz, who was, professionally,
an ethicist, had problems being and behaving ethically. Even so, people still
maintained favorable opinions of Kurtz. He was a strategic visionary with an un-
canny ability to rebound from organizational conflict with his reputation rela-
tively unscathed. As the evidence above suggests, Kurtz had an over-bearing per-
sonality and others found it difficult to work with him. But it may be the case
that precisely these types of characteristics were what was needed during that
particular period in America’s history, as we will discuss at greater length below.
Madelyn Murray O’Hair’s reputation is even more contested than is Paul
Kurtz’s. Also considered quite difficult to work with, O’Hair was perceived as
brash and vulgar. She was thought of as behaving highly inappropriate by the
 At the same time that Kurtz was voted out as the editor of The Humanist, the AHA moved its
headquarters from San Francisco to a building owned by Lloyd Morain, a wealthy benefactor of
the AHA. The move to Amherst was in order to bring the AHA headquarters next to the publish-
ing headquarters of The Humanist, which were located in Amherst where Paul Kurtz worked as a
college professor. Kurtz and the AHA remained in the same building for a period of time even
after Kurtz was voted out of the AHA.
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standards of her day. She had a deep distrust of others and a justified paranoia
cultivated by abuse from a hostile public and government officials as well as
from a series of betrayals in her life. Her response to most threats, perceived
or otherwise, was typically the same: “excommunication”. The hardline she
maintained meant that the splitting that occurred around her typically took
the form of others being banished, or leaving of their own accord. One of our in-
terviewees, Bette Chambers,who hosted O’Hair in her home, offered this descrip-
tion:
Madalyn O’Hair…she was Madalyn Murray at the time…I still hold the view that atheism
would’ve become popular in this country far sooner than it has even today, which isn’t
very much, but we wouldn’t have had quite so much trouble relating to the public and ex-
plaining our position since she called herself the spokesperson for American atheism. I
think that she set the movement back a whole generation. That’s my opinion. She was
an extremely unpleasant person and offended people right and left, primarily at private
gatherings. But she was quite kind of popular on television, and she came across as a loud-
mouth. There was nothing intellectual about her. Not in my opinion. She was an atheist –
period – because she detested religion, the churches. You don’t find Humanists today who
are so anti-mainstream religion. She was anti-all religion.
This sort of impression is contrasted by others who offered a more balanced
opinion of her personality. According to Frank Zindler who, along with his
wife, was very close to O’Hair:
Madalyn was very, very warm and generous with us almost all of the time. However, she
was a brutal diabetic and there would be times…I never could figure out whether it was
high blood sugar or low blood sugar – it was totally impossible for me to ever figure
this out, but there would be moments when she would just go off like a roman candle
and she would shout and scream, ‘You’re excommunicated,’ and she would fire off the
most outrageous letters to people, uh, excommunicating them….
We do believe these quotes are illustrative of O’Hair’s personality. However, it is
important to keep in mind that the perception of O’Hair as brash, vulgar, and, at
times, inappropriate was generated within the cultural milieu of the time.
O’Hair’s rise to fame started in the 1950s, and continued through the 1980s.
This period is widely recognized to have been a time of significant change in cul-
tural values toward women’s roles in society (Brown 2012). However, women’s
position in society throughout this period remained (and to a large degree still
remains) conflicted (Hochschild 1997). The rise of women’s participation in the
workforce starting in the late 1960s, spurred in part by the second wave of the
feminist movement but also by economic necessity (Coontz 1992), began to
shift cultural expectations for women. However, women still faced expectations
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about how they should behave; women were to be passive, soft, caring, and kind
(Gerami and Lehnerer 2001).
It was in this cultural milieu that Madelyn Murray O’Hair’s rise to promi-
nence occurred. It is also in this cultural milieu that we must now consider
how Madelyn Murray O’Hair’s personality was perceived. O’Hair’s persona and
behaviors were, undoubtedly, counter to the normative expectations for
women at the time when she gained prominence. But they were not all that dif-
ferent from what would be expected behavior for a man at that time. In other
words, Madelyn Murray O’Hair is often judged harshly for her tough, brash,
and aggressive demeanor, precisely because she was a woman. If O’Hair had
been a man, it is highly unlikely that she would have received the same degree
of acerbic criticism for her persona or behavior. We are not trying to challenge
descriptions of Madelyn Murray O’Hair’s personality. We are, however, arguing
that criticisms of O’Hair’s personality reflect a gendered double-standard.
From everything we’ve been able to gather, Paul Kurtz’s personality was not
all that different from Madalyn Murray O’Hair’s. Kurtz was an autocrat and
micro-manager who could also lose his temper and yell at his employees. Yet,
we have been unable to find comparable criticisms of Kurtz’s personality to
those of Madalyn Murray O’Hair’s. Certainly there are those who are critical of
Paul Kurtz and his personality, and it was his leadership style that eventually
led to his ouster at CFI.¹² Despite the similarities in personalities between Mada-
lyn Murray O’Hair and Paul Kurtz, very few people describe Paul Kurtz as emi-
nently disagreeable or caustic, like they do with O’Hair. This leads us to believe
that a gendered double-standard has been applied to O’Hair.
In considering the personalities of these two leaders, several commonalities
are apparent. First, and most glaring, both were self-aggrandizing megalomani-
acs who acted as dictators over their respective organizations. Coupled with this
dominance was a great strength. If creation is an act of will, then these individ-
uals shared a strength of willpower. This appears to be the double-edged sword
of the brand of leadership shared by O’Hair and Kurtz.While they possessed the
authority and charisma to push boundaries and blaze new trails, this authority
came at the cost of harmonious interpersonal dynamics. They demanded com-
plete control of those with whom they worked. When these standards were not
met, organizational splitting occurred.
 Per our conversation with Tom Flynn, Paul Kurtz was not formally removed from his position
at CFI but rather was marginalized in his position and lost a substantial amount of power as a
result of several votes by the CFI board. After this occurred, Kurtz resigned his position and start-
ed a new organization, the Institute for Science and Human Values.
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It is likely that the personality characteristics of O’Hair and Kurtz contribut-
ed to the organizational splits in the secular movement (CSH from AHA and
FFRF from AA) we described above, though there were likely other factors in-
volved. Interestingly, even though organizational fracturing was common to
both O’Hair and Kurtz, their public reputations were quite different. Kurtz’s rep-
utation was and remains largely positive. Despite the difficulties in working with
him, his work and many accomplishments are generally held in high regard. In
essence, his “dark side” is largely overlooked. Yet, O’Hair, who was not all that
different from Kurtz personality-wise, has been and continues to be criticized for
her personality, which overshadows her organizational leadership. This is yet
more evidence for a gendered double-standard being applied to these monumen-
tal figures in organized secularism.
Perhaps more important than why these splits occurred is that they occurred
at all. Organizational schisms and the resulting fragmentation are rarely thought
of as a positive for social movements. As intra-organizational schisms become
inter-organizational schisms, communication among like-minded SMOs is limit-
ed. These sorts of factors might generally be thought of as impediments to move-
ment success, as power becomes more diffuse and alliances and coalitions that
might strengthen the movement are torn apart.
Historically, then, it might appear as though interpersonal dysfunction was a
hallmark of secular organizing during this time and the splitting we have docu-
mented certainly seems to support this. However, it is our argument here that,
while this may be the case, social movement theory reminds us that nearly any-
thing can be a resource. In the case of Kurtz and O’Hair, it appears that perhaps
difficult personalities and the resulting organizational splits which resulted from
them were ultimately a resource of sorts for the movement, both at that time and
later.
Finally, while these personality characteristics are not necessarily those we
would associate with ideal leaders, we would be remiss not to consider the con-
text in which these individuals developed. The trajectories of our lived experien-
ces as well as the turning points to those trajectories are informed by the social
structure we encounter, which is relative to time and place. In the case of these
leaders, both physically went to war (i.e., they served in the military). Both faced
power struggles from within their organizations as well as external threats. Both
lived in a time when being openly secular was highly stigmatized, more so than
today. O’Hair and Kurtz were at the helm of secular SMOs during a very difficult
time in America’s history: the Cold War. As others have documented (Cragun
2017), there were intentional efforts in the US during the Cold War to create a re-
ligious American identity that differed from the “godless communists” of the So-
viet Union. As a result, being secular, humanist, atheist, or a freethinker during
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this time period was highly stigmatized. While we cannot say that O’Hair and
Kurtz’s personalities were “necessary” to maintain secular SMOs during this
time period, it is likely the case that their strong personalities and their unwill-
ingness to compromise helped them cope with the widespread stigma against
nonreligion and irreligion that existed during their tenures. Thus, while their per-
sonalities were difficult and alienating to many, it is also arguably the case that
O’Hair’s and Kurtz’s personalities were a resource for the secular movement in
the US during one of its more challenging periods.
6 Unifying the Secular Movement
In this section we address the following question: how did organized secularism
get to where it is today – diffuse, de-centered, and somewhat unified? The tensions
with AHA/CSH and AA/FFRF mentioned above are where we begin to explore
this question. Three splits, two of which (in 1978) were extremely contentious,
instigated organizational growth but led to nearly three decades of animosity
and minimal inter-movement contact. The result of these tensions was that
there was limited coordination among the secular SMOs during this time period.
Despite several decades of limited coordination, bitter and hurt feelings, and in-
civility between the various secular SMOs, organized secularism in the US today
is far more collaborative and unified, even if there remain several national level
organizations and thousands of local grassroots groups. How the movement
transformed from significant internal turmoil to relative calm and cooperation
will be the focus for the rest of this chapter.
As various informants told us, there has historically been more tension be-
tween the groups that split than between the others. After Paul Kurtz left the
AHA, there was a significant amount of tension between Paul Kurtz’s organiza-
tion, CSH, and the AHA, with Kurtz even offering to co-opt the AHA at one point.
Likewise, after Anne Nicole Gaylor left the AA, there was significant tension be-
tween those two organizations that has continued until just recently. Part of the
tension has resulted from the original splits. But another part of the tension
stems from the fact that the organizations that split remain the most similar in
mission, membership, and motivation.
For instance, both the AHA and the CSH identify as “Humanist” organiza-
tions. The label “humanist” provides them a broader label that encapsulates
the many ways of being secular or nonreligious, or potentially even religious.¹³
 One of Paul Kurtz’s early criticisms of the AHAwas that it was too religious in the sense that
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Atheists, agnostics, freethinkers, brights, nonbelievers, antitheists, and others
can all identify as humanist, but not all of them are, obviously, atheists. As a re-
sult, both AHA and CSH have broad appeal. Both have engaged in similar activ-
ities, working toward the advancement of science and for some progressive is-
sues (like women’s and sexual and gender minorities’ rights). However, there
is a bit more of a libertarian sentiment at CSH, perhaps stemming from Paul
Kurtz’s personal political views¹⁴ than there is at the more progressive AHA.
Similarly, AA and FFRF have many things in common.While FFRF bills itself
as a “freethought” organization, a term that has fairly old origins that suggest
independence from organized religion, in much of its promotional material the
organization identifies itself as an advocacy group for nonbelievers or atheists.
AA, of course, is specifically geared toward advocacy for atheists. While FFRF
has focused very heavily in recent years on litigation, AA has its own litigation
division. Both, also, have run billboard and advertising campaigns and arguably
have had greater appeal to atheists and nonbelievers who are a bit more strident
in their views or more “eliminationist” in their approach toward religion (see
Langston et al. chapter, this volume). Thus, some of the continued tension be-
tween these organizations stems from their similarity to each other. David Silver-
man commented about the similarities:
Now, in a market segmentation issue, FFRF and AA are most closely competitive. Um, they,
they’re harder than AHA and CFI. They’re not as hard as us, but they’re closer than the oth-
ers. So, we have a competitive aspect going on between us, um but at the same time, while
Madalyn and Ellen Johnson were not very good at membership cultivation, they [FFRF]
were, so they have far more members than we do, which is just great for them, but it
also makes them care less about working with us. So, it’s a tough thing because I’m just
trying to do right for the movement and she’s [Annie Laurie] still angry. I think she’s getting
members of the AHA could be “religious humanists” or both religious and a humanist. It was
Paul Kurtz’s efforts in trying to differentiate his new organization from the AHA that resulted
in the heightened use of the phrase “secular humanism.” Prior to that point in the 1980s, hu-
manism was not exclusively secular (and still, technically, is not). However, to simultaneously
criticize the AHA, which still catered to and included religious humanists, and to distinguish
his new organization from the AHA, Kurtz called his organization The Council for Democratic
and Secular Humanism (or CODESH). “Democratic” was originally included in the label to dis-
tinguish Kurtz’s new organization from the AHA as well, as the AHA was heavily influenced by
very left-leaning individuals, some of whom identified as socialists (like Corliss Lamont). Given
the degree of competition that existed between these groups, it is important to recognize just
how influential branding was for the organizations.
 One of our informants, Michael Werner, informed us that Paul Kurtz identified as a Repub-
lican.
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past it. We just had a big, a legal symposium. And they went. They came. Annie Laurie
came. Cold to me, but there.
As far as AA’s relationship with the AHA and CSH, again we quote David Silver-
man:
Oh, I like them very much. I have very good relationships with Ron [Lindsay from CFI] and
Roy [Speckhardt from the AHA]. Um, I think we respect each other and like each other. I
think we see each other as allies. I think we see each other as different market segments.
I think there are people at AHA that don’t like AA. There are some people on the board of
AHA that don’t like AA. And some see us as competitors because that’s just where their
mind goes. But for the most part, I think the relationship with us is as good as it can be
or should be. I mean, if I have a question for Roy, I can just call him or email him and
he’ll come right back and give me an honest answer. Same with Ron. And if we disagree
with each other, we can say it and we can do well. So I think the relationship between
the three of us is positive and looks positive moving forward.
The market competition between groups was recognized in several interviews,
with some informants going so far as to suggest that AHA and CSH really
could and maybe even should merge, as should FFRF and AA. However, other
informants disagreed and believed that the various organizations were different
enough that they appealed to slightly different niches of the secular public.
When asked about this, Roy Speckhardt said:
I had talks with Ron Lindsey at CFI as recently as a couple of years ago about ways we
could potentially bring the two organizations together and it didn’t go that far [merging]
as there were you know some things didn’t work out for that. But we did come up with
a couple of projects we can work on together.Who knows, down the road it might happen.
I think the philosophical differences between our groups are pretty minor at this point. Still
the memberships are a little different. You know a little more anti religious on one side, a
little less on the other; a little more libertarian on their side, a little more socialist leaning
on our side.
And when Roy Speckhardt was asked about the possibility of FFRF and AA com-
bining into a single organization, Roy noted that such a unification is probably
not in the movement’s best interest:
Well, it’s tricky. Financially speaking it’s not necessarily an advantage to merge organiza-
tions because most people in their annual giving… If you look at the 20,000 people who
support us, they’re people who say I’m going to give each of my member organizations
my membership dues. That might be $50 a year and if there’s one organization they give
it $50. If there’s ten, they give each of them $50 and that’s $500 that goes out.
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Roy Speckhardt, like many of our informants, no longer believed the various sec-
ular organizational movements were involved in a zero-sum game. To the contra-
ry, there is variation among the constituents – they have different interests and
different desires (as various chapters in this volume suggest; see chapters by
Schutz, Smith, Frost, and Langston et al.). Additionally, while there is some com-
petition among the organizations for donations, there is also evidence that the
competition is both: (a) quite limited as big donors tend to have their preferred
organizations as well, and (b) minimal because donors will often give more if
they are giving to multiple organizations than if they are giving to just a single
organization.
What the above suggests is that the dynamics of the secular movement in the
US have changed. While there was, for decades, competition, fracturing, and
even hatred among the various organization, today there is a growing sense of
unity and common purpose. While there is still competition between the organ-
izations, it is probably more accurate to characterize that competition as “friend-
ly.” Likewise, the implication of calling the movement “disorganized” misses the
mark. A diffuse organization can be just as useful for a social movement or po-
tentially even more effective than a centrally organized social movement. Poly-
cephalous movements are also more likely to withstand controversies within
the movement; problems within one of the constituent organizations will not de-
stroy the entire movement. Thus, when scandals occur in the secular movement
– and they certainly have occurred – the entire movement is not destroyed, as
might be the case if there was just a single secular social movement organiza-
tion.
The closer degree of coordination in organized secularism, as noted at the
beginning of this chapter, is relatively recent.We believe a combination of factors
coalesced in the early 2000s to change the dynamics of the movement. To begin
with, a transition in leadership – from Kurtz and O’Hair to the current crop of
leaders – took place. Many of the new leaders had observed the caustic person-
alities of prior leaders and intentionally chose not to follow that lead. The
change in leadership was coupled with the rise of a common enemy – funda-
mentalist and conservative religion. Fundamentalism in the US has its origins
in the early 20th century, and conservative religion has gained prominence in
American politics prior to this point with the rise of the Religious Right and
the Moral Majority in the late 20th century. However, the perceived threat of reli-
gious fundamentalism became particularly prominent as a result of the Septem-
ber 11th, 2001 attacks. The clear and present danger of fundamentalism to secu-
larism combined with new leadership changed the environment of the secular
movement. In what follows we attempt to describe this change in greater detail.
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In 2000, Mel Lipman, an attorney and activist from Las Vegas, was nominat-
ed and elected to the national board of the American Humanist Association
(AHA). In 2002, at the urging of a fellow board member, Lipman ran for the
AHA presidency on a platform of bringing together all of the varied organizations
who believed in doing good without a belief in a supernatural entity. His agenda
was not to merge the organizations, but rather to work together towards common
goals.
In 2003, Mel Lipman succeeded Edd Doer, who served 14 years as president
of the AHA. On January 15, 2005, Mel Lipman convened the “Inauguration Sum-
mit” – an unprecedented meeting of secular elites with a history of frosty rela-
tionships from over 22 freethought groups to discuss how their respective organ-
izations could work together for common interests, namely tackling the religious
right in the upcoming November election. There was, however, one organization
that missed the summit, the Council for Secular Humanism (CSH), allegedly due
to scheduling conflicts.¹⁵
At the conclusion of the weekend the most promising impact was the com-
mitment among those in attendance to remain in communication and to look for
ways to collaborate. To this end, attendees were extended an invitation to join
the Secular Coalition for America (SCA). Founded by Herb Silverman, a math
professor who became a secular activist in the early 1990s, the SCA provided
an opportunity for its member organizations to come together to cooperate in
areas of mutual interest and to support the other organizations in their efforts
to uphold separation between government and religion. SCA is a lobbying organ-
ization, but for Silverman, this was secondary to decreasing in-fighting and fos-
tering a sense of community. He believed that through cooperation the nonreli-
gious would be able to amplify their voice, increase visibility, change public
opinion, and be as effective as possible in their lobbying efforts.
True to their skeptical nature, the largest national secular, humanist, atheist,
and freethought organizations were hesitant to join SCA, until the AHA signed on
in 2005. Between 2006 and 2008, American Atheists (AA), Society for Humanis-
tic Judaism (SHJ), Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), Military Associa-
tion of Atheists and Freethinkers (MAAF), American Ethical Union (AEU), and
Camp Quest (CQ) became members. As of 2016, SCA is comprised of 18 voting
member organizations. According to AHA’s current Executive Director, Roy
Speckhardt, “The secular coalition, as it became more prominent, helped estab-
lished groups get along better and get to know each other better.” Prior to these
efforts in the early 2000s, when leaders from different organizations came to-
 http://americanhumanist.org/hnn/archives/?id=177&article=10.
“Splitters!”: Lessons from Monty Python for Secular Organizations in the US 81
gether, it was almost a given that fights would ensue. The 2005 Summit catalyzed
a significant transformation in how the various organizations interacted with
one another.
7 Conclusion
Today, there are several national, member-based secularist movement organiza-
tions and thousands of local grassroots organizations in existence. Contempo-
rary social movements, especially in the Western world, are heterogeneous, ideo-
logically diverse, and loosely integrated (Gerlach and Hines 1970). It’s not
uncommon for movements to have a decentralized, or “leaderless” authority
structure, the very characteristic that Baker and Smith (2015) problematize for
secular groups.
When looking historically at the development of secular organizing in the
United States, it appears that difficult personalities and interpersonal conflict
were a bit of a hallmark. The many splits that occurred imply a contentiousness
within the movement. As discussed, these personalities did not develop within a
vacuum. Some of the roughness of these personalities seems well-adapted for
the trying times and numerous threats these leaders encountered. Still, for
those who have joined the movement since this period of fragmentation, the
splits and the personalities driving them may not be the fairy tale story of a uni-
fied effort towards a common goal one might hope to find. Even so, in the case of
nonreligious organizing, it appears that dysfunctional personalities had func-
tional outcomes. Oddly, the difficulty of working with O’Hair and Kurtz ultimate-
ly served as a resource for movement mobilization, as organizational splintering
diversified and strengthened the movement.
When we view these events through a social movements lens, these conten-
tious inter-movement politics lead to an important conclusion. Drawing on Ger-
lach and Hines’s (1970) work, we see how the diversity of secular organizations
creates a more diverse, or polycephalous, movement landscape, which is a
strength of the movement, not a weakness. In a variety of ways, the fragmenta-
tion that occurred during the contentious 1970s and 1980s led to a variety of sec-
ular SMOs, which has allowed them to develop specialized niches with greater
appeal to different segments of the secular public. This diversified the landscape
of the movement, with various groups taking on different issues and developing
along unique trajectories. This ultimately set the stage for the unification that did
occur. As of 2016, it’s unlikely you’ll hear members of one secular SMO calling
members of another, “Splitters!” Perhaps we can finally say that the various sec-
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ular SMOs are, as Brian begged his Jewish brothers to do in The Life of Brian,
“struggling together” against a common enemy.
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John R. Shook
Recognizing and Categorizing the Secular:
Polysecularity and Agendas of
Polysecularism
1 Introduction: Seeking the Secular
What may count as a “secular” organization, or a “secular” movement? How
should secular societies be studied, classified, and compared? The amount of re-
search into group manifestations of secular energy and activism has been limited
and disjointed, most likely due to a general lack of clarity and rigor.
This chapter offers a well-defined framework for classifying and contrasting
the compositions and agendas of organizations for secular people. That frame-
work must be assembled gradually and carefully, which requires initial sections
of this chapter for describing how the secular and secularity can be studied sci-
entifically. The second section shows how to liberate a free-standing conception
of the secular from pre-fabricated contrasts against religious normalcies. The
third section explains how to avoid the prevalent fallacies in the social sciences
that distort the identities of secular people. The fourth section introduces the
idea of “polysecularity” to better discriminate the many types of secular people.
The fifth section introduces the idea of “polysecularism” to cover primary modes
of activism chosen by some secular people in the public sphere, which need not
be characterized only by negative opposition to religion. The sixth section orients
research into public secular attitudes through the positive self-identities and
chosen agendas of secular individuals. The highly diverse array of choices for ex-
pressing secularist views and participating in secular agendas in turn sets the
stage for the seventh section, which categories a variety of prominent secular or-
ganizations in America according to their efforts to serve one or another portion
of that diverse array. This chapter concludes by pointing out under-served and
neglected segments of the sizable secular population in America, using the ex-
ample of New Atheism to illustrate how that regrettable situation could occur
in the internet age.
The terms “secular” and “secularity” lend themselves to multifaceted and
multidimensional conceptions, applicable in many ways to individuals, organi-
zations, social institutions, and whole societies (see Rechtenwald and Richter,
this volume). Despite their utility for analytic frameworks in research, the
work of observing secularity, tracking secularity, and explaining features of sec-
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ularity continues to be methodologically challenging. Expanding the field of Sec-
ular Studies on stably academic foundations is difficult enough; presumptions
and stereotypes about the nonreligious continue to divert inquiries towards
dead ends. Suppositions that the secular is the realm of crudely materialistic
and utilitarian matters, secularity indicates an insensitivity or impassivity to re-
ligious or spiritual wonders, or that secularism is basically about anti-religious
antagonism, continue to exert open or tacit influence across academia. Secular
Studies could settle down where religious studies and theology wishes it to re-
main, as a subfield subordinate to their supervision. Alternatively, it can clear
its own academic path with philosophical clarity and scientific rigor.
In the West, unbelief and its secularity has commonly been viewed as a de-
viant rebellion against theism. That perspective does simplify methodology. If
the secular is only perceivable through a religious lens, then secularity seems in-
conceivable except in relation to religion, and secularity has no meaning apart
from religious structures. Only the clarity of religious doctrine about divinity per-
mits any shape and definition to nonreligion, this viewpoint goes on to suggest.
Even atheists often assume that theism presents a doctrinally well-defined target
for atheism’s opposition (Clark 2015). Hence academia’s approach, ever since
Christian universities arose, has been to let experts in religion handle explora-
tions into impiety and irreligion. Religious scholars have been devoted to ex-
plaining religion’s reasonableness, its universality, its naturalness, and its use-
fulness. That devotion has conveniently set standards of normality for judging
unbelief ’s deformities and deficiencies, and protecting society from secularity’s
corrosions. Historically (and presently), theology has regulated the secular.
There is an alternative. A scholarly field concerned with the secular could
control its own methodologies, theoretical terminology, and interpretations of
empirical findings. Inquiry into the views, values, and motivations of nonreli-
gious people could begin with observations of them in their own lived worlds,
instead of starting from theological portraits of religious people in theirs. Any
presumed naturality and normality to religion (Barrett 2012; contra position in
Shook 2012) can be bracketed away from sound methodology. Scholars and sci-
entists studying nonreligious people, in non-Western as well as Western societ-
ies, can investigate the affinities and affirmations behind a person’s preferred
secular views and activities (Beit-Hallahmi 2007; Zuckerman 2010; Caldwell-Har-
ris 2012; Coleman, Silver, and Holcombe 2013; Norenzayan and Gervais 2013;
Guenther 2014; Burchardt et al. 2015; Bilgrami 2016). Not believing in a deity,
or not behaving religiously, by itself tells us little about what a person does ac-
cept and affirm.
The field of Secular Studies and allied disciplines are ready for closer re-
search into phenomena of individual secularity using secular methodologies
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and sensitivities to secularity’s own histories and agendas. The reality of “poly-
secularity,” as I term it, awaits exploration at the individual level. Polysecularity,
in brief, refers to the broad diversity to secularity displayed by people throughout
their mundane lives. Secular people needn’t be defined in terms of deviancy any
more. Some secular people are secularists offering resistance to religion, by par-
ticipating in the advancement of secularism’s affirmative agendas. The diversity
and positivity inherent to secularist attitudes and activist agendas is here labeled
as “polysecularism.”
This chapter concludes by situating secular organizations in America within
this polysecularity-polysecularism framework. The framework’s classification of
ideological niches situates where various types of secular organizations can find
their corresponding sorts of supporters. The phenomena of polysecularity at the
individual level is accompanied at the social level by the polysecularism of or-
ganizational diversity observed in the United States. This framework accounts
for the kinds of disagreements, and even inevitable antagonisms, among secular
organizations.
2 Situating Secularity
Research into secularity too often proceeds as though being secular or not being
a believer is predicable upon some basic, static, and singular construct. Theolo-
gy helpfully cleared the way for that procedure.With only one path up the moun-
tain to the sacred, there is only one path down. Secularization is just de-sacral-
ization; secular people descending to the mountain’s base are secular only for
having taken the path in the wrong direction. However, scholarly research into
the pluralism of religions exposes difficulties for objectively defining religion
or faith. Why must research into the secular wait upon any fragile consensus
about which mountain is “religion” or which meaning to the “religious” is
best? No religion’s theology could serve as a good guide for this rough terrain.
How about history? Historians have been heard proclaiming that irreligion is
but a modernist creation, emerging about the time when “religion” as a concept
was invented. If “religion” is as artificially constructed as some historians of
modernity think (consult Nongbri 2012), wouldn’t de-centering modernist frame-
works bring authentic and non-essentialized secularity back into view? Besides,
atheists could not be as constructed to the same degree as “religion” by modern-
ity, since real unbelief could not be produced by an unreal religion. Hence, his-
torians should not classify atheism as a religion’s modern spinoff or sect. Medi-
eval scholastics read about atheism from ancient Greeks (Shook 2015), and
atheists are visible during the Renaissance (Wotton 1992).
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Either way, whether theology’s unreliable map or history’s dubious framings
are followed, confused theorizing rather than methodical observation ends up dic-
tating who is inhabiting societies. That situation is not sustainable for a scholarly
field aspiring to any scientific status. Empirical research already points towards
immense qualitative and quantitative variances in the beliefs, values, motivations,
and psychological characteristics of individual nonbelievers. The people lacking
belief in deities may be more varied than all those who do believe in a deity. Stud-
ies into personal secularity are confirming that possibility; recent research has ac-
cumulated impressive results (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006; Beit-Hallahmi
2007; Kosmin et al. 2009; Streib and Klein 2013; Silver et al. 2014; Keysar 2015).
Despite what religion’s theologians or modernity’s historians may claim, sec-
ularity is not reducible to a feature of secularism or a by-product of seculariza-
tion. Trying to reduce secularity to any particular thing, much less something
that exists only in relation to religion, is not proving to be empirically or ex-
planatorily satisfactory. Secular people don’t share common routes departing
from religion, they don’t maintain similar attitudes about religion, and many
have no attitude or opinion whatsoever about religion. Secular people don’t ad-
vance the same priorities for opposing religion, and they typically can’t agree
about effective strategies for countering religion. In fact, it appears that more
secular people are not thinking about religion than those who are, and those sec-
ular people who happen to ponder religion hardly consider the matter in similar
ways. It is not even the case that secularism is a uniformly definable issue, an
adjunct or corollary to liberalism, or a singular ideology (Bilgrami 2014; Baker
and Smith 2015; Kitcher 2015).
Despite these warnings from empirical studies, sociology and social history
have been largely following a dictum accurately pronounced by Rajeev Bharga-
va: “It should be obvious that the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ are always and ev-
erywhere mutually constituted” (Bhargava 2011, 54). This dictum is false, and
Secular Studies must reject it. Its role as a platitude says more about religious
scholarship than anything secular. Secular and religious scholars alike should
be able to register empirical facts before imposing paradigms. Most evident to
objective observation are the shifting cultural forces contending for social au-
thority over time in various countries. What constitutes religion, in the first
place?
Religions are hardly the solidly permanent entities – the unmoved movers –
that their followers presume or expect. They are continually reshaped and re-
formed by critical attention, from within and without (Berger 1967). Religions
sometimes encounter such attention in the form of resistance, by those trying
to modify the scope and degree of religious influence within society. When dis-
putes over religion escalate to the point where some people are questioning its
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validity, legitimacy, or authority, these engagements enter the arena of secular-
ism.While sharp criticism of religion is not the same as intentionally advocating
secularity, it can nevertheless have that practical effect. No religion fails to no-
tice. Questioning religion in public typically elicits defensive reactions, con-
cerned for repairing any diminishment of religious conviction and public confi-
dence in religion. That is why public criticism of religion easily arouses
theological surveillance and intervention, shoring up the reputation of religion
with justificatory responses.What starts out as the civil questioning of religious
involvement in society can easily transition towards tendentious arguments over
doctrines defended by theology and disputed by dissenters. Civic dissenters may
become defensive from accusations that they dangerously deviate from the “cor-
rect” religious worldview. The mere ability of another person to consider serious-
ly a worldview that differs from one’s own is a clear epistemological threat to the
religiously structured way of life (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Those courageous
enough to declare their doubts about core theological creeds get cast into the
role of being a religious apostate, or perhaps even being an “atheist.” Critics
of religious controls over society and politics are then called “secularists” but
classified practically as atheists too.
So far, this account of religious-secular engagement can make Bhargava’s
platitude seem sensible. An account of civic dissent, as theology would shape
it, revolves around unreasonable deviations from religious conviction and cor-
rectness. Nevertheless, that is not how civic dissenters necessarily describe
their motivations. The religious need not be “constituting” the secular, by any
means. Yes, public disputes are often dragged into theological arenas, but that
hardly means that the inspiration to civic dissent is exclusively or even primarily
about religion itself. Civil dissent with religion can easily erupt over civic matters
of concern to all society, not merely creedal issues of theological interest. The
way that theological defense mechanisms must regard civic dissent as unwel-
come unorthodoxy is just a partisan perspective. It is just one way of framing
the matter in a way favorable to religion, much in the same way that entrenched
governing regimes can depict political dissidents as traitors motivated by un-
patriotic ideology, in order to depict the government as truly loyal to the nation.
The process by which civic dissent from religion and religious influences
over society are usually framed as some sort of theological schism, or even a
chasm of apostasy, can make it appear that dissenters cannot be understood un-
less and until a measure of their theological distance from the religious hegem-
ony is measured. The genuine motivations and goals of civic dissent can be easily
overlooked by such a single-minded method, especially those aspirations having
nothing to do with religiosity, but instead with secular hopes and ideals. Those
wanting the least do to with religiosity, desiring to associate with similarly sec-
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ular people in a more secular society, are hardly “unbelievers” – they have all
sorts of secular motivations and civic goals. As far as religion can tell, however,
they are just impious unbelievers and nothing more, bereft of the “correct” con-
victions that ought to guide everyone. That negativity, from a theological per-
spective, is their only reality.
Secular Studies researchers can remain beholden to that dependent negativ-
ity, in seemingly innocuous ways. A trained inability to apprehend or conceptu-
alize the secular in any independent manner only debilitates secular research,
rendering it vulnerable to religious paradigms. In two recent works, exemplary
for their struggles against religion-inspired treatments of the nonreligious, we
can read the following:
Yet “secularity” is not independent of “religion” at all but is rather only meaningful in re-
lation to it. The idea of something being secular is simply unintelligible without an under-
standing of something else as religious and a view as to where the (moving) boundary be-
tween the two falls. (Lee 2015, 25)
“Nonreligion” denotes phenomena that are generally not considered religious but whose
significance is more or less dependent on religion (atheists are an obvious example).
(Quack 2014, 439)
With such mantras securely in place, full recognition of anything positive to re-
ligion’s supposed “other” won’t be possible. Allowing the meaning of the “sec-
ular” or the “nonreligious” to be controlled by religious thinking is only a (mov-
ing) measure of religion’s hegemony over scholarship. Distinguishing the “non-
religious” apart from the “secular” so that one of these terms might better apply
to matters more aloof from religion, all the while insisting that both terms can
only ultimately be understood in relation to religion, only leaves the subject
more confused and unscientific (Jong 2015). As for atheists, they are indeed of
great significance to religion; appealing to them as exemplars of secularity
would be expected from that same religious hegemony, not independent secular
scholarship.
Instead of waiting for religious thought to explain what “secular” must
mean, Secular Studies could instead study social and individual phenomena,
noting those that lack religious features and whose significance is independent
from anything religious. Despite the mantras now crowding religious studies,
and too much of secular studies, a person can be quite secular regardless of
whether that person’s thoughts have ever pondered religion or that person’s
daily life ever contacts anything religious. To claim otherwise commits either
the psychologist’s fallacy or the sociologist’s fallacy, explained in the next sec-
tion.
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3 Secular Identity
Identifying secular people is one thing; secular identity is another. A person can
be quite secular regardless of whether that person ponders secularity or encoun-
ters secularism. Being secular isn’t essentially about having a secular identity,
any more than being secular is about having a nonreligious identity. The ques-
tion must be asked, who is really controlling the assignment of identity? Mixing
up social classifications with personal identities wasn’t invented by theology or
sociology. Society itself prefers to deal with evident stereotypes rather than sub-
surface identities, and politics finds it convenient to reduce self-identity to group
categorization.
Social scientists can avoid reifying stereotypes. Any researcher speaking of
“identity” should make clear which sort of identity is meant (Turner 2013,
chap. 6). A manageable way to discriminate types of identity can include:
You are an “X” if and only if you should prefer others to regard you as an
“X.” [ideal identity]
You are an “X” if and only if you prefer others to regard you as an “X.”
[valued identity]
You are an “X” if and only if you openly agree that you are an “X.” [admit-
ted identity]
You are an “X” if and only if you sincerely think of yourself as an “X.”
[self identity]
You are an “X” if and only if X means Y to society and you think of your-
self as Y. [social identity]
You are an “X” if and only if X means Y by definition and you happen to
fit Y. [categorical identity]
For example, the classification of “atheist” is a categorical identity: so long as a
person does not believe in any god, that person is an atheist, regardless of
whether that person thinks much about the matter or tells anyone else. (Similar-
ly, a person can be a theist without ever visiting a house of worship to pronounce
a creed.) In a way, being an atheist is nothing personal despite being intensely
personal – it isn’t ultimately about who a person takes themselves to be, or about
what sort of person others expect you to be. Sociology’s theorists who narrow
atheism down to classifications able to sort people by anti-religious signs,
such as “I have lost my faith,” “There’s no god,” or “I stand with atheism,”
are not learning much about atheists in general. Religion’s defenders often go
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further, narrowing atheists to only people standing out of the crowd as anti-the-
ists and anti-religion secularists. Sociology, by contrast, can be neutral on iden-
tity. Sociologists have every right to seek and find people fitting pre-set social
identities, if that proves methodologically useful. However, pointing to admitted
identities or social identities as if personal identities have been revealed, or vice-
versa, is never methodologically sound.
Defending religion by taking advantage of lax psychology or sociology is
nothing new, and neither is the need to point out fallacious reasoning in aca-
demia. The “psychologist’s fallacy,” as William James noted when psychology
was emerging as a scientific field (James 1890, I, 196), occurs when the psychol-
ogist expects the analyzed matters described by theorizing to be prominent in a
subject’s own naive experiencing. The matters important and meaningful for re-
fined theory are often insignificant and meaningless for coarse experience, and
those matters may not even occur within any subject’s experience. Correspond-
ingly, among many fallacies from sociology, a particular “sociologist’s fallacy”
occurs whenever the sociologist expects that the social categories applicable
to people, while confirmed by sound social theorizing, must also characterize
how those people experience their immersion in the social environs around
them.
The psychologist’s fallacy is committed when the researcher presumes that a
person intuitively and self-consciously appreciates the matters of the mental life
just as described by psychological theory. This fallacy worsens when that psy-
chologist further expects that a person’s thought processes rely on those theor-
ized matters while reaching judgments and making decisions. The fallacy is ex-
posed when it must be denied that psychological characterizations determine
the entities of one’s self-consciousness. The sociologist’s fallacy is committed
when the researcher presumes that a person automatically and habitually appre-
ciates matters about the social life just as described by sociological theory. That
fallacy worsens when that sociologist further expects that people’s judgments
and actions rely on those theorized matters while conducting their social life.
The fallacy is exposed when it must be denied that social categorizations deter-
mine the identity of one’s self-conception. A person will not necessarily conceive
of themselves in the terms imposed by psychological or sociological theorizing.
They can be persuaded to do so, in some cases, but that hardly shows that they
were doing so all along.
Consider this analogy. Vegetarian eating could surely be done in a world
where no one eats meat, despite the fact that no one in that world would
keep calling it “vegetarianism,” and the fact that in our world there are self-pro-
fessed vegetarians sitting next to meat-eaters. We should not fixate on a defini-
tion of “vegetarian” as “the eating of things that are not meat.” Surely “vegeta-
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rian” can be categorically defined in its own right as “a vegetable diet,” since
vegetables can exist regardless of whether meat also exists, eating vegetation
can be done without thinking about animals, and people can be vegetarian eat-
ers without thinking about their meatless condition. The way that the popular
notion of “vegetarian” immediately and primarily suggests “not eating meat”
to many minds simply reveals how meat-eating is taken for normality in many
cultures.
Similarly, the way that “secular” suggests “defying religion” or “disdaining
religion” only tells us about what is still taken for normality in our culture. An
assigned self identity or social identity within the context of a single society is
not automatically a valid categorical identity for universal application. There
are legitimately scientific social categories and corresponding social facts that
are irreducible to social identities or self-categories, just as the reverse is true.
What may characterize so-called “irreligious” people in Christendom during re-
cent centuries is not axiomatically determinative of all secular experience and
secular identity everywhere. In sum, secularity and secularization are not limited
to locales where religious people are talking about them. Again, nothing reli-
gious is required to constitute secularity.
There is one type of secular person who self-consciously rejects gods and
openly disdains religion: the secularist. Later sections explore the identity of sec-
ularists and their social agendas. However, the classification for “secular person”
in general can be a categorical identity, and unrelated to religion, if the “secular”
is correctly defined.
4 The Secular
The Oxford English Dictionary first lists this primary meaning for “secular”:
Of or belonging to the present or visible world as distinguished from the eternal or spiritual
world; temporal, worldly.
The OED, like earlier dictionaries going back to the seventeenth century, assigns
the meaning of “secular” through two concepts: the temporal and worldly. Both
“temporal” and “worldly” are terms definable without reference to anything re-
ligious. Therefore, etymologically and logically, the “secular” is properly defined
without reference to anything concerning religion. That “secular” can make
sense as a terminological (not logical) contrary of the “religious” is simply
due to the fact that religions usually describe their sacred and divine matters
as other-worldly, eternal, and the like. In countries long dominated by Christian-
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ity, that terminological convenience within European culture has been hypostat-
ized into an ontological constraint, as if the “secular” must depend on religion
everywhere. In fact, thinking about the ontology of religious matters depends on
the ontology of this ordinary world, and not the other way around (Atran 2002,
chap. 4).
What is the secular? The secular is the temporal and worldly, spanning the
breadth of our travels and the course of our lifetimes. Taken to its broadest imag-
inable extent, the secular coincides with the natural, another concept definable
without any reference to religion. Religion must define itself in concepts bor-
rowed from the secular and natural realm in order to form ideas pointing beyond
temporal or worldly matters, but nothing in the secular realm must concern itself
with religiosity. That includes people. People can live secular lives without think-
ing about anything religious or nonreligious, or doing anything religious or non-
religious. “Secular” doesn’t essentially mean “non-religious” any more than
“athletic” essentially means “non-sedentary.” To be athletic implies being
non-sedentary, but people do not consider themselves as athletic simply because
they happen to not be sedentary.
To be fully secular, all one has to minimally do is to lead an entirely worldly
and temporal life. One needn’t ever have the thought, “My opinions and values
are not religious” or “My daily experiences have nothing religious about them,”
or “My life’s activities and associations are so worldly and temporal compared to
religious living.” Imputing such thoughts to secular people, in order to assuredly
classify their secularity in some minimally religious terms, has no academic le-
gitimacy. Committing the psychologist’s fallacy or the sociologist’s fallacy can be
avoided.
Taking particular interest in secularity would be an expected feature of reli-
gion, of course. To satisfy that religious concern, inquisitors classify nonreligios-
ity into various types of deviances from religiosity or measured distances from
religious matters. But secular people have their own concerns, not involving re-
ligion. In societies where a religion wields enough power to impact secular peo-
ple’s lives, secular people respond by defending their priorities. To the extent
that they succeed, “secularization” may be said to be occurring there, and sec-
ular people who take action to resist religious influences and coercions may
be labeled as “secularists.” All the same, the lives of secular people needn’t de-
pend on secularization. Secular people can exist where no secularization is on-
going, and they can live where no secularization has happened. To imagine oth-
erwise is to dream of a mythical time when all humanity was uniformly religious.
It is the case that identifying the “atheist” and categorizing types of unbe-
lievers as they are understood nowadays should take into account contemporary
secularity’s context within the wider field of civic engagements occurring within
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society. Demographic research abandoned biased and essentialist views of
“atheist” inherited from religion to discover much variety within that classifica-
tion. Logically, not having belief in a god encompasses both the rendering of
judgment against gods and the withholding of belief about gods, as well as
the absence of any thought about gods. Psychologically, the condition of
blank indifference feels very different from thoughtful doubt or conclusive deni-
al. That is why a third sub-category, the “apatheist,” has come to light among the
Nones (noted by Marty 2003 and analyzed in Shook 2010). Apatheism serves as
the “None of the above” category after religious and nonreligious identities are
abandoned. The apatheist gives so little thought to religion that the label of ag-
nostic or skeptic bestows too much credit for contemplating the matter. By de-
clining to accept any identity label for unbelief (atheist, agnostic, etc.) as well
as belief (Protestant, Catholic, etc.), and having little to no interest in opinions
about religion or God, apatheists end up as the “Nones of the Nones.”
Polysecularity, even if its diversity is sorted in relation to religion, stretches
very broadly from atheist activists to spiritual-minded seekers. Just a sampling
illustrates this point:
(i) Atheists heartily expecting that religion’s disappearance would benefit hu-
manity.
(ii) Atheists skeptically doubting that any gods really exist.
(iii) Agnostics judging that no one can know anything about god.
(iv) Agnostics simply admitting how they personally can’t know what to think
about god.
(v) Apatheists relieved to no longer be connected to a religion.
(vi) Apatheists who have never had the first thought about religion.
(vii) Seekers avoiding religion but wondering if some faith will arrive.
(viii) Seekers sampling religious practices and expecting some faith to grow.
Does this list illustrate how secularity requires reference to religion? Quite the
opposite: all that is required are the affirmative reasons people happen to
have for occupying their secular stances. They don’t even have to realize how
they occupy those positions. Religions can measure the distance of those stances
from orthodoxy, but secular people needn’t mind, or care. Remember our vege-
tarians – the existence of meat-eating isn’t responsible for the existence of veg-
etarians. The existence of secular people is not necessarily the responsibility of
any religions.
This point needs to be repeated. It is not religion which must establish the
possibility of secular nonbelief and atheism. Affirmative grounds – such as rea-
son, morality, and justice – supply ample reasons for adopting alternatives to re-
ligiosity. Theologians, it is true, have perpetually claimed that those grounds
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came from, or at least depend on, the divine. They have also proposed that un-
belief is due to depraved irrationality, deception by pure evil, willful love of sin,
or anarchical rebellion. Setting aside magical thinking about impiety’s bases and
causes, explaining secular unbelief should be grounded in research attending to
secular people’s own beliefs and life courses. Why do they find secular ways of
thinking and living more satisfying than religious ways? Why have some never
shown any interest in religious matters? Why are many leaving religious paths
to travel other lifestyle paths? For those still engaging with religious matters
in their thoughts, by what criteria do they pass judgment upon religion? For
those choosing to engage religiosity in society, what civic goals do they try to ac-
complish?
5 Polysecularism
The macrocosm scale of group-level engagements involving secularity, often visi-
ble in the form of social controversies and political struggles, have been high-
lighted by prominent scholars for over two decades (Casanova 1994; Bhargava
1998; Asad 2003; Taylor 2009). Their robust research demonstrates how to be
sensitive to the impressive variety of religious-secular stances taken by citizens
in many different countries. Bhargava’s (2014, 330) attention to individual scales
as well as social scales has become even more pronounced. Although “secular-
ism” is usually used in only its political sense, it nevertheless can cover multiple
dimensions. He writes,
I begin by distinguishing three senses of the term “secularism.” First, it is used as a short-
hand for secular humanism. The second specifies the ideals, even ultimate ideals, which
give meaning and worth to life and that its followers strive to realize in their life, I call it
ethical secularism. I distinguish this ethic from political secularism. Here it stands for a cer-
tain kind of polity in which organized religious power or religious institutions are separated
from organized political power or political institutions for specific ends.
Secularism remains more useful for Bhargava primarily as a social and political
phenomena, rather than as a feature of social processes emerging from secular
individuals and their perspectives.
This top-down approach has been typical across much of secular studies, as
it was inherited from sociological studies of religion. Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, as
another example, has discerned correlations between personal, social, and
civic-minded secularisms. Since no single pattern to such correlations could
be expected across societies, one can at best speak of “multiple secularities,”
as she has done (2012). One kind of secularity found in one country may balance
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a certain distribution of religious and nonreligious people with given arrange-
ments of civic power allotted to religions and the government. Other countries,
depending on their particular development as a nation, have settled into quite
different distributions and arrangements (and these patterns are dynamic over
time as well). Like Bhargava,Wohlrab-Sahr ascribes secularity principally to col-
lectives such as societies and nations, rather than to individuals. Classifying citi-
zens and their concerns is subsequent upon categorizations for social arrange-
ments and dynamics.
Although individuals hardly exist apart from their social roles and functions,
and citizens surely have their political duties and powers, transposing socio-po-
litical classifications upon the individual level is methodologically hazardous.
Such transposition can seem justifiable. Whatever is studied at the personal
level should be correlatable, in some manner, with important features at
group, social, and national levels. Even large-scale processes of secularization
or re-sacralization concern how many people are managing their social and
civic relationships and thinking about their own stances. But those people are
not involved in any uniform or predictable way. Secular people do not have iden-
tical attitudes towards religion, they do not have the same priorities for opposing
religion, and they will not usually agree about effective strategies against reli-
gion. A fallacy lurks in an expectation that people themselves are well-catego-
rized for all purposes through the broad social categories for processes ongoing
in their locality. The reliable exception is the secularist.
Secularism is primarily about efforts to diminish religious control over social
structures and public thinking. There is no uniform or unified way that secularity
manifests itself as a public agenda. There are many agendas of secularism, de-
pending on the type of religious control to be monitored and challenged. For ex-
ample, political secularism seeks adjustments to the relative control of religion
and government over each other. There are multiple secular agendas, and
many types of activists supporting one or another of those agendas, that do
not necessarily cooperate or even cohere. That absence of unity, and ready ca-
pacity for fractiousness, calls for the recognition of “polysecularism.”
The evident fact that no two countries arrange political stabilities in religion-
state relations in the same manner points to multi-secularity, as we observed.
The less-noticed fact that secularist agendas within a country have distinct ideals
and goals, and may not care for consensus among them, points to polysecular-
ism. Polysecularism in turn draws attention to the diversity of roles for the pro-
secularism citizen, the secularist. Secularists can have allies. Participation in a
particular secularism agenda, such as political secularism, is by no means lim-
ited to nonbelievers. A religious citizen who supports public education over pa-
rochial education or supports separation of church and state should not be la-
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beled as a secularist without strict qualifications. Nonreligious citizens (atheists,
in the basic sense) who advocate for some secularism agenda(s) can accurately
be classed as secularists.
Core agendas of secularism, and secularist supporters of those agendas, typ-
ically align with one or more of these activities: (a) endorsing the reasonableness
of personal secularity by contesting religious claims about unnatural/transcen-
dent divinities and values; (b) grounding morality with ethical systems consis-
tent with secular personal living and human welfare; and (c) justifying free so-
cieties having political systems promoting individual liberties and civic progress.
It is no coincidence that these three secular agendas look familiar to intellectual
historians recounting major kinds of popular freethought and secular thinking in
western civilization (Putnam 1894; Larue 1996). Nor is it a coincidence that de-
mographers tracking secularist attitudes in populations can also detect that fa-
miliar pattern.
The demographic study of a social phenomenon like religiosity, or secularity,
can identify three primary features of an individual’s outlook: one’s belief, be-
havior, and belonging. These features are organically interfused, so an isolation
of one factor is at most a useful abstraction (Day 2011), but they can suggest cor-
relations with other social features and cultural factors. Polysecularism displays
three general modes – based on belief, behavior, and belonging – concerning
one’s worldview, one’s social ethos, and one’s civic participation. As both schol-
ars of intellectual history and social movements have noted, irreligion and anti-
theism are frequently motivated by objections to religiosity’s reliance on faith, or
to a religion’s ethical lapses, or to religion’s detrimental effects on societies.
Three primary agendas of secularism manifest at the individual level in the sec-
ularist; three idealized types are hence available for “the secularist”:
(a) The secularist is the anti-theistic and anti-metaphysical thinker denying re-
ligious dogmas.
(b) The secularist is the anti-religious moralist accusing religion and religious
people of ethical failings.
(c) The secularist is the anti-clerical activist demanding that denominations re-
nounce governing power.
Idealized manifestations of “the secularist” can also be phrased in terms of pos-
itive agendas and loyalties:
(d) The secularist is a staunch advocate of reason and science, over superstition
and religious faith.
(e) The secularist is a dedicated subscriber to a secular ethics, placing humanity
first instead of a god.
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(f) The secularist is an equal citizen of a secular polity, keeping other group
memberships subordinate.
Where religion exercises cultural dominance, the secularist can stand out as a
radical freethinker, a wise sage, or a dangerous agitator. In a country already
fairly secularized in many ways, such as the United States, secularists would
not stand out so prominently, but they do attempt to sustain momentum inher-
ited from past secularist efforts.
Polysecularity is one kind of phenomenon, while polysecularism is quite an-
other. Only a minority of secular people ever become secularists and participate
in one or another of secularism’s agendas. That fact is often overlooked or mis-
interpreted, even in otherwise reliable histories of freethought and secularism.
All too often, one feature of secularism is taken to characterize all of secularity,
or to define the essence of atheism. Models designed to explain group behavior
or make crowd action understandable seek out characteristic social identities,
but they don’t necessarily characterize all concerned. Social histories focusing
on a single era will discern how one or another type of secularist then holds cen-
ter stage, but extrapolating that starring role across other eras or cultures is un-
wise. The next sections describe how these three primary agendas (along with
many secondary agendas) are capable of being equally potent; they are not nec-
essarily allies, and they don’t easily blend together or even cooperate in align-
ment with each other. Antagonisms are certainly possible, and probably inevita-
ble, as the next section explores.
6 Polysecularity and Polysecularism Today
Too much research conducted on secularity has tended to assign nonbelievers
into “atheism” for their group identity, and jointly assumed that secularist acti-
vism is characteristic of atheism, since activism is an obvious place to acquire
observations of atheists. Such presumptions have allowed much research to ex-
pect many or most nonbelievers to share a common psychological profile, de-
spite the way that common perceptions of atheism do not essentialize atheists
to a high degree (Toosi and Ambady 2011). Trying to explain “the atheist,” and
what atheists are all doing, works better with a pre-prepared essentialization
for atheism, of course. Previous sections of this chapter have raised worries
about that essentialization. It is not an unreasonable concern that religious
bias against atheists has been predisposing psychological research to “discover”
negative personality traits in atheists in order to fit “evolution of religion” narra-
tives composed to normalize religiosity across humanity. Disordered brains
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would bring disorder to society, after all. Depicting unbelievers as ready partic-
ipants for disrupting civil stability with unruly secularist activism has long been
a stereotype perpetuated by religion.
What do secular people actually take themselves to be thinking, and doing?
Much data can be gathered from open and self-identified atheists already attend-
ing atheist, skeptic, humanist, or freethought groups, or participating in online
forums sharing those interests (Cimino and Smith 2007; Pasquale 2010; Smith
2010; Baker and Robbins 2012; Williamson and Yancey 2013). Recently, Christo-
pher Silver and Thomas Coleman (2014) led a research team investigating an
even broader spectrum, looking for motivations and priorities of nonbelievers
who mostly do not affiliate or participate with any group of like-minded nonbe-
lievers. Their research findings allowed them to distinguish six main types of sec-
ular people, lending additional empirical support to the sketches of polysecular-
ity and polysecularism in this chapter. These six types do not deviate much from
prior understandings of the nonreligious gained by demographers (Kosmin et
al. 2009), and they don’t appear to diverge greatly from other recent hypotheses
for arranging aspects and scales to secular/atheist identities (Cragun, Hammer,
and Nielsen 2015; Schnell 2015; Vainio and Visala 2015). These six types are also
easily recognizable to secular leaders (such as myself) who are experienced with
grassroots recruiting among nonbelievers.
Earlier sections of this chapter highlight three main distinctions within pol-
ysecularity (skeptical, agnostic, and apathetic) and three main modes to polyse-
cularism (intellectual, moral, and civic). Interestingly, Silver and Coleman’s clas-
sification of six types of nonreligious people easily fit six of the boxes in a 3x3
table resulting from crossing polysecularity with polysecularism.
Table 1. Classifying the nonreligious by Silver and Coleman
types of polysecularism
types of polysecularity pro-reason pro-ethics pro-civics
atheist IAA AT
agnostic SA RAA AAA
apatheist NT
A brief overview of these six types, quoting from descriptions by Silver and Cole-
man (2014, 993–996), shows how to situate them.
Intellectual Atheist/Agnostic (IAA). “IAA typology includes individuals who
proactively seek to educate themselves through intellectual association, and pro-
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actively acquire knowledge on various topics relating to ontology (the search for
Truth) and non-belief. … IAAs associate with fellow intellectuals regardless of
their ontological position as long as the IAA associate is versed and educated
on various issues of science, philosophy, rational theology, and common
socio-political religious dialogue.” These secular people are open about their un-
belief and irreligious dissent on intellectual grounds, and they like to associate
with others on those bases. The IAA type lies at the congruence of a pro-reason
motivation and skeptical atheism.
Anti-Theist (AT). “[A]ntitheists view religion as ignorance … they view the
logical fallacies of religion as an outdated worldview that is not only detrimental
to social cohesion and peace, but also to technological advancement and civi-
lised evolution as a whole. They are compelled to share their view and want
to educate others … Some Anti-Theist individuals feel compelled to work against
the institution of religion in its various forms including social, political, and
ideological, while others may assert their view with religious persons on an in-
dividual basis.” Anti-theists are primarily dissenters against religion in society,
more than against god in heaven; the anti-theist type is ardently antagonistic
against what religion stands for in society and what religious people do. The dis-
tinction between IAA and AT types is familiar to sociologists as something akin
to the divide between High Church (intellectual) and Low Church (emotional)
sides to an ideological movement or religious denomination. The AT type exem-
plifies combining the skeptically atheist stance with the civic and political sec-
ular agenda to limit religion’s influence in society.
Activist Atheist/Agnostic (AAA). “[T]hey seek to be both vocal and proactive
regarding current issues in the atheist/agnostic socio-political sphere. This socio-
political sphere can include such egalitarian issues, but is not limited to con-
cerns of humanism, feminism, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender issues, so-
cial or political concerns, human rights themes, environmental concerns, animal
rights, and controversies such as the separation of church and state.” The AAA
type often seeks alliances with other movements, prioritizing positive civic and
political agenda(s) without worrying much about labeling as “atheist” or “agnos-
tic.” In the grassroots arena, this type tends to prefer non-confrontation with re-
ligion, and often seeks “inter-faith” work with religious groups on shared civic
goals. The AAA type results from combining the tolerantly agnostic attitude
with civic secular agendas.
Ritual Atheist/Agnostic (RAA). “The RAA holds no belief in God or the di-
vine, or they tend to believe it is unlikely that there is an afterlife with God or
the divine. … [T]hey may find utility in the teachings of some religious traditions.
They see these as more or less philosophical teachings of how to live life and
achieve happiness rather than a path to transcendental liberation. Ritual Athe-
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ist/Agnostics find utility in tradition and ritual.” This type perpetuates traditions
of religious or “spiritual” humanism or religious naturalism, and many congre-
gate with Unitarian Universalist churches or Ethical Culture societies, or other
sorts of humanist communities. They are often intellectual, and they endorse
worthy civic and political causes, but they typically put more of their energies
into local communal activities rather than antagonism against religion. The
RAA type connects the agnostic attitude with the secular priority of living an eth-
ical life.
The last two categories are for people who aren’t “secularists” in the strict
sense of participating in the advocacy of secularization, although they do con-
tribute to the overall secularity in a society.
Seeker-Agnostic (SA). “[R]ecognizes the philosophical difficulties and com-
plexities in making personal affirmations regarding ideological beliefs… simply
cannot be sure of the existence of God or the divine. They keep an open mind in
relation to the debate between the religious, spiritual, and antitheist elements
within society.” These seekers often turn up in polling as “transient” Nones;
they may be attending churches (irregularly) because they care about finding
a reasonable fit with their flexible worldview(s). Affirming atheists can disap-
prove of the SA type for appreciating too many perspectives, but the SA type
won’t put all their faith in a single confining worldview, even science’s. This
type of nonreligious person represents the combination of an agnostic attitude
with search for a reasonable lifestance.
The last category is the Non-Theist (NT). “For the Non-Theists, the alignment
of oneself with religion, or conversely an epistemological position against reli-
gion, can appear quite unconventional from their perspective. However, a few
terms may best capture the sentiments of the Non-Theist. One is apathetic,
while another may be disinterested. The Non-Theist is nonactive in terms of in-
volving themselves in social or intellectual pursuits having to do with religion
or anti-religion.” These individuals are prototypical apatheists, avoiding cogni-
tive or cultural tensions about being nonreligious. They aren’t anything like non-
conformists or anarchists – that would require too much effort – as they partic-
ipate in lifestyles they judge best.
This sort of classification for types of secular people only superficially clas-
sifies people by their evident priorities, as they explain those priorities them-
selves insofar as they are nonreligious. This classification cannot and does not
mean to imply, for example, that IAA types aren’t ethical or don’t care about
the civic life. An IAA or AT (etc.) may be a highly energetic promoter for a secular
cause or give generously to the Red Cross or the United Way. This sort of classi-
fication is about how people connect their nonreligious attitude with their sec-
ular views and preferred activities.
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There are a total of nine possible combinations. Three boxes stand empty
only so far as Silver and Coleman’s initial presentation of their research is con-
cerned. There probably are nonreligious people in their data better fitting into
these three boxes. The top middle box is for people too anti-religious to enjoy
congregating, while preferring some sort of “lifestyle humanism” expressing
their personal principles, so they affirm humanist ideals without communal val-
idation. The lower left box is for people too apathetic to have an opinion about
religion so they aren’t using logic to argue against it, yet they feel strongly devot-
ed to advancing critical thinking and rational analysis, so we can label them as
“rationalists.” The lower right box is for people apathetic about both religion
and ethical ideas. They aren’t protesting against religion using government,
but they do support a civil order guaranteeing stability and liberty for everyone
regardless of religiosity, so they can be called “republicans.” (The lower-case “re-
publicans” advocated constitutional democracy in the annals of politics, while
“Republicans” belong to a particular political party.)
No ideal schema awaits at the “end” to this kind of research, but more de-
tailed classifications have theoretical value in conjunction with further produc-
tive investigations. An example is provided below, taking cues from polysecular-
ity. It provides a row for those occasionally seeking religious inspiration, and a
column for those expecting science to refute and replace religion.
Table 2. Classifying the nonreligious by attitude and agenda
Secular agenda





















With any such classification, no presumption should be made that an individual
fits only a single classification, thinks of one’s self as fitting a category, or under-
stands that category’s intellectual history.
Agnostics who appreciate science can be comfortable with truces sounding
like NOMA: science and religion are “non-overlapping magisteria” that yield dif-
ferent yet valid knowledge. (“Religion knows what happens after death, some-
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thing science could never refute.”) By contrast, staunch skeptics relying on sci-
ence demand non-negotiable confrontations with religion over the truth. Those
apathetic about religion can drift into optional stances. Logic-lovers will find ra-
tionalism’s neutrality quite sensible (lending appeal to stoicism), while admirers
of science will expect it to admit that plenty of religious views get scientific con-
firmations (“It looks like evolution works best when God causes mutations.”) Pri-
oritizing civic order finds agnostics advocating, with Thomas Jefferson, a civil re-
public that stays strictly neutral about religion.
Looking across the bottom row, seekers have several options. Few seekers
know anything about Plato, for example, but seekers expecting logic to identify
god (or be god) would head towards a dualistic metaphysics like Platonism. Sci-
entific-minded seekers will expect a synthesis of divine guidance with nature’s
laws, so some sort of syncretic worldview (Deism or Theosophy, for example)
can appeal to them. Seekers prioritizing ethics gravitate towards eclectic reli-
gious or quasi-religious communities. Seekers prioritizing civic order may
judge, as James Madison did, that a providential god favors a god-fearing repub-
lic over decadent aristocracies.
7 Organized Polysecularism
Organizations advancing the interests of secular people can be classified using
these sorts of frameworks, because public support rests on those able to play
the role of a secularist through their attendance at events and financial giving.
Like individuals, organizations may or may not neatly fit a single box. However,
few attempt to equally represent many boxes, because of the inherent discrepan-
cies and disagreements among them, as the theory of polysecularism explains.
This theory also can account for the kinds of disagreements, and even antago-
nisms, between secular organizations, and the fragile nature of alliances.
Research into secular movements and organizations has accelerated recently
(Smith 2013; Cimino and Smith 2014; Langston, Hammer, and Cragun 2015; Le-
Drew 2015b). Secularists trying to find or re-shape their identities are participat-
ing in dynamic and growing organizations from neighborhood- to nation-level
sizes, which are simultaneously molding their messages to attract participants.
The typical type of organization at the local level is the “single-issue” secular
group, so that even a small city has pro-science, atheist, and humanist meetups
(see Schutz this volume). Larger organizations take a “small-cluster” approach
covering a few neighboring boxes, such as American Atheists at IAA/CON/AT,
or the American Association for the Advancement of Science at NOMA/ACC.
Some national-level organizations are “horizontally-integrated” to represent an
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entire row – the Center for Inquiry, for example, from IAA to AT.Very few organ-
izations would or could attempt a vertically-integrated approach – the American
Humanist Association is the closest example by clustering at HUM/RAA/AAA
(for more on these national groups, see Fazzino and Cragun, this volume).
Deep fault-lines between many of the boxes are sufficient to prevent any sin-
gle secular organization from growing into a large cluster, and often obstruct al-
liances among secular organizations.
First, promoting a humanist ethics about equality and rights agreeable to
people of all faiths can be deeply upsetting to anti-theists unwilling to set
aside objections to faith just for the sake of social harmony. The anti-theism
agenda can sound out of tune with the humanist ethics agenda, because human-
ism is unwilling to denigrate or demonize religious believers for their “foolish”
faiths. Promoting a humanist ethics about equality and rights agreeable to all
peoples can collide with anti-theism’s typical degree of intolerance towards re-
ligious believers. Anti-theists won’t see anything ethical at all about faith, de-
spite humanism’s efforts to understand religion as something quite human,
and anti-theism won’t award any rights to religion just for the sake of social har-
mony.
Second, the anti-theism agenda doesn’t harmonize well with the secular pol-
ity agenda. Prioritizing open attacks against the reasonableness or even sanity of
religious believers will alienate the believers who do agree on separation of
church and state. Religious believers couldn’t really be blamed for losing interest
in a political alliance with anti-theists to reduce denominational control in gov-
ernment. For their part, advocates of a secular polity can tolerate non-theocratic
religions as legitimate social organizations promoting the good life for their
members, but anti-theism refuses to recognize churches as truly healthy for
their congregants.
Third, the anti-clerical agenda can sideline the humanist ethics agenda. Pri-
oritizing the establishment of a secular government on value-neutral principles,
as liberalism proposes, demotes secular ethics to private values instead of potent
political ideals. Humanist ethics are demoted from a universal framework of
principled ideals down to just another lifestyle choice for people who happen
to be secular. Humanism once upon a time positioned itself as the supreme ar-
biter of human rights and democratic values. It gave birth to liberalism, which
went on to disavow its heritage while searching for non-ethical foundations to
political rights and institutions. Liberalism, for its part, has staked its legitimacy
on lacking any partiality towards one or another competing view of the good life
or a comprehensive conception of “the good.” That excludes any favoritism or
reliance on humanism, so humanism is reduced to the same civic status held
by every religion, and loses its distinctiveness alongside that company.
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Polysecularity is the demographic backdrop to the cultural and political
stage where polysecularism is enacted in multiple agendas and secularists
choose their preferred roles. Polysecularity forbids any simplistic reduction of
secularity to something uniform and predictable. Homogeneity and consistency
will not be found anywhere. Whether secular organizations like it or not, the
three main secular agendas are difficult to pursue simultaneously, and in fact
they usually tend to frustrate and obstruct each other. As the second table re-
veals, more nuanced discriminations among secular viewpoints and secularist
positions only expose additional fault-lines.
The course of “New Atheism” also illustrates both polysecularism and its
challenges. Self-identified new atheists don’t sound like humanists (Cragun
2015; LeDrew 2015a), but their distinctive tone conveyed substantive agendas
(Kettell 2013; Kettell 2014). Few organizations seemed ready for those agendas.
Secular organizations that re-arranged priorities after the rise of New Atheism
in the mid-2000s, for example, promptly generated external scrutiny and internal
challenges.Was the energy of New Atheism about science confronting religion’s
illusions (CON), or was it more about shaming religion for its social conservatism
and complicity in rights violations (AT)? Perhaps both, but it caused organiza-
tional strain to divert resources to both simultaneously. (Full disclosure: this au-
thor was a staff member of two major secular organizations during the height of
New Atheism.) For their part, humanists didn’t see how those controversies help-
ed deconvert religious people through values, while agnostics didn’t see science
disproving God or the Bible, so New Atheism left both types wondering how
much they really had in common with aggressive atheists. As for New Atheism,
it quickly identified traitors – NOMA, ACC, and AAA – while dismissing human-
ist communities as too “religious” (“They are still singing together?!”). Mobiliza-
tions in defense of AAA priorities (such as “Atheism+” and “The Orbit” initia-
tives) distanced themselves from New Atheism. The secular organizations
focused on church-state separation clustered with AAA/SEC and tended to
avoid New Atheism bombast, while larger organizations mimicking New Atheism
rhetoric found fewer allies among religious organizations also defending church-
state separation.
In the meantime, vast constituencies are still getting overlooked. Seekers
comprise a large majority of the Nones. Types of seekers such as SYN and
CON want toleration and church-state separation. They could supply vast ideo-
logical and financial support to core secular agendas, but they have been mostly
ignored.
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8 Conclusion
An accurate definition of the “secular” relieves it from conceptual dependency
upon religiosity. The diverse secularity of individuals can therefore receive empir-
ical study and classification independently from religious categories. Religions
typically regard anything too unorthodox as atheistic, and any alternative to
their social domination as anti-religious secularism. Through that biased lens,
secularity would appear to owe its nature to religiosity, but academic study
can reach for objectivity. The phenomena of polysecularity and polysecularism
are accessible to fallacy-free psychological and sociological research. The evi-
dent diversity to positive secular agendas contradicts simplistic views offered
by either religion’s defenders or New Atheism.
Nevertheless, “organized polysecularism” need not be an oxymoron. That
breadth to polysecularity provides many social niches for successful organiza-
tions serving their circumscribed but focused bases. Temporary alliances on spe-
cific secular agendas can be powerful in democracies that pay attention to multi-
ple interest groups able to work together. After all, flourishing secularity and
secularism in a country should exemplify more pluralism, not less.
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Amanda Schutz
Organizational Variation in the American
Nonreligious Community
1 Introduction
Social scientists are learning more about nonreligion and those who claim no re-
ligious preference. Recent research focuses on the growth of the unaffiliated
(Baker and Smith 2015; Hout and Fischer 2002), how and why individuals be-
come nonreligious (Fazzino 2014; Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006; Ritchey
2009; Smith 2011; Zuckerman 2012a), collective identity formation (Guenther,
Mulligan, and Papp 2013; LeDrew 2013; Smith 2013), prejudice and discrimina-
tion directed toward atheists (Cragun et al. 2012; Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann
2006; Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan 2011), and the rise of New Atheism, fa-
cilitated by new media and the popularity of atheist writers (Amarasingam
2012; Cimino and Smith 2014).¹
Some of these researchers have also addressed nonreligious organizations,
or groups that offer activities and services to those who identify with nonreli-
gious labels. Thus, these groups are specifically not religious, not merely reli-
giously neutral (Eller 2010). Recent research suggests that the nonreligious com-
munity is a heterogeneous one, that nonreligious identities and the pathways
that lead to them may be just as diverse as religious ones, and that “typologies”
of non-belief can be developed (Cotter 2015; Mastiaux, this volume; Silver et
al. 2014; Zuckerman 2012b). Given this variation in nonreligious identities, we
can reasonably expect to encounter heterogeneity in organizational structures
and outcomes as well. This prompts me to ask: What are the different organiza-
tional types that exist in the American nonreligious community?What purposes do
they serve for the people who join them? What kinds of events, activities, and
services do they provide? These are largely descriptive questions and answering
them will provide a context in which individual and collective meaning making
takes place.
Several methods of categorizing organizational activity into a typology could
be employed effectively. Such groups could be organized based on the identity of
individuals who join them: an organization for atheists, an organization for hu-
 Summaries of previous research on nonreligion can be found in several chapters throughout
this volume.
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manists, an organization for skeptics, and so on. While the names of organiza-
tions often reflect such categorization, this may not produce the most informa-
tive typology. The terminology used to describe nontheistic labels and ideologies
– both by laypeople and the academics who study them – is diverse and contest-
ed (Lee 2012). These labels are undoubtedly important to nonbelievers,who often
make subtle distinctions when discussing their nonreligious identities. However,
if presented a laundry list of nonreligious labels, many nonbelievers would iden-
tify with multiple labels (Langston, Hammer, and Cragun, this volume).
I believe a more useful way to categorize these groups – that is, assign them
identities – is by their functions, purposes, goals, or the chief benefits they aim to
provide for their members, which can be expressed through the types of events
that organizations offer. To determine what these functions are, I analyzed meet-
ings and activities hosted and sponsored by several nonreligious organizations
in Houston, Texas. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss some relevant
literature on nonreligion, and how organization theory can be applied to the
study of nonreligion. I will then describe methods of data collection, the organ-
izations observed, and the sample of nonbelievers interviewed for this project.
Next, I will detail a typology of the events that are hosted, sponsored, and pro-
moted by Houston’s nonreligious organizations, which I suggest can be used to
determine an organization’s most salient identity. Finally, I will briefly discuss
the implications of gaining a better understanding of organized nonreligion.
2 Background
2.1 Nonreligion Studies
Lois Lee defines nonreligion as “anything which is primarily defined by a rela-
tionship of difference to religion” (2012, 131). Nonreligion is associated with a
number of terms; if nonreligious individuals choose a label at all, they may
use words such as atheist, agnostic, skeptic, humanist, freethinker, or secularist
to describe themselves. (I refer to these individuals collectively as “nonbeliev-
ers.”) In the past, researchers have been reluctant to view nonreligion as a social
phenomenon rather than an individual one because, historically, it has been
seen as a force that promotes individualism rather than integration, with nonbe-
lievers being perceived as immoral, nonconforming, and alienated (Campbell
[1971] 2013). However, the social significance of nonreligion is especially evident
today as more people organize themselves into coherent structures that explicitly
reject religious belief.
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Much of the research on the nonreligious focuses on individuals’ identity
formation and the stigma they face, particularly if claiming an atheist identity.
Nonbelievers have consistently remained a stigmatized group, despite the fact
that they are slowly gaining acceptance in American society, though at a slower
rate than other marginalized groups (Edgell et al. 2006; Edgell at al. 2016). Re-
search on perceptions of atheists shows that out of a long list of minority groups,
atheists consistently rank as one of the least liked and most distrusted; Ameri-
cans see atheists as a cultural threat and the group least likely to share their vi-
sion of American society, compared to Muslims, immigrants, and LGBTQ individ-
uals (Edgell et al. 2006). Other research suggests that people see atheists as a
sort of “ethical wildcard” and are unsure of what they actually believe (Gervais
et al. 2011, 1202).
As this stigma is discreditable and not immediately visible to others (Goff-
man 1963), atheists are able to “pass” as believers if they wish; in such cases,
the stigmatized individual is typically responsible for signaling to others that
he or she does not fit normative assumptions (Gagne, Tewksbury, and McGaugh-
ey 1997). Some nonbelievers are reticent to disclose their lack of belief, fearing
they may experience disapproval or rejection from others (Smith 2011). Thus,
nonreligious organizations may be a valuable resource for nonbelievers, aiding
in the management and normalization of this stigmatized identity (Doane and
Elliott 2014).
2.2 Organization Theory
Organizational involvement could be a significant variable in the nonreligious
experience; thus, it is important to examine the types of organizations in
which nonbelievers choose to spend their time. Within the nonreligious com-
munity, organizations will take on different roles, or, I suggest, embrace different
identities that are displayed to the public via the events they offer.
Social scientists have no shortage of interpretations surrounding the term
“identity.” It can be understood both as an internalized aspect of one’s self
and as a group or collective phenomenon (Owens 2003). It can serve as a moti-
vator of social or political action, but can also be a consequence of such action
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000). It is a concept that transcends levels of analysis
and can be investigated at the individual, group, or organization level (Ashforth,
Rogers, and Corley 2011; Gioia 1998; Whetten 1998). Like individuals, organiza-
tions need answers to identity questions like “Who are we?” or “What do we
want to be?” in order to successfully interact with and communicate their values
and goals to others (Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton 2000; Albert and Whetten
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1985). Organizational identity refers to what members “perceive, feel and think”
about the organization they belong to (Hatch and Schultz 2007, 357). It allows an
organization to distinguish itself from others that may share common goals and
functions by expressing its “character,” or whatever the group deems “important
and essential” (Albert and Whetten 1985, 266).
Organization theorists suggest that outsiders can affect the character of an
organization (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Hsu and Hannan 2005). This is a signif-
icant point because much research has focused on the negative perceptions peo-
ple have of atheists, but less has examined how nonbelievers respond to these
perceptions as collectives (see Fazzino, Borer, Abdel Haq 2014; Guenther 2014;
Zuckerman 2014, 11–37). Some nonbelievers may expend considerable effort to-
ward dispelling the stereotypes attributed to them, which can be funneled
through organizational channels; in other words, if nonbelievers wish to signal
to outsiders that they are socially engaged, compassionate, or ethical, they may
form or join an organization that prioritizes the qualities they value. Action with-
in the context of nonreligious organizations, then, can help members manage
the impressions they (as nonbelievers) give others (see Smith 2013). However,
since little is known about what nonreligious organizations actually do, reac-
tions to such groups – from both average religious Americans and the nonbeliev-
ers unfamiliar with them – can be critical. This is especially true of organizations
that more closely resemble religious groups, perhaps because the idea of organ-
ized nonreligion is counterintuitive (see Smith, Frost, this volume). Research has
suggested that organizations with contradictory elements can elicit aggressive re-
sponses (Galaskiewicz and Barringer 2012); since nonbelievers reject belief in a
supernatural deity, others assume that they will reject other aspects of religion
(e.g., a strong moral code) as well.
To this point, such organizations have been utilized primarily as a strategy
of sampling for atheists, or a context where nonreligious identities are fostered
(Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006; LeDrew 2013; Ritchey 2009; Smith 2013). How-
ever, with few exceptions, researchers have not closely examined nonreligious
organizations as entities in and of themselves, their variation, or how these for-
mal and informal groups might affect (or be affected by) those who join them
(see Guenther, Mulligan, and Papp 2013; Lee 2015, 106– 130; Zuckerman 2014,
107– 136). Research that does address nonreligious organizations usually refers
to such groups abstractly and as a united collective, rather than parsing out
the specific and diverse goals that each organization in a given area may have
(though see Shook, this volume). Recognizing that not all organizations are cre-
ated equal can allow for more nuance in our discussions of nonbelievers’ iden-
tities, motivations, beliefs, and practices. Shedding light on what each of these
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organizations does may also broaden perceptions of nonbelievers and organized
nonreligion as a whole.
3 Data and Methods
As part of a larger project, I used qualitative research methods to explore how
individual and collective nonreligious experiences manifest as organizational ac-
tion; this chapter describes such action. I conducted approximately 80 discrete
observations among eight local nonreligious organizations in the Houston
area, over a period of eight months. I conducted 125 semi-structured in-depth in-
terviews with founders, leaders, and members of these groups, as well as people
who were not actively involved. I also performed content analysis on websites,
interactions on social media, and literature distributed at events. Field notes
and transcripts were coded line by line and patterns emerged inductively, allow-
ing me to discern variation in the activities and events each organization hosted.
I analyzed each organization’s self-description (usually published on a website
or in distributed written material), what members said about the organizations,
and my own observations of events and activities. In cases where these accounts
differ, I defer to my observations and justify my reasoning for doing so. By trian-
gulating observations, personal accounts, and recorded material, I was able to
construct a typology of nonreligious events. The events sponsored by nonreli-
gious organizations reflect their members’ priorities, and by focusing on events
(i.e., what the organizations do), we can determine their “essential character”
(i.e., what they are).
3.1 The Setting
Houston seems an ideal setting to conduct research on organized nonreligion.
Texas is generally socially and politically conservative, and many Texans are
evangelical Protestants. Houston is also home to several of the largest mega-
churches in the US. It is consistently ranked by national polls as one of the
most religious states, having above average levels of affiliation, belief, commit-
ment, and religious behaviors. However, Houston also claims to host the world’s
largest atheist community and provides a diverse range of events for those who
identify with various nonreligious labels.
The city appears to be in a “Goldilocks zone” between high and low levels of
secularity that allow nonreligious organizations to thrive. Houston is the fourth-
largest city in the US, set to overtake Chicago in the coming decades. It is descri-
Organizational Variation in the American Nonreligious Community 117
bed by its inhabitants as “cosmopolitan” and is one of the most diverse cities in
the country – racially, ethnically, and culturally (Klinenberg 2016; Steptoe 2016).
In order for its inhabitants to coexist, it must be tolerant of diversity to some ex-
tent. At the same time, Houston is located firmly in the Bible Belt, not far re-
moved from the Deep South, where religion is prevalent enough that nonbeliev-
ers can expect to encounter it in everyday interactions. Nonbelievers in Houston
report hearing religion in political rhetoric (both locally and nationally), seeing it
make its way into public classrooms, and frequently being asked, “Where do you
go to church?” upon meeting new acquaintances. Nonbelievers in places like
Houston may feel a greater need to organize in response to religion than those
in more secular communities like Boston, San Francisco, or Seattle, while simul-
taneously feeling safer openly doing so than in predominately conservative
Christian or rural communities.
However, this should not suggest that cities or regions that are more or less
religious than average cannot produce successful nonreligious organizations.
For example, some research has described successful atheist groups in rural
areas, even in the face of resistance and marginalization from religious others
(Ritchey 2009). Conversely, the Sunday Assembly – a growing secular organiza-
tion that emulates church services – was founded in London, despite nearly half
of Britons having no religious affiliation (Bagg and Voas 2010). Further research
in a range of settings is needed to confirm any concrete patterns of organization-
al vitality, though García and Blankholm (2016) suggest that nonreligious organ-
izations tend to emerge in US counties with larger populations of evangelical
Protestants.
3.2 The Organizations
Nearly all nonreligious organizations in Houston have a public online presence
(e.g., social networking sites like Meetup.com and Facebook.com), so as to at-
tract participants. Houston hosts several large local nonreligious organizations
(totaling 5,000+ online members at the time of fieldwork) that provide a variety
of gatherings for nonbelievers. I conducted participant observation among eight
of these organizations, each hosting regularly scheduled, recurring events open
to the public; that is, all organizations discussed here sponsor events that occur
weekly, biweekly, monthly, quarterly, or annually, which anyone can attend.
The three largest nonreligious organizations – Houston Atheists (HA), the
Humanists of Houston (HOH), and the Greater Houston Skeptic Society (GHSS)
– host or promote a variety of gatherings (e.g., coffee socials, discussion groups,
family-friendly happy hours, volunteer opportunities, meditation) that may ap-
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peal to different niches (much like the national organizations described by Faz-
zino and Cragun, this volume) and draw in different types of nonbelievers (like
those described by Mastiaux, this volume). Another organization, the Houston
Oasis (Oasis, hereafter) – dubbed a “godless congregation” due to its churchlike
structure – meets every Sunday for coffee and fellowship, music, and a lecture.
(At the time of fieldwork, Oasis had also launched “franchises” in Kansas City
and Dallas, and were preparing to launch in Boston.) Smaller groups in the
Houston area include Houston Church of Freethought (HCoF), Natural Spiritual-
ists (NS), Houston Black Nonbelievers (HBN), and a local chapter of the national
organization Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (AU).
Some of these groups also coordinated action with an Austin-based organiza-
tion, Atheists Helping the Homeless (AHH), though I did not directly observe
this group.
3.3 Sample
My sample of interview respondents shares many demographic characteristics
with those of previous research on nonreligion. Slightly over half of respondents
were male, over two-thirds were white, about three-quarters had a bachelor’s de-
gree or higher, and three-quarters identified as politically left-leaning, with a me-
dian age of 43 (ranging from 20 to 84). Respondents were recruited directly from
group meetings, via Meetup mailing lists or Facebook posts (depending on the
recommendation of group leaders), and by word-of-mouth and snowball sam-
pling. Most participants grew up with some degree of socialization in Protestant
Christian denominations, though I also interviewed people who were raised
Catholic, Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness, Muslim, Hindu, and nothing in particular.
Since there is no obligation to attend meetings after joining nonreligious
groups online, by sending requests for interviews using Meetup and Facebook
(rather than recruiting solely from group meetings) I was able to reach people
with various levels of involvement with the organizations, including founders,
leaders, regular attendees, those who attend occasionally or rarely, those who
used to but no longer attend, those who have not yet attended but intend to,
and those who have no interest in attending face-to-face events. Speaking
with nonbelievers about their organizational affiliations and preferences (or
lack thereof) provided insight into how people viewed these groups and what
they offer, and whether or not these impressions matched those that organiza-
tions were attempting to give.
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4 A Typology of Nonreligious Events and
Organizations
As the number of nonreligious organizations increases in a given area, they may
develop distinctive characteristics and values in order to differentiate themselves
from others. In this way, nonreligious organizations do more than provide a
space where people can simply “not believe in God”; they serve specific purpos-
es and fulfill functions (many of which echo those fulfilled by churches) that
they cannot or choose not to fulfill via other means.
Table 1. Typology of Nonreligious Events and Organizational Identity
Type of
event
Purpose Examples of meet-
ings and activities



















Humanists of Houston, Greater Hous-
ton Skeptics Society, Houston Black






















The typology shown in Table 1 and developed below is based on the various
types of events that nonreligious organizations sponsor, which are typically or-
ganized, hosted, or promoted by leaders and/or a core group of highly active
members. I classify these activities as falling into six categories: social, commu-
nal, educational, political, charitable, and spiritual. These “types of events” can
serve as a proxy for organizational identity: an organization that hosts primarily
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social events can be considered a “social” organization, an organization that
hosts primarily educational events is considered an “educational” organization,
and so forth. Thus, the identities assigned to the organizations described below
are ideal types. In practice, organizations may display different identities at dif-
ferent times by offering different types of meetings and activities that provide dif-
ferent purposes. This is of course true of individuals as well: we are capable of
having multiple identities, but at any given moment one of our identities may
be more salient than another (Stryker and Burke 2000). If an organization
tends to stress a particular purpose over others, if certain events prove more pop-
ular by drawing larger crowds, or if the group sponsors a particular type of ac-
tivity more frequently than others, I consider this its primary, or most salient, or-
ganizational identity.
It is also important to note that assigning identities based on events that re-
flect a group’s primary purpose – determined by the organizations’ stated mis-
sions, what members say about them (during interviews, in passing at meetings,
and online), and my own impressions of the events they sponsor – is not the
only way to categorize nonreligious organizations. As mentioned previously,
they could be categorized based on the identities of those who join them (athe-
ist, humanist, skeptic, etc.), though I am skeptical of the usefulness of such a
typology at the organization level. Organizations could also be categorized by
their leadership structures, or level of formality. They may have hierarchical lead-
ership, with a president and board of directors who administrate all activity, or
they may be structured horizontally, with responsibilities diffused among many
committed members. They can be run as dictatorships or democracies. They can
be formalized with 501(c)(3) status, securing the same legal and monetary ben-
efits granted to other non-profit organizations, or pursue no such ambitions.
Meetings may have strict agendas or none at all. This is an avenue certainly
worth exploring further; indeed, the groups I observed did display a variety of
organizational structures, though as a typology it may not capture the variation
that manifests via a group’s diverse membership. Ultimately, based on the data
collected, I constructed a typology based on events, which I believe represents
the character of the organizations and values of their members.
4.1 Social
Some nonreligious organizations are primarily social in nature. Houston Athe-
ists, for example, prioritizes providing members a safe space to socialize with
like-minded others, where the topic of religion will not be a point of contention.
Other research has identified this as a key reason people give for joining an athe-
Organizational Variation in the American Nonreligious Community 121
ist community (Tomlins 2015). In fact, at HA events, religion often was not a pop-
ular topic of conversation. Throughout the course of fieldwork, I noticed that if
someone was a first-time attendee at these types of events, they were often
asked about their religious background, or how long they had been a nonbeliev-
er. It was typically assumed that fellow attendees had “de-converted” from reli-
gion or somehow “discovered” atheism. In fact, only one interviewee of 125 ex-
plicitly indicated being raised an atheist; all other respondents were either
raised in some religious tradition or as “nothing in particular” before they con-
cluded at some point that they did not believe. As these organizations are, by
name, non-religious, this topic often fueled initial conversations between new ac-
quaintances. After these brief “introductory” talks, conversation usually shifted,
often revolving around topics like science, entertainment, or current events.
Still, in the event that the topic of religion did come up, members could rest
assured that there would be no need to “come out of the closet” like there might
be in other social settings. Pat², a member of HA, had this to say about the
group’s social gatherings:
One big thing that can make you uncomfortable if you’re looking for friends and you’re an
atheist is, you know, if the person is religious it’s inevitably going to come up, and you’re
going to have to deal with it. But sidestepping, skipping that whole issue is nice. So it
doesn’t mean you’re going to like everybody or you’re going to agree with everybody on po-
litical issues or anything like that, but that’s one big topic that you can avoid,which is nice.
Being able to disclose a nonreligious identity without risk of judgment was a big
draw for many people who chose to attend these meetings. Regardless of the
sponsoring organization, these events share some characteristics: there is nearly
always food, coffee, or alcohol and there is rarely an agenda. There is also no
leader or designated authority figure directing action or conversation. They are
usually held in public spaces like a restaurant or bar, or occasionally at a
group member’s home in the form of a potluck. Nearly all of the nonreligious or-
ganizations in Houston offered informal social gatherings throughout the month,
though most did not prioritize these types of meetings.
 Interview respondents have been given pseudonyms. Names of organizations and their lead-
ers (publically available information) have not been altered.
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4.2 Communal
Nonreligious organizations can also be communal. Members strive to share
knowledge, skills, and services with one another, with a focus on creating com-
munity. Over the course of my fieldwork, I began encountering events and activ-
ities that involved gathering members together in a shared safe space, but did
not quite fall into the strictly “social” category described above. The idea of
“community,” I found, is deeper than simply meeting a basic desire to socialize.
At social events, participants meet over food or drink for conversation with
other nonbelievers, which may or may not result in the same people gathering at
the same place for subsequent gatherings. While a “communal” organization
may host such events, its primary purpose is to function as a consistent, depend-
able group, where members can ask for help if they need it and take advantage
of learning a new skill when offered – much like a typical church does for its
congregants. The Houston Oasis is a prime example of such an organization:
they do host dinners and happy hours like those described in the preceding sec-
tion, but they also strive to be an enduring community that fosters a sense of be-
longing among nonbelievers. Someone looking for a close-knit secular commun-
ity (perhaps filling a void left from leaving a church, though not necessarily)
might be drawn to Oasis for this reason over a group like Houston Atheists.
(However, this should not suggest that people involved exclusively in social or-
ganizations like HA cannot forge deep connections; indeed, some people I
spoke to had developed close friendships or met their spouses at such events.)
These organizations can be especially appealing to young couples and fam-
ilies with small children, who are looking for like-minded and similarly situated
people to share experiences and build relationships that will extend beyond the
events hosted by the organization. These are, of course, also functions that are
performed by churches and other intimate communities. During an interview,
Alayna discussed the significant role church played in her life, and how difficult
it was to give up when she began questioning her faith:
Honestly, the last thing that was holding me back from fully admitting that I didn’t believe
in God, was the concept of community.… I need church, I need a community that has my
back even if I don’t know these people, right? Because I’m part of their community, they’re
gonna step up and help me, or they’re gonna be there for me and they’re gonna create a
sense of home for my children. Because it did that for me as a child. Church was a really
fun place for me. I loved church, I loved the friends I had at church, I loved the sports I
played through church. And I was really afraid of saying I’m not gonna be part of a church
anymore…. Once I realized that I could have community without God, I was gone.
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While some founders, leaders, and members of organizations like Oasis do not
wish to be compared to a church, others, like Alayna, recognize and appreciate
the similarities. Weekly Oasis events, for example, mimic the structure of a
church service. They meet every Sunday morning for coffee, cookies, music (per-
formances, not sing-a-longs), and a lecture, sometimes given by a member of the
community but often given by outside speakers. When no speaker is scheduled
in advance, a presentation is given by Mike Aus: co-founder, executive director,
and de facto leader of Oasis. They offer childcare during the meeting (some even
call it a “service”) and pass around hats to collect donations. They host family
friendly events, happy hours, and discussion groups. They are a 501(c)(3) educa-
tional non-profit organization, with a salaried executive director and a board of
directors.
Oasis was also working toward building a “directory of skills” that would list
select group members alongside their professions or services they were able and
willing to perform for other members. If, for instance, someone at Oasis needed a
dentist, an electrician, or childcare, they could consult the directory and enlist
the services of a fellow community member before resorting to outside recom-
mendations. Similarly, churches – particularly those catering to immigrant and
minority populations – often provide their congregations with basic resources
beyond spiritual fulfillment (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Pattillo-McCoy 1998).
Having the option of relying on other group members for everyday (even trivial)
needs can help foster a sense of affinity among nonbelievers that churches have
successfully provided their congregations for generations.
Oasis was appealing to Alayna precisely because it shared these characteris-
tics – both significant and trivial – with her conception of “church,” not in spite
of them. For many formerly religious nonbelievers, church is synonymous with
community, and a nonreligious organization’s ability to mimic these qualities
can provide familiarity and comfort.
4.3 Educational
Several of Houston’s nonreligious organizations could be categorized as educa-
tional.While some members do become involved to meet social needs, others say
they are looking for “something more”; they want to learn something new or en-
gage intellectually in structured discussions. At these types of events, members
can learn about and debate the philosophical merits of atheism and shortcom-
ings of religion, hold discussions about science, ethics, or social issues, or ac-
quire new perspectives from outsider groups, like the LGBTQ or Black commun-
ities. The organizations may host lectures and presentations (given by community
124 Amanda Schutz
members or guest speakers) or advertise outside events of interest. These types of
gatherings were the most popular among nonreligious organizations, and nearly
all of the organizations I observed hosted educational events; even groups that
did not host these types of events, like HA and Spiritual Naturalists, often promot-
ed those hosted by other organizations on their Meetup and Facebook pages. Or-
ganizations specifically prioritizing these events, thus displaying an educational
identity most prominently, include Humanists of Houston, Greater Houston Skep-
tic Society, Houston Black Nonbelievers, and Houston Church of Freethought (de-
spite its tongue-in-cheek name, I categorize the HCoF as an educational organiza-
tion rather than a communal one, as its events tend to focus less on community
building and more on intellectual stimulation).
While the nonbelievers I observed were not always keen on restricting casual
conversations to religion and nonbelief, educational events frequently dealt with
these topics. For example, sociologist Penny Edgell gave a talk at Rice University,
where she presented data from the new wave of the American Mosaic Project,
discussing new and persistent trends among atheists and the unaffiliated. She
was joined by Anthony Pinn, a Black professor of religion at Rice and author
of the book Writing God’s Obituary: How A Good Methodist Became an Even Bet-
ter Atheist. This event was hosted by the university, but was promoted by several
nonreligious organizations, including HA, HOH, and HBN. Pinn has also made
appearances as an invited speaker at some of Houston’s local nonreligious gath-
erings.
Topics up for discussion at these types of events varied widely. Sometimes
educational events dealt with scientific topics, such as a talk hosted by GHSS
about conservation programs at the Houston Zoo. Other times these events fo-
cused on social issues, like HBN’s discussions about mass incarceration and ho-
mophobia in the Black community. Ethical concerns were also a popular topic of
discussion, perhaps because nonbelievers are often assumed to lack a moral
compass (Gervais et al. 2011; Zuckerman 2009). For example, early in my field-
work Oasis began holding a monthly discussion group focused on ethical issues,
such as the death penalty, euthanasia, and organ transplantation. As Mike Aus,
former pastor and co-founder of Oasis, said preceding a Sunday morning lecture,
“There’s so much to talk about when you’re not limited to one book.”
4.4 Political
Another role these organizations can play is a political one: they can offer events
that focus on raising awareness of church/state issues and providing members
knowledge and access to political channels. Such events might aim to incite
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change in policies that could be interpreted as favoring religious individuals and
institutions, perhaps going so far as to initiate lawsuits challenging such poli-
cies. For example, the Houston chapter of Americans United tries to host an
event every quarter. One of these events featured a discussion with Ellery
Schempp, plaintiff in the 1963 Supreme Court case Abington School District v.
Schempp, which banned mandatory Bible readings in public schools. However,
AU is not a nonreligious organization in the sense that other organizations dis-
cussed here are. It was founded in 1947 by Protestant Christians and caters to
both the religious and nonreligious who wish to see a government free from re-
ligious influence (and religion free from government influence). Many of my re-
spondents spoke of the separation of church and state as a cause that can be
supported by believers and nonbelievers alike, an idea supported by social re-
search (Baker and Smith 2009). Still, AU events are promoted by several of Hous-
ton’s nonreligious organizations for those members who are passionate about is-
sues tying together politics and secularism.
Such organizations can also encourage political activism, or promote events
that highlight secular, political causes (see Fazzino, Borer, and Abdel Haq 2014).
For example, there was a recurring protest that HOH had been hosting with Am-
nesty International, in which members met in front of the Saudi Arabian consu-
late to protest the treatment of Raif Badawi, a liberal blogger who was sentenced
to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes for posting critical comments about Islam
in Saudi Arabia. Another prominent issue plaguing secular Texans during my
fieldwork involved the injection of religion into public classrooms: group mem-
bers angrily spoke of a new history textbook the state was considering adopting,
which cited Moses as an honorary Founding Father of the US.
Respondents often reported being frustrated with this kind of infusion of re-
ligion and public life, both at home and abroad. They spoke of seeking an outlet
for such frustrations, but were also cynical about the efficacy of actions like pro-
testing and petitioning. However, I did recognize at least 30 people from Houston
who made the 165 mile drive to Austin for the second annual Texas Secular Con-
vention, an entire weekend of talks on church/state issues specifically facing the
citizens of Texas, which hosted panels and presentations with titles such as “The
Importance of Secular Education,” “Staying in Contact with Your Legislator,”




Nonreligious organizations might be primarily concerned with charitable en-
deavors, such as providing opportunities to donate and volunteer as individuals
or as members of a nonreligious community. Groups like HOH and Oasis hosted
at least one charitable event each month (e.g., volunteering at local food banks,
donation centers, and hosting blood drives), and members of these organizations
often participated in monthly giveaways with Atheists Helping the Homeless, a
group launched in Austin, Texas, in 2009 that had recently started a chapter
in Houston. However, many nonbelievers I interviewed expressed a desire to
see more activities like this, and lamented that there were too few opportunities
to volunteer with nonreligious organizations. In fact, they recognized that reli-
gious groups often do charity very well, and some respondents even volunteered
through churches or religious organizations simply because many charities have
religious affiliations.
Some members of nonreligious organizations also recognized that disadvan-
taged nonbelievers might hesitate to obtain services from religious charities, es-
pecially if the recipient perceives an expectation to attend the church or some-
how become involved with the religious group. Felicia, a member of Houston
Black Nonbelievers, said:
[A fellow HBN member] and I talked about the plight of the homeless. You know, a lot of
these shelters around here are Christian-based, you know, it’s that beat-you-over-the-
head-till-you-become-a-Christian,whether you are or not, and he would like something sec-
ular. Now if you wanna go to church or whatever, that’s your business, we’re not gonna
proselytize. And he said, “I’m pretty sure there’s some atheists out there but they have
to say they’re Christian in order to get services.” I said yeah, I’m pretty sure there are.
Not only are secular charities important in that they provide nonbelievers in
need a place to go without religious strings attached, but nonreligious organiza-
tions that endorse charitable activity can also mitigate the impression that athe-
ists are immoral or indifferent to helping other people. For instance, on our way
to the Texas Secular Convention in Austin, Rose, an active member of GHSS,
spoke to me about a conversation she had with a religious acquaintance. After
describing volunteer work she had recently completed, the acquaintance re-
sponded, “Why do you bother volunteering if you don’t believe in God?” This
gave Rose the opportunity to explain that nonbelievers can be moral individuals
who enjoy helping others, with no promise of an afterlife in return. By volunteer-
ing specifically as part of a nonreligious organization, nonbelievers are engaging
in a sort of secular activism that aims to dispel these negative assumptions (see
Fazzino, Borer, and Abdel Haq 2014; Zuckerman 2014).
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4.6 Spiritual
Finally, these organizations can be spiritual in nature, providing a place where
members can go to experience emotions traditionally associated with religion
– like awe and self-reflection – where disbelief in the supernatural is not only
acceptable (as it often is in Unitarian Universalist congregations), but expected.
While “secular spirituality” might seem counterintuitive, there are a sizable
number of people in these organizations who feel that the idea is compatible
with an atheist or humanist worldview. For example, when I asked one of my re-
spondents, Robert, if he thought there was room for spirituality in an atheistic
worldview, he gave this enthusiastic response:
When the light bulb burns out it’s gone, and it’s sad. Sort of. But it’s also kind of awesome
because I’m not gonna live forever. I get this one chance to eat ice cream and be with peo-
ple I love and check out sunsets and visit Canada, and it’s great. Is there room for spiritu-
ality? Yes. I meditate, that helped me get off drugs. There’s room to hold someone’s hand
and say, you know, I’m just thankful you’re in my life and I really love you and I’m really
thankful you’re my friend, I’m thankful you’re my sister, I’m thankful for all these different
things…if that’s prayer, then that’s prayer.… And there’s also room for being crass and
there’s room for the banal as well. The sacred and the profane. I need both of those things.
I need comedy clubs where I can go and shout obscenities, and I need moments were I can
reflect on just how awesome it is that I exist.
Though Robert and several other respondents spoke of spirituality in a way that
did not conflict with their non-belief, most of them did not actually attend events
that specifically catered to spiritual nonbelievers. Indeed, of all the types descri-
bed here, spiritual events struggled the most to maintain a critical mass of non-
believers to justify continuing meetings. One group in Houston dedicated to sec-
ular spirituality, Spiritual Naturalists, operated on and off for several years. They
resumed operations in the form of a bi-weekly meditation session and philoso-
phy talk in March of 2015, only to disband four months later, claiming that in-
stead of this “official organization” the group should have focused on allowing
a “grassroots community to emerge organically.” The group now operates via
newsletters and a mailing list, announcing events of interest in the Houston
area and allowing members to connect on their own terms.
This lack of participation may be due to the personal meanings that re-
spondents attached to the idea of spirituality. In fact, research has suggested
that while people interpret religiosity as incorporating the institutional aspects
associated with religious belief, they interpret spirituality as being more individ-
ualistic (Zinnbauer et al. 1997); secular spirituality may be interpreted similarly.
Not all nonbelievers are comfortable using the term “spirituality,” and it seems to
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be an idiosyncratic concept in that its meaning varies from individual to individ-
ual. Some nonbelievers associated spirituality with meditation, and chose to
meditate on their own terms (some with a meditation group, or even at a Bud-
dhist temple) as opposed to specifically meditating with other nonbelievers.
When my interview respondents spoke of spirituality and I asked them to ex-
plain what they meant when they used the word, they tended to define it either
in terms of mindfulness and awareness, such as a realization of being a part of
“something bigger than ourselves” (usually defined in a literal, scientific way,
i.e., “nature” or “the universe”), or a desire to strive toward self-improvement.
Zuckerman (2014) coined the term “awe-ism” to describe feelings of wonder
that several of my own respondents expressed.
5 Conclusion
During her talk at Rice University, Penny Edgell suggested that public attitudes
toward nonbelievers will be difficult to sway until the full range of diversity in
the nonreligious community is exposed. Americans make broad, negative as-
sumptions about nonbelievers (which have not greatly improved since the first
wave of the American Mosaic Project in 2003), viewing them as immoral and
un-American. These perceptions persist, despite the fact that people who claim
them do not report personally knowing anyone who does not believe in God
(Edgell et al. 2006); thus, the stigma attached to atheism often goes unchal-
lenged. People may assume that nonreligious organizations exist solely for the
purpose of criticizing religion – in fact, I spoke to several nonbelievers who
also made these assumptions about nonreligious groups before attending them-
selves. Although these organizations do provide nonbelievers an outlet for vent-
ing frustrations about the prevalence of religion in everyday life, I witnessed rel-
atively little outright hostility toward religious individuals. Many respondents
reported harboring no ill feelings toward believers, some acknowledged the
good that religious communities can do, and a few even empathized with
those who do believe in God. Research that exposes the diversity of beliefs, be-
haviors, and values among the nonreligious (like that described throughout this
volume) has the potential to change negative perceptions held by the general
American public.
This chapter is derived from a larger project focusing on this diversity in non-
religious communities, including whether individuals with certain preferences or
experiences are drawn to one type of group over another; the role organizations
play in helping individuals construct and manage their personal identities; and
whether organizational involvement helps to instill a set of positive beliefs, val-
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ues, or characteristics that accompanies what it means to be a nonbeliever. I also
suggest that individuals can shift and alter the characteristics of the organiza-
tions they join. In a span of only eight months, I saw these organizations
grow and dissolve and change. Much like with individuals, organizational iden-
tity is not static. In fact, some organization theorists suggest that organizations
need to be more flexible than individuals in how they define themselves because
they must be able to adapt quickly in order to survive precarious social, political,
or economic conditions (Gioia 1998; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000). The Hu-
manists of Houston provides a good example of such a shift. Since coming
under new leadership in 2015, HOH has become a multi-faceted organization, of-
fering its own social, educational, political, and charitable activities, and co-
sponsoring or promoting events hosted by nearly all other nonreligious organi-
zations in the Houston area (for more on how nonreligious organizations can
support one another, see Fazzino and Cragun, this volume). While I categorize
HOH as an educational organization, as its most popular events fall under this
umbrella, the organization’s shifting focus on building a humanist community
– that is, a close-knit group of core active members – means HOH could be shift-
ing its most salient identity toward becoming a communal organization, rather
than a predominately educational one.
The organizational types described above serve an important purpose in
nonreligious communities, especially to those individuals who have lost their
faith and left their own religious communities (Fazzino 2014). Nonreligious or-
ganizations are very much like religious organizations in the functions they pro-
vide their members. Religious organizations have historically provided a space
for their members to socialize, learn new things, engage in political discourse,
volunteer, reflect and meditate, and build enduring relationships. Of course, re-
ligious organizations are not the only way to meet these needs and goals (nor are
nonreligious organizations the only alternative), but they have arguably been the
most successful. Providing a space for nonbelievers to have these fundamental
human experiences is vital, especially in a society that overwhelmingly values
the religious ethos. Despite religion’s declining influence as a social institution
over other areas of social life, scholars recognize that it remains significant in
American society. Nonreligious organizations like those described in this chapter
will likely continue to grow unless (or until) religion becomes such a trivial part
of everyday public life that nonreligious organizations – that are nonreligious by
design – no longer need to exist.
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Building Bridges in the Shadows of
Steeples: Atheist Community and Identity
Online
1 Introduction
I met Sam and Joanna Southerland in a small conference room in the downtown
branch of our city’s public library. The two had known each other most of their
lives but had been married only two years at the time of our interview. Both ex-
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Sam (48) left the religion voluntarily in his early 20s and
Joanna (51) had been forced out four years before we spoke. The couple recon-
nected via Facebook after Sam learned Joanna was no longer with the church.
When asked, they liked to joke that they “met online.” As we talked about
their involvement with their local atheist organizations and their experience nav-
igating their minority worldview among a generally theistic population, the role
of the Internet and social media emerged as a prominent feature of their secular
lives.
For Joanna, still new to her identity outside of the insular Jehovah’s Witness-
es world, the community she found with the Midwest Atheist Coalition both on-
line and in person proved to be essential to her new social life. Sam was the first
to demonstrate the importance of the Internet in both their lives, explaining that
the difference in their paths out of religion sometimes made it difficult for them
to talk through the feelings Joanna was having, particularly early on in their re-
lationship. The atheist communities, especially the online resources, were there
for her in a way Sam could not be. He explained: “She’s done a very good job of
establishing these Internet friendships in a way that she has someone to talk to. I
mean, I’m not going to shut her off to talk about these things. But for me it’s a
different path that we’re on.” Joanna then added her own thoughts: “And the
atheist community is a whole thing online itself. They are trying to rally the
troops basically because eventually people are going to wise up and see that re-
ligion is the cause of so many problems in the world.” “Catharsis, I think, is the
bottom line of why we participate, support, and are drawn to the YouTube, Face-
book, online [atheist] community,” said Sam, finishing the discussion.
Sam and Joann illustrate what others (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006; Le-
Drew 2013) have called “active atheism,” i.e., individuals who actively seek out a
community of other atheists. While most atheists do not physically congregate
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(Bullivant 2008, Pasquale 2010), organized secular communities are becoming
more common. Many such individuals participate only online; others may inter-
act in real physical communities. Just as most atheists do not “congregate” (Bul-
livant 2008; Pasquale 2010), there are plenty of individuals who only participate
online. The subjects of this research were unique in that they partook in atheist
community both in person and online, indicating that the online behavior served
as a piece of their larger, active atheist identity. The participation of those indi-
viduals described here reflects what research has found atheist organizations
doing themselves: using an online presence to extend or supplement their phys-
ical reach (See Schutz; Smith, both in this volume). This chapter explores the
specific functions of that Internet activity and finds that two patterns stand
out: the Internet as a mechanism for finding and strengthening community,
and social media as a tool for secular activism and outreach.
2 Literature Review
Early on in this research, it became clear that the Internet, particularly social
media, was a significant site for the investigation of identity and group bounda-
ries among my atheist respondents.
Just as technology itself has grown and changed dramatically in the last few
decades, so has social science scholarship investigating the roles of these tech-
nologies and their influence on social life. Early research, as well as some con-
temporary work, was particularly skeptical, warning that computer mediated
communication could negatively effect communication and interaction in gener-
al (Mallaby 2006; Marche 2012; Olds and Schwartz 2009; Turkle 2012), and that
connections made in “virtual space” were shallow and weak compared with
face-to-face interaction (Fernback 1997; Turkle 2012). Zeynep Tufekci, responding
to a recent wave of popular articles that claimed social media was “eroding
human connection,” reminded readers that, historically, great changes in social
life always produced a strong reaction. She pointed all the way back to Cicero
claiming children had stopped obeying their parents – perhaps the first ever
“kids these days” rant – and Plato was concerned that writing, as an invention,
could “rob people of wisdom” (Tufekci 2013, p. 13– 16). Clearly, as these ancient
examples demonstrate, concern over changes to social life are not unique to
modern innovations in technology.
Social media and technological advances have drastically changed commu-
nication and social interaction in society (Chayko 2014). Most empirical work es-
tablishes how this new era of communication helps individuals and groups to
facilitate community (Baym 2000; Baym, Zhang and Lin 2004; Kendall 2010;
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Parks 2011). Members of groups who interact online tend to refer to themselves
as communities (Chayko 2008; Parks 2011). As online relationships become more
salient in the lives of those who take part, the definitions and parameters for
concepts like “community” change. As Rainie and Wellman (2012, p.12) put it:
“The new media is the new neighborhood.” For those seeking community, the
community found online can be genuine and grant a significant sense of
place (Chayko 2014; Polson 2013). In today’s culture, online and face-to-face so-
cial interaction are not two separate spheres. Online activities are very much a
part of lived experience for most people.
Recent research on organized atheists acknowledges the Internet as an influ-
ential resource for secular individuals and secular groups in the U.S. over the
past decade (Cimino and Smith 2011 and 2012; Smith 2013). Smith and Cimino’s
(2012, 18) research focused on new media as an important platform for atheist
concerns, particularly in the roles of “information distribution and conscious-
ness-raising.” Increased visibility among like-minded friends, as well as the pub-
lic at large, has led secular individuals and groups to reframe their goals and ex-
pectations in terms of public image and activism (Smith 2013). New media
changed the individual and collective identities of those involved, which in
turn changed the boundaries involved (Guenther, Mulligan, and Papp 2013;
Shook, this volume). As Cimino and Smith (2011, 33) stated while discussing
the effects of New Atheism and new media: “We can now see how secularists
feeling a greater sense of acceptance and exclusion both emerge from the
same dynamics.” Members of a group rely just as much on their shared common-
alities with other members as they do on their differences with non-members.
The Internet and social media serve as the newest field on which those boundary
negotiations play out.
This chapter contributes to this growing body of work by providing empirical
data on active atheists’ involvement in both virtual and on-the-ground commun-
ities.
3 Methods
As a researcher based at a large, Midwestern university, I started my search for
participants with the campus club for atheist and agnostic students. From there I
employed purposive sampling in order to ensure my sample included represen-
tatives from as many (adult) age groups as possible. All of the interview partic-
ipants preferred the label “atheist” when asked to describe their secular identity.
While literature has pointed to historical tensions between secular humanism
and atheism as distinct movements that may continue to clash (Cimino and
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Smith 2007), the individuals I interviewed and the groups they represented did
not disclose conflict over these terms and labels. In total I completed 30 inter-
views for this research; most of the content for this chapter came from a subset
of 13 participants who discussed their use of the Internet and social media as a
significant part of their involvement in the atheist community more broadly.¹
I sought out individuals who actively participated in some sort of secular
group or club. I categorized active participation as meeting with other group
members, in person at least once a month. Many of my participants also interact-
ed with other secular individuals online, but to fit my criteria they had to engage
with other members of their secular community face-to-face. The findings in this
piece come from a larger research project focused on identity and boundaries
among active atheists in the U.S. Midwest. It is important to note that this project
did not set out to make observations concerning these issues in an online con-
text. In fact, I did not explicitly ask about online activity as a component of athe-
ist activity. This is a subject that came up organically through the research proc-
ess. As the interviews progressed, it became clear that social media and the
Internet in general were a significant component of secular life for the partici-
pants of this study and, therefore, findings I could not ignore.
Interviews generally took approximately 90 minutes to complete. I conduct-
ed interviews in a variety of locations including participants’ homes, my office
on campus, or a quiet public place such as a library or coffee shop. Each inter-
viewee read and signed an informed consent document, which assured them
that their names, the names of their clubs and organizations and identifying
characteristics would be excluded from any publication related to the project.
All audio files, transcripts, and other research documents were kept in a secure
location for the duration of the project. Shortly after each interview, I typed notes
describing the interview to be attached as a cover sheet to the transcripts later
on. After carefully transcribing each interview I began a multistage coding proc-
ess. I created the first layer of the coding structure based on categories from the
interview guide; the next came from themes that materialized as the research de-
veloped. As patterns emerged through the process itself I coded the data several
times from multiple perspectives. A study of this nature, with this size and scope,
does not bear the weight of generalizability. Even so, the findings are a step to-
ward better understanding the issues involved.
The interview data collected reflected a specific conversation, co-created by
researcher and participant. The mere presence of a researcher affects all aspects
 While all of my interviewees had access to the Internet and social media, 13 of them spoke
very specifically of their interactions online as an integral part of their collective secularity.
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of the research process. In my position as researcher, it was essential to be pres-
ent in the project without stealing focus from the participants (Frankenberg
2004). My interviewees and I shared the interview process, but it is their story
I aimed to tell, not my own.
4 Findings
4.1 Cyber Interactions of Active Atheists
Individuals create boundaries, drawing lines of community in many different
ways – through words, actions, participation, and/or financial support (Lamont
and Fournier 1992). For members of atheist groups and organizations, the Inter-
net has become another important site for the creation and maintenance of so-
cial boundaries (Smith and Cimino 2012; Smith 2013). Almost half of my inter-
viewees (N=13) reported some level of online engagement with secular
communities as part of their atheist activity in addition to their in person partic-
ipation. Once an interviewee mentioned the online world I probed for a better
understanding or clarified when it was unclear what type of participation they
were describing (in person vs. virtual).With these participants the discussion al-
ways began with the participant including online activity in their description of
involvement in secular communities. Two themes emerged with regard to how
these participants used the Internet: (1) finding community and (2) outreach/ac-
tivism.
4.2.1 Finding Community
The Internet is an efficient way to find a group of like-minded individuals. Athe-
ists and believers alike might employ an Internet search to find local groups or a
church to join. This practice proved especially true for the active atheists in this
research.When asking how they originally got involved with secular groups and
organizations, many interviewees started with an Internet search, a search that
was, for many, within social networking platforms (e.g., Facebook, Meetup.com,
etc.). They typically interacted in virtual space before meeting people face-to-
face. Again, researchers have noted that atheist organizations use online chan-
nels as a strategic pathway to gain attendance and participation (See Schutz;
Smith, both in this volume). Meetup.com, in particular, has been a popular
method for active atheists to find groups and activities (Guenther et al. 2013).
For some this was the first and last foray into the online atheist community;
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for others it lead to more meaningful online relationships with their like-minded
associates.
One practice that spoke to how boundaries operate in an online scenario en-
tailed people finding the initial point of contact – perhaps a Facebook page –
and from there becoming linked in further and further. Martin, who discussed
working toward a more secular society for the sake of his son, was a 31-year-
old chef in a Midwestern metropolitan area. He explained how his atheist Inter-
net surfing led to significant involvement with one of his city’s atheist organiza-
tions:
I first got involved with it just kind of trying to keep up with secular news. I would go onto
Richard Dawkins’ website from time to time and read articles. There was an article about a
new website and campaign called “We Are Atheism.” So I read a little about it and turns
out it came from this group on a local campus essentially. I was like: Oh wow! This is so
cool and it’s local! So I kind of reached out to them on their Facebook page, like: Look
this is very important to me. It’s become a big part of who I am right now. What can I do
to get involved? So the founder of “We Are Atheism” is also the director of philanthropy
on the board of directors for Midwest Atheist Coalition [MAC]. So, she said I should join
MAC and I had never heard of it at that point. When they said, “Check us out,” I did
and it just progressed from there. They recognized that I had a passion for it and, to a de-
gree, a talent for it, so it just went from there.
Martin served on the board of the MAC at the time of our interview. Online inter-
action with an atheist community often overlapped into in person interaction for
participants with whom I spoke. This was the pattern by which online commun-
ities often transform into face-to-face communities in general (Chayko 2014;
Rainie and Wellman 2012). Consistent with Smith’s (2013) research on Colorado-
and Texas-based atheists, this was generally true for the atheists I interviewed.
The simple act of being part of a Facebook group, listserv, or passive member of a
national organization could easily open the door to myriad opportunities for par-
ticipation and community building.
The Internet was not only useful in finding a secular community, but also
functioned in a supportive, affirming, and sometimes therapeutic role. While
scholars may be correct in that origins of online communities are shallow
when compared with more traditional communities (Fernback 1997; Turkle
2012), in the case of a marginalized minority such as atheists, these shallow
roots can make a significant difference in people’s lives. Tom (34) made the
point that the online atheist communities lend emotional support for atheists re-
gardless of whether or how face-to-face connections exist. A self-proclaimed
loner, Tom used social networking sites to stay tethered to the global secular
community:
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I’m around millions of different people who believe what I believe thanks to Facebook, My-
Space, Google Plus, whatever. I can finally connect on at least one level with somebody in
Japan or Russia.We may not be a large physical group, but we are around the world. At any
given point there’s somebody around the world that’s going through the exact same thing
that I am.
The Internet facilitated interaction with a global network of individuals who
shared ideas and experiences, fellowship that might be difficult to find in geo-
graphic proximity.
Tristan, a 21-year-old college student and community theater actor, started
his participation in the Plains City Atheist (PCA) group by posting questions
on the organization’s Facebook page. Before his deconversion from a conserva-
tive branch of the Lutheran church, he and a few friends had been novice “ghost
hunters.” He wondered what the atheist community thought about ghosts, and
whether or not he should give up his hobby. Online communication not only
helped him clarify his beliefs, but also introduced him to his new secular social
network. That initial interaction led Tristan to get involved with PCA and even-
tually organize an atheist group at his community college. This social support
from afar can be vitally important for individuals in the process of leaving reli-
gion, particularly conservative religion. Guenther et al.’s (2013) work with New
Atheist Meetup.com groups emphasized the permeability of boundaries when
it came to the inclusion of the ex-religious. Tristan’s experience fit this pattern
of permeable boundaries; the PCA community accepted his religious past and
the difficulty he had leaving all things supernatural behind. As Tristan became
more involved with the PCA and the satellite group he started at his community
college he found he no longer had time for “ghost hunting” anyway.
4.2.2 Virtual Lines Drawn
Boundaries function not only to clarify insider status, but also outsider status
(Bellah 1987; Lamont and Molnar 2002). Online interactions may build and de-
fine communities, but for my atheist participants, the Internet was also a
space where individuals and groups drew lines of exclusion. Several participants
discussed the social repercussions of being openly atheist online. Tristan was
“un-friended” by family members on Facebook as a result of the atheist affilia-
tions and comments he posted on his profile, a common experience for openly
self-identified atheists (Guenther et al. 2013; Smith 2013).While some of Tristan’s
family reacted negatively, choosing to end communication with him explicitly
because he was an atheist, others reacted more positively. He recalled his sur-
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prise, “A few of my younger cousins, people around my age and in high school,
have ‘liked’ things I posted that were anti-religion.With Facebook and things it’s
really easy to see who is on your side or not, you know?” Tristan’s status as an
“out and proud” atheist in the virtual sphere consequently clarified a number of
his real world relationships, particularly with extended family and acquaintan-
ces who would not otherwise have been aware of Tristan’s secular worldview.
Samantha (20), the president of her University’s atheist club, discussed deal-
ing with arguments aimed at her secularly oriented online posts on a regular basis.
She said, “I mean people hear atheist and are going to dislike it. I write a blog and
I get a lot of flack online where people aren’t seeing me face-to-face, so that’s in-
teresting. I’ve seen so many terrible things online. It’s ridiculous!” Social network-
ing sites made these ideological divisions transparent in a way that is different
from face-to-face interaction.When a person reveals ideological affiliations via so-
cial networking profiles their worldview instantly becomes visible to whoever has
access to their profile or site. This may only be friends or family or this may make
their opinions public on a global scale, depending on the platform and the privacy
settings they choose for their profiles.
Social networking sites like Facebook also produce evidence of activities,
demonstrating where a person stands within their social networks. The reli-
gious/secular divide became clear to Tom (34) when he read about what his
friends were doing via Facebook without him. He remarked, “I see what they
post on Facebook. I see what they do. I hear about get-togethers [that] are
with certain people, certain cliques. And you obviously were not invited or
thought to be mentioned. So, yeah, there’s negative consequences for being dif-
ferent.” Again, the autobiographical way opinions, activities, and interactions
are logged and posted via online social networking sites demonstrated social
standing and clarified relationships between individuals without them ever hav-
ing to directly confront one another. Tom felt he and his family were being ex-
cluded from certain events because of his/their atheism. Calling back his earlier
quote though, Tom also said he was around millions of people going through the
same thing he was thanks to the Internet. The same boundary that demonstrated
what he was missing out on locally served to bolster his sense of community and
solidarity with the other atheists who might have had similar experiences in
their local friendship networks (Guenther et al. 2013). Tom’s online interactions
made visible his simultaneous acceptance and exclusion (Cimino and Smith
2011).
Conflict between individuals within online atheist forums came up in inter-
views as well. After 12 years as a police officer, Eric, 38-years-old when inter-
viewed, switched gears and applied to law school. At the time of our interview
he was just finishing his first year and loving the thoughtful, spirited academic
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environment. As a busy father and student he had a hard time attending the real
life gatherings of the atheist groups in his area and preferred to interact online.
Unfortunately, Eric’s argumentative approach was too aggressive for the group’s
facilitator. He mused,
I post a lot of stuff and make a lot of arguments. Sometimes I’m fairly funny, and sometimes
I’m a bomb thrower and say just the most ridiculous thing that still fits my beliefs in the
face of someone’s comments [just] so I can make a point (…) they kicked me out of the on-
line discussion. I’m too provocative for the Provocateurs group.
He continued to post comments and engage in debates from his own Facebook
account, but he was asked not to participate in the “Peacemakers and Provoca-
teurs” group’s official online discussion. This particular group, which met in per-
son and had a Facebook page, was meant to promote dialogue between believers
and nonbelievers in Eric’s local area. Apparently Eric’s “bomb throwing” upset
believers and atheists alike.
4.2.3 Secular Cyberactivism and Outreach
The other dimension of Internet-based interaction in the active atheist commun-
ity that emerged from interview data was the use of online networks as a forum
for debate, activism, and outreach. As narratives demonstrate, interviewees en-
gaged in these interactions in attempts to disseminate information, to persuade
others, and/or to make a public statement. Some respondents reported spending
quite a bit of their online time arguing with religious believers. As Cimino and
Smith point out (2012), such deliberate assertion of identity and affiliation
takes place in the virtual sphere where it is uniquely public while at the same
time can grant users anonymity. The ability to be anonymous in virtual interac-
tions may allow those who are otherwise timid in face-to-face interactions the
opportunity to express themselves boldly, and with little to no repercussion.
This was the case for Cameron, a 31-year-old who embodied the stereotype of
the shy, thoughtful individual. During our interview, he kept answers short
and to the point, only adding detail and examples when requested. When
asked about situations where others challenged his secular worldview, he refer-
enced virtual interactions and declared, “I seek it out.” Cameron deliberately
trolled the Internet hoping to provoke a fight, but did not engage much in the
real world. Face-to-face confrontations have a potential for escalation that online
encounters do not.
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Cameron was not alone in his antagonistic mentality of “looking for an argu-
ment online.” Alex, a 29-year-old former conservative Christian turned atheist
also engaged in online trolling. Alex’s story was striking in that he held the
same type of attitude when he was a devout Christian who, for years, lurked
in chat rooms looking for non-Christians with whom to argue. The catalyst for
his deconversion and eventual adoption of an atheist worldview came from
one such online exchange with an elderly history professor, Dr. Russell. As a jun-
ior in college Alex encountered Dr. Russell in an online Bible discussion group.
The two decided to leave the group to exchange emails directly. According to
Alex, Dr. Russell was at first reluctant to engage with him too assertively, but
Alex insisted on a thorough debate over the existence of God and validity of
the Bible. Alex felt driven to this argument by his faith, or as he put it, “I was
trying to pursue God and I ended up in this situation where I couldn’t believe
in him anymore!” Once comfortable in his new secular identity, Alex began
the same pattern of debate and argument online, but this time from his new
ideological perspective. Like Cameron, Alex preferred not to get involved in ran-
dom face-to-face debates:
I don’t walk into a bar and say “Hello stranger, let’s have a debate.”(…) In terms of the In-
ternet though, I have a YouTube channel. So this is a pretty big part of my life actually. I
have people challenge my faith on a daily basis in terms of comments there. I can go
look at a video and who wrote a comment today and debate them if I want.
With 30,000 subscribers to his YouTube channel, Alex has the opportunity to en-
gage in debates with theists regularly. He described to me picking through com-
ment threads from videos on his channel, often joining arguments already in
progress. From Alex’s perspective, his goal of advocating for the right side and
sharing the truth was no different; merely the origin of that truth had changed.
Both Jennifer (34) and Eleanor (69) shared stories of striving to be more vocal
and forceful in their online interactions with believers. Jennifer was a pharmacist
who served on the board of directors for the PCA. For several years, living in a
different town, she hid her secularity. Now that atheism was publicly part of
her identity, she was trying to participate actively in online discourse concerning
religion. Referencing this shift Jennifer acknowledged, “But now I’m more of an
asshole atheist, or I’m trying to be. So if someone puts something stupid on their
Facebook page I’m trying to be like, ‘That’s not true; here’s where the proof is.’
And there are a lot of stupid people out there! On Facebook at least.” After years
of self-censoring and feeling isolated because of her worldview, Jennifer has
learned to embrace opportunities to stand up for what she believes. Being
more vocal about her worldview has likely resulted in more conflict, which is
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why she classified herself as an “asshole atheist.” The U.S. publics’ disgust for
the irreligious (Edgell, Hartmann and Gerteis 2006; Hammer et al. 2012; Zucker-
man 2009) put outspoken atheists like Jennifer on the defensive, a position she
used to shy away from but now welcomes. Like the others in this study, she at-
tempted to stand up for reason and science over the perceived divine, but it had
taken a while for her to find the strength to do so.
Eleanor, a 69-year-old grandmother of seven, had been involved in Midwest-
ern atheist organizations for just under two years at the time of our interview.
Eleanor claimed not to be an activist, unlike some of her fellow group members.
She did not attend demonstrations to hold pro-atheism signs, nor did she distrib-
ute atheist literature in the busy city district. However, her description of inter-
actions with others on Facebook told a different story.
Last year Eleanor posted a different creation myth on her Facebook page
every week, making the point that all cultures maintain some type of origin
story. She laughed and recalled, “I put things out there and get some reactions,
and some of them I wonder, like, where’s your head?” Eleanor posted these items
knowing she would get a reaction from her religious family. When they would
counter with a Biblical statement she was quick to provide links to scientific
journals or other evidence-based claims that contradicted their religious argu-
ments. Eleanor’s behavior may not be considered activism in the classic sense,
however, her consistent attempts to “plant seeds” of reason in the minds of
those with whom she cyber-communicated is a form of cyberactivism. In their
study of secularism on the Internet, Smith and Cimino (2012, 22) described sim-
ilar interactions as “secularist cultural activism,” which they then classified as
“soft activism.” Social movement scholar Bobel (2007, 149) made a distinction
in her work between “being activist” and “doing activism,” where a participant
in social movements may do activism without taking the step of self-identifying
as an activist. This distinction, said Bobel (2007, 157), represents a more “compli-
cated account of identity” in the study and analysis of social movements. Elea-
nor’s situation – stepping back from demonstrations and protests but leaning
into arguments and debates online fits into the “doing activism” side of Bobel’s
categorization.
Many of the frequent social networking users I spoke with discussed finding
a balance in how they presented themselves and their “soft activism” online.
Dominic (22), in fact, had to tone down his online rhetoric in order to maintain
friendships with individuals outside the atheist community. A recent college
graduate in the biological sciences, he explained, “My sophomore year I got
into a lot of Facebook debates where I will bring up controversial topics on
my wall or somebody else’s wall talking about things, and that led to a lot of is-
sues.” He, and those with whom he was arguing, had a hard time keeping the
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conversation amicable. Dominic discovered that, “Whenever you’re talking
about somebody’s religion there’s always a chance that they’re going to be of-
fended.” Not willing to give up his virtual campaign for atheism, Dominic discov-
ered a different tack. Rather than jeopardize friendships through Facebook flame
wars, he found that conversations with strangers satisfied his desire to argue for
atheism:
I’ve gone onto anonymous threads and talked to people through email where it’s like, for
example, one person emailed our [atheist club] website once saying, “Do you know that
there is no God? Because if you say you do you claim to know everything and if you
claim to not know then you’re really not an atheist are you.” So I started emailing with
them and we went back and forth.
Through trial and error Dominic found an outlet closer to that of Alex or Camer-
on. All three wanted to share what they knew, and what they had come to believe
with other people. Internet communication has turned out to be an effective way
to accomplish this. With such a wide variety of platforms available one could
easily find a place to have his or her voice heard.
Both Dominic and Eric – the law student mentioned earlier who was asked
to leave the online discussion forum for believers and nonbelievers who wanted
dialogue with one another – found themselves in situations where their enthu-
siasm for the topic lead to admonishment from their online communities.
Each, however, found a way to channel his zeal and continued to participate
in dialogue with believers. They kept at it because it was not just about the
fun of debating online; they believed they had a greater purpose. Dominic and
Eric put themselves out there in an effort to raise awareness and make it easier
for others to find a voice. When I asked why he engaged in online debates and
Facebook flame wars Eric posited:
I think there are a lot of atheists who are in the pew [participating in church], or who are ‘in
the closet,’ or otherwise silenced because they don’t feel like they can [speak up] and I feel
like the more out there I am, and the more in your face I am, the more of them may feel
more comfortable.
This talk of “closeted” atheism was a common way to describe atheists who do
not publicly share their lack of belief. Scholarship on atheist identity formation
has compared the process of going public with an atheist identity to the process
of “coming out of the closet,” with non-heterosexual sexualities and trans gen-
der identities (Smith 2011, 2013; Siner 2011). Parallels exist between the atheist
community and the LGBT community in terms of issues like stigma, societal ac-
ceptance, and identity processes. The cooptation of “coming out” language,
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though, is a fairly new appropriation used informally by interviewees here, and
more formally by atheist organizations like Richard Dawkins’ Out Campaign, as
well as academically (Linneman and Clendenen 2010; Smith 2011, 2013; Siner
2011; Zimmerman, Smith, Simonson, and Myers 2015).
Alex even put his whole story on YouTube in order to share it with others.
Many of my interviewees to some extent shared the goal of raising awareness,
and online interaction has proven to be a good system through which to carry
out that mission. According to Smith and Cimino (2012, 19), the Internet has
been “both means for dissemination and mobilization” for the secular move-
ment. The active atheists I spoke with used Internet interaction as an outreach
tool. Atheism is still highly stigmatized in many segments of mainstream society
(Edgell et al. 2006; Hammer et al. 2012; Zuckerman 2009). If it is not directly dis-
couraged, non-theism is often absent from conversations about spirituality or
worldviews. My participants discovered the Internet as a space where their
ideas could be heard and might even be spread to others.
5 Conclusions
The active atheists I interviewed for this research engaged with social media and
other Internet based platforms to find other non-believers, to discuss their mi-
nority opinion with kindred others, to argue and assert their opinions with
those who did not agree, and to reach out in the name of spreading secularity.
As Chayko (2014) maintained, online communities are real communities for
those who need them. My findings indicate that some active atheists in the
U.S. Midwest needed online outlets as part of their atheist identity and an aug-
mentation to their physical secular community.
Boundary work enacted online proved particularly effective for active athe-
ists in forming and articulating an atheist identity. The virtual world was a space
where participants could explore what it meant to be an atheist individual as
well as how they might fit into the atheist community. From finding a commun-
ity, to building solidarity, to reaching out to those not yet in the fold, online in-
teractions supplemented connections these individuals made face-to-face and
sometimes represented situations they could not, or chose not to engage with
in a physical context.
The Internet, social media, and computer mediated communication of myri-
ad kinds permeate social life and will continue to do so. Given the extent of on-
line interaction among atheists and the communities they have built, future re-
search should continue to examine online atheist activities. Some elements of
the atheist and secular movements have materialized and evolved predominately
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online; for example 2012’s “Atheism Plus” component of the secular movement
emerged online (Carrier 2013; McCreight 2012). Further investigation of boundary
work would provide additional breadth and depth to the topics discussed here.
Regardless of the theoretical backdrop, as is always the case with research con-
cerning secular individuals and groups, there is more to know.
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Jesse M. Smith
Communal Secularity: Congregational Work
at the Sunday Assembly
1 Introduction
The Sunday Assembly is young. It is still developing as an international organ-
ization, and is in the early stages of making its mark in the broader secular com-
munity. Exactly what this mark will be remains to be seen. Despite its youth and
status as essentially a 21 century secular congregational experiment, it appears
to be maturing quickly and is unquestionably meeting a demand within a certain
sector of the secular population in the west and other parts of the globe. Espe-
cially because of its newness, it is important to begin a discussion of the Sunday
Assembly, and the idea of communal secularity more abstractly, by outlining the
basics of its formation and operation in order to understand both its uniqueness
within, and relevance to, organized secularism generally.
After examining the key components of its history and early development,
this chapter explores the interactional details of what I call “communal secular-
ity,” (Smith 2017) with the Sunday Assembly serving as a salient case study of the
concept. This involves a sociological discussion of congregational and identity
dynamics, and the application of social psychological insights regarding ritual,
emotion, morality, and other symbolic dimensions of this type of collective ex-
pression of the secular. I conceptualize communal secularity as the particular re-
lationship of these elements vis-à-vis the secular, and by way of defining the
process by which some secular people in contemporary culture address and ex-
press their secular identities, values, and worldviews.
2 Sunday Assembly’s History and Organization
The Sunday Assembly began in the United Kingdom in 2013, a product of earlier
conversations between Sanderson Jones and Pippa Evans, two young British co-
medians. One day while driving to a gig together, they were reportedly half-jok-
ing about the idea of a church for atheists, when they stumbled upon the con-
ceptual seeds that would grow to become the Sunday Assembly (SA or
Assembly, hereafter). On the simplest level, we can define the SA in accordance
with its publicly stated intent as proffered by it co-creators. It is, as SA’s website
OpenAccess. © 2017 Jesse M. Smith, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
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described it, a regularly scheduled gathering – an assembly – of secular-minded
people for the purpose of “living better, helping often, and wondering more.”¹
The creation of an inclusive, synod-style network of secular congregations in
communities around the globe became the major objective. The very first Assem-
bly was held on January 6th 2013. About 200 congregants were in attendance at
the Nave, a deconsecrated church in London. The original Assembly has since
found its permanent venue at the historic Conway Hall, the home of one of
the oldest ethical culture societies. The SA has seen significant growth and gar-
nered considerable public and media attention (and some controversy) since
then. As of this writing there are officially 70 established, active congregations
in 8 countries across Europe, North America, and Oceania. Over half of all As-
semblies are in North America. The most active Assemblies have between 50
and 250 congregants, while many smaller start-up or “warm-up” congregations
(by some reports, in the hundreds) have far fewer participants and meet irregu-
larly.
The SA is a non-profit, volunteer-based organization and has acquired legal
status as a registered charity with a trading subsidiarity, Sunday Assembly Lim-
ited. Each congregational chapter, regardless of its geographic location, adheres
to a general set of guidelines, policies, and quality control measures as outlined
by its creators, official charter, and other administrative organizers, collectively
referred to as the General Assembly. Sanderson Jones holds the position of
CEO. He and the SA are supported by a COO, “community creators,” and a
five-member board of trustees. Like the polities of some (especially liberal) reli-
gious groups, it gives a fair amount of autonomy to individual congregations re-
garding the specifics of their Sunday services. There is no deliberate hierarchy or
central authority beyond the basic administrative body (the General Assembly),
which supports the public relations, media, and marketing aspects of running an
organization. There is no codified or official Assembly doctrine and no paid or
trained clergy who exercise doctrinal authority over congregations. Instead,
each congregation is led by a team of Assembly organizers who adhere to the As-
semblies policies and general objectives. Each start-up congregation is self-pro-
duced by volunteers in the community based on local interest and demand.
Local secular activists, humanists, and nontheists interested in starting a
congregation are directed to the SA’s website where they are asked to review
the charter, relevant policies, accept their terms and conditions, and to connect
with already officially recognized congregations. This initiates the process of de-
veloping a new Assembly. Next, aspiring congregation organizers undergo a for-
 Sunday Assembly’s web address: www.sundayassembly.com.
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mal peer-review process from SA’s governing body to show evidence that a sta-
ble, regularly meeting congregation is feasible. When at least 10 committed or-
ganizers can show they are meeting regularly and gathering interest in the com-
munity (most often through various social media outlets like Facebook and
Meetup) they can become a “warm-up” group, be added to the website as
such, and benefit from wider promotion.
Once a regular venue has been established, musicians are brought on, and
speakers have been lined up, the warm-up group can formally apply for official
status, and if approved, have their first “launch” as a full-fledged Sunday Assem-
bly. If the burgeoning congregation does well, it must then apply for accredita-
tion from the General Assembly within two years of its launch. This accreditation
process involves legal documentation to accommodate SA’s U.K.-based charita-
ble organization status, on-site visits, and video recording of live Assemblies to
ensure they are meeting the objectives and are within the guidelines.²
Not surprisingly, most Assemblies are hosted in major cities such as London,
Los Angeles, and Sydney, but there are also congregations in smaller cities and
even rural areas around the globe. Specifically, there are up to 200 Assemblies
(including warm-up groups) on 5 different continents. No official public records
are yet available regarding membership at the SA, but it seems likely that if con-
gregations continue to grow, greater effort will be made toward official record-
keeping. Unlike most religious congregations, there is no formal documented
process (e.g. baptism or member confirmation) for becoming a member of the
SA, and currently organizational affiliation is entirely based on adult, voluntary
self-identification.³ Irrespective of SA’s quick growth, their total numbers are a
tiny fraction of those maintained by many established religious congregations.
Even if each current, active Assembly had 100 regular congregants, that would
bring the total global participation to around 7,000 people.
 See www.sundayassembly.com for more details regarding the technical aspects of its organ-
ization.
 This contrasts with many religious organizations, where much of the membership is com-
prised, not by adult converts, but by those raised within the religion as children who become
official members through religious ordinances.With some organizations (e.g. Mormon Church),
those who leave as adults must formally petition to have their names removed from member re-
cords. Otherwise they continue to be counted as members by the Church, despite inactivity or
even apostasy.
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3 Studying Godless Congregations
I began studying the Sunday Assembly in the summer of 2013 – just months after
its formation – after receiving a small grant to travel and begin fieldwork. I par-
ticipated in the San Diego, Chicago, and London Assemblies. San Diego has one
of the larger Assemblies in the United States, and at the time had around 200
participants. The Chicago chapter had around 80 congregants when I attended
(they had a larger turnout previously, but lost some participants because of an
issue securing a regular venue). Conservatively, these numbers likely represent
many of the 70 Assemblies active today.
Over 18 months I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 13 con-
gregants from the San Diego Assembly, and 8 from the Chicago Assembly. I at-
tended, but did not interview congregants from the London Assembly due to
travel and time constraints. My participation in live Assemblies in each city to-
taled about 10 hours, but I also analyzed the content of approximately 18
hours of live video recorded Assemblies made available on the San Diego chap-
ter’s website. Watching recorded Assemblies added to my fieldwork by expand-
ing my familiarity with details of Assembly services. This allowed me to further
develop the themes and patterns of interaction that I observed in the field. This
was important for my research since U.S. Assemblies only occur once a month,
which obviously limits the frequency with which I could attend.
I recruited interviewees both in person during actual Assemblies and with
organizer-preapproved flyers that announced my study. The latter led to further
recruits in a snowball fashion after Assembly events. Each interviewee was also
asked to complete a separate survey that gathered demographic information and
asked logistical questions about their involvement with the SA. Basic demo-
graphics for the 21 Assemblers are as follows: 9 identified as male, 10 as female,
1 as transgender, and 1 as gender queer. Interviewees ranged in age from 19 to
80. Eighteen respondents identified as white, 2 as Hispanic, and 1 as African
American. The majority identified as middle class. All had at least some college
education. Most of the interviews were conducted by phone with those I met in
person or those who volunteered their time and left contact information after
seeing a study flyer. The reason for phone interviews was practical; there was
usually not time during my travels and after Assembly services for in-person in-
terviews.
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4 Sunday Assembly as Communal Secularity
When the SA was first taking off, the co-creators playfully suggested to an inter-
ested public and media that it was the, “best bits of church, but with no religion”
(Del Barco 2014). This statement was offered a bit facetiously, but, of course,
there is also truth to it. Indeed, much of the controversy surrounding the SA
when it first arose had to do with whether it is, or is not “religion for atheists,”
and what the implications of this might be.⁴ Rather than taking either media
characterizations, or the SA’s self-description at face value, I define the SA as,
“communal secularity” to offer in more neutral terms, how it is both like, and
unlike religion in relevant ways.
4.1 Promoting Secular Worldviews
Examining the Sunday Assembly’s charter and the words of Assembly organizers
and congregants themselves is a good starting point for understanding what at-
tributes it shares with religious congregations, as well as its meaning, organiza-
tion, and positioning within and relationship to the broader secular community.
The charter offers ten short propositions that outline the manifest reasons for its
existence. The first three are the most essential to the SA, and the most relevant
here. “Sunday Assembly: (1) Is 100% celebration of life. We are born from noth-
ing and go to nothing. Let’s enjoy it together. (2) Has no doctrine.We have no set
texts so we can make use of wisdom from all sources. [and] (3) Has no deity.We
don’t do supernatural but we also won’t tell you you’re wrong if you do.”⁵
The first proposition is significant enough that the final statement of the
charter simply rephrases it: “And recall point 1: The Sunday Assembly is a cele-
bration of the one life we know we have.” This is a fundamental existential claim
that “doctrinally” sets the Assembly apart from religious congregations. Indeed,
nearly all religious groups, whether they have a this- or other-worldly orienta-
tion, are premised on beliefs about a supernatural realm, an afterlife, however
conceived, and the continued existence of the self (or soul) within it.
The implications of this perspective provide the context in which the mean-
ing structures and congregational activities of the SA make sense and reflexively
unfold. The existential premise that conscious experience ends with the death of
 One influential religious leader, for instance, called the very idea of the Sunday Assembly,
“highly inappropriate,” suggesting it is trivializing what makes religion a “sacred” institution.
 Access the full charter by clicking on the “About” link at www.sundayassembly.com.
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the body informs and shapes the behaviors of the secular congregation just as
beliefs in supernatural agents and eternal life inform the same with regard to re-
ligious congregations. How? Primarily through the linkage between cognitive be-
liefs/suppositions, a collective ethos, and the ways in which the micro interac-
tions within congregations support, validate, and reinforce each. When Geertz
(1973) wrote about the (sub)cultural construction of worldviews and the
“moods and motivations” that instantiate them, he was showing how our collec-
tive behaviors, far from arbitrary, reflect and inform the things individuals value
and believe.What we do is both cause and effect of how we think. An ethos is an
ethos precisely because it locates the person within broader “webs of signifi-
cance” that extend to collectives. Religious groups are salient illustrations of
this because they explicitly respond to big questions about the cosmos and
our place and purpose within it.
One might suppose this is inapplicable to organizations that overtly espouse
secular claims, propose they are doctrine-free, and – as with the first proposition
of SA’s charter – assert a temporal-materialist cosmological view. But the pur-
pose, organization, and activity of the SA suggest Geertz’s “webs of significance”
are no less applicable to secular groups that engage in meaningful, collective rit-
uals and practices. The collective ethos the SA expresses through congregants’
interactions is an important component of the broader, interrelated set of beliefs
that comprise what Baker and Smith (2015, 208) call “cosmic belief systems.”
Based on their study of survey data and secular organizations, they outline
the “cultural contours of nonreligious belief systems,” arguing that organized
secularism posits and advocates particular beliefs about the world in ways sim-
ilar (and dissimilar) to organized religion. As such, both religion and the secular
should be studied with the same conceptual tools – all focused on their broader
cosmic belief systems (worldviews):
The organization and functioning of religious, non-institutionalized supernatural, and sec-
ular beliefs can be studied in similar ways. For while some varieties of secularity are prem-
ised on disbelieving in supernatural precepts, they nonetheless posit particular beliefs
about reality and the social world, and also appeal to particular traditions and epistemic
authority (Baker and Smith 2015, 208).
In other words, secular organizations, and especially secular congregations like
the SA, are not so much about disbelief as they are about expressing positive be-
liefs about the world, even if these beliefs are framed in a way that downplays
the importance of belief, as evidenced by their rhetoric of radical inclusivity
and ostensible lack of interest in promoting doctrinal beliefs. Thus, whether sec-
ular or religious, what we might call congregational culture, by its very nature
helps shape, organize, justify, and reward congregants’ beliefs, and ultimately,
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cosmic worldviews. This is also in line with Lee’s (2015) concept, based on her
ethnographic study of nonreligious individuals in Briton, of “existential cul-
tures.” Such cultures, Lee suggests, involve those sets of “ideas about the origins
of life and human consciousness and about how both are transformed or expire
after death – what have been called ‘ultimate questions’ in the literature” (2015:
159– 160).
4.2 Ritualizing the Secular through Congregational Practice
Religious congregations have long been the subject of academic research (Am-
merman 1994), but few studies have examined the idea of the secular congrega-
tion – most obviously because they are comparatively rare. There are historical
examples of secular-oriented congregations such as the Ethical Cultural Society,
communal or pagan groups centered on religious naturalism (as opposed to su-
pernaturalism), and religious congregations welcoming of nonbelievers in addi-
tion to theists, most notably seen in Unitarian Universalism. However, the Sun-
day Assembly represents the clearest contemporary example of an avowedly
secular congregation, as it expresses a nontheistic/nonsupernaturalist identity
and secular message through the deliberate adoption of a congregational
model.⁶ As such, we can define and study the SA as a salient form of nontheistic
expression, which is attempting to formalize itself through the development of a
new institution (Smith, forthcoming); that is, functionally they bring secular val-
ues and beliefs to life through ritualistic practice, in similar ways that religious
congregations express theistic beliefs.
On the most basic level a congregation is simply a gathering of individuals
for some identifiable purpose. But sociologically, congregations are complex so-
cial entities that circumscribe interrelated processes of identity, belief, and prac-
tice. Cultural (and subcultural) values come in to high definition in congregation-
al contexts, and as significant mediums of symbolic identity expressiveness
(Hetherington 1998) and ritual interaction, congregations develop the private
lives and beliefs of individuals in public spaces (Tavory 2013). As Ammerman
(1994) observes, religious congregations serve as important symbolic links to
other cultural dynamics that can strengthen community relations, develop social
networks, and encourage prosociality. As volunteer associations, they bring to-
 This form of cultural appropriation is not uncommon among religious groups themselves.
“Seeker-sensitive” churches, for instance, often appropriate various aspects of secular culture.
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gether community members, create solidarities, and can serve as a springboard for
social action well beyond the parameters of the congregation itself.
Beyond the purely practical outcomes of congregations, they also function
as powerful symbolic settings that touch upon bigger issues. They give meaning,
direction, and purpose to the relationship between person, society, and cosmos.
Congregations are important resources for moral identity and spiritual fulfill-
ment (Gallagher and Newton 2009) and they bridge personal stories with collec-
tive moral narratives, and serve to dramatize the experiences of congregants’ ev-
eryday lives – their aspirations, struggles, family and social values, and even
political concerns. Of course, beyond these functional outcomes (but related to
them), religious congregations embody particular belief systems and make reli-
gious claims about the nature of reality.
In what sense does communal secularity do the same? At the interactional
level, Assembly services closely parallel the basic activities of religious congre-
gations. A typical Sunday service includes intervals of singing and dancing to
secular songs, (in some cases to a live band), “moments of reflection” and sim-
ilar silent observances, talks on secular themes, testimonials from congregants,
artistic performances like poetry readings and spoken word, ice breaker activi-
ties, and even the passing of a collections plate to financially support the con-
gregation. Designed to be family friendly, Assemblies include a “kids corner”
in where small children can occupy themselves with other activities while the
adults focus their attention on the services.
At the San Diego, Chicago, and London Assemblies I attended, there was a
palpable enthusiasm among the congregation, in part fueled by those leading
the services. Each host was effective at engaging congregants, but none more
than the co-creator of SA himself, Sanderson Jones at the London Assembly.
He had many of the qualities of a charismatic religious leader, including the abil-
ity to elicit a range of emotions from the audience from laughter to reverence.
This is why researchers Cimino and Smith (2014, 118), in their study of American
secular activism in Atheist Awakening, compared Sanderson to a “Pentecostal
preacher.” Weber’s (1947) description of charismatic authority centered on how
the personal qualities of religious leaders can be routinized in such a way as
to become an institutionalized feature of the religious organization over time.
Of course, unlike Joseph Smith and other founders of new religious movements,
Sanderson neither fancies himself a prophet, or makes supernaturalist claims or
substantive demands of his “followers.” However, the essence of his leadership
style and its connection to his character bears the signature of the charismatic
authority Weber identified as being central to the success of new religious move-
ments, should such movements sufficiently integrate this authority on an insti-
tutional level.
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These congregational activities effectively cultivate a setting in which a this-
worldly, temporal-focused life is celebrated in communal, secular terms. It is in
this sense that the idea of “secular ritual practice” gains the most purchase. Core
elements of congregational ritual include: (1) emotion work (Cowen 2008), (2)
symbolic and moral boundary construction (Wilkins 2008), and (3) belief sys-
tems, or ideologies (Tavory 2013). The first is apparent on multiple levels. Emo-
tions suffuse rituals with significance by framing them in terms of some greater
purpose (Corrigan 2008). When congregants employ the above elements of As-
sembly services, whether activating their vocal chords and bodies for singing
and dancing, or listening reverentially to poetry on some humanist-naturalist
motif, they are engaged in more than entertainment. These practices sacralize
the secular, that is, they endow the secular with special meaning beyond what
“the secular” signals in everyday ordinary living (what Durkheim called the pro-
fane). Put differently, Assembly services employ rituals that construct and main-
tain a “secular solemnity” in some sense analogous to religious congregational
worship.⁷ What makes this the case is not so much about songs, talks, or artistic
performances themselves (after all, these happen in many contexts having noth-
ing to do with either religious worship or secular solemnity), but their collective,
emotional nature and the ways in which a shared sense of meaning and aesthet-
ic are directed at the secular itself and given symbolic import.
Previous research on both religious congregations and atheist organizations
(Guenther 2013; Smith 2013) show how emotions shape symbolic and moral
boundaries. For instance, Wilkins’s (2008) study of a Christian congregation
found that members would use a kind of emotional exuberance – essentially a
kind of “happy talk” – in their interactions within and outside the congregation
as a way of demonstrating to others, and themselves, that they are happier than
non-Christians. I am not suggesting Assemblers are likely to do the same, or that
secular people believe they are happier than the religious, but I have observed at
Assemblies and in my interviews an inclination toward, and appreciation of, the
role of emotions in secular beliefs and values. More than other secular organiza-
tions, the SA attracts and cultivates an inclination for what Durkheim identified
as collective effervescence, wherein members of a group direct emotional energy
onto some object or idea, endowing it with qualities of the sacred.
As Woodhead and Riis (2010) argue, scholars (and laypersons) tend to over-
emphasize the cognitive, belief-based dimension of religion, which misses the
 The likeness of secular to religious congregations should not be overstated however. Belief in
– and rituals directed at – the supernatural are clearly different in both their content and inten-
tion from those involving secular ideas and values.
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critical role of emotion. This bias is perhaps especially salient among researchers
and secular people themselves with regard to atheistic groups, where the ration-
al, proposition-based arguments about the nature of reality are given primacy
over emotion. The SA stands as an interesting counterexample of secular groups
that place a premium on emotion and the experiential qualities of secularity. In
Durkheimian terms, the cultivation and projection of emotion figuratively rever-
berates back on to the group, adding to the sense of solidarity and commitment
among its members. Absent an object of worship, Assemblers nevertheless en-
gage in emotional work that produces a similar outcome. In this way, the ab-
sence of theistic belief does not impede the more essential need for communality
and belonging among this segment of the secular population (Oakes 2015).
Assemblers themselves talk about how they value ritual practice and other
social aspects of congregational life usually associated with religion. This in-
cludes the “spiritual” idea of seeking the transcendent. Consider the comments
of Becky, a local Assembly organizer and chapter leader. She suggested that rit-
uals are useful for “bringing people together” and can help shape meaningful
experiences that “go beyond the mundane.” In talking about SA’s motto, “Living
Better, Helping often, and Wondering More” she went on to state:
These [awe and wonder] are very, very important, and I would like to think I wouldn’t be
closed off to explorations of “spiritual things” although the way I view the nature of reality
is that all of these spiritual experiences are simply human experiences. They are rare, they
might be unique, they might feel transcendent or special given the nature of our everyday,
mundane lives, but they are simply human experiences…and that’s what makes them great.
It is not just those leading congregations who value ritual and seek such expe-
riences. Stan, a rank-and-file Assembler commented:
One thing that I do value about religion is the rituality of it. I have always been able to con-
nect with the mystical experience portion of religion…The transcendent, or the peace and
calm that comes from repeated ritualistic practice. I find that quite essential, and it ties into
the meditative techniques I’ve come to develop…but I don’t have to connect that to religious
experience or to a particular set of dogmas or belief structure…If you’re in a group and
you’re singing songs together as a congregation and everyone around you has the emotion;
you look at those people and your feelings resonate and you share that experience…I feel
empowered and I can find joy in that experience and to feel that sense of serenity and to-
getherness with fellow humans and connect to them in an emotional way is very much, for
me, a transcendent experience. I find great peace in that shared emotion.
Both Becky and Stan value the emotional and ritualistic aspects of communal
secularity. One may suppose they would therefore lean toward or be open to be-
liefs regarding the supernatural, but that is not the case. As Manning (2015)
160 Jesse M. Smith
shows in her study of secular parents, there are many different internal reasons
and external pressures for seeking the communal, and part of the ambiguity of
seeking something beyond the mundane may have to do with how secular peo-
ple define and employ terms such spirituality and the transcendent. Neverthe-
less, regarding the supernatural per se, when I asked specifically about this As-
sembler’s beliefs, Stan went on to suggest:
My worldview is based on that which can be objectively proven…a worldview based on ob-
servable reality, that is to say objective…As I developed an understanding of the world I live
in I realized the only way to be certain about the reality that you and I are both experienc-
ing is to focus on that which is objective, both sides, to measure and explain something
that is not subjective. The [best] methodology of coming to a justified belief about reality
is…science – a method to test and provide falsification for claims made about the world
that we share. Being scientifically literate and sound are very important for both developing
my worldview and for maintaining a worldview that I can feel comfortable having.
At root, Stan is a materialist and atheist. His language about “objective reality,”
the necessity of scientific methodology, the importance of “falsification” etc., is
very much in line with studies examining the views of many atheists (Hunsberg-
er and Altemeyer 2006; Smith 2013). Yet, his pursuit of the “peace” of the tran-
scendent and the utility of the collective emotion and congregational rituals that
provide an avenue to it, undermines the usual assumptions about nonbelievers.
Of course, it is unlikely that all Assemblers are as open and comfortable as Becky
and Stan with these “spiritual”⁸ pursuits, but it does seem that Assemblers are
generally those who seek what are usually thought of as religious goods, in sec-
ular, nontheistic, and most often scientific terms.
More important here, however, is the connection between congregational
work and belief systems themselves. Peter Berger, in The Sacred Canopy
(1990), famously wrote about the ways in which religious behaviors and rituals
justify and reinforce specific beliefs. Through plausibility structures belief-sys-
tems and entire worldviews are constructed and maintained through (sub)cultur-
al practices and institutions in ways that are intellectually and emotionally com-
pelling to individuals. Becky’s and Stan’s ideas represent the connection of
embodied ritual practice to broader belief systems. Congregational contexts in
particular give substance and validation to these beliefs, whether religious or
secular. In short, the SA stands as an example of how some secular people
draw comfort from and validation of their beliefs, not simply through cold athe-
 It is important to note, as the literature suggests, that the term “spiritual,” among the reli-
gious, can have wide-ranging meanings and uses. The interpretation of secular individuals’ “spi-
ritualty” should be qualified in a similar way.
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istic reasoning in their private mental lives, but through the collective, congrega-
tional dynamics of communal secularity. This is particularly noteworthy, as con-
temporary studies point to the hyper-individualism that characterizes many
atheists and other secular people. It is clearly useful to speak of “secular rituals”
as long as the intention and meaning of ritual is understood in context. As Cimi-
no and Smith (2014, 139) observed in their study of organized atheists, whereas
the religious understand rituals, “as a means of transcending ‘the worldly,’” and
connecting to a divine realm, “secularists understand ritual as a means for cel-
ebrating oneself as human and dwelling in a contingent world.” Assemblers un-
derstanding of – and search for – transcendence, thus speaks to transcendence
of a different kind. It is not that which most religious theology promotes, in that
it seeks to rise above the secular world through preternaturalism, the search for
the divine, or that which exists beyond nature, but the active invocation of the
secular world itself as a source of transcendent meaning in the here and now.
4.3 Secular Activism, Secular Mission
Earlier I suggested rituals are meaningful because they impart a sense of some-
thing bigger, or as Corrigan put it, “a greater purpose” (2008). But what is the
“greater purpose” for ritual-embracing secularists who do not believe in a cos-
mic grand design set out by a deity? The manifest goal of the SA – to celebrate
the one life we know we have – may seem apolitical, or to be about simply enjoy-
ing the company of like-minded people who want to live life to the fullest. But
there is more to the story than this.
If we understand secularity not as a passive descriptive term referencing
those who happen to be secular, but a dynamic concept that suggests it’s public
expression motivated by particular aims, then the question becomes more about
the ways in which nontheistic congregations contribute to secular activism and
secularism more generally. In other words, we do not have to understand the SA
as an activist organization with global aspirations per se, to see how it contrib-
utes to the broader promotion of the secular. The socio-political and historical
conditions of SA’s emergence suggest this. The increased political polarization
and the salience of the religious right (especially in the United States), religious
and political sectarianism, and the rise of global fundamentalism(s) have each
contributed to the growth of secularity (Baker and Smith 2015). Combined
with social media and other communication technologies, and the availability
of information generally via the Web, it should not be surprising that secular or-
ganizations – most prominently in the U.S. – have proliferated, perhaps even
causing, in the words of Cimino and Smith (2014), an “atheist awakening” for
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the 21st century. The SA has been part of the wider outcome of these social and
political conditions; one iteration within the broader secular community in
which the timing was right for its development.
In this light, it should come in to focus how secular congregations are linked
to secular activism and the promotion of the broader secular cause. In contrast to
some religious organizations, the SA does not recruit new membership through
active proselytization, and it is much too young to have experienced the benefits
of intergenerational socialization to establish and maintain a core membership.⁹
Rather, it relies on promoting itself through its website, local chapters, social
media, existing secular organizational networks, and word of mouth to an al-
ready extant (and growing) population of secular-minded people interested in
congregational, communal culture. Thus, aggressive marketing or the targeting
of specific nonbeliever groups has not been necessary, as there is a subset of
nontheists in the broader secular community already poised to participate as
they have few other options for joining strictly secular congregations or for com-
munal forms of secularity generally.¹⁰
In the United States in particular, demographics have played an important
role in providing a viable market for secular congregations. For example, in-
creasing religious disaffiliation, the rise of the nones, and other shifting patterns
of religious (non)identity (Hout and Fischer 2002; Sherkat 2014) have opened an
effective space for secular congregations and different ways of living secular
lives (Zuckerman 2014). Since many American nonbelievers were raised in reli-
gious households, the SA is seen by some as a way of reconnecting with the com-
munal aspects of religion, but without the commitment to religious claims they
do not accept as true.
Despite important differences in growing their numbers and developing
commitment to the organization, there are some both latent and manifest “mis-
sionizing” elements to the SA (Smith 2015). Congregational commitment is made,
not through narratives of conversion or adherence to particular doctrinal claims,
but through belief in the value (or necessity) of addressing the challenges of
community and the anxieties of contemporary life in secular terms. This is evi-
denced in the online publications of the SA,where organizers write posts on con-
 Given this and other shifting social patterns, it will be interesting to see if so-called millenni-
als develop more interest in the SA than other demographic groups as might be suggested by
their more liminal relationship with religion and traditional institutions generally.
 No clear data exist on membership composition, so I cannot make objective claims about
demographic patterns regarding who joins the SA. However, by most accounts, they seem to
largely draw a mostly white, middle-class demographic. Average age and the proportion of
men to women Assemblers is not known.
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necting with others during difficult times, dealing with grief and the loss of loved
ones (including through “nonbeliever funerals”), leading meaning-rich and pur-
pose-driven lives, and always searching for experiences “beyond oneself” – all
in secular terms.¹¹ Returning to SA’s charter, the last several of its proclamations
are illustrative. The SA states it will be “a force for good” via its “community mis-
sion” with congregants as “action heroes.” The Sunday Assembly will “make the
world a better place” and is “here to stay” (Sunday Assembly). In other words,
the SA’s aspirations and activities reach well beyond simply offering regular Sun-
day services to secular congregants. Through community outreach, volunteer ac-
tivity, and working groups (“smoups”) on social justice issues within local As-
sembly chapters, the SA essentially functions in the public sphere as the kind
of community organization that Cnaan and Curtis (2013) discuss in their study
of religious congregations as voluntary associations. In this view, sans theology,
religious congregations are simply one prominent manifestation of the rational
nonprofit sector.
Yet, we know faith and religious claims do in fact motivate and orient the
collective actions of religious groups. They are sometimes more effective than
other organizations at generating trust between participants and facilitating
community engagement across and between social networks – not all of them
having to do with religion (Seymour et al. 2014). What about avowedly secular,
faith-less congregations? Is the SA no different than any other secular nonprofit
charity unconnected to any particular religious institution? Given their commu-
nal rituals, goals, and symbolic positioning vis-à-vis the wider public as a deity-
free congregation, the answer is no. Rather, the organizational practices of the
SA suggest it is more than a celebration of life; it is a public, symbolic demon-
stration of the moral utility of secular values and their connection to an atheo-
logical cosmology centered on this life, rather than one to come.
Given the preceding, we can distill the following four interrelated elements
regarding the activist and “mission” dimension of communal secularity. It is cen-
tered on: (1) the reaping of social and personal rewards of communal life for sec-
ular individuals, (2) normalizing and destigmatizing nontheism, (3) promoting
secular beliefs, and (4) validating and legitimizing those beliefs through public
congregations and organizational social action. It does this all through activities
found in the more or less traditional organizational structure of religious congre-
gational communities. It appears as though the SA has taken heed (knowingly or
otherwise) of the advice offered by Baker and Smith (2015, 215) in their study of
 One blog series on the SAwebsite, for example, is titled “M is for Meaning” and offers advice
about finding meaning and happiness in both good times and the bad.
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contemporary secularism that suggested, “in order to achieve long-term organi-
zational success, secular groups would need to – dare we say it – look to reli-
gious communities.”
4.4 Sunday Assembly and the Secular Community
How does the Sunday Assembly fit within the wider secular community? What
role does it play, and what does this all mean for organized secularism at
large? As I have suggested, the SA meets a demand among those who desire a
communal secularity that, organizationally and interactionally, functions
much like a religious congregation. For a subset of those in the broader secular
community the SA offers meaningful ritual practices that develop a kind of emo-
tional and expressive solidarity qualitatively different from the solidarities found
in other traditional atheist and secular activist groups. There is an emerging pop-
ular interest among nonbelievers in these expressive, even nonsupernaturalist
“spiritual” pursuits. Recent examples include Sam Harris’s book Waking Up: A
Guide to Spirituality without Religion (2014), and Alain de Botton’s, Religion for
Atheists: A Nonbeliever’s Guide to the Uses of Religion (2013).¹² Given the interests
of the SA in creating meaningful experiences in secular terms (e.g. the aforemen-
tioned secular funerals), the communal secularity it is cultivating is consistent
with – and could possibly extend in the future to – the management of life
cycle events usually associated with religion, such as birth ceremonies, secular
marriages, and other symbolically-infused rituals.
In developing a communal secularity, the SA also promotes a secular mes-
sage that contributes to organized secularism through its volunteer and service
efforts in local communities. It implicitly advances secularism through practices
that facilitate commitment to secular values beyond the purely rational-instru-
mental or intellectualized versions of nonbelief, such as those characteristic of
the new atheism. This will likely contribute to any continued growth and success
the SA may experience organizationally. Its cultivation of commitment from its
congregants unfolds in less obvious ways when compared to groups like the
American Atheists, Center for Inquiry, and other secular organizations that
purse their activism through public campaigns, and sometimes legal action.
Whereas avowed secular activist groups engage the public through billboard
campaigns, conventions, sponsoring debates, television programing (e.g. Amer-
 Alain de Botton even has his own secular organization, The School of Life that bears similar-
ity to some of the goals of the SA.
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ican Atheists “Atheist TV”), demonstrations, and political activities (e.g. church-
state separation issues and other legal matters), the communal secularity of the
SA has a different quality of character in its relationship to the wider public. Its
Sunday services and community and volunteer actions are focused on a rhetoric
of inclusivity, promoting secular ethics, and – given the continued social stigma
of atheism (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006) and discrimination toward non-
believers (Hammer et al. 2012) – normalizing nonbelief at a cultural level. They
avoid the perceived defensive or combative posture of atheist activist organiza-
tions and in fact in some ways attempt to downplay the nonbelief component,
highlighting instead the celebratory and communal aspects of their organization.
In addition to what it offers participants by way of the congregational model it
embraces, the SA’s position in the broader secular community is in large part
based on its focus and public expression of normative cultural values. In a
sense, it eschews a defender-of-atheism disposition and instead adopts a do-
good, lead-by-example approach to normalizing nonbelief.
None of this is to suggest all Assemblers are secular activists or are involved
primarily because of their will to influence public perception of nontheists. In my
interviews with Assemblers, although many were involved in secular activism of
some kind, there were also those who simply wanted to enjoy the services, with-
out intention of making a moral or public statement about the value of secularity
or the importance of affiliation with secular groups (see Langston et al. this vol-
ume, in which they outline the motivational dynamics of both “secular affiliates”
and secular nonaffiliates”).
It is also too early to tell how the SA might evolve in the future based on the
desires of it constituents,¹³ but the kind of secular the SA represents – and what
is different about it from other secular organizations – lies essentially in its com-
munal character and symbolic positioning as it embraces the organizational and
community-building strengths found in the religious congregational model.
5 Conclusion
Secularity, as the context of the present volume suggests, reflects a wide range of
values, identities, individual viewpoints, and organizational activities. In a study
of organized nonbelief and the strategic goals of secular groups, Langston, Ham-
 One notable fracture has already taken place: the Godless Revival split from the Sunday As-
sembly as it (SA) was seen as not having sufficient focus on an atheist message. The inclusivity
and porous symbolic boundaries that currently characterize the SA could lead to further divi-
sions in the future.
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mer, and Cragun (2015) examined the affiliation patterns of nonbelievers, finding
a mixed bag when it comes to why some nonbelievers, and not others, join sec-
ular groups. Those who do not affiliate cite their nonbelief as a low priority; that
it is simply not an important part of who they are (although, as somewhat coun-
ter to this, the authors also found fully one-third of secular nonaffiliates say they
would join a group if one were locally convenient). This suggests that for those
who organize – including Assemblers – their nontheism is important to their
identities and outlook on life. Most relevant here however, is the study’s findings
that affiliation patterns hinge on the question of how secular groups interact
with the broader – and especially religious, public. Significantly more (60%)
of nonbelievers had a preference for the “accommodation” of – rather than con-
frontation (25%) with – religion (Langston et al. 2015). It may be that nonbeliev-
ers see the SA as a novel and non-confrontational way of expressing and promot-
ing secular beliefs.
But the meaning of the secular, and surrounding issues regarding identity-la-
bels, can be complicated, and of course, not all secular-identified people see the
SA as truly secular. For instance, some prominent secular humanists such as
Tom Flynn, the editor of Free Inquiry, and Greg Epstein, the humanist Chaplain
of Harvard, see the SA, not as a secular congregation, but as “congregational hu-
manism,” defined essentially as a nontheistic version of communal religiosity.
This is because some secular humanists view communal activity based on a re-
ligious congregational model as being at odds with the meaning of secular. As
Flynn argues, “secular humanists often disdain traditional congregational prac-
tices” (2013, 4) and therefore would not see initiatives like the SA as truly secular.
To be sure, some atheists and other constituents in the nonbelieving community
would take umbrage at the idea of congregational nonbelief, and thus Assem-
blies clearly self-select for nonbelievers open and unoffended by the notion of
communal secularity. How or whether Assemblers themselves fit into any of
the particular “types” that have been offered in secular-atheist typologies (see
Cotter 2015; Silver and Coleman 2013) will be left to future researchers to deter-
mine after the SA has moved out of its status as a novel nonbeliever phenomen-
on, into an established secular organization.
What these differences – and the idea of communal secularity itself – dem-
onstrate is further evidence of “polysecularity” (see Shook, this volume) and of
the fact that increasingly, contemporary societies are characterized by multiple
secularities (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012). That is, the contemporary secu-
lar landscape is characterized by greater diversity of secular viewpoints, inter-
ests, and complexity of meaning than is often acknowledged in prior scholarly
literature. Some of the demographic patterns of atheism (see Williamson and
Yancey 2013), for instance that it is a white, middle-class, male phenomenon,
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suggest more homogeneity in the secular community than there is. But beyond
the demographics and social location(s) of nonbelievers, there is also consider-
able variation in the meaning of nonbelief for individuals, and this is manifested
in the different strategies and goals of secular and nonbeliever organizations.
From the SA to the new atheism, this challenges the notion of a united or uni-
form secular culture or movement (Baker and Smith 2015). But this also does
not imply that accommodationists are pitted against confrontationists in the
world of organized secularism. In reality, as Langston et. al. (this volume) sug-
gest, different secular groups simply emerge from, and respond to, the diversity
of motives, values, and goals of nonbelievers themselves.
Researchers have observed that congregations with strong core faith messag-
es develop stronger congregational adherence from their members (Roberts and
Yamane 2012). For instance, evangelical groups that place more demands (e.g.
time commitment, confession of sin, profession of belief) generally elicit stronger
commitments from congregants. Such a model usually relies on narratives of
conversion, rebirth, or other kinds of personal experience that deepen religious
conviction and “prove” commitment to the congregation. Absent a “core faith
message” or clear doctrine, Assemblies place little by way of demands on con-
gregants and are unlikely to draw the kind of commitments that religious congre-
gations are known for. Notwithstanding this concern, the SA does promote a sec-
ular message, and as a public space for the celebration of secular values, it relies
on individuals by way of their general convictions regarding community, science,
and education, as well as their personal commitments to normalizing nonbelief
and expressing a secular worldview in a public setting.
It is not yet clear what impact the SA will have on the secular-religious land-
scape in the decades to come. But it is clear that it is unique and offers members
something they do not find in other secular organizations. Its focus on emotion
and ritual are a far cry from the traditional convention meeting halls where athe-
ists occasionally gather to polemicize in philosophical debates about God or la-
ment the influence of religion in public life. Its focus on radical inclusivity, cel-
ebration, and solidarity sets it apart from other secular organizations. But
individual nonbelievers do not simply choose one group or the other. Many
are involved in multiple groups, suggesting that communal secularity is not nec-
essarily at odds with other secular organizations, but perhaps offers a space in
which nonbelievers and even “hardline” secular activists can take reprieve
from the embattled politics of (non)belief and enjoy the collective effervescence
that congregations by their nature offer, be they religious or secular.
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Rejecting Rejection Identities: Negotiating
Positive Non-religiosity at the Sunday
Assembly
1 Introduction
On a sunny Saturday morning in May of 2015, a group of over 80 non-religious
Americans and Britons gathered in the basement of a Presbyterian church in the
heart of Atlanta, Georgia. As individuals and groups of two and three trickled in,
grabbing bagels and coffee and finding their seats, a band was setting up in the
front of the room. At 9:00 a.m. sharp, the band gathered the room’s attention and
soon everyone in the basement was belting out the lyrics to the themesong from
the 1980s comedy Ghostbusters. Some sang, clapped, and danced in the aisles,
while others laughed sheepishly and followed along as best they could by read-
ing the lyrics displayed on the large overhead behind the band. The band was
equipped with a saxophone, a piano, a guitar, and both lead and backup vocals,
and they quickly orchestrated a “call and response” dynamic with the audience
during the choruses.When the band asked, “Who you gonna call?” the audience
yelled back gleefully, “Ghostbusters!” Everyone was on their feet and smiling,
looking around at their neighbors with knowing glances that signaled shared
memories of the movie and the irony of singing about ghosts at a gathering de-
voted to secular worldviews.
The occasion for this secular sing-a-long was the second annual internation-
al conference of the Sunday Assembly, a growing network of “secular congrega-
tions” that selectively appropriate and replicate the Protestant church model to
build community among the non-religious. Organizers and members had come
from all over the United States and Britain to meet one another, share questions
and concerns, and celebrate their successes as a growing organization. The or-
ganization, which began in London in early 2013, has quickly spread to over
70 local assemblies across the globe, though primarily within Britain and Amer-
ica. Local assemblies meet on Sundays, sing songs and listen to speakers, and
they focus their gatherings on building community and pursuing a more mean-
ingful life.¹ They seek out ways to volunteer and engage with their local com-
 See the organization’s website for more detailed information on the organization’s vision and
mission at www.sundayassembly.com
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munities and they organize small group activities among assembly members, in-
cluding game nights, potlucks, and movie outings.
In this chapter, I draw on data I have collected from 21 months of ethno-
graphic observations and interviews with a local Sunday Assembly chapter in
a Midwestern American city², as well as observations from the larger organiza-
tion’s annual conference in 2015, to detail the ways in which this organization
is attempting to collectively construct a positive non-religious community. The or-
ganization is intentionally drawing on aspects of religious ritual and practice
that facilitate community building and meaning making, while at the same
time selectively rejecting the aspects that are not amenable to a non-religious
worldview.While I argue that the non-religious individuals who populate the as-
semblies are attempting to move beyond rejection identities and anti-religious
activism, this does not mean that they agree on what it is that they should affirm.
Jesse Smith (this volume) developed the concept of “communal secularity”
to describe the ways that Sunday Assembly is both like and unlike organized re-
ligion in important ways. In this chapter, I detail how this tension between being
both like and unlike religion is negotiated in everyday decisions and interactions
among Sunday Assemblers. Both within and among local Sunday Assembly
chapters, debates and conflicts abound regarding where the organization should
draw boundaries in regards to the inclusion of spirituality and ritual, as well as
how much they should exclude explicit anti-religious rhetoric and activism that
is prevalent in other non-religious organizations. More specifically, three major
themes have emerged that highlight this boundary-making process: (1) the ex-
plicit goal to be “radically inclusive” of all individual beliefs while simultaneous-
ly maintaining a non-religious and non-theistic orientation as an organization,
(2) the attempt to cultivate a “secular spirituality” and a collective transcendence
that is devoid of supernatural rhetoric or beliefs, and (3) the selective appropri-
ation of the institutional form of a Protestant church that attempts to eschew the
hierarchy and dogma found in many Protestant religions while attempting to
replicate their ritualized, emotionally engaged communality.
 The city has been anonymized to protect participant identifications.
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2 A Shift in Non-religious Identities
Non-religious identities³, including atheism and agnosticism, have often been
seen as identities that are built on the rejection of religion and, indeed, many
of the prominent organizations and figures of modern atheism in the West
have fueled this image (LeDrew 2015; Kettell 2014). From the anti-religious rhet-
oric of the New Atheists to the image of embattled nonbelievers fighting against
religious discrimination promoted by many national and local non-religious or-
ganizations, non-religion is indeed a “rejection identity” for many individuals
(Cimino and Smith 2007; Smith 2011, 2013). However, as this population has ex-
panded and evolved, there is a growing sense that an identity based on the re-
jection of religion and the politicization of nonbelief is insufficient for building a
“positive” non-religious community. The rapid growth of “secular congrega-
tions” that focus on community, inclusiveness, and meaning making instead
of criticism and polarization is evidence of a larger trend in which non-religious
individuals are attempting to move beyond religious rejection to construct more
“positive” non-religious identities and practices (Cimino and Smith 2014; Lee
2014, 2015).
While I am not the first to highlight the increasingly diverse individual and
collective identities being constructed among the growing non-religious popula-
tion (see Cotter 2015; LeDrew 2013; Lee 2014, 2015; Smith 2011, 2013, and Shook
in this volume), there is still much work to be done in this area. As Smith (2011,
232) explains, the non-religious do not step into a “ready-made” identity with a
“specific and definable set of roles or behaviors.” Without the ready-made iden-
tities, rituals, and communities that the religious so often have available to them,
the non-religious are forced to get creative in their search for new ways to engage
with their communities and make meaning out of their beliefs and experiences.
By describing the ways that one non-religious community is navigating this proc-
ess, this chapter builds on previous research that “recognizes the non-religious”
as a rich and diverse population full of complexity that is characterized not just
 Terminological debates abound in the nascent study of non-religious identity, so in order to
be clear and consistent, I draw on Lois Lee’s (2015) definition of non-religion as “any phenom-
enon – position, perspective, or practice – that is primarily understood in relation to religion but
which is not itself considered to be religious” (32). I will use “non-religion” as an umbrella term
to denote a wide variety of identities and beliefs, including atheism and agnosticism, but also
less clearly defined differentiations from religious belief and practice.While many of my partic-
ipants use the terms secular/ism, atheist/ism, and non-religion/ous interchangeably, I follow
Lee’s (2015) lead and keep these terms distinct, using “secular” to denote areligious phenomena
and “non-religious” to denote phenomena built in relation to religion.
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by a lack of beliefs and practices, but as having the potential to construct sub-
stantive, positive identities and practices (Lee 2015).
3 The Sunday Assembly: Changing the World
with Joy and Jon Bon Jovi
The Sunday Assembly is the perfect example of the recent move to make non-re-
ligious communities more positive. The organization in many ways replicates the
Protestant church model; they just simply do so with no reference to a deity or
the supernatural. In fact, they avoid discussions about both religion and non-re-
ligion, striving to be “radically inclusive” and welcoming to people with a variety
of beliefs and worldviews. The organization attempts to be non-hierarchical, and
while there are a handful of paid organizers who run the international organiza-
tion that manages the various local assemblies, individual chapters have no
equivalent to a pastor or a leader. All the organizing at the local level is volunteer
based, and speakers, who come from both inside and outside of the assemblies,
rotate each month. Despite its radical inclusivity, however, the Sunday Assembly
is explicitly non-religious and a majority of its organizers and active members
identify as atheist, agnostic, or non-religious.
The Sunday Assembly was founded by two British comedians in 2013, Sand-
erson Jones and Pippa Evans. As Pippa detailed during her introductory com-
ments at the Sunday Assembly Everywhere conference in May of 2015, the two
met a few years prior on a road trip to a comedy gig in Bath. They connected
on the idea of a church-like environment where non-religious individuals
could sing songs and listen to inspirational talks together, offer emotional and
social support for fellow non-religious individuals, and collectively construct
non-religious rituals and practices that might produce a deeper sense of mean-
ing among the non-religious. They initially set out to organize such a community
in London and were met with a surprising amount of success. They began to put
together a “Make Your Own Assembly Kit” online, making it widely available in
order to see if they could build a network of assemblies across Britain and be-
yond. Since then, the number of assemblies has exploded to over 70 individual
assemblies across the globe, from Hamburg, Germany, to Sydney, Australia, to
Cleveland, Ohio.
The Sunday Assembly motto is “Live Better, Help Often,Wonder More,” and
this is reflected in what the local assemblies center their services and activities
around. To “Live Better,” they sing songs together, form small groups based on
interests like watching Ted Talks and playing games, and they have a section
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in their service called “One Thing I Do Know,” which is a space for members
from the community to share an experience that taught them an important les-
son. To “Help Often” they put on monthly volunteering activities and advocate
for helping each other out by starting phone trees and cooking food for people
who are sick or going through a hard time. To “Wonder More” they bring in
speakers who impart knowledge about a topic, much like a Ted Talk, and a por-
tion of their services are devoted to non-religious inspirational readings. They
have a moment of silence in their services as well, asking those who came to re-
flect on the things they learned and how they might apply them to their lives
going forward.
The organization is explicitly apolitical and avoids inserting itself into any
political or social debates that might hinder the chances of collaborating with
religiously-affiliated groups or individuals; while the organization and its activ-
ities are explicitly non-religious, the Sunday Assembly charter states that the or-
ganization is open to anyone who wants to join, regardless of beliefs. As such,
the talks, readings, and music are, for the most part, free of any anti-religious
or pro-atheist rhetoric. Instead, the assemblies focus on topics like science, per-
sonal empowerment, healthy lifestyle choices, and community betterment.
The organization’s rapid expansion has even caught the attention of the
media, and many have dubbed Sunday Assembly “the first atheist mega-church”
(e.g. Walshe 2013; Winston 2013). While there are a handful of assemblies in
other Western European countries like Germany, Denmark, and Hungary, a
large majority of assemblies are located in the United States and the United King-
dom. The goal of the organization is to be a positive community environment for
non-religious individuals and a major piece of that positivity stems from the col-
lective singing of pop songs that the Sunday Assembly is becoming known for.
As Sanderson jokingly quipped at the conference, the Sunday Assembly is at-
tempting to “change the world with joy and Jon Bon Jovi.”
4 Data and Method
I have been involved in ongoing participant observation with a local Sunday As-
sembly in the Midwestern United States since March of 2013 (Midwest Assembly,
hereafter). I started attending their organizing meetings before they held their
first assembly, so I have been able to observe the founding and evolution of
this local chapter and its interactions with the founding assembly and other
local chapters over time. I’ve gone to almost all of their monthly assemblies, I
attend a majority of their organizing meetings, and I have access to their corre-
spondence with other assemblies. In addition, I have interviewed 15 of the Mid-
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west Assembly’s organizers and active members, talking with them about their
reasons for joining, their non-religious identities, and their visions for Sunday
Assembly’s future. I’ve gone to a couple potlucks and a few volunteer activities
they have put on as well. Finally, as mentioned above, I attended a three day
conference in May 2015 where I met numerous organizers from other chapters
in the United States and the United Kingdom, spoke to and listened to the found-
ers speak about the organization and its goals, and sat in on workshops and or-
ganizational meetings where members debated and discussed the organization’s
charter, motto, and the structure and content of the monthly assemblies.
Data for this chapter come primarily from my interactions and interviews
with members of the Midwest Assembly, though I do draw on my observations
from the conference as well. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded
for common themes; observations, both at the Midwest Assembly and at the con-
ference, were transcribed into field notes and analyzed alongside the interviews.
Demographic data on Sunday Assembly membership is not yet available, but the
average Sunday Assembly participant I have encountered is a white, middle-
class, professional in their 30s or 40s.
The main limitation of this data is that the conclusions I draw in this chapter
are primarily based on my in-depth ethnography with one chapter of a much
larger, international organization. Thus, my data is inevitably influenced by
the specific cultural context of the Midwestern United States. However, the
three days I spent observing the conference, where numerous other chapters
were represented and the views and goals of the larger organization were de-
tailed in depth over the course of the conference, offered a chance to corroborate
the data collected from the Midwest Assembly with observations from the larger
organization. Further, while the conclusions I draw in this chapter are represen-
tative of the Sunday Assembly as it is now, it is a new organization that is quickly
growing and evolving. Its goals and vision are constantly being debated, and re-
gional and national differences are likely to influence the trajectory of individual
assemblies and the organization as a whole.With these caveats in mind, howev-
er, this chapter is meant to highlight some of the boundary making and identity
construction processes at work in this new non-religious organization and the
ways in which they are similar to and distinct from the ways non-religious iden-
tity in the United States has been understood in the past.
5 The Sunday Assembly in Context
While the combination of religious rituals and non-religious messages embodied
in the Sunday Assembly is interesting in and of itself, it is even more so consid-
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ering the prominence of the highly politicized, anti-religious rhetoric espoused
by non-religious organizations and their leaders over the last decade. In both
the U.S. and the U.K., the recent rise in visibility of atheism in the public sphere
is due in large part to the popularity of New Atheism, a political movement cen-
tered around a critique of religion and the promotion of a rationalistic, scientific
worldview (Bullivant 2012; Cragun 2015; Kettell 2014; LeDrew 2015). New Atheism
has become a dominant ideological force driving atheist activism and non-reli-
gious organizing coming out of these two countries, and prominent atheist
and secular activist groups like the Freedom From Religion Foundation and
American Atheists in the United States and the Richard Dawkins Foundation
in the United Kingdom promote a minority discourse and identity politics that
emphasize the politicization of atheist identity and the need to battle religion’s
hegemony in public and political spheres (Cimino and Smith 2007; Smith 2013a;
LeDrew 2015).
The often polarizing and negative message cultivated by the New Atheist
movement has produced a large population of atheists who describe and
enact their atheist identity as one built on religious critique (e.g. Kettell 2015; Le-
Drew 2015). Similarly, Smith (2011) found that atheism was a “rejection identity”
for a majority of the atheists he interviewed, an identity built in direct opposition
to religious beliefs and institutions. Consequently, he draws on the idea of the
“not self” to describe how atheists, lacking a ready-made atheist identity to con-
form to, instead frame their identity as “biographical and rejection-based; a
product of interaction, and an achieved identity to be sure, but one constructed
out of negation and rejection, rather than filling culturally defined social roles”
(Smith 2011, 232). For Smith’s participants, atheism was often a way to describe
what they did not believe in or agree with, as opposed to a marker of specific
values, beliefs, or practices that they affirmed.
However, as the number of non-religious individuals continues to grow, re-
searchers are finding that non-religious individuals do not always understand
their identity as rejection-based. Lee (2014, 467) asserts that non-religion can
also signal “substantive nonreligious and spiritual cultures more commonly
than scholars and even respondents themselves appreciate” and that “we cannot
therefore assume that their use indicates disaffiliation or non-identification rath-
er than affiliation and identification.” Lee (2014, 477) finds that non-religion can
be used to describe “an array of concrete spiritual and nonreligious affiliations,”
and argues that social science research to date has been too heavily focused on
atheism and non-religion as a negative, as opposed to a positive, affirmation (see
also Baker and Smith 2015; Pasquale 2009). Similarly, LeDrew (2013b, 465) ar-
gues that “we should understand atheism not in terms of losing beliefs, but rath-
er, in terms of the development of other kinds of beliefs.”
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Indeed, Smith (2013b, Chapter 10) agrees that not all atheism is rejection-
based, and argues that the continued development and growth of organized
atheism will likely lead to a wider variety of orientations to religion and identity.
In line with these new empirical and theoretical developments, in their study of
new non-religious communities in America, including the Sunday Assembly, Ci-
mino and Smith (2014) describe what they call a “new new atheism” in which
nonbelievers are attempting to build a positive identity around their non-religion
in an attempt to move past rejection identities. Like the secular death practices
(MacMurray, Chapter 13) and non-religious weddings (Hoesly, Chapter 12) descri-
bed in this volume, many of Cimino and Smith’s interviewees were seeking out
non-theistic rituals and rites of passage, non-religious alternatives to traditional
religion, and even “secular spirituality.”
However, scholars like Kettell (2014), LeDrew (2015), and Baggs and Voas
(2009) would warn against positing these trends as especially “new,” and
their historical treatments of non-religious organizing in Britain and the United
States reveal that the seemingly disparate identities espoused by the New Athe-
ists and Sunday Assembly are products of a long history of tension within the
Western non-religious community. These scholars identify a major fault line
within Western non-religion that was formed in many ways at its inception
and continues to divide the movement today. LeDrew (2015) defines the two
sides of this divide as “scientific” and “humanistic,” a divide that dates back
to the scientific revolution in the 19th century. At this time, LeDrew explains,
two types of atheism emerged: Scientific atheists were affirmed and fueled by
Darwin’s theory of evolution and began attempting to expose religion as a bi-
product of ignorance that is now superseded by science and reason. Humanistic
atheists, however, considered religion a social phenomena; humanists were
more inclined to see religion as capable of addressing social and emotional
needs, and were thus less inclined to criticize religion and were instead open
to compromising and working with religious individuals and institutions. And
similar debates occurred between self-acclaimed “secularists” who clashed
over the definitions of secularism and whether it signified an absence of religion
or a substantive category in its own right (Rectenwald, this volume).
This divide is still salient today. Kettell (2014) details how disputes within the
modern atheist movement are characterized by a divide between confrontational
atheists, who utilize a combative approach to religion, and accommodationist
atheists, who take a more conciliatory stance. Kettell explains that the internal
structure of the atheist movement is diverse and absent of any central organiza-
tion or ideology; some groups embody a more confrontational and political ap-
proach by engaging in legislative battles over church/state violations, while
other groups are more geared toward acting as a substitution for religious insti-
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tutions, providing secular celebrants for weddings and secular answers to larger
questions of meaning and value. As Schutz (this volume) and Mastiaux (also this
volume) describe, there are a wide variety of non-religious organizations and rea-
sons for joining them, including social, political, communal, and intellectual.
Similarly, Kettell (2014) identifies four major aims and campaigns found within
this heterogeneous movement: reducing the influence of religion in the public
sphere, criticizing religious belief and promoting atheism, improving civil rights
and social status, and community building and group cohesion. He argues,
“These disputes about identity and the use of labels also reflect more fundamen-
tal strategic frictions within the movement about the best way for atheists to
present themselves and approach religious beliefs” (Kettell 2015, 383).
It is in this context that Sunday Assembly emerges, an undoubtedly distinct
deviation from the anti-religious, scientific atheism of the recently prominent
New Atheism, but not entirely unique from other accommodationist non-reli-
gious communities that have come before.⁴ In this environment where non-reli-
gious individuals exist on a continuum of accommodation and confrontation,
the Sunday Assembly has been attempting to strike a balance between the two
poles – affirm a scientific, non-theistic worldview while also incorporating bits
and pieces of religious ritual and spiritual practice where they are useful. In
the following sections, I detail some of the ways the Sunday Assembly balances
its goals of being both explicitly non-religious and radically inclusive, of cultivat-
ing transcendence and reason, and of being like a church while at the same time
different enough from a church to attract the widest range of non-religious iden-
tities and beliefs possible. I will argue that these boundary-making processes il-
lustrate how the positive non-religion that Sunday Assembly is attempting to
construct is shaped by the tensions between rejection and accommodation,
and while the members of Sunday Assembly are attempting to move beyond re-
jection identities, they are constantly negotiating what it is they should affirm.
6 Rejecting Rejection Identities
That was something that I’d missed, I’d missed that community aspect of having a place to
go to on a regular basis that was less about bashing god and religious people … Because I’d
been to [other non-religious groups] who were just so negative. And that was something
 For example, the British Humanist Association that came to prominence in the 1960s em-
braced humanism as their rationalistic moral philosophy and focused on providing concrete al-
ternatives to religion instead of criticizing religion and engaging in political battles to lessen its
influence in society (Bagg and Voas 2009).
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that I started thinking about, this whole idea of a negative identity. Of having an identity
that was formed against something else. And with Sunday Assembly, now we are formed
around this identity of becoming something else.
Eric, member of the Midwest Assembly
Like Eric, many of the members of the Midwest Assembly I interviewed have
been or still are members of other local non-religious groups and organizations.⁵
They often used their experiences with these other groups and organizations,
groups Kettell (2014) would describe as more confrontational, as a foil to de-
scribe what they hoped Sunday Assembly would become. Many expressed that
they found the activist and political groups useful at first, and they supported
these organizations’ efforts to maintain the separation of church and state and
fight for non-religious citizens’ rights, but they grew tired of talking about
“how religion got them down” and wanted to “start seeing what else was out
there.”
For some, the constant rejection of religion and affirmation of nonbelief is
simply not something they are interested in. Zack, a younger member who at-
tends frequently, told me that he did not identify strongly with atheism and
did not “feel the need to talk about it all the time.” He joined because he
liked the music and the possibility of making some new social connections.
Amy, an active organizer of the Midwest Assembly, echoed Zack’s sentiments,
saying, “I hope we can move post atheism in which it’s just accepted that we
don’t have to make our life’s mission to prove there is no god. We just live sec-
ularly as if god was never presumed in the first place.”
For others, however, the constant critique of religion that is prevalent in the
more activist non-religious groups conflicts with the way they want to enact their
non-religious identity. For Amanda, leaving Catholicism was a painful and lone-
ly process, and to ask others to have that same experience before they were ready
felt wrong. She explains:
Despite, you know, really, coming into this identity of atheism, I never felt like it was my
place to dissuade others. Just because this break had been so painful for me, I did not
want to inflict that on other people. If they weren’t having that crisis, people were living
their whole lives happily with these beliefs, who am I to take them away?
 All names are pseudonyms. As this is a small community, very little identifying information is
given about individual interviewees in the attempts to protect participant identifications as
much as possible.
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Brad, a newer member of the Midwest Assembly, also disliked what he saw as
the requirement to reject all the comforts of spiritual beliefs if you become an
atheist. He described himself as an agnostic, but one that still sometimes relied
on the belief that “some force” was holding everything together when he was
going through trying times. He said, “I want to be an atheist at some point. A
lot of people I know are very comfortable being atheist, but the thing I’m holding
back from is that some atheists really hate Christians. I don’t want to hate any-
body. I don’t agree with them, but I’m not going to hate them.” Brad’s experience
with other non-religious groups led him to believe that atheists were overwhelm-
ingly negative toward other religions and even toward other non-religious ideol-
ogies like his. His hope for the Sunday Assembly is that it can be more open to
exceptions and alternative ways of being non-religious.
Overall, the members of the Midwest Assembly express a desire to move be-
yond rejecting religion or building an identity around that rejection. Eric, like
Amy above, uses the term “post-atheism” to describe this new orientation to
non-religious identity. He said, “I more consider myself a post-atheist, rather
than necessarily an atheist. Because my worldview really isn’t defined by an ab-
sence of god. I’m really only an atheist in the presence of religious people. The
rest of the time, I’m just me.” For Eric, to be an atheist means to consciously re-
ject religion and build your identity against that. But to be post-atheist means he
can move beyond that rejection and live his life in a more positive pursuit of
knowledge and meaning. The Sunday Assembly is a space that this new identity
and community formation can take place, a space that is not built on the rejec-
tion of religion, but of “becoming something else.” However, as I will describe in
the next three sections, what this new positive identity should look like is much
less clear, and the members of the Sunday Assembly engage in a constant proc-
ess of negotiation as they attempt to balance between non-religious and non-the-
istic worldviews and beliefs, selective accommodation of religious ritual and
practice, and a sense of the transcendent that is entirely this-worldly and devoid
of the supernatural.
6.1 Negotiating Radical Inclusivity
At the beginning of every monthly organizing meeting for the Midwest Assembly,
one of the five to seven organizing members in attendance reports the “Sunday
Assembly Everywhere Network News.” The Sunday Assembly has set up an
email list-serve in which any member of any local Sunday Assembly chapter
can email all the other members on the list-serve questions and concerns
about their individual assembly or the organization more broadly. At each Mid-
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west Assembly organizing meeting, we spend some time reviewing what has
been discussed on the list-serve. During one such meeting, it was reported
that a self-identified Christian had attended a service of the Los Angeles Sunday
Assembly and sent the organizers a write-up of her experience. In her write up,
this woman discussed how she did not feel like she belonged at the Sunday As-
sembly because she had religious beliefs, but admitted that the Sunday Assem-
bly was not created for her and she understood why it is an important space for
non-religious individuals. The result was what is now an infamously long (over
150 emails) debate between numerous members of the Sunday Assembly com-
munity regarding just how accommodating the Sunday Assembly should be to-
wards religious individuals and their beliefs.
The Sunday Assembly charter, which was written by Sanderson and Pippa
during the founding months of the organization, states, “The Sunday Assembly
is radically inclusive – everyone is welcome, regardless of their beliefs. This is a
place of love that is open and accepting.”⁶ This one statement has led to quite
possibly the most debate and fallout among the different Sunday Assemblies
and their members, and in many ways, shapes the other major themes discussed
in this chapter as well. To start, many express confusion over what “radical in-
clusivity” really is and looks like, causing enough of a stir in the community to
merit an entire workshop devoted to the topic at the conference in Atlanta.
During this workshop, over 30 of the conference attendees gathered in a
small room to hash out what being radically inclusive meant for them as a
non-religious organization. While a majority of those in attendance agreed that
Sunday Assembly should welcome anyone who is interested, as long as they
did not push their beliefs on anyone, some expressed that they felt it was a para-
dox to say you are radically inclusive while at the same time requiring that the
ethos of the organization and its services remain non-theistic in spirit and in
content. Others said they were in search of a secular community and did not
want to compromise their secular commitments to be inclusive of religious be-
liefs. One person in attendance said, “I will feel cheated if Sunday Assembly be-
comes an organization that aspires to welcome the religious and the non-reli-
gious equally. The religious have plenty of opportunities to voice their
concerns and their agenda. Non-believers do not.” While the individuals who
felt this way do not want to focus on rejecting religious ideas, they were con-
cerned that being too accommodating of religious ideas would shut down real
discussions about non-religious beliefs and values.
 See full charter at www.sundayassembly.com/story.
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These debates came up during the town hall meeting that was held on the
second day of the conference as well. During this meeting, anyone at the confer-
ence who wanted could participate in discussions about making changes to the
Sunday Assembly charter, motto, and mission statement. When it was founded,
the Sunday Assembly charter stated that it was a “godless congregation that cel-
ebrates life,” and the Sunday Assembly mission was to support a “godless con-
gregation in every town, city and village that wants one.” The media picked up
on this, and began to call the Sunday Assembly an “atheist church.” I noticed
that many of the Midwest Assembly members took issue with this during the
first few organizing meetings, both because they felt that calling it an atheist
church was too exclusionary of non-atheists who might want to attend, and call-
ing it a church risked turning off potential members who thought it would be
“too churchy.” Further, many felt the term “godless” was needlessly confronta-
tional and made it difficult to connect with organizations that might be offended
by the term. Despite these reservations, the Midwest Assembly continued to de-
scribe themselves as an atheist church in their press releases, and many told me
that it was the term they used when they described the organization to their
friends and family. However, during the town hall meeting at the conference,
members of other assemblies expressed similar reservations with the terms
“atheist church” and “godless congregation,” and the organization ultimately
voted to change their descriptor to “secular congregation” in order to be as inclu-
sive as possible without losing their secular designation.
This conflict between accommodation and confrontation is also present
within individual assembly’s decision making processes. For example, the Mid-
west Assembly recently began volunteering once a month at a homeless shelter
that is affiliated with a Catholic charity. The organizing members discussed the
pros and cons of partnering with the Catholic church, agreeing that while some
of the more anti-religious members might protest, the cause was worth the com-
promise. However, a few months later, an organizing member suggested that the
Midwest Assembly partner with Habitat for Humanity for another volunteering
opportunity. Although Habitat is a Christian organization, the organizer said
she had a good experience volunteering with them in the past and had never
been talked to about religion at any of their events. After some discussion, the
board decided to hold off, deciding that they already volunteered with one reli-
gious organization and agreeing that they should seek out secular organizations
to volunteer through instead.
The Midwest Assembly has also had a number of debates about whether or
not to include references to god or magic in the songs they sing at their gather-
ings. For example, when the Midwest Assembly band wanted to cover “Rainbow
Connection” from The Muppets, there was a debate as to whether they should
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keep the words “it’s probably magic” in the song. The band ended up including
the words, but many of the organizers expressed that the reference to magic
made them uncomfortable. Sue, an organizer who disagreed with the word’s in-
clusion, stated, “We don’t stand against anything but we do stand for something.
Reality.”
These examples illustrate the ways that the goal to be radically inclusive re-
quires the Sunday Assembly to constantly balance between an accommodating
stance toward religious and spiritual beliefs and institutions while at the same
time maintaining a boundary around the non-religious identity of the organiza-
tion and its members. There are disagreements about the decisions that are made
and where the lines are drawn, but this is what many say they like about the
Sunday Assembly. Brad from the Midwest Assembly, for example, said that “to
be radically inclusive means to make exceptions.” He saw these debates about
the “gray areas” as a necessary part of building something new like the Sunday
Assembly. He said, “We all have so many different ideas of what this secular as-
sembly looks like, which means that compromises will need to be made and
some small transgressions like the word ‘magic’ in a song will have to be over-
looked.”
6.2 Negotiating Secular Spirituality
The way people speak about how much they love god, I was like, that is how I feel about
life. And not in a supernatural way, but in a totally materialistic way. I didn’t even have the
words to describe those feelings that I had…there is not language about how that can hap-
pen if you aren’t religious.
Sanderson Jones, co-founder of Sunday Assembly
The above quote comes from another workshop I attended at the Sunday Assem-
bly conference in Atlanta, a workshop on the topic of “secular spirituality.” A
major goal of the Sunday Assembly is the formation of secular rituals and tradi-
tions, like those found in religious institutions, that cultivate a sense of connect-
edness, transcendence, and wonder. Indeed, to “wonder more” is one of the or-
ganizations main objectives, but this, too, has been met with resistance from
members of the Sunday Assembly community.
At the secular spirituality workshop, around 30 of the conference attendees,
including Sanderson, attempted to collectively define “secular spirituality” and
if and how Sunday Assembly should try to cultivate it. Many voiced that they dis-
liked the word “spirituality” and its association with supernatural beliefs, so one
of the main objectives of the workshop was to come up with some new terminol-
ogy to express feelings of secular transcendence and connectedness. After dis-
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cussing some possible vocabulary options, none of which really stuck, Sander-
son asked that everyone join in trying to cultivate a feeling of secular spirituality
right there in the workshop; we tried clapping together, humming together, and
some even “testified” to the group in a way similar to what you would find in a
religious service. As Smith (in this volume) would say, this workshop was meant
to construct new ways to “sacralize the secular” and imbue secular beliefs and
practices with meaning. After these attempts, Sanderson gauged people’s reac-
tions. While some expressed that they were uncomfortable with the experience
and said that it felt forced and “too much like church,” others said they could
see these practices really working and would be trying them in their own assem-
blies.
Explicit attempts to ritualize non-theistic spiritual practices and define a sec-
ular spirituality has been less of a focus at the Midwest Assembly, and some of
the members I interviewed expressed a real discomfort with the idea. Angela, a
more peripheral member, said that she is uncomfortable with secular rituals,
saying, “I don’t attend the assemblies for spiritual or personal growth. I’m enjoy-
ing it as having a party with friends, which is a very different approach than
many others in the assembly.” Angela is concerned that more and more members
of the Midwest Assembly are coming for spiritual growth and she is hoping that
they can strike a balance between their position and hers, or she might have to
stop coming. However, others at the Midwest Assembly are more open to the idea
of a secular spirituality. Jeff, for example, said:
When you see atheists in the news, it’s them trying to stop Christians from doing some-
thing. Their stance towards people who are not atheist is a negative stance … It’s more
of an intellectual kind of a belief system, which has its purpose and maybe it’s just an evo-
lution of this community … But a lot of people don’t want to make an intellectual argument
out of their reason for living. They want it to be more holistic. I don’t think you ever get
away from the emotional.
For Jeff, and many other Midwest members I interviewed, a purely intellectual
approach to non-religious identity lacks a sense of the transcendent and the
emotional connectedness that they are hoping to cultivate at the Sunday Assem-
bly. By singing together, quietly reflecting together during moments of silence,
and trying out new rituals and activities that might potentially produce a
sense of wonder and collective effervescence, these Sunday Assemblers are at-
tempting to cultivate a secular spirituality that balances their secular commit-
ments with their desires for a more holistic approach to the pursuit of meaning
and happiness as non-religious individuals.
Like the debates surrounding Sunday Assembly’s stated goal to be radically
inclusive, the attempts to cultivate non-theistic rituals and spirituality are met
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with resistance and compromise. While some members joined the Sunday As-
sembly in pursuit of these rituals, others have stayed in spite of them or left
all together. Consequently, the organizers of the Midwest Assembly are constant-
ly assessing whether or not their gatherings are too church-like or not enough like
a church. In the next section, I will describe conversations surrounding the
church-like structure of the Sunday Assembly as a final example of the ways
that the Sunday Assembly operates as a space of negotiation and compromise,
of both accommodation and rejection.
6.3 Negotiating Structure: Church-Like, But Not Too Much
The intentional replication of the Protestant church model is one of the defining
features of the Sunday Assembly. The organization’s primary gathering is on a
Sunday, it consists of group sing-a-longs, fellowship, moments of reflection, in-
spirational talks, and coffee; it lasts about two hours and people often go grab
lunch or drinks afterwards. As Smith (this volume) describes, the Sunday Assem-
bly is participating in a congregational culture that structures the relationships
and experience of its members. Not surprisingly, Sunday Assembly has received
a lot of media attention for their enthusiastic appropriation of the contemporary
Protestant church model, but it is in fact a common source of conflict and con-
fusion for its members.
When I asked members of the Midwest Assembly why they liked the idea of
replicating the church model to build community for non-religious people, the
most common answer was: “We don’t know how else to do it.” At the same
time, they talked about how they saw nothing wrong with the church model
in and of itself; they had been disappointed by the way that the more activist
non-religious communities were organized and felt like the church model had
a lot going for it. For example, Eric told me, “Why not take from the best
parts of religion? The things that actually work that are making us better people
and just ditch the rest.” Similarly, Beth, an older organizer with a long history of
church attendance, said:
I don’t think the church model, in and of itself, is bad. I don’t want to throw the baby out
with the bathwater. It’s been very successful, so to me I think there isn’t anything wrong
with modeling it after that. I’m not even sure what we would do if we didn’t. I think the
Sunday Assembly has done a good job at not having a hierarchy, like, there’s no ‘minister’
person. So I think they’ve got rid of the things I don’t like about the church, but I think that
model is good, like I said, I don’t know how else to do it.
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However, others express that the Sunday Assembly is often too churchy for them,
and there are frequent discussions about how to balance being too churchy and
not churchy enough at the Midwest Assembly’s organizing meetings. Luke, who
has stopped participating in the Midwest Assembly since I interviewed him,
told me that he liked the idea of a non-religious church but found the Sunday
Assembly to be too much like a church. He said it was “too formalized” because
everyone stood for the songs and bowed their heads during the moment of si-
lence. Josie, another member who has since stopped attending, attributed the
“churchiness” to the frequent music breaks and a lack of casual interactions be-
tween the assembly attendees. As a result, the organizing team has reorganized
the service in attempts to cut back on the churchy aspects, while attempting to
keep enough of the Sunday Assembly structure so as not to lose the concept en-
tirely. They agreed to rename the “moment of silence” to a “moment of reflec-
tion” and began displaying a quote or question to reflect upon during these mo-
ments. They also agreed that there would be one less song during the service and
more social time to increase interaction and to cut down on the transitions from
siting to standing.
Like the debates about radical inclusivity and secular spirituality, the selec-
tive appropriation of the church model is rife with contradictions and exceptions
that members of the Sunday Assembly continuously navigate. This sentiment is
exemplified in Amanda’s statement to her fellow organizers below, in which she
explains to them that the discussions about how to balance being like a church
and not like a church were never going to be fully resolved, and that that was
okay. She said:
We will always have the conversation that it is too much or not enough like church, but the
whole purpose of this is to toe the line. And we will never get it right, and we have to be
okay with that. We have to embrace the fact that this is the balancing act. I have been on
both sides of the argument, and the perfect decisions are going to make up for the ones that
are not so perfect.
7 Conclusion: Constructing Positive Non-religion
Like Amanda, who sees the Sunday Assembly as largely a balancing act, most
Sunday Assemblers are open to compromising and negotiating the boundaries
of what the Sunday Assembly is and will become. The Sunday Assembly is a
space where non-religious individuals come to move beyond an identity built
on rejection, but who are nonetheless unsure of what that might look like in
practice. By selectively drawing on aspects of church organizational structures
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and spiritual rituals that they have seen work in religious settings, the members
of Sunday Assembly hope to cultivate a positive non-religion that is focused on
building community, pursuing deeper meaning, and celebrating life.
In this chapter, I have detailed three major themes emerging from my field
work with the Sunday Assembly that illustrate how the process of constructing
positive non-religion is full of compromises and exceptions; it is a constant ne-
gotiation between selectively accommodating religious and spiritual practices
and simultaneously maintaining a boundary around the non-religious identity
of the organization and its members. Both within the Midwest Assembly and
among the members of the larger Sunday Assembly organization, debates
abound about the viability of radical inclusivity, the cultivation and promotion
of non-theistic rituals and secular spirituality, and the selective appropriation
of the contemporary Protestant church model as its organizational structure.
But despite disagreements about the shape and content Sunday Assembly, its
unifying goal is to move beyond a negative non-religiosity and towards “becom-
ing something else,” something that can be positively affirmed and cultivated in
practice.
However, my findings here are only one piece of a much larger non-religious
landscape. The Sunday Assembly alone is made up of over 70 chapters, and fu-
ture research should explore the ways that regional and cultural differences
among the individual chapters influence the types of individual and collective
non-religious identities and practices that take shape. Research should also ex-
plore in more depth the organizational dynamics between various non-religious
groups and organizations. The organizers of the Midwest Assembly often discuss
how they want to maintain a good relationship with other non-religious and
atheist groups in the area, but that they are aware that they are competing
with them for resources, members, and a space in the larger community. Future
research should build on Kettell (2014) and Bagg and Voas (2009) to explore the
ways that accommodationist and confrontational non-religious groups interact,
both on the local and national level, and the extent to which there are conflicts
over representation and resources. Further, do these positive and negative sides
of non-religion present themselves in other times and contexts? This chapter has
focused on the U.S./U.K. context, but are there other kinds of divisions among
non-religious individuals in other countries and historical periods (see for exam-
ple Quack 2012)? Beyond the Sunday Assembly, more research is needed that
more explicitly compares accommodationist non-religious groups like the Sun-
day Assembly with religious organizations and groups. How do ritual practices
like collective singing and moments of silence work differently in religious
and non-religious settings?
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In mapping the boundary work of the nascent Sunday Assembly, I set out in
this chapter to contribute to the growing literature on the substantive beliefs and
practices of non-religious individuals and the rich, complex identities they are
constructing in relation to religion (e.g. Lee 2015).While non-religious identities
have largely been understood as negative identities that indicate a lack of beliefs
and practices, the Sunday Assembly is made up of non-religious individuals who
explicitly reject rejection identities and who are working together to construct
new communities and practices that allow them to express a positive non-reli-
gion. And while the shape and content of this positive non-religion is still very
much under construction, the negotiations surrounding its construction exem-
plify the nuanced nature of non-religious identity and practice that researchers
will need to attend to going forward.
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Joseph Langston, Joseph Hammer, Ryan Cragun & Mary Ellen
Sikes
Inside The Minds and Movement of
America’s Nonbelievers: Organizational
Functions, (Non)Participation, and Attitudes
Toward Religion
1 Introduction
Both Campbell’s Toward a Sociology of Irreligion (1971) and Budd’s Varieties of
Unbelief (1977) described how some members of the secular/freethought move-
ments in late 19th century Britain took a militant approach to religious doctrines,
theology, the Bible, and the authority of the church. To these individuals, religion
was, at best, nonsense, and, at worst, harmful. Other members preferred a more
conciliatory approach characterized by politeness and civility. The latter’s goal
was obtaining respectability and social acceptance for secularists and atheists.
It was their view that the former hostile approach barred those who possessed
“advanced religious opinions” from the desired circle of increased social status
and thus out of positions of political influence. Indeed, Budd described this di-
vision in terms of “militant” and “respectable” wings (Budd 1977, 46, 49, 69), re-
ferring to them also as “negative” and “positive” secularism, respectively (also
see Rectenwald, this volume).
There are similar divisions between conciliatory and militant views and ap-
proaches to secular, humanist, atheist, and freethought (SHAF) movement acti-
vism in America today (see Fazzino and Cragun, this volume; Kettell 2013). The
noted similarity between this issue today and as described by Campbell and
Budd served as the impetus for the study that follows. Has this tension persisted
across time, space, and culture? If so, why? Obviously the context covered by
Campbell and Budd was quite different from contemporary America, and yet,
the term “accommodationist” has come to characterize the conciliatory position
for modern American nonbelievers. This term is often applied pejoratively to
nonbelievers who are accommodationists by nonbelievers who are not,¹ whereas
 The term “accommodationist” was previously and still is used to refer to those who think that
science and religion can be accommodated with one another. We point this out to avoid confu-
sion with the term’s other, more contemporary usage in referring to accommodation of nonbe-
lievers with the existence of religion.
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those who wish for the elimination of religion have come to be known as “New
Atheists”—whether or not such individuals self-consciously subscribe to this
label. Campbell (1971, 37–38, 43, 54) referenced these attitudes with the terms
“eliminationists” (or “abolitionists”²) and “substitutionists” (or the “replace-
ment” view), although it should be clear that Campbell’s substitutionists need
not be today’s accommodationists, and vice versa. Modern discourse in Ameri-
can SHAF communities does not identify substitutionism and accommodation-
ism as necessarily commensurate, although some contemporary examples of
substitutionists in America would include Ethical Culture, some Unitarian Uni-
versalist congregations or individuals, and the Sunday Assembly (see chapters
by Smith and Frost in this volume).We offer that modern New Atheism in Amer-
ica can still be understood in the same manner described by Campbell in ex-
pounding on eliminationism/abolitionism; that is, for our purposes, these
terms describe the same attitudinal approach to religion.
Regarding the similarity across place and time, we wondered: what is the
“big picture” when it comes to conflicts, schisms, or divisions that might charac-
terize movement participation and SHAF groups in modern America? Nonbeliev-
ers in America have been described as a particularly contentious group, prone to
fragmentation, and an inability to be organized (although see Smith 2013, 84,
who suggests that such problems are becoming a thing of the past; also see Ci-
mino and Smith 2011, 36). Yet, it is not clear how or why this makes them any
more disintegrated than other social forms of organization, ecclesiastical or oth-
erwise; in fact, we would observe that instability, inter- and intra-organization
contentions, and in-fighting are characteristic of most social movements. Point-
edly, Cimino and Smith (2011, 36) stated that “publics open to internal antago-
nism are publics that are active, not fractured.” But, in the specific case of non-
believers and their movement, certain unanswered questions remained.What do
nonbelievers who are or are not members of these groups think about the actual
or hypothetical goals of these groups? What were these groups doing that might
attract or repel greater support? What were groups, leaders, or activists doing
that turned people away or polarized either participation in or opinion about
the movement? Why didn’t nonbelievers who were not members, and never
had been, join these groups? When we noticed that the dynamic of elimination-
ism and accommodationism was present then, in Britain, and now, in the United
States, these were the kinds of additional questions that sprang to mind. While
 “Eliminationism is the belief that religion has proved to be erroneous and harmful and thus
needs to be abolished” (345). “Substitutionists…are more concerned with building a movement
which can effectively displace religion in all its major functions and thus they favour a less cen-
tralised structure capable of meeting the needs of its members” (345).
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some non-empirical literature spoke to these issues, empirical investigations of
these questions were nowhere to be found in previous studies of atheism and
nonbelief, so we set out in a pioneering effort to address these questions.
1.1 Previous Research
A few contemporary studies address the eliminationist-accommodationist dy-
namic. Kettell (2013, 2014), LeDrew (2012, 2014, 2015), and Cimino and Smith
(2007, 2010, 2011) all described contention among individual nonbelievers and
their groups since the inception of New Atheism in the first decade of the 21st
century. Their work points to differences between New Atheists and those non-
believers who seek, at the most, cooperation and solidarity with religious groups
and individuals on social and political issues of mutual concern, or at the least,
polite coexistence.While these two positions are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, they can be identified as separate strategies or approaches endorsed by dif-
ferent individuals (Kettell 2013).
Kettell (2014, 381), regarding “the atheist movement” in America as a whole,
suggested that it had four aims: reducing the influence of religion in the public
sphere; criticizing religious belief and promoting atheism; improving civil rights
and the social status of atheists; and community building and group cohesion.
Echoing Kettell, but referring to New Atheism specifically, Schulzke (2013) descri-
bed it as “a loosely defined movement that […] is not a clearly stated ideology
and […] lacks clear leadership as a social movement. Nevertheless, it is possible
to identify points of agreement that many or most New Atheists share, as well as
their disagreements with other variants of atheism” (780). New Atheists aggres-
sively and unapologetically challenge both the metaphysical claims made by dif-
ferent religions and religious influence on social life, science, and politics. This
approach sets them apart from previous forms of nonbelief, in terms of their
high-publicity critiques of both Christianity and Islam, and an unwillingness
to compromise or coexist with monotheistic religion (Csaszar 2010; Kettell
2013; McAnulla 2014). Notably, for Schulzke, the New Atheists are differentiated
from both pre 20th century atheists and modern atheists inclined toward accom-
modationism by a greater emphasis on political instead of theological opposition
to religion (i.e., the New Atheists advance “a form of political liberalism that co-
heres to core liberal doctrines” [2013, 779]) and by their confidence in science,
particularly the natural sciences (Cragun 2014). By contrast, then, New Atheism
seeks to supersede traditional atheism by attacking religion’s incursion into the
public sphere; by preventing religion from being an “alternate discourse” along-
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side science; and by elevating atheism as a political cause rather than merely a
personal, and thus private, perspective (Schulzke 2013).
Kettell (2013, 66–67) described a more moderate approach to religion within
the broader nonbeliever movement. Individuals endorsing this position tend to
criticize the New Atheist approach for being an “anti-position” that subordinates
“the affirmation of ethical values, humanistic virtues, and democratic princi-
ples” (Cimino and Smith 2011, 35). Some members of the SHAF/nonbeliever
movement who are not New Atheists could be said to desire a neutral public
arena that is equally shared by all (or at least one devoid of any undue bias to-
ward one specific religious tradition). Their approach is characterized more by
tolerance, coexistence, and a greater focus on the positive as opposed to negative
constitutive attributes of nontheism. Both New Atheists and the more moderate
nonbelievers appear to equally share a desire for the separation of church and
state, but there is conflict over the style or character of approach that should
be used in dealing with religious others, as well as conflict over whether it is
more important to improve the image and reputation of nonbelievers (Cimino
and Smith 2011; Kettell 2013) versus achieving progress toward a religion-free
public sphere. In general, then, New Atheists, as eliminationists, are more likely
to think overt hostility is both necessary and justified in the struggle against both
the influence and existence of religion, whereas other nonbelievers, as accommo-
dationists, think that a more respectful or less hostile approach is likelier to ach-
ieve the desired end of reducing undue religious influence, while leaving religion
extant.
Because no research to date has collected data on nonbeliever attitudes re-
garding movement goals and how best to approach religion, we set out to exam-
ine issues that might serve as the arenas of conflict—the “fractures” that exist
among American nonbelievers—as opposed to their agreements. Our study
was referred to as Atheism Looking In (Langston, Hammer, and Cragun 2014);
we were interested in what secularists, humanists, atheists, freethinkers, and
nonbelievers in general thought about the broader nonbeliever movement and
its aims, and their relation to it. In particular, we were interested in examining
attitudes indicative of hostility, or lack thereof, toward religious influence and
religious beliefs. As such, we loosely saw our study as a kind of organizational
study, but our approach was to examine the movement and its groups through
the perceptions of the members who made them up, whether affiliated or not,
rather than groups themselves as units of analysis.
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2 Method: Survey and Sample
We sent a recruitment email to over 100 American SHAF organizations that were
located on the Internet and in various directories on, or maintained by, these
groups. The email requested participation in our study and contained a hyper-
link to our Qualtrics survey. The first page of the survey contained an informed
consent, which specified who was eligible to participate (i.e. those who had re-
sided in the U.S. at least five years or who were U.S. citizens; 18 years of age or
older). The survey was operational from January 11th, 2014, to February 9th,
2014. A total of 2,527 respondents started the survey, with 2,006 completing it.
After coding and cleaning the data, a total nonrandom sample of 1,939 cases re-
mained, all of which had complete responses to all questions. All data reported
in results here are based on these cases, except where noted. Respondents from
every U.S. state were represented, from a low of three in Hawaii to a high of 149
from Texas. Thirty-two respondents said they did not live in the United States,
but data for these were kept under the assumption that these were U.S. citizens
living abroad.
In order to analytically address organizational involvement and identity, we
divided our final sample into four categories: members of many SHAF groups
(“MGs” for “Many Groups”; n = 581, 29.9%); members of just one group
(“OGs” for “One Group”; n = 356, 18.3%); respondents who were once members
of at least one group but were not members of any groups at the time of the sur-
vey (“FMs” for “Former Members”; n = 222, 11.4%); and respondents who had
never been members of such groups (“SNAs” for “Secular Nonaffiliates”; n =
780, 40.2%). This distinction served as a primary means to analyze differences
on other questions asked in the study.
First, we asked nonbelievers about their preferred identity labels, and about
their preferences for the goals, activities, and functions of nonbeliever groups
(some of which reference within-group activities, with others referencing exter-
nal activities oriented toward religion or the public). Second, we asked MGs,
OGs, and FMs why they thought SNAs did not join nonbeliever groups, and
we compared their answers side-by-side with the actual reasons given by
SNAs. Third, we examined a series of attitudinal questions about approaches
to religion, religious believers, and religious beliefs. Fourth, we asked about re-
spondent willingness to include in their communities what may be unpopular
social or political opinions, and we also asked how many secular nonaffiliates
the respondent personally knew. Fifth, we ran post hoc analyses to examine a
variety of gender and identity label differences in opinions and attitudes. Finally,
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we obtained external data from the American Secular Census, which further il-
luminated our focus and offered corroboration for some of our findings.
3 Results
3.1 What were the age, gender, and racial demographics of
our sample?

















Mean . . . . .
Median     
Mode     
Range – – – – –
Gender
Male .% .% .% .% .%
Female .% .% .% .% .%
Race
Nonwhite .% .% .% .% .%
White .% .% .% .% .%
Note: Nine respondents reported “Other” for gender and are excluded from gender reporting in
this table.
A one-way ANOVA determined that there was a significant age difference be-
tween groups (F [3, 1939] = 31.4, p < .001). However, because Levene’s test for ho-
mogeneity of variances revealed that group variances were not equal (F [3, 1939]
= 14.6, p < .001), we employed a Welch Test, which does not assume equal var-
iances (F [3, 1939] = 30.5, p < .001). Because this result indicated statistically sig-
nificant differences between group means on age, post hoc comparisons using
the Games-Howell procedure were conducted to determine which pairs of the
group membership means differed significantly. MGs (M = 43.62, SD = 16.16)
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were statistically significantly older than the other three groups (p < .001); OGs
(M = 38.98, SD = 16.6) were statistically significantly older (p = .01) than SNAs (M
= 36.02, SD = 13.64). A Chi-Square test further revealed that there was a statisti-
cally significant relationship between age and group membership (χ2 [3, 1939] =
59.06, p < .001, V = .17). More MGs (n = 355; 61.1%) were part of the older group
than the younger group (when splitting age by the median for the total sample).
More SNAs (57.4%) and more FMs (62.6%) were part of the younger group than
the older group.
3.2 What did these nonbelievers call themselves?
















Atheist .% .% .% % .%
Humanist .% .% .% .% .%
Secular .% .% .% .% .%
Skeptic .% .% .% .% .%
Nonbeliever .% .% .% .% .%
Freethinker .% .% .% .% .%
Rationalist .% .% .% .% .%
Agnostic .% .% .% .% .%
Non-Theist .% .% .% .% .%
Anti-Theist .% .% .% .% .%
Spiritual But
Not Religious
.% .% .% .% .%
Other .% .% .% .% .%
Table 2 reports identity labels by group membership level. Selections of labels
were mutually inclusive. Even though we used the term “nonbeliever” as an um-
brella term, many identity labels can be found in use within SHAF communities.
Because these labels, which we assembled from various online sources, were not
meant to be exhaustive, we provided an “Other” category in case our respond-
ents did not see their preferred identity labels among the list. It is encouraging
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that only 6.2% of respondents selected “Other”; even fewer selected none of the
11 labels but only “Other” (eight out of 1,939 respondents, to be exact). Thus, the
labels we offered seemed largely adequate to our respondents in order to de-
scribe themselves.
3.3 Which goals, activities, or functions of local, regional, or
national groups would these nonbelievers support?


















Charity .%a %a .%a .%b .%
χ=.,
V= .
SJ Activism .%a %a .%a .%b .%
χ=.,
V= .
Socialize .%a %b .%b .%c .%
χ=.,
V= .
Politick .%ab .%b %a %c .%
χ=,
V= .
Discussion .%a %b .%b .%c .%
χ=.,
V= .
Litigate .%ab .%b .%a %c .%
χ=.,
V= .





.%a .%a* .%a .%b* .%
χ=.,
V= .
Proselytize .%a .%a .%a .%b .%
χ=,
V= .
Other .% .% .% .% .% N/A
Note: Percentages reflect respondents who support each item as a goal, activity, or function of
groups at any organizational level. Response options were mutually inclusive. Percentages with-
in rows that do not share superscripts are significantly different at p < .01 or lower, with the ex-
ception of “Moral Education” (p = .02) between MGs and FMs, denoted by (*). Because each GAF
was collected as its own variable (i. e. selected or not selected), Bonferroni adjustments in pair-
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wise comparisons were not employed in subsequent pairwise comparisons for 2 (selected or not
selected) by 2 (group membership x or y) analyses. All omnibus Chi Square and Cramer’s V re-
ports for each row are statistically significant, p < .001. For all, df = 3, N = 1939. According to
Gravetter and Wallnau (2008), with 3 degrees of freedom, a Cramer’s V of .06 or above repre-
sents a small effect size; .17 or above represents a medium effect size; and .29 or above repre-
sents a large effect size, meaning that Cramer’s V for Discussion (.28) and Socialize (.25), as the
largest effect sizes for GAFs, approached the threshold of large effect sizes. Discussion = “I
think such groups should hold regular meetings for discussing topics related to critical thinking,
rationalism, religion, science, philosophy, and other intellectual topics”; Moral Education = “I
think such groups should develop and teach programs of moral education and positive values
and ethics, or I think such groups should serve as a platform to improve people morally”; Pol-
itick = “I think such groups should lobby Congress and lawmakers for secular causes, and, in
general, be involved in promoting political views, with the goal of advancing secular views and
causes via political processes; such groups should be involved in politics”; Litigate = “I think
such groups should litigate and be legal advocates on behalf of secular individuals and causes;
such groups should be involved in legal cases”; Socialize = “I think such groups should offer
regular social events, recreational outings, and opportunities to socialize and build a sense
of community among their members”; Officiate = “I think such groups should provide officials
who can conduct life cycle ceremonies such as weddings, funerals, and births”; Proselytize = “I
think such groups should use their influence to deliberately convince others to adopt secular or
nontheistic views”; Social Justice Activism = “I think such groups should be explicitly involved
in social justice efforts to combat racism, sexism, economic inequality, hate crimes, and to sup-
port civil rights, equal opportunity, and social equality”; Charity = “I think such groups should
be involved in humanitarian activities and charitable contributions”.
Compared to the other three groups, MGs over-selected on every goal selection.
SNAs only differed from FMs and OGs in SNAs’ lower preference for Discussion
and Socialize, whereas FMs and OGs only differed on FMs’ higher preference for
Politick and Litigate. Notably, OGs under-selected compared to SNAs on Social
Justice Activism, Politick, Litigate, and Moral Education.
Inside The Minds and Movement of America’s Nonbelievers 199
3.4 Why didn’t secular nonaffiliates join groups? What did
affiliated and formerly affiliated nonbelievers think were
the reasons that SNAs did not join?








Low Priority .% .%
Not Local .% .%
Nonbelief Not Big Part Of Self-Identity .% .%
Too Much Like Atheist Church .% %
Too Focused On Attacking Religion .% .%
Intellectual Independence .% .%
Other .% .%
Silly, Pointless, Contradictory .% .%
Too Ideological, Dogmatic, Close-Minded .% .%
Stigma % .%
Misguided Or Wrong Goals .% .%
No Interest In Discussion Types .% .%
Note: Multiple selections were allowed. Similar questions were asked of both groups; response
options listed here were the same for both groups, with the exception of the proper pronoun
replacement (e.g. “I” for Secular Nonaffiliates instead of “they” for Secular Affiliates and Former
Members). Nonbelief Not Big Part Of Self Identity = “They don’t see nonbelief as a primary part
of their self-identity; being a nonbeliever is just not a big deal to them”. Silly, Pointless, Contra-
dictory = “They think organized forms of nonbelief are silly, pointless, or self-contradicting”.
Misguided Or Wrong Goals = “They think such groups have misguided or wrong goals”. Too Fo-
cused On Attacking Religion = “They think nonbelieving groups are too focused on religion, i. e.
attacking and criticizing it”. Intellectual Independence = “They value their intellectual independ-
ence so much that they are not willing to be told by others what to believe or not believe”. Too
Ideological, Dogmatic, Close-Minded = “They think such groups are too ideological, dogmatic,
or closed-minded about their views”. Too Much Like Atheist Church = “They think organized
nonbelief mimics organized religion too much, i.e. ‘atheist church’”. Stigma = “They don’t
want to risk the social stigma that might come with being a public nonbeliever”. Low Priority
= “They would join but they simply have better or more important things to do with their
time, i. e. it is low priority”. Not Local = “They would join but such groups are not locally or im-
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mediately available to them”. No Interest in Discussion Types = “They have no interest in having
philosophical, metaphysical, or intellectual conversations about science, religion, etc.”
The guesses of Secular Affiliates and FMs placed the most emphasis on stigma,
and on nonbelief not being an important part of SNA self-identity. However,
SNAs reported that they mostly did not join because they have more important
things to do with their time. Roughly a third of SNAs indicated that they
would join if groups were local to them, whereas nearly a third of SNAs said
that being a nonbeliever simply wasn’t that important to them. Among the
“Other” responses,which triggered open-ended short responses in the survey ap-
paratus, 21 respondents indicated “Not enough time”; 14 said that they were “in-
troverted, shy, not social”; another 13 said that they were unaware of available
groups nearby, and another 11 indicated that they were “non-joiners”. Lastly,
10 respondents indicated that atheists and/or their groups “promoted negative
views”.
3.5 How willing were nonbelievers to endorse nonbeliever
groups openly attacking or not attacking religion?
















Attack .% .% .% .% .%
Depends .%b .%b .%b .%a .%
Refrain .% .% .% .% .%
Focus Within .%b .%b %b .%a .%
None Of Above .% .% % .% .%
Note: Omnibus χ2 (12, 1939) = 41.3, p < .001, V =.08. Subsequent z-score comparisons for each
row, employing Bonferroni corrections (p = .001), revealed that MGs were statistically signifi-
cantly different from the other three groups on selections for “Depends” and “Focus Within”.
Attack = “Nonbelieving groups should always or usually openly criticize and attack religion”.
Refrain = “Nonbelieving groups should always or usually refrain from openly attacking religion”.
Depends = “What nonbelieving groups should do depends on context and various other factors;
sometimes they should openly attack religion, and sometimes they should refrain from openly
attacking religion; it depends on various considerations”. Focus Within = “Nonbelieving groups
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should not even worry about openly attacking religion, but should instead focus their attentions
and efforts within their own groups”.
A majority of nonbelievers said that groups should neither refrain from nor al-
ways choose to attack or criticize religion and religious beliefs. While small mi-
norities said that groups should always engage in one of these options (5.2% At-
tack vs. 5.8% Refrain), three times as many said that groups should not worry
about attacking religion, but should instead focus their groups’ efforts within
the group itself.
3.6 How willing were nonbelievers to seek the eradication of
religion, if possible, or to seek common ground with
believers and not try to eradicate religion?
















Eradicate .%a .%a .%a .%b .%
Accommodate .%a .%a .%a .%b .%
Ignore .% .% .% .% .%
Unsure .% .% .% .% .%
Note: While omnibus Chi Square testing was marginally statistically significant different (χ2 [9,
1939] = 16.5, p = .057, V = .05), subsequent z-score comparisons for each row, employing Bon-
ferroni corrections (p = .002) revealed that MGs were statistically significantly different from the
other three groups on selections for “Eradicate” and “Accommodate”, indicated by superscripts
across rows. Eradicate = “If possible, religion should be eradicated entirely”. Accommodate =
“Secularists, nontheists, and atheists should seek accommodation with religious people to ach-
ieve common goals; beyond that, they should leave religious people alone and not seek to erad-
icate religion”. Ignore = “Secularists, nontheists, and atheists should neither work with reli-
gious people on common causes nor should they seek to eradicate religion in its various forms”.
A majority of nonbelievers said that nonbelievers should not only work with re-
ligious people to accomplish common goals, such as the separation of church
and state, but that no attempt should be made to eradicate religion. A quarter
of respondents opted for the elimination option, whereas very few said that non-
believers should pursue neither course of action. While we cannot say anything
definitive about the relatively high number of “Unsure” responses on this ques-
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tion, this could be indicative of ambivalence about how to approach religious
people and religious beliefs. It could also be indicative of an attitude which sug-
gests that nonbelievers should work with believers to achieve common goals
while simultaneously seeking to eradicate religion, an opinion offered by at
least one respondent in post-study feedback.
3.7 How willing were nonbelievers to mock or ridicule
religious beliefs, or to refrain from doing so?
















Avoid .%a .%a .%a %b .%
Depends .%a .%a .%a %b .%
Don’t Avoid % .% .% .% .%
Unsure .% .% .% .% .%
Note: Omnibus χ2 (9, 1939) = 44.1, p < .001, V = .08. Subsequent z-score comparisons for each
row, employing Bonferroni corrections (p = .002) revealed that MGs were statistically signifi-
cantly different from the other three groups on “Avoid” and “Depends”, indicated by super-
scripts across rows. Avoid = “Mockery and ridicule of religious people and religious beliefs
should be avoided; they are counterproductive or make nonbelievers look bad”. Don’t Avoid
= “Mockery and ridicule of religious people and religious beliefs should be encouraged or
used; it is the treatment that religious beliefs deserve, and to avoid using them is to give reli-
gious people and religious beliefs a free pass that they don’t deserve”. Depends = “Some de-
gree of mockery and ridicule are acceptable and/or recommendable, but it just depends on var-
ious different things”.
A majority said that whether mockery and ridicule should be applied to religious
people and religious beliefs simply depends on various considerations. A rela-
tively large minority of respondents said that mockery and ridicule should be
avoided because they are counter-productive or make nonbelievers look bad, al-
though fewer MGs than any of the other groups selected this option.
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3.8 How willing or unwilling were nonbelievers to include or
exclude unpopular social or political opinions from their
communities or the movement in general?
Table 8. Willingness to Accept or Not Accept Unpopular Social and Political Opinions in
















Incompatible .%a .%a .%a .%b .%
Compatible .% .% .% .% .%
Not Sure .% .% .% .% .%
Note: Omnibus χ2 (6, 1939) = 17.7, p = .007, V = .06. Incompatible and Compatible options refer
to whether the respondent thought that unpopular social or political opinions were incompat-
ible or compatible with a secular view of the world, and thus acceptable or unacceptable views
to be held in SHAF communities. Subsequent z-score comparisons for each row, employing Bon-
ferroni corrections (p = .002) revealed that MGs are statistically significantly different (p < .05)
from the other three groups on “Incompatible”, indicated by superscripts across rows.
The nonbeliever movement has sustained problems with diversity issues (Has-
sall and Bushfield 2014; Kettell 2013, 67; Miller 2013; Schnabel et al. 2016), in-
cluding racism, sexism, and social justice issues. On this question, we were
not able to specify which sorts of social or political opinions we intended, with-
out leading respondents. If we had been very specific, these answers may very
well have changed, but, the question as we asked it was meant to be taken by
the respondent as meaning whatever they imagined regarding “social” and “po-
litical” opinions. This may account for the relatively high amount of “Not Sure”
responses. At any rate, the majority attitude of nonbelievers here was character-
ized by inclusion rather than exclusion.
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3.9 What did nonbelievers think about the compatibility, or
lack thereof, between science and religion?
















Incompatible .%a .%a .%a,b .%b .%
Pretend Compatible .% .% .% .% .%
Compatible .%a .%a, b .%,b, c .%c .%
Note: Omnibus χ2 (6, 1939) = 34.8, p < .001, V = .09. Subsequent z-score comparisons for each
row, employing Bonferroni corrections (p = .002), revealed that MGs differed from FMs and
SNAs but not OGs on “Incompatible”. MGs differed from FMs and SNAs but not OGs on “Com-
patible”, whereas OGs differed only from SNAs on this option. Incompatible = “Science and re-
ligion are obviously incompatible; faith is irrational, and endorsing the unity of science and re-
ligion only enables delusion”. Pretend Compatible = “Science and religion are not truly
compatible but we should pretend that this is the case so as not to lose public support for sci-
ence; it is valuable for nonbelievers to work alongside religious believers to pursue shared
goals, and an individual’s religious belief is irrelevant unless it leads them to distort or misrep-
resent science”. Compatible = “Science and religion may answer different questions but they
are compatible in certain ways; failing to see this is either unimaginative or intolerant”.
Extending the accommodationist versus eliminationist argument to discussions
of science and religion, we tried to formulate questions that would reflect these
varying approaches. Attitudes about science and religion among members of the
SHAF movement have ranged from compatible (Gould 1999) to incompatible
(Stenger 2009). The Pretend Compatible response was our attempt to provide
an option for those who, while not seeing science and religion as compatible,
would not choose to make an issue out of this disjunction as long as it did
not threaten the integrity of the scientific process. Given these selections along-
side Incompatible responses, which came from a majority of each group mem-
bership category, most nonbelievers do not think science and religion are com-
patible, though the gap between MGs and SNAs on Compatible is particularly
salient.
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4 Additional Analyses: Gender
The statistically significant demographic differences that emerged across our
questions primarily centered upon gender rather than age or race, thus we pres-
ent the gender differences of interest only.
4.1 What were the gender differences, if any, for GAF
selections?








Proselytize .% .% Χ=, V= .
Litigate .% % Χ=., V= .
Politick .% .% Χ=., V= .
Officiate .% .% Χ=., V= .
Note: For all, df = 1, p < .001, except Officiate, p = .006. GAFs were only included here if they
reached statistical significance with gender.
Females had a lower preference for Proselytize, whereas more minor gender dif-
ferences emerged in the lower female selections of Litigate, Politick, and Offici-
ate.
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4.2 What were the gender differences, if any, on opinion and
attitudinal questions?
Table 11. Gender Differences on Questions 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, and 3.10









χ (, )=., p < .
V=.
Refraina .% .%
Focus Withina % .%









Accommodatea % .% χ (, )=., p < .
V=.Ignore .% .%
Unsure/Undecided .% .%








Dependsa .% .% χ (, )=., p < .










χ (, )=., p < .
V=.
Pretend Compatible % .%
Compatiblea .% %
Note: a Indicates statistically significant differences between column percentages, at least p <
.05.
Although majorities chose to circumstantially criticize or ridicule/mock religion,
wherever respondents had the opportunity to decide between eliminationist and
accommodationist attitudes, females exhibited the latter more so than males.
The fact that the nonbeliever movement is majority male may especially contrib-
ute to public perceptions (or the actuality) that it is a hostile or militant move-
ment (cf. also Silver et al., 2014, on descriptions of anti-theism and views of
“types” of nonbelievers of one another).
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5 Identity Labels: Evidence That They Matter
We endeavored to provide additional analysis for “atheist”, “secular”, and “hu-
manist” identity labels because some literature suggests potential “approach”
differences between secular humanists and atheists (e.g. Kettell, 2013, 2014; Ci-
mino and Smith, 2007, 2011; Smith and Cimino, 2012). Only 75 respondents (3%)
selected, at least, both “secular” and “humanist” but not “atheist”. On the other
hand, 387 respondents (19.9%) selected, at least, “atheist” but neither “secular”
nor “humanist”. A majority of 822 respondents (42.3%) selected all three of these
labels, whereas 142 respondents (9.9%) selected, at the least, none of these three
labels. This left 513 ALI respondents (26.4%) who did not fall into any of these
four reconstituted categories. What were the differences, if any, between these
four categories?
5.1 How did these identity labels compare on GAF selections?


















Politick %a %a %b .%c .% Χ = , V = .
Discussion .%a .%b .%a %b .% Χ = ., V = .
Litigate .%a .%a .%b .%c .% Χ = ., V = .
Charity .%a .%b .%a .%b .% Χ = ., V = .
SJ Activism .%a .%b .%a .%b .% Χ = ., V = .
Socialize .%a .%a .%b .%a .% Χ = , V= .
Officiate .%a .%b .%a .%b .% Χ = ., V = .
Moral
Education
.%ac .%b .%a .%bc .% Χ = ., V = .
Proselytize .%a .%a .%b .%a % Χ = ., V = .
Note: For all, df = 3, p < .001. Percentages in rows that do not share the same superscript are
statistically significantly different, at least p < .05. “Secular Humanists” was constructed by
combining those who chose, at least, both “Secular” and “Humanist” from identity labels, de-
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spite the fact that not everyone who selected one selected the other; see Table 2. From ALI, at
least 1,132 respondents chose, at least, “Secular” and 1,175 chose, at least, “Humanist”.
Those who selected “All Three” identity labels were different on every goal selec-
tion from both “Atheists Not Secular Humanists” and “None of the Three”. “Sec-
ular Humanists Not Atheists”, when compared to “Atheists Not Secular Human-
ists”, showed higher selections on each goal for which they were statistically
significantly different. In this regard, “Atheists Not Secular Humanists” were
more similar to “None of the Three” than were “Secular Humanists Not Atheists”,
whereas this latter group was more similar to “All Three”. Those selecting “All
Three” labels out-selected the other three groups on all goals, except for Social
Justice Activism, which was most selected by “Secular Humanists Not Atheists”.
Thus, secular humanists who did not also call themselves atheists were more
similar to those who identified with all three labels, whereas those who only
called themselves atheists, and not secular humanists, were more similar to
those who chose none of these labels, though the differences between all four
groups are also apparent (cf. Cotter, 2015).
6 Additional Data: The American Secular Census
In the course of carrying out our study, we became aware of another data source
which shed additional light on our topic: the American Secular Census (ASC).
Launched on November 7, 2011, the ASC describes itself as an independent na-
tional registry of demographic and viewpoint data recorded on secular Ameri-
cans. Census registrants are U.S. citizens or permanent residents over 18 years
of age who are skeptical of supernatural claims, including those generally asso-
ciated with religion. Each registrant maintains an ASC website account used to
complete 13 Census forms which collect personal and household information, a
secular profile, a religious profile, political activism and voting patterns, philan-
thropy habits, parenting information, military service, experiences with discrim-
ination, public policy and social views, and opinions about secular advocacy.
For the purpose of making comparisons to our own data, we acquired data
from Personal and Secular Profiles in the ASC online database on November 14th,
2015. At that time, the sample size for registrants who had completed both forms
was 1,340 respondents. Table 13 shows a comparison of age, gender, and race
between ALI and ASC samples. Notably, the ASC respondents were older than
ALI respondents. Outside of this, although we cannot make statistical compari-
sons, both sets of data seem surprisingly similar, though both are composed of
nonrandom, self-selected samples.
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6.1 What were the demographic similarities or differences
between ALI and ASC?






Mean . Mean .
Median  Median 
Mode  Mode 
Range – Range –
Gender
Male  (.%) Male  (.%)
Female  (.%) Female  (.%)
Other  (.%) Other  (.%)
Race
Nonwhite  (%) Nonwhite  (.%)
White  (%) White  (.%)
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6.2 How active in the nonbeliever movement were ASC
respondents?
Table 14. ASC Respondent Level of Involvement in the Nonbeliever Movement
Level of Involvement Frequency (N = )
I’m aware of organizations and events but have not participated .%
I’m slightly active in the movement .%
I’m pretty active in the movement .%
None; I’m vaguely aware it exists but haven’t explored further .%
I’m an insider (e.g. leader, employee, major donor) .%
None; this is the first I’ve heard of it .%
I’m a former participant who is currently inactive %
Something not listed here .%
SNAs comprised 40.2% of the ALI sample. In the ASC sample, those who are
comparable make up 52%, if adding the first, fourth, and sixth categories
from Table 14. If respondents indicated that they were not active in the athe-
ist/secular movement (in this case, however, using only Options 1 and 7 from
Table 14), this triggered a conditional question in the ASC questionnaire which
asked about their reasons for not being involved.
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6.3 What reasons did inactive ASC respondents give for lack
of participation?
Table 15. ASC Inactive Respondent Reasons for Lack of Nonbeliever
Movement Participation




Not a joiner %
Some other reason .%
Events uninteresting to me .%
Not really sure .%
General disinterest .%
Fear of damaging my relationships .%
Lack of childcare %
Bad experience with group, person, or event .%
Don’t see relevance to my life %
Not open about my secularism .%
Health issues .%
Publications uninteresting to me .%
Even though ALI provided an “Other” category so that respondents could list rea-
sons that were not part of the formal listing, 36% of inactive ASC respondents
said that “Insufficient Money” was a reason for lack of participation; this did
not emerge at all in our study. Because selections for “Events Inconvenient”
and “Insufficient Money” were very close, we further determined that 112 re-
spondents (18.2%) selected both options, meaning that for a majority, these
were distinct selections. The top reason for inactivity, “Insufficient Time”,
would support our own finding that respondents did not prioritize participation.
This raises the question of whether these respondents would join or participate
more often if they did have the time. Also, though lack of time is comparable to
participation being a low priority, neither of these compares to nonbelief not
being a salient component of self-identity (see Stryker 2000). Nonbelief could
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be a primary part of self-identity even in the event of insufficient time or if one
has higher-priority life obligations (e.g. family, work, practical projects, hobbies,
friends, etc.). Roughly a third of respondents from ALI said that they would join
groups if they were local; this compares to 37% of non-active nonbelievers from
ASC saying that events are “inconvenient”, though inconvenience could also
refer to schedule conflict, not physical proximity or lack of local groups. This
point also dovetails with lack of time as a top reason. Lastly, 31% of ASC non-
affiliates said they were not joiners,which comports with the qualitative respons-
es we received from 14 ALI respondents (see Table 4), indicating that they were
introverted, shy, not social, or not interested in socializing.
6.4 What did ASC respondents find beneficial about their
involvement in nonbeliever groups?
Table 16. Benefits of Participation Experienced by ASC
Respondents
Benefits Frequency (n = )
Friendships and community .%
Personal development .%





Support with family issues .%
No benefits at all .%
Support with other problems .%
Something not listed here .%
Career opportunities .%
Youth programs .%
Support with substance abuse .%
An alternate strategy to our own would have been to ask secular affiliates about
the advantages of participation in the movement and membership in its groups.
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As Table 16 shows, the most frequently derived benefits were friendships and
community; personal development (e.g. leadership, confidence); and social or
cultural acceptance, a factor that we would suggest probably relates to stigma
against nonbelievers in America (see Table 4).
6.5 What did ASC respondents find disadvantageous about
their involvement in nonbeliever groups?
Table 17. Disadvantages of Participation Experienced by ASC
Respondents
Disadvantages Frequency (n = )
No disadvantages at all .%
Problems with family members .%
Problems with friends %
Problems within the organization itself .%
Problems in the workplace .%
Problems in my community .%
Conflict with mission or values %
Something not listed here .%
Yet another approach alternate to ours would have been to ask about disadvan-
tages that came with movement and group participation. In Table 17, a majority
reported no disadvantages due to their participation, whereas, consistent with
Cragun et al. (2012), the most likely disadvantages occurred for social relation-
ships with family members or friends. With regard to internal conflict, 12%
said they had problems within their own groups, while another 7% said they
had conflict with the nonbeliever movement mission or values.
7 Conclusion
Some nonbelievers don’t have time to join groups but would if they in fact did
have time, and if these groups and related events were readily available and con-
venient. For these nonbelievers, nonbelief is a part of their identity; for others,
nonbelief is not a part of their identity, and they would not join such groups
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even if they had the time or if such groups were available. Though using a small
sample, Cimino and Smith (2011) found that an appreciable number of their re-
spondents engaged in activism and participation exclusively online. A separate
but relevant issue concerns historical anti-authoritarianism and the tendency to-
ward a decentralized organization of humanist, atheist, and freethought groups
(Budd 1977). The Internet provides the opportunity, for those for whom nonbelief
is important, to engage in movement participation and activism; this may com-
port well with a preference for individual, or non-institutional activism carried
out on the individual’s own terms. On this basis, many SNAs likely eschew for-
mal organizational participation in favor of private, individual participation. This
is similar to Cimino and Smith’s (2011, 32) “cultural secularists”, who “[try] to dis-
credit religious belief and advocate for change on more personal and individual
terms, outside the channels created for this purpose by the dominant secular or-
ganizations.”
Our gender differences in particular proved interesting. The lesser hostility of
women betokens consequences for a movement that is male-dominated in both
its membership and its leadership; it stands to reason that a female-led move-
ment might result in noticeable differences in strategies, and thus also outcomes.
It is possible that such a movement might more readily achieve social acceptance
in the American public at large, or at least diminished stigma—although this in
turn depends on what one thinks about the efficacy of an accommodationist
strategy over an eliminationist strategy (see Cragun and Fazzino, this volume,
concerning the organizational leadership of Madalyn Murray O’Hair). Certainly,
females in our data demonstrate a willingness to engage in mockery/ridicule
and criticism of religion and religious beliefs, regardless of whether they selected
“elimination” or “accommodation”. To the extent that female leadership increas-
es, this may result in a more gender-balanced membership. Although this seems
obvious, such change in leadership may also have the effect of increasing the
number of women in the movement by virtue of the fact that “hostile” attitudes
turn them away. Noticeably, 33% of our SNA female respondents said that one
reason they didn’t join groups was because of how focused such groups were
on attacking or criticizing religion (compared to 19% of male respondents).
We cannot suggest that gender differences in attitudes toward hostility,
mockery, and criticism of religion are a strong ground of contention that exists
in and between groups that make up the nonbeliever or secular movement
(pointedly, most of our males also fall into the more accommodating half of
this attitudinal divide). Some data indicate that the gender ratio among nonbe-
lievers has shifted in favor of a growing number of women (cf. Hassall and Bush-
field 2014; cf. also Barna Group, 2015). Nevertheless, it is possible that part of
this increasing diversity in membership is a result of strategy differences
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where women have come to gain greater and more positions of leadership. If not
actual, the effect is at least feasible.
The questions we asked and the data we analyzed were part of our effort to
ultimately understand differences between nonbeliever ideas, preferences, and
attitudes across a variety of affiliative statuses. Despite a nonrandom sample,
the greatest value provided by our study comes from descriptive insights that
can be examined when and if a viable random sample becomes available. For ex-
ample, perhaps nonbelieving men and women in the larger population do not
truly differ regarding eliminationist and otherwise hostile attitudes toward reli-
gion, but, as we found the opposite here, future research can investigate a ran-
dom sample to see if this relationship would hold. The same notion applies to
any descriptive insights generated from this study. Future studies should take
note of the fact that some nonbelievers could be described as the opposite of
“MG/All Three” individuals. In other words, we can identify this category of non-
believer as someone for whom nonbelief is highly inconsequential, a facet of
their lives that likely does not shape or influence behaviors and activities
(these would be “apatheists” per Shook’s chapter in this volume). It seems likely
that this group could only be reached through a nationally representative ran-
dom survey (e.g. GSS, ARIS, etc.), although at present such nationally represen-
tative datasets do not contain data concerning secular and atheist organizations.
It would be interesting to see if and/or how this category differed from our four
groups. Future studies might further benefit from determining why it is that for-
mer members of groups are, in fact, former members, that is, the circumstances
or reasons for their disaffiliation. We speculate that such reasons would largely
resonate with the more pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, concerns that were
expressed here.
One assumption we employed was that dividing respondents into the four
group categories would produce meaningful analyses. While this is obvious,
there are finer group membership conceptualizations that might have been
used to greater analytical effect, such as those found in the ASC (see Table
14). In the sociology of religion, categories such as belief, belonging, identifica-
tion, behavior, and salience are employed in the quantitative analysis of religion;
we would suggest that similar categories, if considered dynamically (and dimen-
sionally?) rather than statically, might prove useful in analyzing nonbelievers
and distinctions among them (see Cotter 2015; Silver et al. 2014). Because we
sought to gauge “approach” attitudes toward religion, a better method for meas-
urement in the future might be to develop a survey instrument with standardized
responses, measured at least ordinally so that other, more sophisticated assess-
ments could be made. Lastly, Mastiaux’s chapter in this volume is a fine example
of how organization members and their “participation motives” may be charac-
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terized; as a qualitative study, it is a welcome complement to our own quantita-
tive approach.
It is worth bearing in mind that the nonbeliever movement did, in fact, exist
prior to the year 2000, yet it has more vitality and visibility today than before.
What ultimately becomes of it will depend, in part, on the vitality and condition
of American religion. Despite the fact that Christianity in America has been fore-
casted to decline (Hackett et al. 2015; Stinespring and Cragun 2015), it seems un-
likely that a minority of American nonbelievers would wish to back off from a
chance to either effectively rid their country of religion, or at least secure a vic-
tory for neutrality in the public and political spheres. If American Christianity
does decline as predicted (as other organizational participation has; Putnam,
2001), then this might attenuate types and magnitudes of divisions between var-
ious nonbelievers, especially to the extent that such decline might bring about
reduced religious influence in the political sphere, or greater social acceptability
of nonbelievers. It could also have the effect of shifting SHAF strategies and ap-
proaches to eliminationist or accommodationist sides, such that one approach
becomes more dominant than the other. Until then, as Kettell (2013, 2014) and
Cimino and Smith (2011) have noted, both eliminationist and accommodationist
approaches fulfill niches that match the desires of respective movement mem-
bers. Kettell (2014, 388) offers that this may be to the advantage of such a move-
ment:
The absence of a consistent or uniform approach furnishes the movement with a high de-
gree of flexibility and dynamism, enabling the formation of loose and adaptive alliances in
response to specific issues of concern that may arise, providing multiple sites of access and
points of entry to atheist groups and ideas and numerous ways of getting its messages
across to a variety of audiences.
Our results not only echo this sentiment, but suggest a blending of these two
views on the part of many individual nonbelievers, despite the fact that most re-
sponses concerning hostility in our study ranged from moderate to minor. Even
majorities of those in our study who took an accommodationist stance did not
opt out of circumstantially attacking, mocking, or ridiculing religion and reli-
gious beliefs. In the end, a more apt metaphor to accurately capture the situation
may be one that does not describe “camps” but rather a sliding scale tempered
by circumstance.
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Björn Mastiaux
A Typology of Organized Atheists and
Secularists in Germany and the United
States
1 Introduction
The typology proposed in this chapter is the result of a transnational study that
was carried out in the years from 2006 to 2013. It had been motivated by media
reports on atheist activism in Germany, in particular the staging of so-called “re-
ligion-free zones” during the Catholic World Youth Day festival in Cologne in
2005. It was reported that this activism was carried out by secularist organiza-
tions, some of which had been in existence for many years. Initial research
made it clear that little was known about these organizations, their networks, ac-
tivities, and supporters, despite the fact that they might qualify as a social move-
ment. Furthermore, the early stages of the conception of this project coincided
with the popularization of the term “new atheism” by Gary Wolf (2006) and
the ensuing reports and debate on the authors and books labeled as such.
This, too, pointed to the existence of a secularist movement, an international
one at that, which seemed to be experiencing a wave of mobilization at the time.
The aim of this research project, as it was conceptualized back then, was
twofold. On the one hand, it was conceived to map and delineate the field of sec-
ularist, humanist, atheist, and freethought (what the previous chapter called
SHAF) organizations in parts of the Western world, and to argue for its classifi-
cation as a social movement. Germany and the United States, with their marked
differences regarding private religiosity and church-state separation, were chos-
en as representative cases from both sides of the secular/religious divide within
the West. On the other hand, the aim was to investigate the motives and biogra-
phies of the members of a certain type of those organizations in both countries.
Who are those people who, despite having grown up and living under very dif-
ferent socio-religious conditions, feature the commonality of not only being non-
religious, but of being a member of organized atheism?
Over the years during which this particular study was carried out, the re-
search landscape on nonreligion, secularity, and organized atheism has changed
dramatically. While at the study’s inception such an academic field was almost
nonexistent, the phenomenon of “new atheism” prompted an explosion of re-
search activity in this area within a number of different scientific disciplines
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(for an early report on this development see Bullivant and Lee 2012). Besides
studies on the “new atheist” writings and campaigns themselves (e.g. Amara-
singham 2010; Zenk 2010; Taira and Illman 2012), research so far has dealt
with the terminology for nonreligion and secularity (e.g. Cragun and Hammer
2011, Lee 2012), the nonreligious’ biographies, demographics, and opinions on
social issues (e.g. Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006), their deconversion stories
(e.g. Zuckerman 2012), their identity construction as atheists (e.g. Foust 2009;
Smith 2011; Beaman and Tomlins 2015), as well as their participation in various
forms of organized secularity (e.g. Pasquale 2010; Cimino and Smith 2011).
Meanwhile, the field of atheist, secularist, freethought, and humanist organiza-
tions and its adherents is more routinely conceived of as a social movement (see
e.g. Cimino and Smith 2007, 2014; LeDrew 2016), as evidenced also by this vol-
ume. At least, it has been treated as such within the fields of religious studies
and the sociology of religion, while curiously the sociology of social movements
is only beginning to take note (see e.g. Guenther, Radojcic and Mulligan 2015).
Also, the movement’s ideological roots as well as conflicting ideological currents
that run within it have been detailed (see e.g. LeDrew 2012, 2016). Accordingly,
these aspects of the study at hand will not be focused on in this chapter.
While several of these and other studies have begun to explore who organ-
ized atheists are, the research presented here has followed some new paths and
is able to offer additional insight in this respect. One important contribution of
this study is that it extends its perspective to continental Europe. The study of
nonreligion and secularity has, up to this point, largely concentrated on the Eng-
lish speaking world. This is also true of the existent member studies of atheist
organizations, most of which were conducted in the United States of America
and Canada – a few in Great Britain and Australia (e.g. Black 1983; Mumford
2015). The secularist movement(s) in continental Europe has (have) hardly
been explored so far. For the case of Germany, the study at hand is a first
foray to remedy this situation.
Yet, as mentioned before, the typology aims to be inclusive and is based on
organized atheists from Germany as well as the United States. In addition to a
first insight into the German secularist movement, the transnational comparison
this approach allows for is the second innovation of this research.
Thirdly, much of the prior research on the motives of nonbelievers to join
atheistic or freethought-secularist organizations has concentrated on informal
meet-up groups or freethought organizations which, through socializing and lec-
tures, mainly serve the identity construction and the treatment of a “nonnorma-
tive identity” (Fitzgerald 2003) of atheists who are viewed as “other” in a highly
religious society (e.g. McTaggart 1997; Heiner 2008; Foust 2009; LeDrew 2013).
Even though there are studies on the political activism of the secularist move-
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ment (see e.g. Cimino and Smith 2007, 2014; Kettell 2013), the protagonists of this
kind of activism, their biographies and motives, have been explored much less.
The research presented here is based on the exploration of organizations which
offer their members both community and education as well as political activism
and protest.
Finally, the material from which the typology was constructed represents a
new approach in the exploration of organized atheism and allows for a novel
or additional way to perceive and structure the movement’s membership. The ty-
pology is based on the identification of narrative patterns (Kruse 2011, 2014),
meaning the leading motives or topics that emerged in the open-style interviews
that were conducted with members. These, in combination with the reported
styles of participation, served to identify eight ideal types of members, which
have been named: the “political fighter”, the “indignant”, the “collectivist”,
the “alienated”, the “intellectual enlightener”, the “silent intellectual”, the “dis-
sociate”, and the “euphoric”. These types of members are going to be portrayed
in some detail further down in this chapter. Before that, the following section
will introduce the sampling and methodology of the study.
2 Sample and Methodology
As at the time of the study’s initiation the field of nonreligion and secularity had
hardly been explored, a qualitative approach was chosen. Also, semi-structured
in-depth interviews were considered the optimal method for the exploration of
organized atheists’ personal views on their activism, their ways into the organi-
zations, as well as their worldviews and religious / nonreligious biographies –
questions which stood at the heart of the study.
Sampling
A first step toward that goal consisted in the sampling of potentially relevant
cases on two levels: the level of organizations, and the level of members. In
order to capture the variety of cases “out there”, regarding members, the aspira-
tion was to find maximally different cases. Yet, in order to allow for comparabil-
ity, on the level of organizations it was necessary to limit variation to a certain
type of groups. Accordingly, organizations that would qualify for the sample
had to meet the following criteria:
With respect to the intended variety of members’ socio-religious back-
grounds, they had to be located in substantially different regions, particularly
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as relates to the role of religion – though my interest was exclusively on Western
countries. Besides practical reasons of accessibility, this was the major reason for
choosing Germany and the United States as countries for consideration. Both
offer considerable internal plurality regarding socio-religious landscapes, with
the predominantly Catholic Bavaria, the Lutheran North, and the largely secular
East in Germany, as well as the religiously mixed and relatively liberal West
Coast, the mainline Protestant Midwest, and the evangelical Baptist South or
“Bible Belt” in the United States. In addition to this intended variation in loca-
tion, on the other criteria the chosen organizations were supposed to be similar
to one another.
One important demand was that the targeted organizations shared similar
goals. As outlined above, one aim of the study was to find organizations
which offered their adherents not only a place for socializing and identity forma-
tion via community and education, but also the chance for political activism,
e.g. via participation in protest, work on press releases, or in other public rela-
tions or outreach projects.
Another demand was for the organizations to take a medium or center posi-
tion regarding their topical scope and targeted population. Some groups follow
only a defined narrow goal within the realm of atheism and secularism or are
open only to a subset of nonbelievers, such as Camp Quest (that organizes sec-
ular summer retreats), or the Secular Student Alliance. Organizations at the other
end of the spectrum, while being critical of religion and church at times, address
much wider issues and, accordingly, attract a more general audience. Examples
for this include civil rights organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and the Humanistische Union (HU), or rationalist and skeptics groups. In
contrast to both of these “extremes”, the organizations that were to be sampled
needed to be open to all the nonreligious and to be concerned with issues relat-
ing to atheism and secularism exclusively.
In the United States these criteria were easily met by a large number of lo-
cally active atheist groups that were either affiliated with or chapters of the Athe-
ist Alliance International (today: Atheist Alliance of America) or American Atheists
(compare Fazzino & Cragun in this volume). These groups typically hold a
monthly meeting, where they will often have a guest speaker – such as a scien-
tist, political activist, or author – as well as other regular meetings, for example
book clubs, discussion groups, or charitable activities. But they also act out, ei-
ther in the form of protests against (usually locally relevant) infringements on
the separation of church and state, in the form of writing letters to the editor,
or in the form of regular radio or TV programs that they produce for free access
cable channels. U.S. organizations which found their way into the sample were
San Francisco Atheists and Atheists and Other Freethinkers of Sacramento from
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California, Minnesota Atheists from Minneapolis / Saint Paul, and the Atlanta
Freethought Society from Georgia.
In Germany, it turned out to be a bit more difficult to find matching organ-
izations. My criteria were met best by the Munich chapter of the Bund für Geist-
esfreiheit Bayern (BfG, Freethought Association of Bavaria). Even though the BfG
is officially recognized by the Bavarian state as a “worldview congregation” with
roots in the 19th century free-religious movement, the Munich based group in par-
ticular had become known for its political activism in opposition to the pro-
nounced influence of religion – particularly Catholicism – on the operations
of the state at the time of my research. The other group from Germany that
was included has a decidedly political orientation. As its name suggests, IBKA
(Internationaler Bund der Konfessionslosen und Atheisten, International League
of the Non-Affiliated and Atheists) commits itself to fighting for the political rights
of citizens without religious affiliation or religious belief – contrary to its name,
though, its activism is not international, but focused mainly in Germany. As for
socializing, some of its regional chapters, at the time of this study, offered meet-
ups, movie nights, or sporadic guest lectures as well. Therefore, IBKA members
from different parts of Germany were selected for the sample, too.
Individual members of these organizations were sampled with the idea of
maximum variation in mind. While the short research time of only two months
in the United States did not allow for the interplay between sampling, interview-
ing, analyzing, and only then further sampling and interviewing that is charac-
teristic of the strategy of “theoretical sampling” (see e.g. Ritchie and Lewis 2003,
80–81), the large number of interviews conducted with very diverse members
nonetheless afforded the opportunity to contrast very different cases ex post
facto, which is in line with this research strategy as well. Members were contact-
ed via various paths. In the case of most of the American organizations, my visit
to the area and my call for interviewees was announced well in advance in the
organizations’ newsletters. Also, this research journey involved a visit to the re-
spective organizations’ monthly meetings, which allowed for the introduction of
the research project as well as on-the-spot recruitment of interviewing subjects.
In the case of the German organizations, the Munich based BfG group and
nationally active IBKA, their annual main assemblies served the same purpose.
Another occasion for recruiting interviewees was a monthly meet-up of the Co-
logne-based IBKA group. In order to find members more spread out over the
country, who did not regularly participate in group activities, a call for interview-
ees was placed in IBKA’s online forum. This as well as the announcements in the
U.S. organizations’ newsletters ensured the participation not only of highly ac-
tive, but also of more or less passive members. In order to counter a potential
bias due to self-recruitment or recruitment only via “gatekeepers” (such as the
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organizations’ presidents), who sometimes helped to find interviewees, several
members were approached by myself and asked for participation in interviews.
This also helped to increase the socio-demographic variety of participants.
All in all, 63 interviews were conducted, 58 of which were used for the anal-
ysis. Of these 58 interviews, 36 were with members of American organizations,
and 22 with members of German organizations. The ratio of men to women
was 39 to 19. Regarding age, seven interviewees fell into the range of 21–30
years, 11 each into those of 31–40 and 41–50 years, nine members were between
51 and 60 years old, 16 between 61 and 70, and finally four were 71 years old or
older. Even though the sample was not drawn for statistical, but rather theoret-
ical representativeness, the gender and age ratios are somewhat typical of secu-
larist organizations, which are known for a predominantly male and older mem-
bership (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006, 106; Pasquale 2007, 47). Also, the
educational level in these groups is usually above average, and Pasquale reports
a predominance of educational occupations for the members of a secular-hu-
manist group in the American Pacific Northwest (Pasquale 2010, 50). Both of
these patterns were observed in this study’s sample as well. Aside from teachers
and university educators, there was some diversity regarding the interviewees’
(former) occupations: they ranged from scientists, lawyers, and physicians, to ar-
chitects and IT specialists, to paramedics, secretaries, and booksellers. While
some of the younger participants were still attending college, most of the
older respondents had already retired from their jobs. A few of the interviewees
were unemployed, with one living in an alternative commune. A peculiarity of
the American sample was that two of the members used to be priests in their ear-
lier careers. Ethnically, most participants were Northern European or of Northern
European descent, with the exceptions of an Italian, a Greek, a Brazilian, and
one Iranian. Only one interviewee was African-American and another one of
Asian descent.
Data collection and analysis
The interviewing technique used was semi-structured interviews in the tradition
of the “problem-centered interview” (Witzel 2000). In contrast to totally open,
narrative interviews, the purpose of this interviewing tradition is the exploration
and collaborative reconstruction of a fixed “social problem” or “issue” that the
researcher has already acquired some familiarity or “theoretical sensitivity”
with. This familiarity paired with the desire to learn about different dimensions
of the problem at hand structures the interviewing guideline by providing a
number of topical fields that are to be addressed. The interviews for this study
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started out with a warming-up phase, in which respondents were asked to intro-
duce themselves and to talk about their general biographies. After this, the main
topical fields that were explored were (1) the interviewees’ ways into their organ-
izations, (2) their worldview or religious / nonreligious biographies, and (3) their
experiences, activities, and opinions as members of their organizations.
These three fields of interest also structured the first step of the analysis: the
use of the “qualitative case contrasting method”, as detailed by Kelle and Kluge
(2010). Building upon the practice of open coding in grounded theory (e.g.
Strauss and Corbin 1998), in this approach categories and subcategories are de-
vised deductively from the pre-structure of the interviews as well as inductively
from the text and contrasted, refined, and restructured systematically by com-
parison of a range of cases, until the variation within the field is sufficiently de-
lineated.
The aim of the second step of the analysis was to reduce the overwhelming
variety found – regarding organized atheists’ ways into the movement, their
worldview formation, as well as their views on and experiences of activism –
with the construction of a typology of very basic, exemplary, or ideal types of
members. This typology was constructed using an analytical method delineated
by Jan Kruse (2011, 2014). It builds on the identification of certain “narrative pat-
terns” that are deemed to be characteristic of the individual respondents, which
are made up of central motives and discursive habits that occur consistently
throughout the interview – especially in so-called “rich” or “dense” passages
as well as in the opening monologues (Kruse 2011, 176). The identification of
four such narrative patterns in combination with the reported activism, behavior,
and ambitions of the interviewees led to the construction of eight ideal types of
organized atheists.
3 The Diversity of Organized Atheists
Investigating the members of atheist organizations, the study presented here has
focused on the fact of their membership. It has studied organized atheists as
members. What do they do as members of their organizations? What do they
think about the activities of their groups and about other members? How did
they get to be a member in the first place? And what has been the history of
their worldview formation leading up to becoming a member? As it turns out,
the diversity of answers to these questions is overwhelming. This section will ex-
plore some of this diversity and will put into focus those results which either
contradict or amplify our knowledge of organized atheists from prior studies.
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Worldview and Worldview Formation
There is some debate, both among scholars and within organized atheism, over
whether agnostics should count as part of the atheist movement (see Cimino and
Smith 2007, 416; McGrath 2004, 174; Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006, 25). But
considering that agnosticism, rather than an independent worldview position
which is softer or less radical than atheism, actually constitutes a method of rea-
soning by which one may arrive at either an atheist or theist position (Eller 2010,
8–9), it is not surprising that agnostics have always been involved in atheist or-
ganizations – and several members identify that way primarily. In general, many
– even though by no means all – of the members of atheist or secularist organ-
izations give a lot of thought to how to position themselves regarding their
worldview and what to call themselves. This was evidenced by the inscription
on Paul G.’s (Atheists and Other Freethinkers, AOF, 76) – the creator of the
“Brights” – business card. It read:
I am a bright (my naturalistic worldview is free of supernatural / mystical elements). I am
agnostic in regards to unverifiable claims (including gods), humanistic in morals, pragmat-
ic in actions, freethinking in regards to authority, existentialistic in philosophy, sartrienne
in regards to purpose, scientific in regards to what constitutes knowledge, contrarian in de-
meanor, and skeptical with respect to all the aforementioned.
Whether they call themselves “atheist”, “agnostic”, “secular humanist”, “natu-
ralist”, “bright”, “Jewish atheist”, “mystic”, or some other term I found in my
sample, such as “liberal” or “realist”, organized atheists presumably share at
least the commonality of being nonreligious in some form and also critical of
(at least certain aspects and variants of) religion.
Yet they have arrived at this common place via very different routes of world-
view formation. Some of these routes have been outlined by Stephen LeDrew
(2013), who, in his research on atheist activists in Canada and the U.S., has dif-
ferentiated five “different trajectories to atheist identity and activism”. Of the five
paths he describes, two have secular socialization as their starting point, while
three start out from religious socialization. All five eventually lead to atheism
and only from there to atheist activism. While this typology of different routes
of worldview formation matches the experiences described by most of the inter-
viewees from my study, there are at least a few cases in which this model is not
sufficient. In several cases there was ambiguity regarding the classification of a
participant’s socialization as having been either “religious” or “secular”. Some
of the respondents grew up in a home that was only nominally religious. Others
experienced cognitive dissonance early on, either because their parents were not
both equally religious, belonged to different churches, or changed religious affili-
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ation continuously over a short period of time. Others grew up in a strongly re-
ligious household within a secular environment or in a secular household within
a religious environment.
Additionally, a few cases had not even acquired an atheist identity or a po-
sition critical of religious belief at the point at which they entered their atheist
organization. Dietmar H. (BfG, 50), for example, was recruited as a member
for BfG Munich only after being interviewed on the group’s radio program. The
group had invited him to their show as a victim of purported church-state entan-
glements. At the time, Dietmar had made local headlines after a gay pride float
mocking Pope Benedict for his anti-gay rights policies, which he and his collea-
gues had created, had been confiscated by the Bavarian police under dubious
charges of “insulting a foreign head of state”. Up until meeting the BfG group
and learning more about their positions, Dietmar had never considered himself
an atheist, but was only critical of different religious traditions for their views on
gay rights. He had even studied theology in college and had been employed as a
public school teacher for Protestant religious education for many years, a job he
only quit for a more promising career option, not for a lack of religiosity. Even
though he said that he did not believe in a personal god, he still regarded
Jesus as an ethical role model and expressed spiritual ideas.
A similar case was that of Brigitte S. (BfG, 42). Even though she had disaffili-
ated from the Catholic Church long ago, as she was at odds with its conservative
positions on many social issues, she had never thought about cultivating a more
pronounced secular identity. This only changed when she made friends with two
active members of the BfG group and decided to join in order to do “something
meaningful”. One explanation for these cases may be the widespread perception
of a strong privilege and influence of the Catholic Church in Bavaria. As BfG Mu-
nich does not only act as a secular “worldview congregation” (“Weltan-
schauungsgemeinschaft”), but as an activist group fighting for the separation
of church and state, it is conceivable that the group and its goals are deemed at-
tractive also for citizens who do not identify as atheists primarily.
Ways into Organized Atheism
While Dietmar and Brigitte found their way into BfG through personal contacts,
atheist organizations also employ more conscious and systematic attempts at
“frame bridging”: making people who share similar views aware of the organi-
zations’ existence (Snow et al. 1986, 467–469). They may advertise in progressive
media, practice outreach via their own media channels, or employ the strategy of
“bloc recruitment” (Oberschall 1973) by cooperating with other movements or, at
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least in the case of the American organizations, Unitarian Universalist churches,
which provide some membership flow. Even though the literature on social
movements stresses such active efforts at mobilization by movement actors, in
the case of atheist organizations “self-recruitment” – i.e. the active search for
a group one can join – seems to be even more important. Goodwin and Jasper
(2009) describe self-recruitment as a common reaction to so-called moral
shock. This kind of shock may set in when “events or information raise such a
sense of outrage in people that they become inclined toward political action,
with or without a network of contacts” (Goodwin und Jasper 2009, 57–58). Out-
rage may be generated by so-called “suddenly imposed grievances” (Walsh 1981,
2), which can be events or new developments, perceived as scandalous, that are
reported on in the media. To Steven F. (Atlanta Freethought Society, AFS, 50), for
example, the publically staged prayer for rain after a drought period by the gov-
ernor of Georgia on the steps of the state capitol constituted such an event. Frie-
drich G. (BfG, 71) of Munich got agitated when he read that posters of demonstra-
tors against the local visit by the Pope were confiscated by the police: “It was in
the newspaper. And so… (,) I wasn’t there myself, but still this infuriated me. And
so I wrote to the paper. And in the course of this I became aware of BfG and be-
came a member”. Personal experiences that contradict a person’s values and ex-
pectations may also be experienced as a suddenly imposed grievance. Rainer P.
(IBKA, 41), for example, had always believed that religion was nothing to worry
about in modern-day, highly secularized Germany, until he asked for the removal
of a large crucifix in the classroom of the public elementary school that his
young son attended, who seemed to be afraid of the object:
How a mayor conspires, more or less, with the school district of Cologne in order to keep
the crucifixes on the walls of a ridiculously small school of a hundred and fifty kids, how a
priest from the pulpit calls for protest marches in front of this school until the crosses get
reapplied, and similar things, …how the local paper deems it worthy of a full page report
and their front page that these crosses got removed, well, that… surprised me quite a bit. I
didn’t expect that. I really didn’t expect that. That the opinion of the granny at home re-
garding the crucifixes in the children’s classroom may count more than a supreme court
ruling, I didn’t expect that either. …And when I realized all of this, I thought that, indeed,
it might make sense to get active.
In other cases, the active spread of information by movement activists in combi-
nation with their interpretation of the situation may cause moral shock: “Moral
shocks do not arise only from suddenly imposed grievances; organizers try hard
to generate them through their rhetorical appeals” (Jasper and Poulsen 1995,
498). Lukas G. (IBKA, 30) and Martin H. (IBKA, 23), for example, consumed
the organization’s magazine and newsletter for a while before they decided
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that it was time to get more involved. But, of course, this framing can only be
successful if potential recruits “already have certain visions of the world,
moral values, political ideologies, and affective attachments” (Jasper and Poul-
sen 1995, 496) that match those of the movement. In cases such as these, moral
shock does not set in in reaction to a singular event or experience, but in reaction
to the perception of a slow and creeping development, a change in cultural val-
ues perhaps, which, apart from outrage, causes the feeling of alienation. Typical
for the American experience is the observation of the rise of the Religious Right
in the years prior to and during the presidency of George W. Bush (see also Faz-
zino, Borer, and Haq 2014, 176– 181). Alice C. expresses well how, prior to her
joining of AOF, she felt increasingly uncomfortable:
Early on it was not… something I… gave much… thought to. I would say, in the last fifteen
years, though, I’ve become very aware of it… and… /eh/ almost annually increasingly
shocked. And… /eh/ the whole country feels like… East Texas, oughh, pushing this (,)
this incessant… need to convert everybody. There’s only one religion, and it’s theirs
and… (,) you know, the sooner you acknowledge that, the better off you’ll be. It’s uncanny.
It’s everywhere now. …Just as it… used to be forty years ago.
Similar to moral shock, and often in combination with it, alienation is a feeling
that may lead to self-recruitment. It is an experience which may motivate people
to look for others to help them relieve the tension. In addition to the feeling of
being at odds with the surrounding culture at large, alienation may also result
from more limited experiences of new, confusing, or frustrating situations,
from the loss of an old or the adaptation of a new worldview and identity, or sim-
ply from moving to a foreign, possibly more religious place.
Whatever their motives for joining, most of the respondents from this study
reported that once they had learned of the existence of these organizations they
immediately became a member. But in those rare cases, in which doubts were
reported, it was often the influence of other persons which convinced them to
join eventually. Lee S. (Minnesota Atheists, MNA, 69), a former Evangelical
preacher, for example, was originally biased against atheists, and it took him
some time and courage to finally attend a few meetings of the organization
whose TV programs he had already watched and enjoyed.What finally convinced
him to join as a member was the presence of a person he knew, respected, and
considered similar to himself:
And so… my first reaction was: well, I wouldn’t want to have anything to do with those…
people, but… the more I listened, the more I thought: you know [laughs slightly], I think I
have more in common with them than I have with any Christians. So I attended a few meet-
ings. …And as a matter of fact […] I walked in the door […] and I… see a person there and I
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suddenly […] recognize him. …He was somebody that I went to high school with. […] And he
was a very popular guy in high school. And… so we got to talking. And it turns out, he, too,
had been in the ministry [laughs]. And he, too, was ordained. And now he was a member of
Minnesota Atheists.
Other doubts about joining had to do with fears that the group might be too sim-
ilar to religion, that it might be ineffective, or that members might be either too
eccentric or intolerant. In some examples, these doubts could be dispelled by the
influence and convincing presence of a charismatic leader. Steven F. (AFS, 50)
and his wife, for example, had known for a long time of the existence of secu-
larist organizations in the Atlanta area, but had never bothered to join, since
they thought that people there might be strange. This changed when they saw
an interview with AFS’ Ed Buckner on TV:
And… Ed was very articulate. An intelligent man. And, so, what he said was (,) was great. I
mean, he wasn’t shouting, he wasn’t pounding his chest, and he wasn’t screaming or yell-
ing or any of that kind of thing. He was just very (,) it was a very reasoned and rational…
statement that he made. And that immediately appealed to us. And… we just kind of went:
hmm, Atlanta Freethought Society? So we wrote that down. And we went and did a google
search and found their website.
Finally, Stan C. (San Francisco Atheists, SFA, 45) was impressed by Madalyn Mur-
ray O’Hair, the notorious founder of American Atheists, who spurred in him the
enthusiasm to become an activist:
You know, a lot of these separation organizations don’t have much of a sense of humor.You
know, somebody like me walks in the room, they go: oh, you know, you should get a hair-
cut! With American Atheists it was just very (,) yeah: you’re one of us! Welcome on board!
And part of that was the Madalyn O’Hair attitude. So, if Madalyn O’Hair had not been
around with her free-wheeling, you know, fuck-you attitude, I probably would not be
doing this… myself. But she made it seem cool. She made it seem fun. She made it seem
exciting. And she made it seem important. You know? So that’s a large part of why I’m
doing what I’m doing today.
Activism within the Organization
Due to conscious sampling decisions, interviews were conducted with members
with varying degrees of activity in the groups: passive members, whom McCarthy
and Zald (1977, 1228) in their member typology call “isolated constituents”, as
well as weakly, medium, and highly active members. In some cases, the degree
of activism may depend on people’s experiences with other members. Mariva A.
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(SFA, 38), for example, who only sporadically attended meetings of her organi-
zation, explained that she could not relate to some of the other members and
criticized them for their public demeanor, sharing her experience at a public de-
bate as an example:
I kind of, …like, was a little bit embarrassed by the behavior of some of my fellow atheists,
for… they were just kind of laughing really loud… and just kind of making comments during
the debate. And… all the, like, the Christians were, you know, fairly well behaved. And I
was just (,) I was thinking, like: okay, …you know, if… (,) if we’re gonna show that we’re
as good as these people, like, let’s behave that way!
In general, the diversity of characters found in these groups is often cited as a
drawback and reason for restraint in commitment. But even those who are the
most committed may evaluate this diversity differently. Assunta T. (BfG, 46),
for example, criticized the majority of casual members for lacking enthusiasm
and sincerity in their atheism:
Our biggest problem is the nonreligious themselves. […] They’ll actually have the nerve and
tolerate that their wives, friends, children… have a different conviction. They treat it as their
spare time… (,) their hobby. And hobby only in the sense that if they find the time they may
go and attend a meeting. But never make a fuss! They’ll only speak up where they feel safe
and know that everybody is of the same opinion. That’s our trouble!
Stan C. (SFA, 45), on the other hand, felt rewarded by the less active members for
his efforts in providing them a place to feel at home at:
Well, the monthly meetings basically just give people a chance to meet other atheists, give
them a chance to relax. Those of us who have been working on it for an entire month get a
chance to talk to people who actually care what we’re doing [laughs slightly]. You know? So
(,) so, it’s nice.
These statements show that within the movement there are different expecta-
tions regarding organized atheists’ openness and candor about their lack of re-
ligion.While Assunta expected of her fellow atheists a self-confident demonstra-
tion of their rejection of religion, Stan was more tolerant of some of the atheists’
fear of ostracism.
Just as these expectations vary, so do the actual practices of concealment or
disclosure. Some respondents kept their atheism completely to themselves,while
others decided to reveal it only selectively, such as Sharon W. (AFS, 57), who was
careful not to appear as a member of AFS as long as she was working as a school
teacher in the U.S. South. Others, who did not have to fear work-related sanc-
tions, liked to admit to their atheism and seemed to enjoy some of the reactions
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they would get. Adrienne M. (SFA, 34), for example, sometimes liked to be seen
as a femme fatale when going out to bars in her home state of Texas and meeting
men:
and of course they’d be Republican, they would be so intrigued… by that fact that I was a (,)
a Democrat, and that I was a liberal and that /hughhh/ [gasps] I didn’t believe in god! That
was like I was like this (,) like they were flirting with danger just by hanging out with me or
something.
Similarly, Michael C. was amused about a common reaction to his answer for
people’s question about his church affiliation:
And you can (,) and you can watch it. Right in their eyes. You can see them like going
through… (,) /eh/ it’s almost like a computer (,) going through all their files, looking for
an appropriate (,) like: what do I do with that? You know? He’s an atheist? What? And
they’re trying to be… polite. Because that’s the big thing in the South. You have to always
appear to be (,) you can be the biggest bastard in the world, but you have to appear to be
polite. And /eh/… (,) you know, they’re like: o-o-h…(.) They always make that sound.
They’re like: o-o-o-h, …okay. You know? And (,) and I can tell, …they’re like: …I wonder
if he’s about to kill me [laughs].
Other than simply answering people’s questions about their religion, some re-
spondents talked about regularly confronting people with the fact of their athe-
ism more or less directly. Chuck C. (SFA, 60):
I travelled a lot when I was working. I would intentionally… on an airplane have a book.You
know: ‘Atheism Understood’. Or something about atheism. That would be my book to carry
on the plane. And it wasn’t that I really wanted to read that book, but I wanted to invite
conversation.
Finally, Assunta (BfG, 46), the leader of BfG who advocated for some atheist
pride – similar to that of the gay movement – and liked to wear atheist t-shirts
and caps in everyday life, even reported that she regularly put invitations to
events and political pamphlets by her organization into the business mail of
her family’s medium-sized company in the car-manufacturing industry.
The organized atheists from this study did not only use different strategies
regarding the disclosure of their atheism in everyday life, but they also preferred
different strategies for their organizations. Cimino and Smith (2011) argue that
the American secularist movement was torn in this respect: “The tension be-
tween, on the one hand, spreading secularism and attempting to expose the fal-
lacies of belief and, on the other, seeking acceptance in a largely religious soci-
ety runs through the recent history of secular humanism” (28). LeDrew (2013,
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18–19) argues that favoring either a “confrontational” approach, in which criti-
cism of religion and satire are used in order to produce attention and to push
certain political goals, or an “accomodationist” approach, which is deemed to
further respect and acceptance of atheists, would mirror different ideas about
a collective self (see also Fazzino & Cragun in this volume). To my observation,
these divergent strategies do not only separate secular humanists from atheists,
but they are also associated with different umbrella organizations within the
atheist sector. This regularly causes debates within local atheist groups, as de-
scribed by Don K. (AOF, 53) for the case of AOF:
You know, do we… (,) do we join American Atheists, who for so many years have been (,)
who have lived by… ridiculing… religion? …Or do we take a more… understanding ap-
proach, I guess you could call it? The way… the Atheist Alliance International… approaches
it, saying: we need to develop… a better connection… with society, so that they will accept
us as equals. …And, you know, so, yeah, it’s a (,) it’s a constant… conflict that we have in
our board meetings. You know, which direction do we go?
At the time this study was conducted, a similar debate took place in the Munich
based BfG group. Some of the members criticized the group’s president, Assunta
T., for her provocative style and activism, such as the implementation of a blas-
phemy contest. Friedrich G. (BfG, 71):
In any case, she is not a conventional character. Let’s put it that way. And she does exhibit
that quite a bit. […] You know, I don’t have a problem with that at all. But the fact is, we
want to change things. And for that we need the regular citizens. And therefore my opinion
is that the current politics are not very favorable, the politics of provocation. …Because that
way we scare away the regular citizens.
Yet, Assunta countered with the opinion that citizens in a democratic society
should be able to stand criticism and satire. Accordingly, she advocated a provo-
cative, attention-grabbing strategy, arguing that noble values alone “are not
sexy” for the media:
Those so-called humanistic, secular values, …they should have actually been societal con-
sensus for a long time. It shouldn’t take anything for that. […] You know? So it’s sad enough
that we still have to work our asses off for that. And we can only be successful […] with
provocation, of course! …What else? With provocation. How else do you want to reach any-
thing? That’s how the world works. As long as there are things going wrong, we must pro-
voke and trust that in a democratic society democratic-humanistic people will be able to
bear that.
But just as atheist blogger Greta Christina (2010) argued that one should “let fire-
brands be firebrands” and “diplomats be diplomats”, voices that saw advantages
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in both strategies and even the need for a movement to be pluralistic could also
be found.
4 A Typology of Organized Atheists
It has become apparent that goals, strategies, identity labels, as well as world-
view biographies vary drastically among organized atheists. The saying common-
ly used in the movement that “organizing atheists is like trying to herd cats”
finds some validation in these results. Still I want to argue that this bulk of high-
ly diverse cases can be reduced to a fair number of characteristic exemplars or
ideal types of members.
The typology proposed was achieved by the identification of narrative pat-
terns or “central motives”, which consist of typical figures in verbalizations as
well as in topical choices and which heavily inform and shape the character
of an interview while putting it in line with select others. In order to be seen
as central motives these patterns must appear recurrently throughout an inter-
view and especially be present in its “richest” passages (Kruse 2011, 176– 179).
I have identified four such narrative patterns, which in combination with one
of two behavioral patterns or modes of action – one more other-, the other
more self-oriented – constitute eight ideal types of organized atheists.





Political Conflict Political Fighter Indignant
Belonging Collectivist Alienated
Philosophical, Scientific, and Religious Knowledge Intellectual Enlightener Silent Intellectual
Identification with Organization Dissociate Euphoric
The Narrative Pattern of “Political Conflict”
The common motive in narrations of members who I will call the “political fight-
er” and the “indignant” is the narrator’s conviction that in the current situation
democratic or constitutional principles are violated, as religious ideas or actors
are being granted undue influence on the operations of the state or as atheists
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and the nonreligious are being discriminated against. This concern is at the heart
of these persons’ activism, while epistemological questions of religious belief or
unbelief are seen as less important or dismissed completely. This overriding prin-
ciple is represented fairly well in a statement by Adrienne M. (SFA, 34):
I refuse to debate people on the existence of god. I don’t care. Believe whatever you want to
believe! Whatever makes you happy, I want you to do it! But you need to keep it out of my
government… and off of my body and away from me! …That’s the only reason I do what I
do. […] I’ve never even read the bible! Okay? I don’t care. I can’t get past page two. It’s bor-
ing. …So I refuse to debate the existence. …What I do is civil liberties.
Apart from this political orientation, the two types of members who are united by
this motive show further distinct characteristics which distinguish them from
one another.
The Political Fighter: Representatives of this type are characterized by their
disputability, their conviction of a high degree of self-effectiveness, as well as
their preference for a confrontational strategy. Their activism is strongly outward-
or other-oriented. Ed B. (AFS, 62), for example, said that what he loved most
about his activism was “to do public speaking and debates”. When, during the
interview, he reproduced the disputes that he regularly has with people who
want the Ten Commandments to be posted in public buildings, he self-ironically
remarked: “You can get me on some soap boxes now. I’ll preach for a while, if
you want me to [laughs]”. Similarly, Assunta T. (BfG, 46) described herself as
“streitlustig” (cantankerous – literally “argument jolly”), “with an emphasis
on ‘lustig’” (“jolly”). She shrugged off fears of retributions for an outspoken sec-
ularism, as voiced by other members of her organization, with a “pfff” sound,
characteristic of her and used many times throughout the interview. As long
as nothing worse happened than having ones car’s tires punctured, one needed
to speak out against religiously motivated violations of individual rights. Assun-
ta, as well as other representatives of the political fighter, stressed that this
should be done by oneself rather than waiting for others, such as political par-
ties, to do the job. She said that it was not her style to bemoan a bad situation,
but, rather, to do something about it. Besides believing in the effectiveness of
political action, political fighters typically also exhibit a strong will and a ten-
dency to make decisions unilaterally. Accordingly, they often take up leading
roles in their organizations. As they strongly believe in the legitimacy of their
project, they advocate the use of a confrontational strategy in order to get atten-
tion.
The Indignant. Representatives of this type are characterized by their indig-
nance. Just as the political fighters, they are appalled about new developments
regarding the relationship between state and religion or regarding religious in-
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trusions on individual liberties.Yet, different from the political fighters, their am-
bition is less to look strategically for ways to change the political situation in the
long run, but rather to look for an outlet to their disgust, for a way to vent their
frustration, which they find in their organizations. Accordingly their activism is of
an expressive nature and often rather low-key and sporadic, such as writing let-
ters to the editor, as Jay B. (AFS, 77) does:
We also have in our local newspaper on a daily basis… a column called vent. And the vent
means really, literally, for people to let off steam. …And it’s a… series of what might be
called one-liners, in which people would make some comment. And… I have, again,
been very (,) pretty successful in having a number of vents printed.
Some other indignants do not get active themselves, but rather want to support
financially and give voice to political activists, even though they may not believe
in the realization of their instrumental goals, as for example Lisa K. (IBKA, 32):
I don’t believe that they can actually achieve a lot. But knowing that there is a voice that
says: hello, here, we have an opinion on this, too, does help. That’s why I find the work that
they do tremendously important.
Representatives of the indignants are often new members as their indignation is
usually fresh and connected to a specific current issue. Yet, in other cases, out-
rage and frustration may be kept up and alive for years, not least by the religion-
watch and news services of the organizations themselves.
The Narrative Pattern of “Belonging”
Another central motive that surfaced regularly in some of the interviews is that of
belonging. Interviewees who represent the types of the “collectivist” and the
“alienated” articulated experiences of estrangement and a – sometimes pro-
found – desire to (re‐)connect with others. Mariva A. (SFA, 38), a “Jewish atheist”
who, after a religious quest, became a member of San Francisco Atheists, but
who still enjoyed attending services at a progressive church on Christmas and
Easter, got at the heart of this pattern when she remarked:
And I came home from one of these services, and I told my husband: you know, I think, one
(,) maybe the reason I’ve gone to all these different religious… outlets and… services and
traditions and rituals is, …you know, between like the Native American sweat lodge and
the Buddhist retreats and, you know, the Quaker meeting house and the gay Jewish syna-
gogue and Glide Memorial Church (,) you know, maybe what I…(.) I thought I was looking
for god, but, I think, what I was really looking for and what I found… was a connection to
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humanity. […] And that was sort of a profound realization for me that… you could look at
almost any religion and it’s sort of a different expression of humanity. You know, the Bud-
dhist tradition is an expression of becoming quiet and becoming grounded and becoming
very meditative. And the Native American expression of religion is… about becoming very
connected to the earth and to nature. …You know, and the Jewish expression is (,) is very
intellectual. It makes us think. It makes us, you know, buzz with ideas. And, you know, the
San Francisco Atheists dinner […] sort of brings out the misfit in me and makes me feel like,
you know, finally we’re part of a community where we’re not being ostracized.
The term “community” is used frequently in the narratives of both the collectivist
as well as the alienated. Both may use the term in two senses – meaning either
society at large or the smaller group of the secular community. Yet, for the col-
lectivist the wish to belong is directed more at the former, while for the alienated
it is directed more at the latter.
The Collectivist. As atheists, representatives of the collectivist type feel alien-
ated from and misunderstood by the general population. They are driven by the
desire to bridge that gap and by the wish to find community with the greater col-
lective. As a co-founder of Atheists and Other Freethinkers, Mynga F. (AOF, 63) de-
fines this as the group’s original goal: “The purpose of AOF… is to… promote
civic understanding of atheism… and acceptance of it in our community”. Collec-
tivists are looking for common ground with the religious population of their so-
ciety. One starting point for this is their refusal to criticize religion at large,
which, as Paul G. pointed out, did not mean not to protest at all:
It’s not that we won’t ever criticize. …It’s simply that we do not lump religion… in one giant
lump and therefore say: religion’s bad! We can’t say that [chuckles], ‘cause there are reli-
gions that are good. And so… that (,) that’s the basic idea.
This differentiating and benevolent treatment of religion is not necessarily moti-
vated by strategy. Instead, it may result from personal positive experiences with
religion, such as in Paul’s case. He did continue his passion for singing in church
choirs long after his loss of faith and still enjoys singing church songs together
with his wife. Yet, the collectivists ask for the same kind of acceptance by the re-
ligious in return. They try to earn this respect, for example, with the help of char-
itable activities that they pursue or that they want their organization to engage
in, such as highway cleanups or food drives. In addition, they promote openness
about their worldview in personal relations. This, according to Don K. (AOF, 53),
should help to dispel stereotypes about atheists as anti-social beings, which
“church-going people” may have: “They will also learn then to accept atheists
as… equal participants in… society, and that we can share… our common hu-
manity… without… embracing a deity”.
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The Alienated. Others who share the experience of alienation from their sur-
rounding society with the collectivists are less concerned with trying to bridge
that gap. Rather than hoping to prove that atheists are respectable members
of society, too, their narratives tell of a desire to find a new “home” – be that
in social or intellectual terms – a small community of like-minded people. This
motive is common for (but not exclusive to) members who grew up and used
to live in an area where religion mattered little or not at all and who, after mov-
ing, suddenly were confronted with a higher degree of religiosity or with religion
at all. Heiko T. (MNA, 40), for example, had grown up as the son of a nonreli-
gious father and a moderately religious Lutheran mother in the secularized Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR) / Eastern Germany. After he got divorced from
his American wife, whom he had followed to Minnesota after their wedding, he
felt lost and foreign there. He reported that during the first two years of his stay
in the United States he had mainly been working on his doctoral dissertation and
got to know American society mostly via television.What he was presented there
on several religious channels was decidedly different from what he knew of re-
ligion from back home:
I actually saw hate there. This was not the kind of Christianity… which teaches love and
understanding, you know. It was decidedly directed against atheists… and nonbelievers.
You know? Well, to me this was shocking. Also, there were certain aspects of Christianity
that I had never heard about, like the Second Coming of Christ and… the rapture, …things
like that. […] And also, of course, the cultural war of the intelligent design movement. And
then there’s me with my scientific background. So that hits (,) that hits close to home.
Also, trying to find a new partner after the divorce turned out to be difficult for
Heiko, as women were regularly put off by the fact of his nonreligion. Both ex-
periences prompted him to go online and search for other “atheists” in “Minne-
sota”. Martina R. (BfG, 35), who also grew up in the GDR and lived in East Ger-
many for the better part of her life, did not have any experience with religion
until she took a job in Bavaria. There she was not only confronted with Catholic
street processions, but also with new colleagues who claimed to be religious.
This at first unsettled her and she wondered whether, as an atheist, she was
missing an important source of support in her life. Yet, she started to develop
some atheistic self-esteem after she learned that religion had not saved a partic-
ularly faithful colleague of hers from committing suicide. Finally, after seeing a
representative from BfG in a discussion on television, she soon joined this organ-
ization, in order to learn more about a well-reasoned secular position. As in
these two cases, the feeling of alienation can be a short-term experience, result-
ing from a new situation. But it may also become a permanent condition, as for
atheists who are surrounded by strongly religious people in their jobs and pri-
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vate lives. To them, their organization feels like a safe haven, where they can be
“themselves”, as Stu T. (MNA, 46) explained:
In our society religion is (,) you know, like in the workplace and in social settings (,) so it’s
just largely: hands-off! People don’t say anything rather than risk offending somebody. And
so it was… (,) I think it was… energizing to just be able to be myself, …be more of myself
and be able to say what I think and to be able to talk about those kinds of subjects and
hear, you know, different perspectives and views without… people getting upset.
The Narrative Pattern of “Philosophical, Scientific, and
Religious Knowledge”
The two types who, as their main narrative pattern, share an interest in philo-
sophical, scientific, and religious knowledge have a lot in common otherwise,
too. Their narrations show a high degree of self-reflection and structure. They ap-
pear as critical thinkers and they exhibit intellectual curiosity. Both, the “intel-
lectual enlightener” as well as the “silent intellectual”, also share the experience
of a religious deconversion, which they usually interpret as a consequence of
their inquisitiveness. David F. (SFA, 43) portrayed this as a necessary connection:
And… it’s just ironic that, if you take… your Christianity seriously enough… to investigate
that and to really hold that up, you know, to look for the truth, it will [claps hands] fall
apart, if you look at it too close, in my humble opinion.
Joseph H. (MNA, 46), for example, traced his deconversion back to his high
school education, for which he attended a Catholic school:
Now, whereas most high school students didn’t particularly care and they just did enough
to get by, …like other subjects, I was really interested. I asked questions. …Sincerely con-
cerned… teachers and priests gave me books to read. And in doing so, I learned the history
of my religion, …in particular, and all religions in general, and discovered that they all
had… very… reasonable, rational histories. Like the history of any… philosophy or political
movement or city state or… economic system or whatever. They had a beginning. They had
a cause and effect. …And it wasn’t something that was dumped out of the sky. It wasn’t
something handed down by a deity. And more and more the idea gelled in my mind
that… (,) that it had to be that the exact same causative forces that created… the ancient
Egyptian gods… and the Roman gods and the Greek gods and the Chinese gods… had to
have been the exact same causative forces that had created the Christian god. …It made
sense. …Ironically, if I had never gone to a Catholic school, I might never have questioned
anything.
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Others started to investigate religion more closely only later in life, such as Rü-
diger C. (BfG, 69), who in private developed a growing interest in the bible, or
former evangelical preacher Lee S. (MNA, 69), who, over the years, discovered
more and more contradictions in the scripture. What they all have in common,
though, is that after their deconversions they continued their “search for the
truth” and kept up an interest in questions of philosophy, science, and religion.
The Intellectual Enlightener. In addition to this pattern of an interest in phi-
losophy, science, and religion, some of these intellectuals exhibited in their nar-
rations a drive and desire to actively educate. Trained biologist and educator
Mynga F. (AOF, 63), for example, who also represents the type of the “collecti-
vist”, viewed the public’s education about evolutionary theory as a service to
all of society. For this reason she took the Darwin Day event, which her AOF
helps to set up each year, to be of premier importance. Others are more con-
cerned with the provision of knowledge about religion, such as Steve Y. (AFS,
54), president of the Atlanta Freethought Society at the time, who saw this as
the organization’s most important purpose:
We want people to learn (,) especially people like myself back in 1998, when I was still try-
ing to figure things out… about religion… and nonreligion… and matters like this. […] Our
organization might be able to help them to understand better. And so that’s a good thing. I
love (,) I love it when people… come to… that realization and they learn more every day
about how there are some real problems with religion.
This motive of the “intellectual enlightener” is typical for members who have
had a religious past of their own or who went through an intense religious
quest. One example is Grant S. (MNA, 63), a former school teacher, who after
30 years as a Jehova’s Witness converted to Catholicism and wrote a doctoral dis-
sertation about cults at a Jesuit university. After having lost religious faith alto-
gether he joined Minnesota Atheists, despite his aversion against joining organ-
izations, only in order to be able to educate others about religious cults. In
particular, he had hoped to be able to provide active Jehova’s Witnesses with
a dropout’s point of view on their religion via Minnesota Atheists’ media outlets,
such as their cable TV show. Also, he entertained the idea of conducting a tuto-
rial:
Sort of a class 101, atheism 101, that would give you books and then it would give study
questions and sort of set it out that you could follow it through and study it. …Fine
books that would… aim at where you’re at. Because… in my own approach it was sort
of: catch by catch, whatever happened to be the most accessible. […] But I think that
most people are not here. They’re here. …They’re not as… educated. And so they need to
have a program or a way of approaching it. […] I’m always the teacher, I’m always the ed-
ucator. And… that’s what I want to do… (,) is trying to educate people and to help them.
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One reason for the fact that “intellectual enlighteners” seem to be predominantly
those members of atheist organizations who used to be strongly religious in their
past may be found in Laurence R. Iannaccone’s concept of “religious human
capital”. It builds on the idea that the time, money, and effort spent on religion
for religious believers amount to an investment in techniques and knowledge,
which makes it less likely for them to leave their faith behind:
The skills and experience specific to one’s religion include religious knowledge, familiarity
with church ritual and doctrine, and friendships with fellow worshippers. It is easy to see
that these skills and experiences,which I will call religious human capital, are an important
determinant of one’s ability to produce and appreciate religious commodities. (Iannaccone
1990, 299, italics in original)
Iannaccone’s argument is that these investments over time would make it more
and more irrational – and therefore unlikely – for an individual to change his or
her religious affiliation, to marry someone of a different faith, or even to decon-
vert from religion altogether. Obviously this did not hold true for those atheists
who used to be very religious in the past. But while, despite all costs, reason and
conscience compelled them to leave behind their faith in which they had invest-
ed so much, they still discovered a chance to apply at least parts of their reli-
gious human capital in sharing their religious knowledge with others. David F.
(SFA, 43), a former evangelical Christian who at the time of the interview partici-
pated in religious-secular dialogue projects and authored a book on the histor-
icity of Jesus, even voiced his wish to convert this element of his religious capital
into economic capital:
What I hope to do (,) you know, if the magic career fairy came down and granted me my
wish, I would be on, like, the lecture circuit… or some sort of teaching position, you know.
… I think I’d be… really good as a teacher and…(,) I mean, people really seem to enjoy my
public speaking. …And that’s what I’d like to get paid for.
The Silent Intellectual. The adjective “silent” characterizes the representatives of
this type only regarding their treatment of philosophical, scientific, and religious
knowledge. Compared with the intellectual enlighteners, interviewees who ex-
hibited this narrative pattern were far less eager to share their knowledge, but
rather to be educated further themselves. They showed a high and generalized
ambition to learn. One case in point is Joseph H., who answered the general bio-
graphical question about the most important stages in his life so far by talking
extensively about experiences that shaped his way of thinking. Other biograph-
ical events, like meeting and marrying his wife or having a daughter, instead, ap-
peared only as an afterthought:
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For some reason they don’t… jump out exactly as turning points in my life, because in cer-
tain ways they didn’t really… affect my world outlook, perhaps. They weren’t… (,) they were
very important and emotional… parts of my life, but they really didn’t… teach me anything.
I really haven’t learned anything. I really wasn’t transformed… by the experience of becom-
ing a father or being married.
The silent intellectuals like their organizations for the chance to meet others that
may be of a similar intellectual orientation as well as for being able to attend
presentations on various scientific and philosophical topics. Some, like Rüdiger
C. (BfG, 69), particularly enjoy their group’s library, which enables them to study
criticism of religion and its history systematically. Accordingly, Kenneth N. (AOF,
56) believed that he would leave AOF only in the case that he would not be able
to learn anything new there any longer:
I like AOF because I’m always learning things. And that’s when I’m happiest, when I’m
learning something. …Yes, it’s an educational… pursuit. It’s a way of expanding my
mind. And I think, if I ever left AOF, it would be because… I felt that my mind is no longer
growing.
The Narrative Pattern of “Identification with the
Organization”
While the narrative patterns introduced so far were characterized primarily by
members’ motivations for affiliating with their organizations (political protest,
community, education), the narrations of the two remaining types of members
were shaped more strongly by how they positioned themselves toward their
groups. All of these interviewees felt compelled to negotiate the relationship
with their organization as a means of performing a segment of their personality
that they identified with very strongly. Substantially, these interviews were dia-
metrically opposed to each other, though, as they were characterized either by
vehement rejection of or full-blown compliance with the atheist organization.
The Dissociate. All of the organizations explored have a fair share of nominal
or passive members.With their membership, they only wish to support the goals
of the movement symbolically or financially or they merely wish to be informed
by their group’s newsletter or magazine. This does not make them “dissociates”
in the sense discussed here. Rather, the members classified as such actively re-
ject identification with their atheist group, some of its practices, and members.
This rejection results from a value central to the person’s identity which he or
she does not see fulfilled or represented by the other atheists and their organi-
zations. Interviewees who exhibit this pattern also exhibit a certain amount of
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generalized distrust and accuse the atheists of some of the same mistakes that
they accuse the religious of. Marco P. (AFS, 65), for example, identified predom-
inantly as a mystic. By this he meant a person who did not believe without ques-
tioning, but who was open still to new experiences and insights. Persons, who
would jump to conclusions or unconditionally cling to their convictions, he
called “stupid” – a term that occurred frequently throughout his interview.
One of his fields of interest was that of near-death experiences. He had offered
the board of directors at AFS to give a talk on the topic, but at the time of the
interview he was certain that this would be rejected, as many atheists deemed
the field to be unscientific. This “closed-mindedness”, Marco said, made him
just as angry as bans on the teaching of evolution, which he experienced in
his career as a lecturer in anthropology:
I don’t react well to people who try to limit my freedom. And, essentially, what you’ve been
hearing me say about the Atlanta Freethought Society… is that… it seems to me that there
are some… in there that have their own very, very narrow view of what free is. …If they real-
ly were freethought… they would be really open to all thought. But… I don’t have the opin-
ion that they are.
While Marco P. felt threatened by “stupid people” who wanted to limit his free-
dom, the central issue in Mona T.’s (IBKA, 69) narration is her rejection not only
of Christians, but also of conservatives and sexist men – who, in her experience,
tended to appear in personal union and who she deemed responsible for most
bad things that ever happened to her. Even though in IBKA there were no Chris-
tians, she reported that she still grew critical of the group:
Because I think the only ones who can really do anything against those dreadful religions
are the leftists… and women. They have the most reason. And both are heavily discriminat-
ed against in this organization. …Being leftist is treated as bad. And women are in the mi-
nority. […] I pity that. But I am still going to stick with IBKA, because otherwise it would
only be one less – one leftist and one woman.
Finally,Wolfram B. (IBKA, 55), who was mainly active in the anarchist and paci-
fist movements, was discouraged from further attending IBKA meetings not only
by procedures there, such as podium discussions, that he deemed too hierarch-
ical for his taste, but also by the fact that he was not able to recruit new members
for the pacifist movement:
Well, of course, who votes for Social Democrats is not interested in peace and who votes for
the Greens goes to war as well. Let me put it that way [laughs slightly]. So, my topic is a
minority issue, I know. …That was obvious. No one showed any interest in it.
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Therefore,Wolfram himself developed no interest in engaging with atheism more
actively and remained distant. Polletta and Jasper (2001) see a reason for the
phenomenon that people sometimes associate themselves with movements
whose members they criticize in the fact that “(c)ollective identity is not the
same as common ideological commitment. One can join a movement because
one shares its goals without identifying much with fellow members (one can
even, in some cases, despise them)” (298). To that effect, Marco P. (AFS, 65)
stressed that before joining AFS he did not think “{{with feigned voice, soft}
ooohhh, I’m going to meet people like me. And I’m gonna feel so at home
and so comfortable.} Bullshit!” Instead, he said, he only wanted to make a state-
ment:
I have no… interest in stupidity. …So, I don’t run around looking for stupid groups. I
joined… this particular… Atlanta Freethought Society not because I thought these people
were… smart and had any answers, but because I (,) …mainly I thought it was a way of
me doing… what I think is morally proper. Me saying: hey, here’s another number you
can put on your membership list to show that not everybody in this god-damn country
is a simple-minded evangelical.
The Euphoric. In contrast, representatives of the euphoric feel completely at
home in their atheist activism. Their identity as atheist is at the center of their
personality. With the freethought-secularist movement they have found a plat-
form with the help of which to act out on this aspect of their identity. This
ideal type is characterized by three motives: the public self-presentation as athe-
ist in activist as well as everyday situations, the conviction of being part of a vic-
torious movement, and the characterization of religion as psychosis and mental
imprisonment. David M. (SFA, 77) represented the prototypical euphoric:
I got an atheist cap. It says American Atheists up here. I got that at one of the conventions.
And… a reporter from the Chronicle interviewed me… and took my picture and… (,) and this
actually was at an atheist meeting, I believe, in Berkeley. They were discussing something…
about atheism or something the government is doing. And this reporter was there and…
took my picture. And I’ve been in parades. I’ve been in a lot of parades… holding… a ban-
ner or something. And I give out these pins [pins with the word “GOD” crossed out].
It is obvious that David enjoyed presenting himself as an atheist in public. In
contrast to many other American atheists, he happily had his picture taken for
a newspaper. Also, he liked to be present and honk his horn at demonstrations,
the actual cause of which seems to be less important to him. He fashioned him-
self an “atheist preacher”, who, for example, sings atheist blues songs and plays
his harmonica at a night club or who advertises his book, “Atheist Acrimonious”,
in everyday situations, such as while inquiring about car insurance on the
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phone. This ambition results from his idea that atheism constitutes a superior
and, in the long run, victorious worldview. David typically argued for this view
with a mixture of serious and tongue-in-cheek arguments:
Atheists have more fun.You have more enjoyment being an atheist. You’re happier being an
atheist. …And [laughs] (,) and, of course, if you’re talking to another guy, says: you can
drink more without guilt. I mean, you can have another beer! …And drink more whiskey!
Shit, you got ‘em right there [laughs]! …Or you talk to the women and says: …did you
know that the atheist men are the handsomest men in the world? They’re a lot more
handsomer than these Catholics. You know? …Tell ‘em any god-damn thing! It don’t matter.
As long as you get their attention.
Of these arguments, David was at least convinced of the greater happiness that
atheists would enjoy. His happiness about his own atheism and his enthusiasm
to advertise for it result from his past, when, he claimed, he suffered from “god
phobia”. Having finally concluded that the god he used to be afraid of did not
exist, to him, accordingly, felt like an enormous liberation: “And I’ve been elated
and happy about it… ever since that… I just can’t get over it. I am so happy
[laughs].”
5 Conclusion
The phenomenon of “new atheism” at the beginning of the 21 century has led to
a growing academic and public visibility of a freethought-secularist movement,
whose protagonists have sometimes been called “militant” or “zealous atheists”
(Gray 2008; Platzek 2011). Apart from the general problem that “militancy” is a
mischaracterization of stringent criticism, my exploration of German and Amer-
ican atheist organizations has revealed that the membership of these groups is
much more pluralistic – regarding degrees of and motivations for members’ ac-
tivism, their views on strategies and openness, as well as their worldviews and
worldview formation. A certain degree of zeal may only be ascribed to members
that I characterized as the “political fighter”, the “euphoric”, and, to some de-
gree, the “intellectual enlightener”. In general, organized atheists’ activism
may be either other- or self-oriented, it may follow political, communal, or edu-
cational goals, and it may seek confrontation or accommodation. Also, some of
the members may be very critical not only of religion, but also of their fellow
atheists and atheist organizations.
This plurality was present in both the American as well as the German or-
ganizations. One exception, at least in my sample, was the ideal type of the “eu-
phoric”, whose prototypical representative I only found in one of the American
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groups.While this may be mere coincidence, I would like to argue that a system-
atic difference between organizations from the two countries can be found with
respect to the narrative pattern of “belonging”. Even though the study’s design
does not allow for quantitative comparisons, it is noteworthy that this narrative
pattern was much more common in the American interviews. There may be a
structural reason for this tendency, and it may have to do with the “ubiquity
of theism” (Smith 2011) in U.S. society and the more charismatic and expressive
character of American religiosity. It has been reported that these factors make
the American atheist identity a rejection identity faced with stigma and ostra-
cism. Accordingly, the main reason for joining atheist organizations so far (look-
ing at American cases only) has been seen in the management of a non-norma-
tive identity through association with like-minded people – either with the aim
of fighting the stigma, or with the aim of banding together. While important in
the American context, this is less of a motive in the case of Germany, where non-
religion and atheism are not uncommon and faced with less of a stigma. Accord-
ingly, this exploration has shown that there exist further motivations for secula-
rist activism – namely political outrage and intellectual curiosity – which can be
found in both countries alike.
Finally, the difference in religious vitality between the two countries overall
may be responsible for the most striking difference between the German and the
American atheist organizations. The latter proved to be a lot more vivid. Even
though in both countries I consciously sampled organizations that offered
their members chances for getting active politically as well as for socializing,
the German groups studied offered social events and meetings much less regu-
larly and less frequently than the American ones. Efforts at organizing informal
meet-ups within the German groups were generally short-lived and charitable ac-
tivism not considered necessary. Therefore, except for the preparation of the
newsletter, the more active members tended to only meet irregularly, such as
for occasional political protest, for outreach at progressive festivals (such as
Labor Day or gay pride events), for an occasional lecture or book discussion,
and for their groups’ annual conferences. In contrast, the American groups fea-
tured not only their monthly meetings, but also dinner clubs, book clubs, char-
itable as well as a plethora of other activities. Even though national differences
in civic cultures may also play a role here, it seems more likely that the degree of
religiosity present in a culture determines heavily the degree of activism in athe-
ist organizations, which on all other counts are so similar to one another.
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Dusty Hoesly
Your Wedding, Your Way: Personalized,
Nonreligious Weddings through the
Universal Life Church
1 Introduction: The Growth of Personalized,
Nonreligious Weddings
Wedding ceremonies in the United States are increasingly personalized and non-
religious, a trend facilitated in part by the Universal Life Church (ULC), which
will ordain anyone nearly instantly.While it does not identify as a secular or non-
believer organization, the ULC provides a popular pathway for self-described
nonreligious couples to achieve a unique wedding that honors their beliefs
and relationships. As a church, its ministers are capable of solemnizing mar-
riages legally; and as a religion that allows anyone to become a minister, it per-
mits secular people to perform legally valid weddings. Although civil ceremonies
are secular, they are not often customized for specific couples. Secular celebrants
who are certified by nonbeliever organizations are few and far between, and in
most states their weddings are not recognized legally. Given that nonbeliever or-
ganizations have not prioritized secular alternatives to religious rites of passage,
nonreligious couples find alternatives that facilitate such rituals, even paradoxi-
cally yet pragmatically by utilizing a religious resource such as the ULC. The ULC
thus complicates notions of “organized secularism” because it shows how many
avowedly secular people take up a strategic religious identity in order to achieve
a desired nonreligious ritual in an individualized manner.
The rise of nonreligious weddings in the 21st century tracks with several de-
velopments in American society and technology, particularly the rise of the
“nones” and widespread use of the internet. Since 1990, more Americans have
declared that they have no religious affiliation, rising from 8% in 1990 to 21%
in 2014, according to the General Social Survey (Hout and Smith 2015, 1). A
2014 Pew survey claims that 23% of Americans are religiously unaffiliated
(2015, 3). Younger cohorts are more likely to be unaffiliated, with 33% of those
aged 18–24 claiming no religious affiliation (Hout and Smith 2015, 3). During
this same time, the rates of Americans who earn bachelor’s and graduate de-
grees, engage in premarital sex, cohabit before marriage, delay marriage and
childbirth, and forego marriage entirely have increased. In 2010, the median
age for first marriage was 29 for men and 27 for women, up from 26 and 24 in
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1990 (Cohn et al. 2011). As newer generations get married, they want their wed-
dings to reflect their increasing secularity. Those with no religion tend to marry
partners also with no religion (Baker and Smith 2015, 163–164; Merino 2012, 8).
Alongside these trends, the growth of the internet as a site for exchanging and
marketing wedding concepts and vendors has changed how Americans marry.
The development of wedding websites and blogs, such as The Knot, A Practical
Wedding, and Offbeat Bride, has steered middle class tastes regarding wedding
fashions and DIY alternatives. The internet has also made it easy for people to
become ministers in religions that allow near-instant ordination online.¹ The pri-
mary institution offering such ordinations is the ULC, which has ordained nearly
23 million people since 1962 by mail and online.
Rates of weddings performed by conventional clergy have declined as cou-
ples opt instead for friends or relatives who get ordained online or else hire pro-
fessional wedding officiants, an emerging industry in the 21st century (Gootman
2012).² According to The Knot’s 2009 survey of its members, 29% of member cou-
ples were married by a friend or relative; by 2015, that number jumped to 40%
(Sun 2016). The Wedding Report similarly shows that the ratio of weddings per-
formed by friends or relatives (from 10% in 2008 to 17% in 2012), or by profes-
sional officiants who advertise as wedding vendors (from 13% in 2008 to 17% in
2012), is growing (McMurray 2012, 2–3). Simultaneously, the ratio of weddings
performed by priests (27% in 2008 but 18% in 2012) and by pastors, ministers,
and rabbis (43% in 2008 but 39% in 2012) is declining, while the proportion of
civil ceremonies has remained steady (about 6%) (2–3).³ Despite the statistical
variations between The Knot and The Wedding Report, both show a clear and
fast-growing trend toward friends and relatives officiating weddings rather
than traditional clergy. Nonreligious people increasingly want a personalized
ceremony that reflects their values, led by someone they know. Most of the indi-
 Internet-based religions offering near-instant online ordination, usually for free, include
American Marriage Ministries, Open Ministry, Universal One Church, Church of Spiritual Human-
ism, Rose Ministries, American Fellowship Church, First Nation Church & Ministry, Church of the
Latter-Day Dude, United Church of Bacon, Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, and more, in
addition to the Universal Life Church.
 The New York City Clerk’s office “processed 1,105 marriage licenses last year for ceremonies
officiated by Universal Life ministers, a small fraction of the total, but more than twice as
many as in 2009” (Gootman 2012).
 There are almost no government or academic surveys of how people marry or of the numbers
or ratios of civil to religious wedding ceremonies. Counties and states rarely input data regarding
whether marriages were civil or religious into state records databases, although that information
is marked by officiants on individual marriage licenses in most jurisdictions. Rates of civil cere-
monies likely climbed after the nation-wide legalization of same-sex marriage in 2015.
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viduals ordained online for this purpose receive their ministerial license through
the ULC.
American weddings have become more individually-centered, alternatively
spiritual, and overtly secular since the 1960s, as couples have sought alternatives
to traditional religious rituals. This personalization and detraditionalization of
American weddings is linked to the ULC, which began as a mail-order ministry.
News media (Curtis 1970; Gootman 2012; Lehmann-Haupt 2003; Price 1993), wed-
ding guidebooks (Ayers and Brown 1994, 117– 118; Bare 2007, 180– 181; Francesca
2014, 22–24; Roney 1998, 78, 98; Roney 2013, 24; Stallings 2010, 116; Toussaint
and Leo 2004, 39), and scholars (Dunak 2013, 80; Mead 2007, 138, 161) have ex-
plicitly cited the ULC as part of the growth of personalized weddings. Same-sex
couples, now legally permitted to marry across the U.S., typically want nonreli-
gious weddings, with many led by ULC ministers (Freedman 2015). These sources
report that couples seeking nontraditional and nonreligious weddings often ask
a friend or relative to officiate for them, using the ULC as a way to ensure their
marriages’ legality while reflecting their choices for how they want to celebrate
their special day.
This chapter explores how nonreligious couples celebrate their weddings
using the ULC as a case study, and how ULC weddings complicate simplistic sec-
ular-religious binaries. Since nonbeliever organizations, as well as most religious
organizations and civil officiants, are unable to meet the demand for personal-
ized, nonreligious weddings, nonreligious couples seek alternatives such as
the ULC. The ULC is a religious institution that will ordain nonreligious people,
who can then officiate personalized, nonreligious, and legally-valid weddings. In
order to be recognized by the state, a secular or “spiritual but not religious”
friend who officiates a ceremony is counted as a religious minister, and the non-
religious ceremony is counted as a religious one, even though all of the parties to
the wedding understand it and themselves to be thoroughly nonreligious. Ac-
cording to my original survey and interview data, most ULC ministers and the
couples who engage them self-describe as nonreligious, typically as “spiritual
but not religious” but also as humanist, secular, agnostic, and atheist. Similarly,
they describe their weddings as nonreligious, consciously excluding traditional
religious language and locations. Examining ULC weddings thus reveals not
only the diversity of nontheistic self-identification and lifecycle ritualization,
but also the interpenetration and co-constitution of religious and secular catego-
ries. The ULC, its ministers, and its weddings blur the presumed boundary be-
tween religious and secular, showing their constant entanglement.
In next four sections, I discuss my research methods, the history of American
wedding personalization and secularization, secular options for nuptial celebra-
tion, and the ULC’s history particularly as it relates to weddings. I then analyze a
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sample ULC wedding (section 6) before placing it in the context of general ULC
wedding trends (section 7). Finally, I conclude by examining further how ULC
weddings, in instantiating a sort of “secular sacred,” demonstrate the mutual
entanglement of the religious and the secular.
2 Methodology
In order to investigate how nonreligious couples marry through the ULC, I con-
ducted mixed-methods research including participant observation, interviews, a
survey, and archival research.⁴ I was ordained by the ULC in 2000 while I was a
college undergraduate; I had heard about it from classmates and thought it
would be fun to become a titular minister. I did nothing with my ordination
until 2009 when two friends asked me to officiate their wedding. Over the
next six years I officiated twelve more weddings for friends and relatives: two
in 2011, three in 2012, two in 2013, two in 2014, and three in 2015.⁵ Weddings
took place in California, Oregon, Washington, Louisiana, Connecticut, and Eng-
land. For each wedding, I took notes about what kind of ceremony the couple
wanted, where it took place, what kind of language and rituals they wanted in-
cluded and excluded, how they met and fell in love, why they wanted to get mar-
ried, and what compromises (if any) the couple made amongst each other and
with their parents or other family members who expressed preferences for the
ceremony. All but one of the couples agreed to interview with me about their
wedding for my research, and all names and identifying characteristics are ano-
nymized.
From November 2013 to May 2014, I distributed an online survey of ULC
members and couples married by them through personal chain referral email
and Facebook contacts, ULC Seminary and ULC Monastery monthly email news-
letters and Facebook pages, and eighteen other Facebook pages which used the
 Parts of this methodology section repeat descriptions from an earlier publication (Hoesly
2015).
 For full disclosure, I also began a wedding officiant business in Santa Barbara, California in
2012 and have since officiated over 80 additional weddings in that capacity. No data from those
weddings is included in my research, however, because I opted not to solicit those couples’ con-
sent to participate in my study and because I was paid for officiating their weddings. My re-
search question primarily focuses on couples who consciously select someone they know to of-
ficiate their ceremony as a ULC minister, rather than couples who select an officiant-for-hire who
is otherwise a stranger and who just happens to be ordained by the ULC.While this is an inter-
esting population and a phenomenon worthy of further study, it is not the focus of this chapter.
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name “Universal Life Church.” Questions covered each respondent’s past and
current religious, spiritual, or secular beliefs, practices, and self-identifications;
reflections on their affiliation with the ULC; knowledge about and characteriza-
tion of the ULC; descriptions and labeling of ULC weddings in which they have
participated; and demographic information. Some questions allowed for an
open-ended response. All responses were anonymous. 1,599 people completed
the survey. Answers were coded and analyzed for patterns related to respond-
ents’ (non‐)religious self-identifications, motivations for affiliating with the
ULC and characterizations about the church, and (non‐)religious characteristics
and labeling of ULC wedding ceremonies. At the end of the survey, respondents
could opt-in to participate in a follow-up interview by providing their contact in-
formation. No compensation was provided to any survey or interview partici-
pant.
I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 62 ULC ministers and
31 couples married by ULC ministers from October 2012 to May 2015. Participants
were gathered through chain referral sampling and through the opt-in question
at the end of the online survey. As it is not possible to determine what a repre-
sentative sample of ULC ministers and couples wed by them would be, given the
respective ULC churches’ lack of demographic data collection, I sought inter-
viewees via purposeful sampling, looking for “typical cases” as well as signifi-
cant variants (Patton 2002, 230–242).⁶ Most chain referral participants lived in
California, Oregon, and Washington, so most of my interviews occurred in
those states. Interviews took place in person, by phone, and online via Skype
or Google Hangouts. All participants have been given pseudonyms. Questions
covered the same topics as the survey. Interviews were transcribed, coded,
and analyzed for patterns related to the same themes as the survey.
I also interviewed the president of the Universal Life Church (Andre Hens-
ley), as well as leaders of several ULC-affiliated and spin-off organizations,
such as the Universal Life Church Monastery (George Freeman), the Universal
Life Church Seminary (Amy Long), and the Universal Life Church Online
(Kevin Andrews), among others. These interviews covered the history, activities,
 Typical case sampling is one kind of purposive/purposeful (nonprobability) sampling. In typ-
ical case sampling, the researcher looks for themes that recur frequently or that are not extreme
or unusual. These cannot be used to make generalized statements about the experiences of all
participants, but rather are illustrative. Other kinds of purposeful sampling include extreme/de-
viant case sampling, maximum variation (heterogeneity) sampling, homogenous sampling, con-
venience sampling, chain referral, etc. I looked for recurring themes and narratives until I
reached data saturation. By significant variants, I mean seeking extreme or deviant cases as
well as covering a spectrum of perspectives (maximum variation).
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and organization of each group, and the leaders’ involvement in and thoughts
about each church, in addition to the same topics discussed in the other inter-
views. These interviews were designed to augment the information I gathered
from ULC archival sources, newspaper and magazine databases, and court deci-
sions. The original ULC in Modesto, California allowed me to study their church
records, newsletters, and publications. Online, I visited ULC websites, subscri-
bed to various ULC email newsletters, followed official and unofficial ULC Face-
book pages, and read official and unofficial web-based discussion forums.
3 Your Wedding, Your Way
Personal choice reigns supreme in how couples construct contemporary wed-
dings.⁷ Just as modern couples choose their marital partners, they also want
to craft a wedding that manifests their particular desires, tastes, and beliefs. Al-
though couples often negotiate some aspects of their weddings with parents or
other concerned parties, the couples’ expressive choices are paramount. Under-
lying contemporary American wedding culture, Rebecca Mead argues, is the idea
that “a wedding ceremony, like a wedding reception, ought to be an expression
of the character of the couple who are getting married, rather than an expression
of the character of the institution marrying them” (2007, 139). Specifically linking
this trend with ULC-ordained ministers, Mead attests that growing numbers of
“unchurched” people desire “freelance, part-time” ministers who can offer “an
aura of spirituality without the regulations of an organized religion” (138).
Such weddings are an “expression of their taste when it came to religious rit-
ual—their selection among an array of elements” they could include (136–
137). As Howard Kirschenbaum and Rockwell Stensrud noted over forty years
ago, “The personal wedding has revolutionized our society’s way of thinking
about rites of passage” (1974, 15). The ideology of personal choice continues to
ground and shape American weddings today, including for nonreligious couples.
Starting in the 1960s, scholars documented a cultural turn away from more
established religions (Wilson 1966), observing new forms of religious experimen-
tation, spiritual seeking, and secularization (Roof 1993; Roof 2001; Wuthnow
1998;Wuthnow 2010). Progressive, anti-establishment attitudes challenged tradi-
tional religious institutions and orientations. Feminists and civil rights move-
ments insisted on full equality, inclusion, and social justice. Increased social
 Christel Manning has shown that personal choice also guides how nonreligious parents raise
their children (2015).
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mobility and higher education further threatened local affiliations and social
mores. For many, the individual self became the locus of authority. This new
era of “expressive individualism” affected all facets of American life, including
marriage (Bellah et al. 1985, 33). Karen Dunak describes this trend toward “indi-
vidual expression, personal authority, and cultural reinterpretation” as central to
modern weddings, which eschew patriarchal forms of wedding ritualization and
marriage, passé religious or parental expectations, and rigid conformity to social
conventions (Dunak 2013, 6).⁸
Since the 1970s, books titled Your Wedding, Your Way (Ingram 2000; Naylor
2010; Newman 1975; Stoner 1993; Vincenzi 2003) have celebrated growing indi-
vidualization in American weddings while noting declining religious elements.
In 1975, Carol Newman offered tips for “planning and executing a personalized
ceremony,” capturing a moment in the history of American weddings that in-
creasingly emphasized prioritizing a couple’s choices for their ceremony above
traditional wedding etiquette, parental concerns, and religious traditions (13).⁹
Her book included suggestions about outdoor wedding venues, modern spiritual
readings, and “where to find a flexible officiant” who would be “open to the con-
cept of the new wedding” (128). Clergy allowed couples to include less patriar-
chal or sexist language in ceremonies, for example, or to write their own
vows. “Even within the traditional wedding,” Newman wrote, “personalization
has become common practice” (134). The growth of personalized weddings
went hand-in-hand with a turn toward spiritual and secular self-identifications,
leading couples to evacuate religion from their ceremonies.¹⁰ As Marcia Seligson
 Karen Dunak states, “Spirituality trumped organized religious belief. Personal selection and
contribution were paramount” (2013, 85). Couples incorporated nonsexist language in their cer-
emonies, Kahlil Gibran’s The Prophet or the “Apache Wedding Prayer” instead of biblical quotes,
alternative clothing, outdoors locations, and other elements reflecting the new era. This “indi-
vidualized approach to their weddings” reflected couples’ desires for “honesty and authenticity”
as much as leftist politics or alternative lifestyles (92).
 Leah Ingram similarly advised couples: “Forget what convention tells you to do. This is your
day and you should have a wedding that truly reflects who you two are as a couple” (2000, xi).
 Sharon Naylor encouraged couples to “break from tradition and create a one-of-a-kind cel-
ebration,” emphasizing that the wedding ceremony is “where you join your lives together in the
manner of your choosing,with the words and the music youwant, the rituals that mean the most
to you [emphasis in original]” (2010, 31). This is in contrast to the “strong-handed direction to
follow religious protocol, to include the types of rituals that mean the most to them [emphasis
in original]” (15). Her oppositional view of religion shaped her recommendations for wedding
location (“Look at nature as the ultimate religious location”) and officiant (suggesting the Cel-
ebrant Foundation & Institute, a civil servant, or “having a friend or relative ordained to perform
your ceremony”), as well as many other wedding elements (34–35). In her list of values that
shape couples’ desires for non-traditional weddings, “Religion is not a big part of your life”
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noted of the “new wedding” of the 1960s, “Whatever the script created, most
kids of the new world prefer that God be mentioned as little as possible”
(1973, 278).¹¹ Similarly, today’s nonreligious couples—whether “spiritual but
not religious” or secular—prefer to leave religion out of their weddings, even if
they draw upon some religious ritual forms or otherwise bend traditions to
their personal likings.
4 Secular Wedding Options
Nonreligious couples in America who do not want to be married by a traditional
religious authority have limited options apart from a civil ceremony if they want
their wedding to be legally valid. In the United States, each state regulates mar-
riage differently, although all require a marriage license issued by civil officials.
The vast majority of couples who wish to marry have only two options: a reli-
gious wedding performed by clergy (often labeled a “minister of the gospel” in
state marital statutes) from a recognized religious organization or a secular wed-
ding performed by a designated civil official (such as a judge). Religious ceremo-
nies are often performed in churches or other religious buildings, but can also
take place at other sites, depending on the flexibility of the clergy person per-
forming the ceremony and the requirements of the religious tradition. The specif-
ic content of these ceremonies depends upon the dictates of the religion and the
choices of the individual minister. Civil ceremonies usually take place in city
halls or courthouses, although some civil officials may choose to perform cere-
monies at other locations and times, depending on where and when a couple
wishes to marry. Due to the constitutional prohibition on government establish-
ment of religion, and since civil officiants are agents of the state, these ceremo-
nies are supposed to be secular. Some states allow additional alternatives for
couples, such as getting married by a notary public,¹² by someone who becomes
came first, followed by ecological living, a preference for unique or personalized elements, and
other values (6).
 Robert Bocock argued that there is a general trend away from religious ritual and toward sec-
ular forms in industrial societies, including in weddings and funerals (1974). Bryan Wilson also
documented declines in religious weddings (1966). Nicholas MacMurray and Lori L. Fazzino dis-
cuss secular funerals in this volume.
 Four states authorize notary publics to solemnize marriages: Florida, Maine, Nevada, and
South Carolina. Kelle Clarke, a member of the National Notary Association, reports on the No-
tary Bulletin website that notaries in other states can get ordained online in order to officiate
weddings (2014).
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deputized for a day,¹³ or by self-solemnization,¹⁴ but these are not options in
most states.
Secular wedding options usually do not provide the personalization that
modern couples desire, or else are not legally valid. While tens of thousands
of couples marry in civil ceremonies each year, courthouse weddings are typical-
ly standardized ceremonies led by a stranger with little tailoring for the individ-
ual couple. Aside from civil ceremonies, there are several secular organizations
that authorize trained celebrants to perform weddings, including the Center for
Inquiry (CFI), the Humanist Institute,¹⁵ the Humanist Society,¹⁶ and the Celebrant
Foundation & Institute. The Unitarian Universalist Association (UUA) will also
perform atheist weddings. Although many couples get married by using such cel-
ebrants each year, several issues limit their reach and appeal: the process of be-
coming certified is lengthy and costly, few states recognize marriages solemnized
by secular celebrants, and couples who want a personalized wedding prefer
someone they know to officiate it.
In order to become a celebrant with one of these secular organizations or the
UUA, one has to undertake a period of training, pay fees, and submit to the rules
of the certifying body. For example, to become a CFI secular celebrant, an indi-
vidual must become a member of the CFI, attend a training, obtain letters of rec-
ommendation, write an essay describing one’s worldview, interview with CFI di-
rectors, obtain approval, and pay initial and yearly fees.¹⁷ Similarly, the
Humanist Institute requires applicants to complete online training; the Humanist
Society requires an application, a fee, and membership in the American Human-
ist Association; and the Celebrant Foundation and Institute requires lengthy
training and higher fees in order to become a “Certified Life-Cycle Celebrant™.”
These rules make it hard for nonreligious couples to have someone they know
 Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Washington, D.C., for example, allow peo-
ple to become a “deputy marriage commissioner for a day” or “temporary officiant” (or similar
title) so that they can perform a particular civil ceremony. There are several requirements in
order to become deputized, such as paying a fee and obtaining paperwork from the county
clerk’s office, with specific requirements dependent on local statutes.
 Colorado, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Washington, D.C., allow couples to self-solemnize
(perform their own marriage), for example.
 The Humanist Institute is an affiliate of the American Humanist Association.
 The Humanist Society is an adjunct of the American Humanist Association.
 The CFI further notes that it “does not allow anyone acting as a CFI Secular Celebrant to sol-
emnize a marriage under any religious designation or pretense, or using the certification of any
religious organization,” including the Humanist Society and “so called ‘mail order’ ordinations
such as the Universal Life Church.” “CFI Celebrant Certification,” Center for Inquiry, accessed
March 1, 2016, http://www.centerforinquiry.net/education/celebrant_certification/.
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become certified to perform their ceremony. Furthermore, most states do not per-
mit celebrants trained by secular organizations to solemnize legal marriages,
and there are very few secular celebrants in states where this is permitted.¹⁸
The UUA, by contrast, is recognized by every state as a religious organization
whose marriage solemnizations are valid.
More importantly, none of the couples I interviewed considered a secular cel-
ebrant because such celebrants pose the same problem as clergy and civil offi-
ciants: lack of a personal relationship with the couple. The driving motivation for
nonreligious couples to ask their friends or family to become ULC ministers is so
that they can have someone they know well perform an intimate, heartfelt wed-
ding tailored to that specific couple, while reflecting their nonreligious world-
views. A celebrant trained by one of the aforementioned secular organizations
or a UUA minister could offer a customized ceremony, but she likely would
not be someone with whom the couple had a prior relationship; instead, she
would be a stranger who the couple contracted for a service. A friend ordained
online by the ULC, for free, without any creedal commitment or organizational
oversight, allows nonreligious couples to marry however they wish assured
that their ceremony will be recognized as legally valid. It can be a romantic, per-
haps humorous, and personally-meaningful celebration led by a close friend or
relative of their choosing.
5 The Universal Life Church
The story of the ULC is a prism for contemporary American religion, reflecting
trends in emerging forms of spirituality, secularization, individualization, and
state regulation of new religions. Kirby J. Hensley (1911– 1999) incorporated
the ULC in 1962 in Modesto, California, offering free ordinations to anyone
 In 2013,Washington, D.C., began allowing “civil celebrants” trained by a secular or nonreli-
gious organization to perform marriage ceremonies, and New Jersey became the first state to au-
thorize “civil celebrants” to solemnize marriages in 2014. Oregon followed suit in 2017. The CFI
won a federal lawsuit, Center for Inquiry v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, in 2014 forcing Indiana,
Illinois, and Wisconsin to recognize CFI secular celebrants as lawful marriage officiants. In
2014, Nevada changed its marriage statutes to permit notary publics to perform weddings
after humanists and atheists filed a lawsuit. As of 2015, due to a lawsuit, Washington County,
Minnesota became the fourth county in that state to allow atheists accredited by a nonbeliever
organization to perform weddings; bills that would allow atheists to officiate weddings have also
been introduced in the state legislature. Movements in the United Kingdom similarly advocate
that governments recognize humanist weddings (Engelke 2014; Law Commission 2015). New
York has long permitted Ethical Culture Society leaders to solemnize marriages.
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who wanted one. He had preached earlier in Baptist and Pentecostal congrega-
tions, but they dismissed him due to his unorthodox beliefs and provocative
preaching style. In founding his own church, Hensley wanted to “make it possi-
ble for anybody to be ordained… No matter what he believes [emphasis in orig-
inal]” (Ashmore 1977, 21). The ULC had no doctrine except to do “that which is
right… and every person has the right to decide what is right for himself [emphasis
in original]” (24). Hensley’s church is a religious institution flexible enough to
accept all manner of beliefs and practices, including Christianity, Judaism,
Asian religions, UFOs, New Thought, metaphysical spiritualities, and atheism.¹⁹
In addition to shielding ministers from any doctrinal orthodoxy that might be im-
posed by church hierarchies, the ULC defends individual religious freedom from
state regulation. As he told one college audience, “We don’t stand between you
and your God, but between you and the State. The purpose of the Church is to
bring absolute Freedom of Religion to all people [emphasis in original]” (52).
Hensley called the ULC a “buffer zone” for religious liberty, protecting ministers
from the encroachments of both church and state while ensuring that no outside
authority would dictate or delimit a person’s beliefs or practices (1986).
The unconventional form and content of the ULC helped it grow rapidly, or-
daining over one million ministers by 1971, but it also brought challenges from
government regulators and skeptical media. Draft boards complained that the
church encouraged Vietnam War draftees to resist conscription by claiming
the draft’s ministerial exemption. California’s tax agency argued that the church
served as a for-profit diploma mill, since it offered honorary doctorate degrees
for a fee without state accreditation. The IRS refused to grant the church tax-ex-
empt status. However, the ULC sued and a federal judge ordered the IRS to rec-
ognize it as a tax-exempt religion in Universal Life Church v. U.S. (1974). The court
also declared that states cannot require accreditation for honorary theological
degrees. Hensley and the ULC touted this ruling in publications, subsequent
legal arguments, and in the media, including during their long-running dispute
with the IRS after it revoked the ULC’s tax exemption in 1984 for advocating tax
avoidance schemes. By that year, the ULC had ordained over 12 million ministers.
In the 1970s-1980s, a number of legal cases challenged the legitimacy of ULC
weddings in state courts, but over time judges have generally ruled in favor of
their validity (Rains 2010).²⁰ Unlike childbirth or puberty rituals or funerals,wed-
 For example, Hensley ordained Madalyn Murray O’Hair, the founder of American Atheists,
awarded her honorary degrees, and issued a charter for her Poor Richard’s Universal Life Church
in Austin, Texas (Ashmore 1977, 39; LeBeau 2003, 148–150).
 The first of these, Ravenal v. Ravenal (1972), centered on a New York couple’s divorce wherein
the man argued that he owed no alimony due to the fact that they were never legally married.
Your Wedding, Your Way 263
dings must conform to state marital statutes in order to count as legal marriages;
they are governed by laws in ways that other lifecycle rituals are not (Cott 2000).
Despite the few states where ULC weddings were litigated, the vast majority of
states have always accepted ULC weddings as legally valid.²¹ The ULC encourag-
es ministers to check with each county in which marriages will be performed to
ensure their legal validity.²²
The judge agreed, declaring the marriage void since the ULC minister and the ULC itself did not
meet the state’s definitions of a church or of a minister eligible to solemnize marriages. Many
laws governing marriage require ecclesiastical bodies to have some structure managing their
clergy and for ministers to maintain a regular house of worship, meeting times, and member-
ship. The ULC’s loose ecclesiology did not fit these state definitions of religion and ministry,
judges ruled. This early decision would be affirmed in later cases, Rubino v. City of New York
(1984) and Ranieri v. Ranieri (1989), although a different New York court, in Oswald v. Oswald
(2013), ruled recently that the ULC counts as a religion and its ministers are eligible to solemnize
marriages. The judge in the latter case argued that the ULC, while unconventional, is a religion if
it says it is and that courts should not second guess church decisions about their own ordination
processes. The logic of these two positions, for and against the ULC, played out in several other
cases. In Cramer v. Commonwealth (1974) and State v. Lynch (1980),Virginia and North Carolina’s
supreme courts ruled that the ULC is not a church and that its ministers are not clergy according
to their state statutes defining these terms, while Mississippi’s supreme court ruled in favor of
the ULC in Last Will and Testament of Blackwell v. Magee (1988). Judges in Washington, D.C.,
ruled against the ULC in 1981 (In re: Dixon) but for it in 1998 (In re: Stack). Judges in different
Pennsylvania counties ruled against the ULC in 2007 (Heyer v. Hollerbush) and for it in 2008
(In re: O’Neill). A 2001 Utah bill prohibiting recognition of marriages performed by ministers
who are ordained by mail or online was ruled unconstitutional by a federal judge in Universal
Life Church v. Utah (2002). In 2006, the New York City Clerk’s office issued a rule allowing ULC
ministers to officiate weddings in the five boroughs. Additionally, a New York Assemblywoman
has tried to pass a bill from 2005 to at least 2012 that would grant online officiants legal power to
solemnize marriages throughout the state. The overall trend is that the more recent decisions
recognize the ULC as a religion and its weddings as legally valid.
 Indeed, the few jurisdictions where ULC weddings are not honored due to judicial rulings are
Virginia, North Carolina, and parts of Pennsylvania and New York. In personal phone calls with
clerks and recorders in each jurisdiction in which ULC marriages are supposedly invalid, I was
told that marriage licenses are recorded without inspection as to the ecclesiastical body ordain-
ing the minister. In effect, ULC weddings in these jurisdictions are processed successfully nearly
all the time.
 New Haven County in Connecticut refused to accept my ULC ordination as valid for perform-
ing a marriage there when I called in the summer of 2015. This seems to run counter to an official
opinion of the Connecticut General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Research, which declares
that “Nothing in statute or case law appears to prohibit mail order ministers from performing
marriages in Connecticut” (OLR 2003-R-0490). I have officiated legally valid weddings in four
states. New Haven and Frodsham, England are the only two jurisdictions that did not accept
my ULC ordination; nevertheless, I performed ceremonial weddings for each of these two cou-
ples, even though they were married legally in civil ceremonies earlier in the day.
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The expansion of the internet in the 1990s broadened the ULC’s reach and
further connected it to wedding personalization. In 1995, the ULC created a web-
site offering online ordinations and retailing ministerial products under a sub-
sidiary called the Universal Life Church Monastery (ULC Monastery). Newspapers
ran stories about journalists getting ordained online, celebrity ordinations, and
nontraditional weddings led by ULC ministers, further promoting the ULC as a
way for nontraditional or nonreligious couples to personalize their weddings.
After Kirby Hensley died, the ULC settled with the IRS. Internally, it lost control
of the ULC Monastery, which was reincorporated as an independent entity in Se-
attle, Washington by George Freeman, a ULC minister who thought that the
church was not harnessing the power of the internet as much as it should.
Today, the ULC Monastery owns hundreds of online ordination websites, direct-
ing web searches to the ULC Monastery; most people ordained online today are
ULC Monastery ministers.²³ In the early 2000s, two ULC ministers created the
Universal Life Church Seminary and the Universal Life Church Online, both affili-
ated with the original ULC. These sites offer ordinations and sell their own min-
isterial products; they united into one organization, also called the Universal Life
Church Seminary, in early 2016. In this chapter, I will use the name Universal Life
Church or ULC to refer to all of these churches, unless I am referring to a partic-
ular church, in which case I will identify that specific church by name.
6 A ULC Wedding
In this section, I present an example of a nonreligious couple who got married by
a friend who was ordained online by the ULC so that she could perform their
wedding. Given the diversity of the types of couples and weddings I encountered
in my study of ULC weddings, no single story can capture this variety. Still, Scott
and Sadie’s worldviews and wedding include many of the characteristics that ap-
peared frequently in accounts of personalized, nonreligious ULC weddings.
Scott and Sadie got married in 2010 in Portland, Oregon. They had both
moved to Portland to attend college and then remained in the city after gradua-
tion. Even though they were just acquaintances during school, their friendship
eventually grew into something more, as camping trips and regular hikes be-
came stepping stones to developing their romantic relationship. They dated for
 The ULC Monastery ordains around 1,000 people per day, according to my 2014 interview
with its president, George Freeman. In 2009, Andre Hensley said that the ULC ordained
8,500–10,000 ministers per month (Nowicki 2009).
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six years before getting married, which they agreed “brought us together more as
partners.” Even though they had lived together before marrying and had already
committed themselves to each other, they felt that having a legal marriage and
ceremony “substantiated the relationship.” They are now in their mid-30s and
raising a son.
Sadie grew up near Boston in an Italian-Irish Catholic family, attending
church regularly, but she left the church in high school after a class inspired
her critical evaluation of religion in general, leading her to refuse confirmation
rites. “I started learning about religion and religious history and decided—I was
never really that into going to church anyways—and I didn’t really want to be a
part of the church and so I separated myself from that,” she said. “I have not
embodied any religion since then. I’m not really interested in it,” she added. In-
stead, in Portland, she has developed a strong circle of interpersonal support
and a deeper connection with nature.
I know a lot of people love their churches for things like community, but I feel like, living
here in Portland, we have so many awesome friends and neighbors and colleagues that we
just have such a strong community in all that that I don’t feel like I need a church in ad-
dition to that. And so, I’m not a religious person at all, but I love nature and science, and I
feel like I get all my spiritual needs fulfilled by all that.
For Sadie, being outside in nature is peaceful and rejuvenating, a “place of med-
itation”: “I feel like that’s what church is. It’s a break from reality where you can
get a little peace and reset, and I feel like I find that in other ways.” Describing
herself as a “very rational, practical person,” Sadie asserts that she does not be-
lieve in religion and that it is not something she thinks about much. “It’s not a
part of my life,” she said, adding that she would not involve their son in religion
either. Sadie described her view as both “anti-religion” and indifferent to religion
in her everyday life.
Scott was raised in a liberal Methodist church near San Francisco but he quit
religion soon after his confirmation ceremony. Like Sadie, a high school course
where he learned “all the awful things the institution has done” catalyzed his
change. Additionally, “the concept of feeling spiritual and feeling connected to
something else just… drifted away.Without a thought.” Over time, he drifted fur-
ther away from religion or spirituality and towards indifference.
For a long time, I thought, “Oh, I’m agnostic.” I’m almost more atheist now? Like, I would
defend the argument that there is no god. It’s not like, all of a sudden, there’s going to be
evidence at some point that there is some god so I should be agnostic. I just say, whatever
comes, comes. But at the same time, I don’t think about it a lot, so maybe that is more ag-
nostic, right? It’s kind of like whatever. To be atheist is to, like, really, think about it, process
it. I don’t think I really do that much.
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Neither Scott nor Sadie are sure about what terms like agnostic mean, but they
also do not care about such labels, asserting that these identifications are not
salient for them. Family and friends are most important in their lives, alongside
other commitments and pleasures such as sustainability, good food, and the nat-
ural world. Scott added, “Sometimes I feel like we don’t have a formalized proc-
ess for reflection, which kind of is too bad, but going out hiking allows for that, I
think, just as much as sitting in church. You know? I dunno. I listen to Fresh Air.
Terry Gross is my pastor [Laughs]. This American Life is our church service.”
Sadie echoed: “Terry Gross is our pastor.” Both Scott and Sadie articulate a lan-
guage of meditation and reflection that is connected to nature, and which they
consider a secular analogue to church, but irony and ambiguity also suffuse
their use of culturally-typical terminology for religious polity and practice. Ulti-
mately, quibbles about terms such as agnostic or atheist are unimportant to
them, as is the topic of religion. They share a secular orientation but it is one
that operates on an implicit level, which becomes operationalized during the
context of my interview with them.
Given their nonreligious worldviews and desire for a personalized, outdoors
wedding, Scott and Sadie immediately gravitated towards asking a friend to ob-
tain ordination online from the ULC. Scott first learned about the ULC through a
high school friend who had gotten ordained in high school or college. As far as
he was aware, the only purpose of the church was to facilitate weddings. He
said, “I remember it being kind of like a gag-y thing where you’re like, ‘Oh. I
could become an ordained minister and marry people? Huh!’” His wife Sadie
had a similar understanding of the church and its utility: “neither of us are re-
ligious or practice any religion, so we were just looking for something that was…
not affiliated with a religious practice, and so… that’s why we went with the Uni-
versal Life Church.” For Scott and Sadie, the ULC is a nonreligious religious or-
ganization, one which they do not consider to be religious in terms of dogmas or
community, but which they think is considered a religion legally in order for the
weddings conducted by its ministers to be counted as legally valid. Sadie added
an additional reason for choosing the ULC: “We also wanted our friend to marry
us. And that provided a way for her to be able to do that.” They quickly settled
on their college friend, Niki, asking her to get ordained by the ULC in order to
perform their wedding ceremony.
Despite their appreciation for the ULC as a vehicle for personalized wed-
dings, Scott and Sadie are critical of the institutional structures leading them
to ask their friend to get ordained in the first place. As Scott said, “I think any-
body should just be able to marry you and then submit the paperwork, and be on
record as having married a person.” Couples should not have to choose between
a secular civil official or a religious minister, they claim, even if that minister is a
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friend who is avowedly nonreligious and only technically a minister by virtue of
having been ordained online in a religion they know almost nothing about. The
ULC, Scott said, is “more of a contemporary fix to an out-of-date kind of proce-
dure, y’know? Maybe not out-of-date, but… it’s like a patch, y’know?” Similarly,
Sadie did not like the fact that the ULC connection tinged their wedding with the
veneer of religiosity. “I don’t see why they have to be ordained. It sort of puts a
religious… edge on it that… I’m not really that interested in,” she said. It would
be better, they argued, for the marriage solemnization process to be simplified
such that any adult can perform marriage ceremonies and sign the legal paper-
work, not just certain civil or religious officials. But given the current marital re-
lations statutes, for them the idea of asking a friend to get ordained has become
an unfortunately necessary step in legitimizing their marriage in the eyes of the
state.
When I asked Scott and Sadie about what other options they considered for
legally solemnizing their marriage, they said the only option they had considered
was having a friend do it.When pressed about why they did not select a civil cer-
emony, Sadie said, “I wanted to get married with friends and family. I don’t even
know how many people you could have in a courthouse.” Scott added, “I think
probably the biggest thing is it being somebody… you know. The idea of some-
body marrying you who doesn’t even know you… or performing a civil ceremony
and it’s someone you don’t know…” The idea of a ceremony presided over by a
stranger, a civil functionary, seemed weird to them and out of steps with the spi-
rit of an intimate, communal event such as their wedding. Similarly, a more tra-
ditional religious wedding was never on the table. “We would not have ended up
at a church, that’s for sure,” Scott said, before stating that churches have “doc-
trines and dogmas” to which he does not subscribe. In Oregon, where they live
and got married, the only options for legally valid weddings are those conducted
by civil or religious figures. Given that they are not religious and desired greater
personalization than a civil ceremony would allow, they opted for the ULC as a
convenient work-around since its status as a recognized religion guaranteed their
marriage’s legal validity while also ensuring their ability to obtain a secular wed-
ding ceremony that celebrated their values and community. Their friend network
espouses similar values. In their time as a couple, they have attended only one
traditionally religious wedding and no civil ceremonies. All of their other friends
were married by the nonreligious friends of nonreligious couples, under the aus-
pices of the ULC.
The process of creating their wedding ceremony, with their friend Niki pre-
siding, was significant for Scott and Sadie. Niki “was just a perfect fit,” Sadie
said. “She’s really creative and funny, and… she just pretty much had all the
qualities we wanted.” Well-spoken in public, funny, thoughtful, creative, and a
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close friend—these are the traits Scott and Sadie cherished in Niki, and which
led them to ask her to officiate their wedding. “Niki asked us all the things
that we wanted to include in the ceremony. It was really our own creation that
we made with her, and it was…. special that way,” Sadie said. Moreover, she
added, “It was nice to see that people really supported us and were happy to
be there, happy to be a part of making that happen.” Cherished bonds of friend-
ship and intimacy proved the foundation for their wedding and for their choice
of officiant. It would have been incongruous and impersonal had they chosen a
civil official or a more traditionally religious minister. The process of crafting
their ceremony with Niki “created a bond” between them that they said made
them “feel closer” to Niki.
Their wedding took place outdoors on an island in the Columbia River just
north of Portland. The outdoor setting was important to them because they love
being in nature and outdoors activities were central to their early relationship.
“Ultimately, we wanted a place that was meaningful to us… and we had previ-
ously, when we were dating, we had a whole day adventure out there, and
had had a picnic at this park before,” Sadie said. Desiring a casual, intimate
wedding, they invited a small group of friends and family, who sat on picnic
blankets. One friend, who came dressed in lederhosen, served as an impromptu
ring bearer. Two others offered readings tailored for the couple. Sadie loved how
much joy infused their ceremony. Niki’s wedding outfit was a “librarian-esque
style getup, with her big glasses, and she came up with a huge book as her note-
book—it was really funny,” Sadie said. The text of the ceremony was nonreli-
gious, reflecting their secular orientations. “I think that what we both read
were just expressions of whatever experiences and memories and things that…
make us right for each other. Speaking from the heart, y’know? As spiritual as
that is, right? But nothing formally spiritual,” Scott said. He added, “Niki did
a really good job. She took it seriously, y’know? And I think that could be a con-
cern. I think that’s why we made sure we thought about who we wanted, and
why she really stuck, was because she’s somebody who is fun and casual but
knows how to take things seriously and speak from the heart.” It was important
to them to balance humor and creativity with thoughtfulness and sincerity in
their wedding ceremony, as well as to celebrate with close friends and family.
The ULC offered them a way to have the wedding of their dreams while also en-
suring its legal validity.
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7 General Trends in ULC Weddings
The primary reason people join the ULC is to officiate weddings for friends or
family. In my survey and interviews, couples repeatedly expressed a desire for
someone they knew to officiate their ceremony. Seventy-eight percent of survey
respondents who are ULC ministers (N=1,584) reported that they liked that they
could officiate weddings after being ordained, and 79% of couples married by a
ULC minister (N=207) said that they were friends (61%) or relatives (18%) of their
officiant. Seventy-seven percent of couples married by a ULC minister did not
consider getting married by traditional clergy, and 67% did not consider getting
married by a civil official. Ministers described how meaningful it was for them to
help their friends or relatives celebrate their weddings. Adelaide said, “I think
having somebody that knows you a little better makes it more meaningful”
than a random clergyperson or civil official. An officiant who had gotten or-
dained as a joke but later officiated his friend’s wedding remarked, “I didn’t re-
alize how deeply, deeply meaningful it actually is when you actually do this.”
Gabe, who has officiated three weddings for friends, said that it is “very empow-
ering to feel that I as an ordinary person can perform recognized religious ritual
functions, recognized by the state or my larger community, and that’s something
that doesn’t require me to be a spiritual person.” A groom who was married by a
friend later joined the ULC himself in hopes of performing a friend’s wedding: “It
would be a great honor,” he said. The gravity and intimacy of presiding over the
wedding of a loved one deepens bonds of affection not only between the couple
but also amongst the couple and their officiant, and into their wider social net-
works.
Most of the couples married by ULC ministers who participated in my re-
search reported that they are not religious, although over two-thirds said that
they are spiritual. Of those married by a ULC minister (N=207), 69% reported
that they do not consider themselves a member of any religious organization.
Given the chance to select multiple identifications, 72% described themselves
as spiritual, 64% as humanist, 47% as secular, 37% as agnostic, 32% as apathet-
ic or indifferent, and 27% as atheistic. Gordon, who has officiated for nearly thir-
ty couples in thirty years, almost all through personal connections, said, “The
people that I’ve married, they’re all secular. None of the people are practicing
any religion—that I know of. So they’re doing this because they don’t want it
to be a religious ceremony.” Only a minority of my interviewees articulated un-
ambiguous atheist, agnostic, or spiritual identities, with most shifting between
different categorizations, ultimately claiming that they are “not religious” and
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that religion is not central to their lives. For example, one bride described herself
this way:
I’m definitely not religious. But I would say I’m spiritual. I associate more with, like, the
Eastern religions, you know, like Buddhism and… I don’t know. I like their tenets more.
But yeah, but I don’t like, I’m not very spiritual. I go to yoga… I meditate, and I try to
like commune with nature and stuff. So I don’t, I guess I just don’t think about it much.
Scott and Sadie similarly played with various identifications—atheist, spiritual,
agnostic, disinterested—without settling on any single label, except perhaps
for consistently articulating themselves as generically nonreligious. This may re-
flect an ambiguity in the terms themselves, an indifference toward choosing pre-
cise terms or ignorance of various meanings of such terms on the part of partic-
ipants, or a fuzziness, hurriedness, or weariness brought about by the out-of-the-
ordinary interview/survey context that called for such identifications on the
spot.
ULC weddings were described as nonreligious and usually as not spiritual
either. Seventy-one percent of peopled married by a ULC minister said that
their ceremony included no language or readings from religious or spiritual
texts. In my interviews, very few respondents reported getting married in a
church or another religious building; instead, the vast majority were married out-
doors or at a rented wedding venue.While most of the weddings used the tradi-
tional form of a generic Protestant wedding, including walking down an aisle
and exchanging vows and rings, they also innovated by evacuating the ceremony
of supernatural referents and incorporating words and/or rituals unique to their
own relationships and sensibilities.²⁴ Only a couple of the weddings I performed
for friends or family included readings from religious or spiritual texts, with cou-
ples opting instead for no readings or for secular poetry, such as by e. e. cum-
mings or Pablo Neruda. Most of the weddings I officiated took place outdoors,
on farms, by rivers or lakes, under tall trees or in a clearing on a sunny day;
the others took place at venues such as concert or reception halls. Other couples,
like Scott and Sadie, loved the humorous yet serious ceremony their friend Niki
wrote with and presented for them at a picnic wedding. One couple I inter-
 Ronald Grimes is skeptical about alternative weddings, arguing that they are “culturally con-
strained” with recognizable themes and predictable sentiments (2000, 208). However, he also
notes that, “At marriage, more intensely than at any other Western passage, primary participants
become ritually active in designing, deciding, and choosing elements for the rite… they conduct
research, scour their traditions, consult friend and relatives, negotiate values, and invent cere-
monies” (213).
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viewed, avid bicycle commuters both, invited guests to ride with them in a pro-
cession through the city to their venue, an industrial warehouse turned into an
events center. All of the ceremonies I experienced or heard about expressed each
couples’ nonreligious worldviews and personal visions for their wedding days,
and each couple told me how special their ceremony was and how meaningful
it was for their friend or relative to help them through the process of becoming
married.
8 ULC Weddings as Religious-Secular
Entanglements
Consideration of the ULC and weddings solemnized by its ministers presents
problems for certain classificatory schema in religious studies and in the social
scientific study of religion, especially the religious/secular binary. There already
exists a healthy literature criticizing this dichotomy (e.g., Asad 2003), yet in clos-
ing I want to explore four areas where I see religious and secular labels blurring
and interpenetrating in connection with the ULC. These areas include: the ULC’s
double mission, ministers’ self-identifications, couples’ valuations of their wed-
dings, and valuations of spirituality and intimate relationships. These entangle-
ments occur because of a complex web of state and federal laws, ULC ministerial
structures and processes, and social and cultural transformations such as the
growth of “spirituality” and other “third term” designations denoting something
between or against religion and secularism, but always in relation to them
(Bender 2012; Bender and Taves 2012).
The ULC’s twin mission for religious freedom implicates it as both secular
and religious simultaneously. Hensley’s vision for the ULC as a bulwark for lib-
erty of conscience and religious practice over against any church regulation of
religion coexists alongside the ULC as a protector of religious liberty over against
any state regulation of religious belief and practice. Its litigation history in fed-
eral and state courts demonstrates the difficulty governments and judges have
had in deciding whether the ULC counts as a bona fide religion or not. Was its
church polity too amorphous, its ordination process too easy, and its doctrine
too short to be taken seriously as a religion worthy of all the rights and benefits
accorded to religious organizations in American law and society? Judges and reg-
ulators at both state and federal levels arrived at different conclusions, with
some ruling that the ULC was not a religion and its clergy were not ministers
while others decided in favor of the ULC by analogizing it to mass revivals or
Martin Luther’s priesthood of all believers. In insisting on being treated equally
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with other religions, the ULC reveals the limits of religious freedom while also
expanding them for itself and others. ULC legal cases demonstrate the church’s
commitment to defending its own religious prerogatives as well as those of its
ministers against state action, all while making no theological or other demands
upon its members. The ULC was founded to protect First Amendment freedoms
as much as to resist the imposition of dogmatic orthodoxies.
A majority of ULC ministers self-identify as nonreligious, usually as “spiritu-
al but not religious,” yet they are technically religious officials of the ULC—and it
is in this very capacity that the weddings they perform are considered to be legal
marriages. Their self-identifications bleed from one category to another, includ-
ing multiple yet seemingly contradictory simultaneous labels, such as when
Scott said that he is nonreligious, agnostic, atheist, and spiritual all within
the span of a few minutes.²⁵ Such ambiguous articulations already imply prob-
lems with rigid religious/secular dichotomizations, but adding the fact that these
ministers perceive themselves as nonreligious calls into question not only what it
means to be a religious leader in the ULC but also what it means to be a minister
capable of solemnizing marriages legally. For many ULC ministers, they are non-
religious except for the moment they check the box marked “religious” on a mar-
riage license, write down their denomination and title, and complete the form. In
that moment, they agree that they are indeed religious ministers, if only nomi-
nally and fleetingly. Most couples married by ULC ministers are self-described
nonreligious people who want a personalized, nonreligious ceremony performed
by someone they know well, yet they acknowledge that for the purpose of mak-
ing their wedding legally valid it must be considered religious in the eyes of the
state. In terms of emptying their weddings of explicitly religious content, these
weddings are nonreligious and on par with a secular civil ceremony. However,
their ritualization choices largely mirror traditional Christian wedding practices,
including a leader standing at the front of the assembly, the couple processing
down an aisle, introductory remarks welcoming guests and discussing love
and marriage, readings from texts, perhaps a ritual (such as lighting a unity can-
dle), exchanges of vows and rings, and the pronouncement and presentation fol-
lowed by a recessional.²⁶ The content may be secularized but the form largely
 Religious, spiritual, secular, and nonreligious identities are not stable, unitary formations
(Chaves 2010; Hackett 2014; Lee 2014). Terms like religion, spirituality, secularism, and nonreli-
gion are discursive constructions contingently articulated in particular locations at specific
times for particular purposes, that is, in a contextualized “religion-related field” (Quack 2014;
von Stuckrad 2013).
 This description closely matches that of the wedding script suggested for CFI weddings (Ci-
mino and Smith 2014, 130– 131) and the Humanist Wedding Service written by renowned human-
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copies religious ceremonies. ULC weddings are both religious and secular: non-
religious in intention yet religious in structure and by state classification.
ULC weddings are also sites of sacralization, valued by participants as expe-
riences of high honor, as deeply personally meaningful, as sacred.²⁷ One groom,
who described himself as “spiritual but not religious” and who had also offici-
ated a wedding for a friend, told me, “[T]he institution of marriage is not some-
thing I find sacred but I do find sacred love and being committed to the one I
love.” Love holds a special place for people involved in weddings—for the couple
marrying, for the gathered friends and family who support their union, and for
the friend-officiant who conducts the ceremony. Another groom, an atheist who
had also officiated one wedding, told me that he was attracted to the ULC be-
cause, “This is how we make things sacred.” Terms like “sacred,” “honor,”
“deeply meaningful,” and “spirituality” mark a set of terms that elide the arbi-
trary bifurcation between religious and secular (Bender and Taves 2012; Huss
2014).²⁸ Kim Knott has labeled marriage, and values such as the right to
marry, as “the secular sacred” (2013).²⁹ By studying self-conscious “processes
ist Corliss Lamont (1972). New York Society for Ethical Culture leader Khoren Arisian similarly
formats weddings this way (1973). The British humanists Matthew Engelke has studied “do
not want belief, but they do want belonging” in their wedding ceremonies (2014, 300).
 Sacralization refers here to the process of deeming or valuating something as “sacred,” spe-
cial, or set apart from ordinary life. I use it to categorize first-order ascriptions of “specialness,”
not an inherent or sui generis quality of things (Taves 2009, 17). In Living the Secular Life (2014),
sociologist Phil Zuckerman observed, “People—even the most ardently secular—still want, need,
and enjoy structured moments of reflection, recognition, and consecration… But they don’t want
these to be religious in nature… But they still yearn for a meaningful, authentic ceremony that
allows them to come together and be a part of a ritualized gathering that marks the occasion as
special, set apart, sincere, heartfelt” (186).
 Boaz Huss argues, “I think there is a considerable decline in the cultural power of the dis-
junction between the religious and the secular, and a growing tendency to blur the distinctions
between these two (postulated) oppositional realms. The decline of religion and the secular as
key cultural concepts comes to the fore in the growing number of people who refuse to define
themselves as either religious or secular, in the growing popularity of the folk concept of ‘spi-
rituality’ that transgresses this binary opposition, and in the formation of new social institutions
and practices (mostly belonging to New Age culture) that indeed challenge and defy the distinc-
tion between the religious and the secular” (2014, 100– 101).
 According to Knott, “…those forging social identities in secular contexts—who draw on non-
religious commitments and beliefs, including atheism, humanism, and secularism—mark as ‘sa-
cred’ those occasions (such as marriage), persons (a lover), things (a ring), places (a registry of-
fice) and principles (equality and justice) that they value above all others, and that they see as
set apart and inviolable: those things that may be deemed to be both secular and sacred [empha-
sis in original]” (2013, 160). Similarly, ritual studies scholar Ronald Grimes claims that the
“eclecticism and bleeding of boundaries that characterize the alternative wedding scene testify
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of valuation and meaning making” in particular contexts, we can see how messy
and entangled events are on the ground (Bender and Taves 2012, 2).We can also
then see how nonreligious material practices and ritualizations complicate sim-
plistic understandings of what secularity and nonreligion mean, such as if they
are taken to mean merely atheism and agnosticism instead of a wider assortment
of frames, seemingly contradictory self-identifications, and religo-secular inter-
penetrations (Lee 2012).
The ULC is a “religion of convenience,” as one interviewee called it, a “cul-
tural resource” (Beckford 1992, 171; Swidler 1986, 281) which allows nonreligious
individuals and couples to create personalized, nonreligious weddings that are
legally valid. Getting ordained online is a “pragmatic religious practice” (Smilde
2013, 44) for these nonreligious ministers, one that leads them toward a “sacred”
goal of uniting two people who love each other in marriage.³⁰ Even if nonbeliever
organizations and secular celebrants are allowed to solemnize marriages legally,
they will encounter the same limitation as civil ceremonies: lack of a meaningful
relationship with the couple. Modern nonreligious couples seeking personalized
celebrations are willing to strategically adopt a religious label in order to achieve
their wedding, their way.
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Nicholas J. MacMurray & Lori L. Fazzino
Doing Death Without Deity: Constructing
Nonreligious Tools at the End of Life
1 Introduction
A growing body of literature is considering secularity and nonreligion from a va-
riety of scholarly perspectives. In this volume, we see both the diversity of efforts
towards secular organizing as well as of the diversity of strategies for researching
these topics. To this discussion, we would like to contribute research on nonreli-
gious organizing at the end of life. Nonreligious organizing at the end of life is
not new, historically, but the ways in which these actions play out in the contem-
porary American context are novel and have much to teach us about broader dis-
cussions of secularization and the standing of nonreligion in U.S. society more
generally.
In this chapter, we use the terms “nonreligious” and “nonreligion” to refer to
both the identities and worldviews of our research participants, though we rec-
ognize that other authors in the collection are using varying and potentially
more specific language. For this project, we collected data from a broad array
of individuals in a variety of settings. As such, it was not possible to learn of
exact belief structures, identities, or more specific personal information that
would allow us to typify our research participants in more nuanced ways. We
use the term “nonreligious” as an umbrella term to cover those individuals
who identify with various Atheist, Secularist, Humanist, Free-Thinker and Ag-
nostic classifications in this project. A further note on language in this chapter
is we are using terms such as “nonreligion”, “religion”, and “science” as gener-
alities within this project in order to frame our discussion, but are sensitive to the
notion that the empirical realities of these subjects are far more complex than
our labels imply, as noted by Harrison (2006).
Several centuries have passed since the Enlightenment, when religion began
to be superseded by science and reason as the primary method for understand-
ing and addressing problems in the natural and social world. Decline in the re-
liance on mysticism, magic, and God, and the rise of rationalization and intellec-
tualization was referred to as the “disenchantment of the world” (Weber 1905).
As explanatory religious frameworks continued to be challenged by science, re-
ligion was said to be pushed further out of public and into private life. As mod-
ernity progressed, the inclusion of religious meaning and symbolism in the pub-
lic sphere continue to decline through processes of secularization (Berger 1967).
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More recent research has problematized the notion of a steady, linear process of
secularization across Western society, noting that the process occurred in seg-
mented, uneven and diverse ways (Martin 2007). Though not occurring in the
uniform pattern once theorized, scholars agree that the rationalizing and secu-
larizing of society transformed the whole of social life in the West. That transfor-
mation encompasses the social managing of death. Historically, handling the
dead was both a personal and public affair with the family in charge of the social
and corporeal aspects (i.e., one’s body), while the church was in charge of the
spiritual aspect (i.e., one’s soul). Modernity has seen, in a Weberian sense,
the rationalization of the management of dying and death, a trend often equated
with secularization (Mellor and Shilling 1993). Death in society today occurs
largely outside of public view (Lofland 1978), sequestered from daily life and
daily concern, handled by a cadre of death-specialists (Mellor and Shilling
1993). Similarly, the location of the deathbed has shifted in modern times from
one’s home to institutional settings, primarily the hospital (Kellehear 2007). If
death has been professionalized, routinized, and institutionalized, we must
ask, “Do these rationalized aspects equate to the secularization of death?” Our
research indicates that in American culture, the dynamic is not so simple.
In this research, we examine death and bereavement among nonreligious
Americans. Our study emerged from Fazzino’s (second author) dissertation
work, which examined lived nonreligion in Las Vegas.While in the field, a mem-
ber of the local atheist group, Betty, died shortly before a scheduled interview.
Fazzino was unable to attend Betty’s funeral, but learned that when her sister,
who is Mormon, closed the service she said, “You know, I don’t care what my
sister believed. I know she’s in Heaven, and when I get up there, I’m going to
tell her ‘I told you so!’” As a Mormon-turned-atheist, Betty forbade in writing
the inclusion of any religious sentiment in her memorial. Nonbelievers in attend-
ance described this as a slap in the face. They were offended by the disregard for
Betty’s final wishes in her sister’s expression of religious sentiments. They also
expressed how this event both amplified and delayed their grief. They felt com-
pelled to decide whether and how to respond to the sister, and how they would
live with the consequences of that choice.
While talking about this situation, we realized that the intersection of our
research areas, religious/secularity studies and death and dying, was fertile
ground for research. The events that transpired at Betty’s funeral left us with
questions about how nonbelievers manage dying and death in a highly priva-
tized religious culture, what resources are available specifically for a nonreli-
gious worldview, and if end-of-life is an area where marginalization occurs. We
decided this topic deserved attention, so we chose to investigate further.
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In this chapter, we present a qualitative analysis of nonreligious understand-
ings, coping strategies, and organizational efforts towards managing death and
dying. We draw from sociology, cultural studies and social justice theories to
form a perspective uniquely suited for exploring death and bereavement among
the nonreligious in the contemporary American context. Our analysis reveals sev-
eral key findings. First, we find that our respondents frequently encountered reli-
gion at the end of life. While a resource for many Americans, religious language,
narratives, symbols and ideas were not helpful to our respondents in coping with
their grief, as these cultural forms do not hold the same meaning for nonbelievers
as for believers. Beyond this, several respondents noted conflict with theology at
the end of life, such as Betty’s funeral, in which religious sentiment was imposed
on that service against their will.
We also found that death is an area where the nonreligious are disadvantag-
ed by a lack of an institutionalized nonreligious death culture. We find that the
nonreligious lack the ready-made “cultural tools,” such as ceremonies, rituals,
rites, language, and grief resources widely available to those of a religious world-
view. Our final finding addresses how the nonreligious have and are producing
and disseminating death cultural resources geared specifically to those with a
nonreligious orientation. We conclude that, taken together, these challenges
both problematize and politicize death and dying for nonreligious Americans.
We close by discussing the implications of our findings.
2 Brief Review of Literature
In the following sections,we review literature pertinent to our research as well as
describe the theoretical concepts and frameworks we use to craft our lens for this
research. In the opening section, we discuss how death intersects with religion
and nonreligion, and describe how the end of life causes the nonreligious to in-
tersect with religion as well. Following that, we discuss a number of theories for
understanding nonreligious organizing from a cultural perspective.
2.1 Death, Religion, and Nonreligion
The end of life presents challenges for persons of all worldviews. It is often as-
sumed that dealing with death would be more difficult without religion. Howev-
er, Seale (1998, 76) situates contemporary death culture by arguing that “modern
rationality… [provides]… guidance for a meaningful death that are at least as
powerful as those of earlier traditions.” For example, from the perspective of
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western medicine, death is the failure of the biological systems necessary for
one’s survival. Medical rites give death a corporeal meaning as a bodily process,
which generates a sense of death as something scientifically accurate or know-
able. Some research has noted that it is the strength of one’s worldview, not the
content that matters. Among older adults, strong adherence to atheism operates
much like religion does for believers, providing meaning, explanation, consola-
tion, and support when coping with ageing (Wilkerson and Coleman 2010). Per-
haps medicalizing death explains differences in psychological distress. Secular
caregivers exhibit significantly higher levels of communication about mortality
with patients and reported significantly lower levels of fear of death compared
to their religious counterparts (Bachner, O’Rourke, and Carmel 2011).
The nonreligious and religious alike must construct meaning to deal with
the inevitability of death. Despite being governed by a secular democracy,
“the will to religion” (Beaman 2013, 151) permeates American culture, creating
a “new normal,” or what Lori Beaman refers to as the assumption that all per-
sons are religious and have spiritual needs (Beaman 2013, 151). Nowhere is
this more apparent that in the reliance on religion for relating to death. One
might say that death is inescapable on several levels. Manning’s (2015) research
on unaffiliated parents reminds us that meaning-making around the topic of
death is not relegated to illness, aging, or some distant time. Death is unavoid-
able for parents who must answer when asked by their children, “What happens
when we die?” As the end of life raises issues of personal philosophy on mortal-
ity, interacting with others around the topic of death may bring one into contact
with the worldview of another. While the nonreligious do not take stock in reli-
gious narratives of post-mortem existence, advancements in technology and
medicine raise questions of extending one’s life and the possibility of someday
conquering death. These scientific narratives offer hope of immortality to the
nonreligious, as the potential for these occurrences fit within the nonreligious
worldview as potentially possible (Fontana and Keene 2009).
Do scientific advances reduce fear and anxiety concerning death among the
nonreligious? Sociologist Ryan Cragun argues that the nonreligious are, in some
ways, better at dying than the religious. His national and international analysis
of death and dying among religious fundamentalists, moderates, liberals, and
the nonreligious found that across all religious categories, the nonreligious
were less afraid of death, less likely to have anxiety about dying, and less likely
to use aggressive means to extend life (Cragun 2013, 166). Moreover, nonreligious
persons also report higher levels of support for death with dignity measures
(Smith-Stoner 2007). It appears, then, that perhaps nonreligious interpretations
of death lead to differing relationships with end-of-life matters than do religious
interpretations.
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The impact of religion on the nonreligious varies. For instance, people who
do not believe in God with some degree of certainty tend to experience religious
environments more negatively than those who do (Speed and Fowler 2016). Many
of the narratives compiled in Melanie Brewster’s (2014) Atheists in America high-
light religion as unhelpful when it comes to providing consolation for death. In
Bakker and Paris’ (2013) study of baby loss, religion was inadequate for helping
nonreligious women who suffered the pain of baby loss. Imposed religion, or
what Lin (2014) refers to as a bereavement challenge, can often impede healthy
grief trajectories. The likelihood that any person will encounter theist sentiments
or practices is largely contingent on one’s social environment; in this case of the
United States. Though not prepared to generalize our findings to national or in-
ternational contexts, our data indicates encounters with religion at the end of life
are common, at least in the contexts we investigated.
2.2 Cultural-Justice Approach to Studying Death
In crafting our theoretical lens, we draw on Swidler’s (1986) cultural tool-kits,
Griswold’s (2003) cultural production theory, Young’s (1990) oppression theory,
and Buechler’s (2000) cultural politics. Swidler (1986) conceptualizes culture as
a toolkit of strategies and repertoires which comprise a system of meaning
through symbols, a set of beliefs, values, and practices, and shared communica-
tion. This “toolkit” concept may be applied at the societal level or to smaller
groups, such as a bowling team, and may also be applied generally or in a par-
ticular context, such as managing end-of-life matters. Griswold’s collective pro-
duction theory synthesizes the micro interactional production of culture through
symbolic interaction with the macro-organizational nature of culture, specifical-
ly in terms of cultural producers and consumers. From this perspective, culture is
not sui generis; it is a production. Taken together, these concepts of producing a
cultural toolkit allow us to look deeper at how modern nonreligious Americans,
much like the secularists in Victorian era Europe who found themselves outside
the normative death and dying culture (Nash 1995), are finding ways to construct
meaning regarding mortality without the cultural toolkit (Swidler 1986) offered
by faith-based traditions.
We must also account for why non-religious individuals so often find them-
selves excluded from normative death culture, especially when the ways in
which Americans relate to death and dying have shifted and vary across time
and place (Kellehear 2007). To this end, we employ the concept of cultural impe-
rialism, which refers to “the experience of living in a society whose dominant
meanings render the perspectives and point of view of one’s group invisible,
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while also stereotyping one’s group and marking them as ‘other.’ [It] is the uni-
versalization of one group’s experience and culture and its establishment as the
norm” (Young 1990, 58–59). Participants in our study voiced feeling marginal-
ized and belittled for their worldview.
Cultural imperialism provides a framework within which Christian-centric
hegemony and anti-atheist discrimination are situated. Recent research on prej-
udice toward (non)religious minorities suggests that there has been growing tol-
erance and/or acceptance for most religious minorities in the US. However, as
Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann’s 2006 study suggests, the same may not be
true for atheists. We argue that there may be other – as yet undescribed – fac-
tor(s) that explain the continued prejudice against atheists. Recent social psy-
chological research may have uncovered one such issue. Perceptions of threat
have been identified, albeit under-theorized, as a contributing factor in anti-
atheist sentiments. Findings delineate three specific types of threat – value
threat, threat to cultural worldview, and existential threat that people may expe-
rience with regard to atheists (Cook, Cohen, and Soloman 2015; Cook, Cottrell,
and Webster 2015). Distrust, disparagement, and social distance have been
shown to substantially increase when existential threat was activated by increas-
ing people’s concern for death. Likewise, existential concern was increased
when people simply thought about atheism (Cook, Cohen, and Soloman 2015).
In short, anti-atheist prejudice may be exacerbated in end-of-life situations.
This suggests to us that even though death itself may less anxiety-provoking
for nonreligious people in comparison to their religious counterparts, feeling
marginalized may increase anxiety at times surrounding the end of life.
Finally, the concept of “cultural politics” (Buechler 2000) is used to describe
political efforts directed towards the cultural realm, as opposed to efforts direct-
ed at the state. In drawing this distinction, Buechler notes that no action is in-
herently state- or cultural-politics, as elements of both forms are always inter-
twined. An example would be the green funeral advocates who work to bring
ecological reform to the American way of death. Similarly, we believe the ongo-
ing negotiation of cultural meaning at the end of life represents this form of pol-
itics, as nonreligious individuals resist defaulting to Christian-centric norms
through the creation of explicitly nonreligious end of life cultural tools. The
norms which preside over the end of life are inherently political, as they reify
some worldviews while marginalizing others. Similarly, efforts to create nonreli-
gious end-of-life cultural tools and repertoire are political, as those projects rep-
resent efforts to reform the American way of dying to include spaces and tools
which nonreligious individuals will find meaningful. While not inherently criti-
quing religion, these projects do critique a status-quo in the United States in
which nonreligious end-of-life resources have traditionally been scarce.
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3 Data and Methods
Data for this chapter comes from observations at several monthly events hosted
by various non-religious groups, including the Humanists and Atheists of Las
Vegas (HALV), the Las Vegas Atheists Meetup (LVA), the United Church of
Bacon (UCB), and Sunday Assembly Las Vegas (SALV). Interview data come
from informal and focus group interviews.We collected textual data by conduct-
ing a series of online searches through search engines such as Lexis/Nexis and
Google. We were intentionally narrow, searching only for the terms “death,”
“dying,” “grief,” and “bereavement” for all the various nonreligious identity la-
bels (e.g., Atheist; Humanist). We read books by prominent atheist authors, col-
lected blogs, popular print media, video media, and we joined the Grief Beyond
Belief (GBB) private group on Facebook. We intentionally did not collect data
from that site because of privacy restrictions, but used it instead as a validity
measure against which we compared our codes. Our analytic strategy was induc-
tive, following the precepts of grounded theory (Charmez 2014).
For the sake of transparency, it should be noted that both authors bring to
this material some insider experience. Fazzino has been involved with organized
nonreligion in Las Vegas, as both an insider and researcher, for six years (2010–
2016). Our collaboration on this project began in March 2014. At that time, Mac-
Murray (first author) began participating in a regular Tuesday night Meetup
event, where Fazzino introduced him to the people at the meeting. In this way,
Fazzino’s insider status facilitated MacMurray’s entre to the groups, making in-
troductions and both organizing and participating in interviews (as interviewer,
not interviewee). Two very active group members had recently died within three
months of one another, just prior to MacMurray’s entrance into the field. These
events provided a foundation for discussing death and dying with participants.
In an attempt to be reflexive about our own standpoint,we would like to mention
that we have been actively involved in the creation and dissemination of nonre-
ligious end-of-life cultural tools ourselves, which is part of our focus in this re-
search (the specifics of this project are described in detail in our findings sec-
tion). Our politics on the matter support the notion of equitable death, in
which individuals of any worldview have equal access to the resources which
might help them navigate the often-troubling times at the end of life. We view
both the subjects of this research and this research itself as contributing to
the secular organizing at the end of life.
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4 Findings
The nonreligious respondents we spoke with typically described death as the
end of individual existence. Interpreting death in this way is quite different
from traditional religious interpretations. Death is, as one participant told us,
“…just different for us.” This difference in worldview may go largely uncontested
through much of daily life, but during times of death, varying or even opposing
interpretations of what death “is” may come into conflict. As many of the cultur-
al norms for social interaction at the end of life contain theist symbolism, the
American way of death often fails to assist the nonreligious. Beyond being of lit-
tle use as a resource, religious symbolism at times became a hurdle to our par-
ticipants, as they felt that their worldview was ignored, downplayed or otherwise
marginalized.
It appears that the lack of nonreligious end-of-life culture is motivating a va-
riety of individuals to create and spread resources which are meaningful from
within the nonreligious worldview. Both in the Las Vegas field and in our broad-
er content analysis, nonreligious organizing at the end of life is an active project.
We argue that these challenges and responses problematize and politicize the
end-of-life for the nonreligious. In the following pages, we attempt to support
and defend this position, providing a glimpse into the lived reality of doing
death without deities.
4.1 The Inadequacy of a Theistic Death Discourse
Worldviews among the nonreligious are incredibly diverse (Lee 2014). Despite
ideological differences, two themes emerged in our data. The first is the inade-
quacy of religion as a means to manage death for the nonreligious. This finding
is supported by prior research (Bakker and Paris 2013; Vail III et al. 2012). Reli-
gious answers may bring comfort to religious people, but many nonreligious in-
dividuals draw little from these explanations. In some cases, death can lead in-
dividuals who had previously identified as religious to question their faith. This
happened to one of our respondents, Gina, who prayed for the healing of two ill
family members. She recalls:
I grew up in a home that left the option of religion up to me. However, I was sent to a pri-
vate Catholic school and was exposed to that belief system. For a while it was nice to be-
lieve that everything could be fixed by kneeling in your pew and praying your heart out.
Then, within the course of one year, an uncle passed away…a few months later my grand-
father very suddenly passed as well. While my uncle was wasting away, I was told to pray,
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and he would be well again. Obviously, it [prayer] didn’t have any effect. Then when my
grandfather was in a coma, I was told the same thing. I put all my heart into praying so
he would wake up. Again, [prayer] not helpful. After that, I knew. I just KNEW that religion
was nonsense, and I would never tell someone to just “pray for it.”
Another respondent, Amber, traces her deconversion from Christianity to when
she was 11-years old. Her father was sick and her entire family would gather
night after night to pray. For Amber, her father’s death meant either God refused
to answer their prayers or he simply did not exist. She concluded the latter and
abandoned her faith. She now sees religion as nothing more than a way for peo-
ple to deal with their feelings rather than face the truth. This link between expe-
riencing death and rejection of religion is also illustrated in the documentary
Hug an Atheist. As one woman narrates: “When my husband was hit by the eld-
erly driver, he spent three days in the hospital dying, and I spent a lot of time in
the chapel on my knees praying to God that he’d be okay. And, of course, in the
end he wasn’t, and part of me felt like that was all time I wasted. I should’ve
been by his side. I shouldn’t have bothered with the chapel.” In all these exam-
ples it seems that religion justified time spent looking for divine intervention,
which for some pulled them away from loved ones with little time left. In the mo-
ment, seeking god’s intercession seemed like the right thing to do, but when it
failed to work, deep regret ensued.
Although some nonreligious individuals wished they could accept religious
narrative to help them cope with death, this does not lead them back to religion.
In the same documentary a man speculates about how much easier dealing with
his father’s death would have been with religion, “It’s been ten months since my
dad died. In times, I think it would have been a whole lot easier if I would have
been a person of faith because it’s just so much easier to strike it up to God’s
will: ‘It was his time,’ ‘He’s in the arms of Jesus now,’…Those kind of clichés…
that to me felt like a cop-out.” The perception that religion, as a means to
cope with death and loss, is “a cop-out” is a second pattern in our data. It sup-
ports a prominent theme in previous research on non-religion, namely the im-
portance of living authentically (Fazzino 2014; Zuckerman 2015). For the nonre-
ligious, truth (or more accurately their perception of big “T” truth) is more
important than mitigating the negative emotions from existential threat. While
understanding that neither religious or nonreligious identities are entirely ra-
tional choices, we find that death is often a time when one’s worldview is put
to the test. The unavoidability of mortality forces humans to manage its inevita-
bility in some way. To this end, the nonreligious are constructing their philoso-
phy of death independent of the theism.
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4.2 Accepting Death as Final End
The nonreligious philosophy of death that emerges from our data is best ex-
pressed by our respondent, Joe:
Put as simply as possible, death makes life worth living. By understanding and accepting
death, we can understand that our time here is finite, and that this is our only chance of
being alive and making the most of it. This isn’t just a life you can ruin and then get a sec-
ond chance after you die. This is it. If you don’t want your last moments of existence to be
spent considering your regrets, death should be the inspiration to get out there and live
your life.
Joe’s quote expresses three main ideas that transcend ideological differences
among the nonreligious: (1) the cessation of life is death; (2) this life is the
only life there is; there is no afterlife or rebirth; and (3) the finality of death
makes life more meaningful, not less. Here, we see a connection between how
death is interpreted and how that interpretation informs one’s personal philos-
ophy of how life ought to be lived. As death is thought of as the final end, the
social life of here and now become more important, as one’s time is limited
by death.
Part of understanding one’s identity as nonreligious means accepting the in-
evitability of death. When we asked, either individually or in focus groups,
“What is death?”, we heard the same three or four responses repeatedly, most
of which were expressed in the same matter-of-fact manner. Death was described
as the end of consciousness, simple non-existence, and as a natural process. In
one focus group, this question generated a dialogue about fear that we did not
expect, but were nevertheless pleased with this direction because of the nuance
that emerged – namely the difference between fearing death and fearing dying.
Joe again articulates this clearly:
…any fear I have had in the past was of dying, rather than being dead. Some people don’t
seem to understand the difference. Dying could very well be a terrifying experience as you
contemplate the fact that you are coming to the end of your existence. Dying is a process
that the living go [sic] through. I can see why many people would be scared of dying, and
having to say goodbye to loved ones. But death itself? That’s the easy part.
Another respondent, Gino, acknowledges: “As a secular/non-religious person, I
would be lying to state that death doesn’t bother me. As much as I accept the
inevitability of death, it’s not something I look forward to and hope to put off
for as long as possible.” While death, as non-existence, means one no longer
feels anything, it is the process of dying or watching others die that is painful.
As another respondent, Sheila, explains: “It’s like you fear other people’s
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death more than your own, ‘cuz [sic] it’s like, ‘I’m dead.Whatever. I don’t care!’”
Sheila’s point, too, highlights the difference between death and dying.
Dale McGowan, a secular activist and author of Parenting Beyond Belief,
writes: “One of the things it is important to recognize is that death isn’t easy
for anyone. There is a myth that religion quells the fear of death; that if we
can only accept the idea of heaven, then we won’t be afraid anymore.” Another
secular author and activist, Jerry DeWitte, writes: “When you can truly put your-
self in that position and realize that the only thing to fear may be the moments
leading up to it, there’s absolutely nothing to fear afterwards. It’s truly accepting
death that gives you a new lease on life. It really does.” It appears that both pro-
fessional writers and ordinary seculars like Joe, Gino, and Sheila, are able to ar-
ticulate a coherent non-religious philosophy of death.
4.3 Nonreligious Conceptions of Life After Death
A common perception is that the nonreligious reject any notion of an afterlife,
but this is incorrect. In his 2013 TEDx talk, “The Four Stories We Tell Ourselves
about Death,” Steve Cave identified four stories that people employ that allow us
to escape death, cognitively at least. The majority of nonreligious people reject
the idea of a supernatural afterlife, rendering spiritual and resurrection immor-
tality stories invalid, but this is not the end of the story. Two stories deemed le-
gitimate by the nonreligious are those proposing scientific or symbolic immortal-
ity. The former espouses the idea that death can be cured through science.
Among those we spoke with, the degree to which this idea was accepted depend-
ed on views about whether or not conquering death was a good thing. Consider
the following exchange from one focus group:
Nick:Will we ever overcome death?
Mary: Be able to live forever?
Nick: Yes.
Jimmy: And would you want that?
Mary: Paul Kurtz thinks maybe…
Jimmy: Yeah! The singularity…
Phil: I think that technology could get us there, you know? We’ve heard about all sorts of
advances in anti-aging, however, there’s also a very big problem, and that is, who gets to
take advantage of it? And, there’s quality of life to consider, of course, but at the same time,
if everybody’s doing it, what’s that going to do to our resources?
Mary: Are people going to stop mating? Stop having kids?
Phil: And that’s why I personally think if you’re gonna [sic] do it, you should sign a waiver
that says you’re not going to procreate and add to the extra shortening of resources.
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Given the opportunity, though, would these participants extend life? Responses
were mixed. Jimmy opposed the idea for himself for individualistic reasons,
namely the loss of doing things he enjoyed and becoming bored. Phil took the
opposite stance, stating he would want to live on given the opportunity just
“to see how knowledge develops.” Being skeptical of science resolving the prob-
lem of mortality and logical about their positions may lend support to our claims
that the nonreligious fear dying, not death.
Symbolic immortality, the idea of living on through the legacy one has cre-
ated in life, was much more common across our data. The following quote from
Humanist Manifesto II summarizes this popular view, “There is no credible evi-
dence that life survives the death of the body.We continue to exist in our progeny
and in the way that our lives have influenced others in our culture.” Among
many who identify as nonreligious, the viable means for achieving immortality
is through the legacy established in life. The evidence of one’s existence is found
in the contributions that person makes, big and small, in the lives of all those
who go on living. Any notion of an eternal life lives only in the memories of
loved ones and in how they hold the deceased in their memory, or in other
words, is a social legacy.
It is important to note that the legacy story is not exclusive to the nonreli-
gious. The problem death and legacy poses for social media has been the subject
of much commentary in recent years. Options for users to name a “legacy con-
tact” who will be granted access to one’s Facebook account in the event of
death, along with headlines like, “What Will Your Social Media Legacy Be?”
from the Huffington Post, have driven the push to secure one’s virtual immortal-
ity. While these options are available to the religious and nonreligious alike, we
find the nonreligious have fewer cultural resources to manage and cope with
death in general.
4.4 Finding Meaning in Death
The general sentiment among our respondents is that death is an experience that
can provide them with meaning, purpose, and peace. Contrary to any conception
that nonreligious people have “nothing to live for”, our data indicates that non-
religious individuals make meaning within the parameters of their worldview,
through the company of loved ones, satisfying their love for learning, experienc-
ing new things, and taking in the wonders of the world. Mortality is an inescap-
able part of the human condition, and research has shown that reminders of
death activate cognitive defenses and uphold cultural worldviews (Greenberg,
Solomon, and Pyszczynski 1997). Applying this idea to our respondents, we
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find it easy to understand how death becomes a motivator for making the most
of this life, as for them, there is no other.
Our respondents expressed this desire to live life fully. Thus, the way one’s
spends their time greatly informs their interactions and behavior. Tito explains,
“It was the finality of death that motivated me to find peace in my life. Death
motivated me to make amends with estranged family members, like my father.
I felt like it was such a waste of energy to hold on to all of the anger and hate
that was pent up inside of me. I accept that we’re all here for only a short
time. Ultimately, death is what motivates me to live, love, and enjoy every second
of my life.” It would seem that quality of life is an important consideration
among the nonreligious for determining what it is to have a “good life” (see To-
scani et al. 2003).
Tito’s quote suggests that one’s quality of life is not determined by others’
adoration, approval, or by the absence of conflict and pain. Whereas many
turn to religion to reconcile the problem of suffering that exists in the human
condition, the nonreligious try to accept the reality of life’s ebbs and flows. Rath-
er than asking why bad things happen, they focus on how to live in spite of bad
things happening. Secular activist and author Ayaan Hirsi Ali highlights this
idea, “The only position that leaves me with no cognitive dissonance is atheism.
It is not a creed. Death is certain, replacing both the siren-song of Paradise and
the dread of Hell. Life on this earth, with all its mystery and beauty and pain, is
then to be lived far more intensely: we stumble and get up,we are sad, confident,
insecure, feel loneliness and joy and love. There is nothing more; but I want
nothing more.” To live a good life is to have a high quality of life, which for
the nonreligious, is measured by their ability to live effectively, authentically,
and autonomously. With this in mind, we now turn to the unique problems
death poses for the nonreligious.
4.5 Negative Encounters with Theist End-of-Life Culture
The formal and routine processes around managing the dying and the dead have
largely been professionalized, rationalized, and thus secularized in the United
States. But religion is far from absent. Our respondents reported many encoun-
ters with theism throughout their end-of-life-experiences. Both personal interac-
tions and institutional support structures illustrate how nonbelievers experience
religion as cultural default at the end of life.
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4.5.1 “Your Religion Only Makes My Grief Harder!”
Talking openly about death has long been considered taboo in U.S. culture (Wal-
ter 1991). While that is beginning to change, we found a pattern of deferring to
cultural scripts when interacting with the bereaved. A common experience
among our nonreligious participants was receiving religious condolences. Well-
meaning religious phrases, such as “She’s in a better place,” or “His spirit is
all around you,” were not interpreted as words of comfort by our respondents,
often instead serving as a reminder of their minority status in society. A partic-
ipant in Hug an Atheist recalled a particular exchange after her husband passed
away, “I got a lot of – ‘He’s in a better place,’ and I was like, ‘He was a healthy 32-
year-old man in the prime of his life. He was in a pretty good place!’ We had just
gotten married, and he had just had a nephew. Things were really good and he
was killed.”
In the same vein, our respondents expressed not knowing how to interact in
a way that was comforting to religious friends and family coping with loss that
was authentic to their worldview. Stephanie explains, “An atheist can’t lie and
utter the immortal words: ‘She/he will be in my prayers.’ It would be untrue.
It would come across as disingenuous sympathy.” Both the (un)intentional deni-
al of their nonreligious worldviews and lacking a way to communicate support
that is both effective and authentic to all involved made social interactions un-
welcome and/or upsetting. Here,we see what seems to be an interactional divide
across worldviews. As these groups fundamentally interpret death in differing, or
even opposing ways, interacting around this topic becomes difficult.
4.5.2 “Here’s to the Hereafter: Last Respects at…Happy Hour?”
As religious toolkits for death are insufficient for the nonreligious, new mean-
ings, understandings, and practices are created, often in times of distress.
Those who were previously religious acknowledged this can be a difficult proc-
ess, sometimes made more so when additional hurdles are present. Fazzino ex-
perienced this first hand in the field, despite being disassociated with formal re-
ligion for 10 years. When Erich, a 30 something-year old “baconist”¹ passed
 The United Church of Bacon is a legal “church” that utilizes the cultural “bacon craze” phe-
nomena to challenge all abuses of religious privilege and put an end to atheophobia and secu-
larphobia. The organization was started in 2010 by celebrity magician Penn Jillette and a group
of his friends, which included John Whiteside. UCB claims no tax exempt status and pay their
taxes. By “baconist,” we mean those who are members of the United Church of Bacon.
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away, she was challenged by not knowing the norms of an atheist funeral. Con-
sider the follow excerpt from her field notes:
The memorial took place on a cloudy afternoon on the first Saturday in March. I bought a
new dress from Ann Taylor because what does one wear to a memorial service being held at
the VFW (a veterans’ organization and bar)? For all intents and purposes, this was a funer-
al…a funeral at a bar. I had two choices – casual or classy. I chose the latter. It was the
wrong choice. Many in attendance wore their Church of Bacon t-shirt to pay their respects
to Erich. Many said he would have wanted it that way.When I saw David Silverman, Pres-
ident of American Atheists, in a suit, I let out a sigh of relief. What the heck was the pro-
tocol for an atheist funeral anyway? I didn’t know what to expect before I got here and I
don’t know what to expect now. I’ll just follow everyone else’s example and go get a
drink at the bar.
Erich’s funeral was held in a bar, which was unusual to Fazzino initially.While it
seemed this space would meet our needs, that would not be the case. Consider,
for example, the following conversation between Prophet John Whiteside (veter-
an, Atheism advocate, and founder of The Church of Bacon -an Athiest organi-
zation based in Las Vegas) and Fazzino about the memorial service lead by
Whiteside, which Fazzino attended for professional and personal reasons, as a
member of the group:
When we [United Church of Bacon] had the memorial service for Erich, the bartender told
David Silverman and I that they triple booked the room. When she said we triple-booked
the room I said, “Oh, I don’t believe this. Look, let me tell you something. This is an athe-
ist…you got to close the bar. You got to get these people out of here. This is an atheist fu-
neral and I’m going to talk bad about the military. I’m going to talk bad about Erich’s ex-
periences in the military. This is a horrible idea.” People from the birthday party using the
room before us refused to vacate so we could have Erich’s memorial.We waited around for
about an hour, and finally Erich’s mom comes over and says, “Let’s just do it.” And so we
started. I was very upset…extremely upset the whole time. David did a good job, and Erich’s
mom did a wonderful job, but I was upset. I was mad! I started blocking the door to the
meeting room with my foot, so they’re going around the long way to get more beers and
they’re knocking over flowers. They’re doing all kinds of things. Somebody at the front
door, and I don’t know who it was said, “Would you mind waiting until the memorial serv-
ice is over?” And the guy said no. That pissed him off. Here we were being civil even though
they refused to leave. This is Church of Bacon’s first memorial, and they are being disre-
spectful. Well, that guy from our group made a comment about this guy’s girlfriend, then
he cold-cocked (i.e. punched) him. The other guy cold-cocked our guy. He made a comment
and the reaction of this drunk guy was to cold-cock him. His girlfriend said, “Are you going
to let him say that to me?” And then he cold-cocked him. It was my first memorial and
there’s a fight outside the bar. After the funeral was over, the guy who ran the place,
who by the way was just reeking of alcohol…in fact, he’s one of the guys who was stum-
bling around and knocked over flowers. He comes up to us and says, “Yeah, I’m VFW,” I
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think he says, “I’m the president. I’m really sorry about this, but I couldn’t get my friends
out of the room.”
Whether or not those attending the party refused to vacate out of a sense of an-
tagonism towards atheists is unknown. It may be that a bar is simply a difficult
place to hold a funeral ceremony. This in itself indicates a lack of institutional-
ized end-of-life culture, as location and dress were tenuous. Instead, we argue
this experience was an outcome of not having a formal space for the atheists
to express their grief. As the nonreligious formalize and institutionalize compo-
nents of the American funeral, such as spaces, presiders, norms for dress, the
potential for confusion, disorganization, and conflict with other groups seems
likely to decrease.
4.6 Organizing Secular Death and Bereavement
If necessity is the mother of invention, then theist dominance on the American
way of death seems to be motivating the creation of new cultural forms. Consider
this Tweet from atheist comic Keith Lowell Jensen, “When I die, cremate me, put
the ashes in walnut shells, close them, and give them to my friends so they can
say “Well that’s Keith in a nutshell.” Whether or not this statement is meant lit-
erally, we can see the potential for flexibility, creativity, and even humor towards
nonreligious death.Without the prescriptive aspects of religious ritual, individu-
als are able to not only choose once-deviant options such as cremation, but to
add personal touches to their death, for the satisfaction of themselves and
their bereaved loved ones. The loosening of religion’s dominance of death
opens a space for a personal agency at the end of life.
4.6.1 Nonreligious Crutches
In “Grief Beyond Belief”, a website intended to provide the nonreligious a space
to support one another online, Rebecca Hensler writes:
When you’re engaged in mutual grief support you discover that the emotions you’re having
that make you feel crazy are very common and so it really was helpful to find out that I
wasn’t the only person who was going around the long way in the market ‘cause I didn’t
want to walk down the baby aisle and things like that. Or who couldn’t cope with seeing
baby clothes.We do have to accept that someone we love is gone forever. They’re not com-
ing back.We can carry them forward in memory.We can let our own actions be motivated
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by our emotions about that person or by what that person taught us. There are a lot of
things that we can do that are comforting …
Nonreligious people are beginning to build their own cultural toolkit to find that
comfort. As the retelling of the memorial at the bar indicates, the nonreligious
require spaces in which their death practice may proceed uninterrupted. We
found the most evidence for the creation of spaces online, in the form of message
boards. These forums were created out of a frustration with the ongoing use of
religious crutches in other grief and bereavement support boards. Spaces like
Grief beyond Belief indicate the value of religion-free discourse for the nonreli-
gious. They offer the following statement of purpose: “The aim of Grief Beyond
Belief is to facilitate peer-to-peer grief support for atheists, Humanists, and other
Freethinkers by providing spaces free of religion, spiritualism, mysticism, and
evangelism in which to share sorrow and offer the comfort of rational compas-
sion.”² These virtual places provide a space in which the nonreligious worldview
is normative, which counters the Christian-centrism they risk facing in main-
stream end of life culture.
As previously mentioned, social norms at the end of life contain aspects of
religious symbolism and cultural meaning which are of minimal condolence to
the nonreligious in even the best of situations. To move around these impedi-
ments, the nonreligious require “crutches,” or what we have referred to as
tools through which to express and represent their worldview. We find that a
common method for constructing these crutches is through the secularizing of
religious crutches. In the following examples, the form of the crutch is borrowed
from conventional forms while the content is replaced with nonreligious mean-
ing³. This is consistent with prior research on the topic (Engelke 2015; Garces-
Foley 2003).
The traditional religious funeral in the West routinely contains elements of
eulogizing the deceased. For the nonreligious, this eulogy will be meaningful
if the content of the eulogy aligns with their worldview. Discussion of a religious
afterlife or being “in a better place” will hold little comfort. Instead, nonreligious
individuals craft eulogies from the cultural symbolism that they find meaningful,
often drawing on scientific knowledge. The “Eulogy from a Physicist” by Aaron
Freeman draws on the knowledge of the physical universe to explain how our
energy is not destroyed upon death, but goes on existing in some other form.
Here, a sort of after-death-longevity is defined from within the accepted scientific
 http://www.griefbeyondbelief.org/about-us/mission-statement/.
 http://openlysecular.org/toolkits-and-resources/.
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worldview, intending to bring comfort and peace to those for whom religion is
unable to sooth. While science has not conquered death, as is hoped for by
some, it is providing resources for making-meaning, as the principle of energy
conversion serves as the basis for this particular eulogy. Moreover, much of
the meaning-making that brings the nonreligious consolation comes in actually
celebrating the life of the loved one, not mourning their death.
Another outlet for these creating and disseminating crutches is the Openly
Secular Coalition (OS). OS is a national campaign headed by Todd Stiefel from
the Stiefel Freethought Foundation, which aims to eliminate anti-secular stigma
by normalizing nonbelief. The coalition has several tool kits on a variety of topics
for different demographics, and have added two additional resources, created by
the authors, on managing and coping with death. These toolkits contain general
information for the specific audience they are intended for, such as lists of re-
sources, readings, complicated grief warning signs, and a host of other content,
intended to provide support at the end of life. These resources contain things as
simple as the types of phrases the nonreligious will find comforting and the
types of phrases they will not, on the basis of their worldview.
Finally, the book Funerals Without God by Jane Wynne Wilson provides in-
sight into presiding over nonreligious ceremonies. The main purpose of this
booklet is help with end-of-life service planning for bereaved loved ones, as
well as to help humanists thinking of going through training to become secular
celebrants. Another group who may find parts of it useful are funeral directors,
primarily when the family of the deceased has no wish to play an active role. By
creating and disseminating this resource (Griswold 2003), Wilson has added an-
other symbolic crutch to the nonreligious end-of-life toolkit (Swidler 1986).
These crutches are important for those who preside over death ceremonies,
as they accomplish the necessary aspects of the ritual while presenting content
that is meaningful to the nonreligious. Based on Fazzino’s field notes (as descri-
bed above concerning attire), normative expectations at atheist funerals are
somewhat tenuous. While this provides a certain freedom of expression, this
can also increase the potential for uncertainty at an inopportune time there
are already high levels of stress and anxiety due to the loss of a loved one. Cul-
tural crutches provide the often taken-for-granted schema of social interaction.
With crutches in-hand, those who preside over nonreligious ceremonies have
greater tools and resources with which to fulfill their social requirements.
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5 Conclusion
Our research indicates that, in America, religious cultural tools are of little use to
the nonreligious when it comes to managing the end of life. Furthermore, we
have seen how differing interpretations of death problematizes and politicizes
this already difficult aspect of life. This highlights the importance of creating sec-
ular death management infrastructure that is explicitly nonreligious. Such infra-
structure will allow nonreligious individuals greater agency, with more resources
readily available, and more cultural crutches waiting to be implemented, aug-
mented and/or adapted for personal use. Our findings indicate that the nonreli-
gious are in the process of expanding their cultural toolkits for dealing with
death, making them better equipped to confront and cope with death.
While death at the macro level of society has been secularized in a number
of ways, through processes of rationalization, medicalization, and the profes-
sionalization of the end-of-life, the interaction at and around the death remains
potentially contentious, as members of varying (and at times, opposing) world-
views attempt to ritualize death in accordance with their worldview. Secular or-
ganizing has already provided a far greater cache of resources than existed even
a decade or two ago. The problem of mortality can be thought of as yet another
“terrain of resistance” (Routledge 1996, 517), in which an interwoven web of con-
tested meanings, symbols, and ideologies between the religious and nonreli-
gious have politicized the end of life, situating the nonreligious and their strug-
gle for meaning, recognition, and resources within the domain of “cultural
politics” (Buechler 2000). On one hand, the lack of an institutionalized death
culture affords the nonreligious some freedom to manage death however they
see fit, which is often appealing to the nonreligious with their strongly-held sec-
ular values of authenticity and individualism. On the other hand, recent efforts
to establish a nonreligious death culture by the broader secular movement may
unmask a historical legacy of cultural imperialism, as their end-of-life needs
have previously been rendered invisible.
As nonreligious end-of-life-tools enter the wider cultural realm, they bring
with them the potential to practice death and dying in new ways. If we imagine
those instances in which our respondents encountered religion negatively at the
end of life, these nonreligious tools bring the potential to overcome negative en-
counters with theism and to practice death in ways the nonreligious find mean-
ingful. While palliative medicine searches for definitions of a “good death”, we
advocate that an equally important concept is the notion of “equitable death”,
or equal representation and access to resources at the end of life for all people.
Our data indicates that the nonreligious often face an additional burden at death
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on the basis of their nonreligion. If our goal is equitable death and dying, then
the nonreligious require access to the same cultural crutches which are currently
available to religious individuals. We see nonreligious organizing at the end of
life as an attempt to carve out a space in American culture for themselves and
others who share their worldview, so that when others come to find themselves
in similar situations, they have more resources at their disposal. As the nonreli-
gious end-of-life-toolkit is expanded, we hope that nonreligious individuals will
increasingly be able to find the resources they need during those difficult times.
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Barry Kosmin
Old Questions and New Issues for
Organized Secularism in the United States
1 Introduction
American secularism is a feature of American exceptionalism.¹ It is unique in its
origins as well as its composition. I have suggested that American history since
1776 has produced alternations between eras of Christian religious ‘awakenings’
and periods of ‘secular’ or non-religious dominance and so, in effect, a contin-
uous ‘culture war’ over the nature and purpose of the American nation (Kosmin
2014a). Recently national social trends seem to suggest the country is entering a
new secular phase (Kosmin 2013). The ARIS 2008 findings showed that half of
U.S households did not currently belong to a religious congregation and on
the average Sunday 73% of Americans did not go to Church.While 27% of Amer-
icans did not anticipate a religious funeral, 30% of Americans did not believe in
a personal biblical style God (Kosmin et al 2009). And more recent surveys have
confirmed these data and trends so we may be at an important tipping point in
U.S. history. The evidence demonstrates that the Zeitgeist, if not the Force, is with
the secular and secularizing Nones and this development makes the analysis
and study of secularism per se of major relevance for American social science.
Religious conservatism, faith-based initiatives, religion-related terrorism, the
New Atheist texts, and increasing use of digital and ‘social’ media have ener-
gized and emboldened secularist advocates, networks, and organizations at
both local and national levels. Accelerated growth in membership has been re-
ported in recent years by nationwide organizations with clear secularist agendas
including the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), Center for Inquiry
(CFI), American Atheists (AA), American Humanist Association (AHA), Secular
Student Alliance (SSA) and the Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers
(MAFF). On the intentional side, public advertising campaigns and events have
been mounted in major cities. This new secularist surge of activism has been
framed, in part, as an identity politics issue and movement in the United States.
Some present themselves as members of a marginalized and maligned minority
 The terms secular, secularist/secularism, secularize, and secularization here are used in the
sense discussed in the Introduction to this volume; referring respectively to non-religious, ideol-
ogy that endorses non-religion, activities or process of reducing the influence of religion, and
the outcome of that process.
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(not unlike gays and lesbians) whose rights have been curtailed or denied (Cra-
gun et al. 2012). Such efforts may be having an effect. References to atheists (or
nonbelievers), even in the American ‘public square’, have become noticeably
more frequent and prominent – such as, for example, President Barack Obama’s
inclusion of nonbelievers in his first inaugural address (Grossman 2009) and ref-
erences to ‘agnostic and atheist brothers and sisters’ by speakers at anti-capital-
ist rallies (Landsberg 2011).
Nevertheless, until quite recently sociological work on secularization virtually
ignored active or organized forms of atheism and the myriad of other secularist
constructs or those that share criticism or rejection of religious ideas, behavior,
or institutions, such as freethought, secular humanism, skepticism, positivism,
and philosophical materialism or naturalism (Pasquale 2007; 2010). Colin Camp-
bell noted ‘[t]he fact that irreligious movements act as agents of secularization
has strangely enough been overlooked by sociologists in their contribution to
the continuing secularization debate […] one has to search hard to find examples
of sociologists referring to material about irreligion in this context’ (1971: 7). As
Beckford summarized the matter:
[T]hey have tended to overlook, omit or deliberately ignore the significance of both organ-
ized and diffuse attacks on religion. It is as if the progress of secularization could be ade-
quately accounted for in terms of the effect of abstract cultural forces, such as class struggle
or functional differentiation, without consideration of the agents and agencies that actively
campaigned for secularism and secular societies. Given that a wide range of campaigns,
movements and voluntary associations promoted secularism, rationalism, atheism and hu-
manism in Britain and elsewhere, it is important to consider their direct and indirect con-
tributions to secularization and to interpretations of secularization. (2003: 36)
It could be argued that in the U.S. the paucity of scholarly attention to organized
secularism until recently was justified because it reflected the societal reality of
the lack of institutionalization and divisions that has bedeviled free thinkers and
secularists in the U.S. for more than a century. Only a small percentage of the
millions who could be identified as Seculars belong to explicitly secularist
groups. In fact, secularism could be described as a classic leaderless movement
in America (Cragun & Fazzino, this volume). Despite accelerating growth in re-
cent years, numbers of atheist and secularist group affiliates have always
been, and remain, extremely small—not only with respect to the populations
of the societies in which they emerge, but with respect to those people who rea-
sonably may be characterized as substantially or thoroughly nonreligious (Budd
1977; Campbell 1971). Historically even during periods of substantially declining
religiosity such as the 1930s and 1960s, secularist organizations failed to capital-
ize on their opportunity with even remotely proportionate growth rates (Demer-
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ath and Thiessen 1966;Warren 1943). As Steve Bruce (2002) and John Shook (this
volume) have suggested, the natural resting state of secularity tends to be pas-
sive indifference to religion, apatheism, rather than active atheism or irreligion.
Secularist organizations (like the American Humanist Association, Council
for Secular Humanism, Freedom From Religion Foundation and American Athe-
ists) have been advocating secularization in the United States for decades, par-
ticularly as watchdogs regarding infringement of constitutional church-state sep-
aration. While their activities has triggered skirmishes with religious advocates
along the way, incremental increases in the population of Nones seem more at-
tributable to cultural, political, or demographic factors than to organized inten-
tional activity. A surge of religious abandonment in the 1960s and 70s, for exam-
ple, was largely attributable to developmental adolescent apostasy in the Baby
Boom generation (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Some Baby Boomers returned
to organized religion but many did not, giving way to increasing proportions
of ‘Nones’ in succeeding cohorts as future generations were not raised in a reli-
gion. Hout and Fischer concluded that ‘change in the religious preferences of be-
lievers in the 1990s contributed more to the increase in no religious preference
than disbelief did’ (2002: 178).
Much like organized religion, secularism is a diverse and pluralist tradition
producing competing visions and organizations. Or, alternatively and negatively,
it can be pictured as a weak worldview movement rent by lack of consensus on
definitions and goals from its inception (Rectenwald, Mastiaux, this volume).
Secularism has had a sectarian quality since its beginnings because of the man-
ner in which diversity of philosophical approach to “human consciousness” as
demonstrated in the Shook’s elaborate taxonomy (this volume) were translated
into calls for social and political action with regard to religion. This uncertainty
has produced a variety of binaries that can be described as “soft” and “hard”
secularism (Kosmin 2007). On one side is the “substitutionist” or “accommada-
tionist” tradition of Holyoake, Huxley and Dewey, and before them the “soft”
thinkers of the Enlightenment, such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas
Jefferson, whose view of humanity led them to doubt that secularization
would be sweeping, thorough and total. The Sunday Assembly (see chapters
by Smith and Frost in this volume) may be seen as a contemporary illustration
of this tradition. On the “hard” side stands the “eliminationist” and “confronta-
tionist” tradition of “out Atheists” like Bradlaugh, Marxist-Leninists and nowa-
days the New Atheists (Campbell 1971, 54). The Atheist Alliance and the Ameri-
can Atheists (see chapters by Mastiaux, and Fazzino & Cragun in this volume)
are contemporary examples of this second type.
Disagreements over strategy and style reflect these longstanding and deep
ideological divisions among secularists (Richter and Langston this volume). In
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the contemporary U.S. the degree to which active atheism, particularly as advo-
cated by the New Atheism, may have contrary effects – prompting religious back-
lash, promotion, and reactionary adherence – cannot be discounted (Bullivant
2010; Kosmin 2014b). This hostility to atheism as a result of its radical image,
of course, is longstanding and consistent with the teachings of John Locke in
A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). As in the past, this negative reaction
prompts debate and disagreement among secularists of varying stripes (e.g.,
Baggini 2007; Kurtz 2010; Uhl 2011). ‘Moderates’ often advocating a positive
free standing secularism complain that acerbic or absolutist ‘shock and awe tac-
tics. . .polarize identities’ and push otherwise moderate religious allies ‘into the
arms of the extremists’ (Baggini 2007: 42, 44).
In the U.S. only a tiny percentage of freethinkers have ever been affiliated
with secular organizations whereas around 60% of the religious population cur-
rently belongs to a congregation (Kosmin and Keysar 2009). The low rates of af-
filiation, mobilization and participation is even more problematic in the current
circumstances of a rapid increase in the potential constituency for organized sec-
ularism. This deficiency is a familiar theme in secularist gatherings where the
“faithful faithless” lament the failure of non-theist organizations to realize
their full political and cultural potential– their inability to penetrate and mobi-
lize their natural market. Secularist organizations today as in the past do indeed
face a social marketing problem as the preceding chapters directly and indirectly
evidence. Organized secularism in the U.S. has failed to affiliate even a fraction
of the more than 10 million strong core constituency of self-identifying non-be-
lievers – the “hard secularists” (Kosmin 2007), those willing to self-identify as
atheists and agnostics. Using wider theological or (un)belief criteria as by set
out in Shook’s “polysecularism” this target group could be even a larger and
more sizeable demographic amounting to one in four Americans according to
the findings of recent national surveys. Secularist organizations have no real
need to proselytize since they already have a 50 million strong potential constit-
uency of Nones. Organic economic and societal forces have created this social
momentum towards mass secularity. Thus the present challenge for secularist or-
ganizations is not to produce growth but building the self-awareness and the
mobilization of this population. The result of this lack of mobilization and struc-
tural weakness is most evident in the political arena where identifying Nones are
almost non-existent and so the most under-represented population in the coun-
try in terms of political office holders.
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2 Recruitment and Organizational Challenges
The religiosity of the United States, compared with other developed societies,
can be attributed to a ‘supply-side’ proliferation of religious products in a com-
paratively free market. Secularism seems to have a similar trajectory (Kosmin
and Keysar 2006). We can explain the sectarian syndrome of proliferating
small secular groups, by applying an economic market model to secular choices
that parallels the religious marketplace. When free of monopolistic or govern-
mental control, religious products naturally proliferate to satisfy multiple
needs and varying tastes. The demographic profile of secularist activists is
heavy with educators and intellectuals. This means secular organizations
spend lot of time and energy on mission statements and discussion of principles
often without reaching consensus. But many more non-activist secularists re-
main unaffiliated.
There is an obvious need to explain the paradox of rapidly growing numbers
of Nones alongside only a slight uptick in secular organization affiliates and so
the weakness of organized secularism. The most significant cause is that most
Nones are Apatheists as indifferent and uninterested in secularism as they are
in religion (see Langston, Shook this volume). Individually they have undergone
a secularization of consciousness in that they have lost any sense of sin, concern
for day of judgement, afterlife, heaven and hell and many traditional social ta-
boos. Yet paradoxically the rise of “individuation and personalization” (Hoesly
this volume) has inhibited affiliation with overtly secularist organizations. Pre-
sumably, one constraint for most Nones is that many of their immediate family
and friends are believers. In fact, in U.S. society most discrimination and hostil-
ity against non-believers arises from family and friends rather than strangers in
institutional settings (Cragun et al. 2011).
The lack of consensus over nomenclature and boundaries highlighted in this
volume reflects the tensions among secular people over secular identities. A ty-
pology based on “state of individual consciousness” produces a binary model of
hard and soft secularisms (Kosmin 2007). This bifurcation of secular perspectives
on philosophy and religion comprises only one dimension of this typology. The
second dimension is based on the distinction between individuals and institu-
tions. Here the individual aspect primarily pertains to states of consciousness
while the institutional aspect relates to social structures and their cultural sys-
tems. In reality, these are not closed cells but ranges stretched between the po-
larities of the dimensions. A range of intermediate positions can and does exist
between soft-soft and hard-hard secularism. In addition, the boundary between
the individual and the institutions is not firm in real life. There is interplay that
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involves social expectations and constraints originating from institutions on the
one hand and extreme subjective mental states that are individually based on
the other. Given the intellectualism of secularists the outcome of all this is a
predilection for sectarianism (Fazzino & Cragun, this volume).
The pioneering research on affiliation and membership patterns among sec-
ularists by Frank Pasquale (2007) highlighted this trend towards sectarianism.
Nones tend to be individualists and skeptical of the value of organizations.
They were never the types who joined the Elks, Rotarians and Masons, the tradi-
tional fraternal membership organizations, which are on the decline in the con-
temporary world of bowling alone. The character of the secular impulse itself
tends to militate against institutional participation specifically on the basis of
metaphysical world views. Pasquale goes as far as to suggest that many non-be-
lievers are “conflicted” about their own individual preferences and motives (Pas-
quale 2010: 2). Another factor that militates against affiliating most Nones is
their individual psychological profile. They tend to be rather analytic and criti-
cal. They have difficulty endorsing standard statements of opinion. They
would rather dissect and discuss than offer straight positions. Most dislike labels
and labeling. Whereas atheists tend to be confident in their identity and hold
strident opinions, by way of contrast the more numerous agnostics, humanists,
and ‘softer secularists”, hold to more moderate and qualified opinions. Their
openness to alternatives and unwillingness to commit to a single viewpoint
makes them particularly hard to organize. Thus secularism unsurprisingly has
no official hierarchy or leadership. The obvious contrast to this semi-anarchic sit-
uation among free thinkers is the authoritarian personality types found in fun-
damentalist religious groups (Ellison and Sherkat 1993), composed of individuals
who are anxious to submit to an authority and to follow a charismatic and often
disciplinarian leader.
The notion that secularization is linked to a preference for autonomy finds
support elsewhere as well. Langston’s research (this volume) tends to discredit
ideological barriers and point out the psychological disposition and structural
weaknesses and fractures that characterize secular organizations. Similarly,
Bruce (2002) views the process of secularization as an individual process.
While it can be characterized as affecting large collectivities, the decision to
be secular is not a decision that is made at the group level. For Bruce, this de-
cision is reached on an individual level. Each single individual makes up his
or her own mind, however affected they may be by others, and therefore they
all experience secularization as affirming their individual autonomy. The rela-
tionship of leaders to led is difficult because Nones tend to be suspicious of cha-
risma and authority. Heightened individualism creates a mentality (if not the pol-
itics) whereby a majority is more libertarian than communitarian in organizational
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outlook. For example, Mastiaux (this volume) showed there is a large pool of sec-
ular sympathizers but there is a lack of secular missionaries.
Obviously, the small size of secularist organizations means a lack of resour-
ces and professionals (clergy). This in turn weakens recruitment efforts so there
is little outreach activity. Another indicator of institutional weakness is a paucity
of donors, particularly large givers, to subsidize outreach. This deficiency means
secular organizations have to rely on self-recruitment largely (Mastiaux, Schultz,
Smith, Frost, this volume) and on social media. As a result there is little face to
face engagement. De Tocqueville saw voluntary organization as a strength and
uniqueness of American society. Yet most types of membership organizations
e.g. trades unions, fraternal organizations such as Elks, Masons etc. are in de-
cline and suffer from the bowling alone syndrome that weakens many voluntary
organizations today (Putnam,2000). Still, this is a particular problem for a con-
temporary movement that lacks inherited infrastructure and plant.
Added to those problems is the fact that most voluntary organizations are hit
by burn out and turnover. This is a feature even of the student organizations SSA
and CFI on college campuses. They operate in friendly markets with a constitu-
ency unburdened by family and job responsibilities but they face a difficult mi-
gratory structure namely a fast turnover of volunteer leadership (McGraw 2016).
Today organized secularism faces a challenge in how to decide how to use to
best advantage the groundswell of popular sentiment and opinion and the or-
ganic, secular trends in society and economy. We have to realize that member-
ship organizations are hard to maintain and resource in today’s society if you
are not offering tangibles, power or salvation to your followers; if the goal is
to fight for their hearts and minds but not their souls. Rational choice theorists
(Stark 1999; Stark and Bainbridge 1985) argue that human beings pervasively de-
pend upon the supernatural ‘compensators’ offered by salvational religion for
unfulfilled worldly expectations and rewards. If true, that reality requires secu-
larists to learn new ways and techniques to acquire people’s loyalty.
The role of the Internet in creating networks of seculars into new organiza-
tional forms is a paramount concern for secular organizations. But how does that
translate into changing people’s sense of belonging or identification, which is
necessary to grow a movement? The emergence of digital technologies (internet,
social media) – another structural (or infrastructural) factor – is likely playing a
role, particularly among the young (Addington, this volume). A young demo-
graphic is not hidebound by tradition so they are early adopters of technology.
Atheists are a rare population, a geographically dispersed minority in many lo-
cations. Younger cohorts, in particular, who were weaned on the Web are consid-
ered ideal for creating ‘imagined communities’ and virtual movements through
blogs, Internet-organized ‘meet-ups’, ‘tweets’ and ‘open posts’ (Cimino and
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Smith 2011; Smith and Cimino 2012). These new media are enabling atheistic
messages to reach larger audiences, no matter how remote or culturally insulat-
ed. How far this trend can overcome the face-to-face deficiencies only time will
tell.
Another methodology which has been adopted by organized secularism re-
cently is public signaling –stickers, flags, tee-shirts, advertising posters on buses
and on the highways and Reason Rallies. In 2014 several secularist organizations
joined together to create a new “Openly Secular” initiative (Openlysecular.org).
The outrage and grievance peddling described by Mastiaux (this volume) as
“moral Shock” is best seen in the FFRF strategy of seeking legal fights in middle
America, suing local governments, school boards and police departments over
prayers and religious symbols infringing the separation of church and state.
As we have noted, Nones tend to be individualists, not joiners. Most Nones
also tend towards being political independents but that is not entirely true of
secular activists. The profile of the leaders and members of secular organizations
is an important factor in the image and appeal. Activist secularists and the lead-
ership are overwhelmingly male, white, well educated, older, and affluent (Key-
sar, 2007). The social majority of secular activists in terms of race, education, age
and income, regardless of where they live, has all the characteristics consistent
with political conservatism and country club membership, or so one would
think. The reality is otherwise. For example, 64% of the readers of the Council
for Secular Humanism’s of Free Inquiry self-identified in 2015 as Liberals or Pro-
gressives (Tom Flynn 2016). AA and AHA members tend to be even more likely to
be social and political progressives (Fazzino & Cragun, this volume). This overlap
between political liberalism and public secularity can be expected to deepen
under the Trump administration.
Nevertheless, gender differences and minority representation are important
differentiators that help explain the profile of identification groups and organi-
zations. Men tend to be more militant than women and that factor is said to in-
hibit female recruitment. This has led to calls for more diversity by gender and
race. So CFI has sponsored three Women in Secularism Conferences and AHA
and CFI have established sub-groups for African-Americans. There is some recog-
nition among secular activists of generational issues and an emphasis on recruit-
ing Millenials. Indeed the student generation is very sympathetic to secularism
but few seem to have the time or inclination to be activists, the interest to pur-
chase secularist publications, or the resources to be donors (Kosmin 2014c).
As regards Hispanics and Asians, secular organizations are myopic. Re-
search such as the Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture’s
(ISSSC) report on Latinos, has been ignored by secular organizations (Navarro et
al). This failure epitomizes the short-sightedness problem of secularist organiza-
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tions and their obliviousness to important facts and opportunities. The findings
show that despite the stereotype of Latinos being a naturally religious commun-
ity there is a new and expanding constituency of Nones among college educated
and English-speaking Latinos. These people are totally invisible to the media,
scholars and unfortunately to most secular organizations. The explanation is
that they fail to fit the common stereotype of the religious Latino. That prejudice
is explicable for the media that loves stereotypes and values exoticism and pho-
togenic Catholic processions but secular organizations lose when they ignore so-
cial reality. The same deficiency reappears in their failure to outreach to Asian-
Americans who ISSSC research has repeatedly identified as the most secularized
population group in the country. In short, the leadership profile and member-
ship ranks of organized secularism appear unlikely to be transformed in the
near future.
3 Congregation and Community Models
The membership of religious congregations in the U.S. has a demographic profile
very different from that of the secular organizations – older white males – as de-
scribed above. The churches tend to disproportionally attract rural dwellers, Af-
rican-Americans, older women and young families (Kosmin and Keysar 2006;
Manning 2015). The secular Sunday Assemblies’ constituency described by
Smith and Frost (this volume) appears different again, having a distinct social
background and psychological profile mainly composed of urban young singles,
the proverbial Yuppies.Yet these “seekers” of groupness and community are very
much a minority of the secular Nones (Schutz, Smith, this volume). This popula-
tion’s need for the support of others is often derided by the majority of the acti-
vist seculars, with their more individualistic and autonomous personalities par-
ticularly by “out Atheists” with grievances against religion or escaping what they
see as personal trauma caused by religion. As we have noted expressive individu-
alism is more common than collectivism among Nones. Nevertheless the Sunday
Assembly movement has attracted attention from the media. It is regarded as a
strategy that might overcome the problems and constraints of organized secular-
ism with recruitment described above. Apparently the new technology and
media work well for Sunday Assemblies as they do for Evangelicals. These move-
ments are not as burdened by complicated and clergy-focused rituals as are
Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism (Addington, this vol-
ume).
Historically the American population has been socialized to see the Protes-
tant congregational model as normative. The cultural hegemony of organized re-
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ligion and Christianity means that Non-Christian traditions, Jews, Buddhist,
Muslims and Hindus have adopted this congregational structure in America.
The Sunday Assembly’s particular organizational structure is the lay led Protes-
tant denomination with a liberal model of standardized services and notions of
voluntary work towards the “common good”. The medium is the message. The
Sunday Assembly has adopted a familiar Protestant Christian format and style
geared to its constituency of young Recovering Protestants meeting in a decon-
secrated church on a Sunday morning.
Of course an organizational model of secularized congregations parallel to
organized religion has been tried before by Ethical Culture, Humanistic Judaism
and the Unitarians but it did not taken off as a mass movement. One reason is
that Secular Humanism and atheism have found it difficult to easily reproduce
the family and generational nexus of ties that religion offers. If the Sunday As-
sembly is to succeed it will need to provide the social provision typical of reli-
gious congregations such as welfare and charity work and early childhood edu-
cation (Manning 2015). Secular ceremonies and life cycle rituals are obvious next
steps. The Assemblies’ predicament is whether to follow the Humanistic Judaism
and Ethical Culture model and label themselves as a religion with clergy, thus
gaining the attendant tax and legal advantages, or to utilize the Universal Life
Church fiction (Hoesly this volume). Yet many secularists value radical purity
and the sectarian and fissiparous tendencies that plague secularism have al-
ready affected the Assembly movement with the rise of the “splitters” of Godless
Revival (Smith; Fazzino and Cragun, this volume)
It is worth placing the Sunday Assembly in the comparative context of the
earlier efforts at secular congregationalism because it provides insights into
the particular dilemmas organized secularism faces. Ethical Culture (American
Ethical Union) was founded by Felix Adler in New York City in 1877. Adler was
a deconverted rabbi and son of a Reform Rabbi. Very much a “progressive” he
organized Sunday meetings in an attempt to offer a more universalistic, ethnicity
free inclusive organization. Ethical Culture offered life cycle rituals. Its motto was
“deed not creed” and it was geared to urban social action sponsoring a kinder-
garten, school and housing and philanthropic projects (Radest 1969). Humanis-
tic Judaism, the “Saturday Assembly” – a Judaism without God- was founded in
Michigan in 1963 by Rabbi Sherwin Wine (Rowens 2004). It has 30 congregations
and 10,000 members in the U.S. Compared to Ethical Culture and the Sunday As-
sembly its services offers more ritualistic ceremonies that reflect the heritage of
the audience, including censored traditional Hebrew texts. It is socially progres-
sive, welcomes “intermarried” couples and operates gender equality (Chalom
2010).
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The secular congregations may be viewed as close to Comte’s vision of reli-
gions of humanity. And their placement on the soft side of secularism makes
them open to joining ecumenical religious coalitions and civic alliances with lib-
eral religious traditions and so fitting into the civic life of mainstream America.
The public’s demand for life cycle rituals and particularly state recognized mar-
riage ceremonies encouraged Humanistic Judaism and Ethical Culture to claim
official status as religions and recruit clergy as state recognized marriage offi-
cers. That strategy provides tax privileges (e.g. clergy parsonage tax relief)
and legal autonomy for the congregation (the same fiction described by Hoesly
for the ULF). The exploitation of unique U.S. constitutional provisions particular-
ly freedom from financial supervision (e.g. exemption from the the need to sub-
mit IRS Form 990 that applies to other non-profit organizations) favors organized
religion and disadvantages organized secularism unless it compromises. One re-
sponse is to establish secular celebrant training program and several secularist
organizations have begun campaigns for state recognition (e.g. Indiana 2016).
Alongside that, they can fight for a level playing field and true equality e.g.
the FFRF claim for parsonage tax relief (Freethought Today, Vol 33 No 5 June/
July 2016).
Burial and death rituals are less subject to state intervention than marriage
licensing but consumerism and market forces are more at play. The ARIS 2008
finding, which discovered that 27% of Americans do not expect to have a reli-
gious funeral, was a surprise. But it was noted by funeral directors and that in-
dustry has responded to market forces such as the rising demand for cremation
(The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 8.21. 2015) Structural forces such as the existence of
an established industry makes it difficult for secular organizations to exploit the
rising preference for non-religious interment. A secular community can offer
support and consolation in bereavement but this remains a family arena and
most families still have a religious majority that sees secular “toolkits” as having
an emotional deficit (MacMurray, this volume) compared with traditional reli-
gious burial and mourning rituals.
4 Appropriation of the Civic Square
One of the weaknesses of organized secularism is its lack of imagination and op-
portunism in claiming territory and furthering its cause using the existing agen-
cies that advance the common good in society. Organized secularism’s myopia is
probably due to its fractured nature and poor leadership. In fact, a wider notion
of secularism with more extravagant claims is possible and this could make it
more recognized and mainstream in society. For example, secularists have not
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focused recently on the role of the public school as a mass secularizing and sec-
ular organization. The philosopher John Dewey saw this opportunity to use the
American public school to promote a democratic secular education based on
freedom, equality, social cohesion and commitment to Human Rights as against
the separatism and religious segregation of faith schools (Dewey 1916).
Campbell concluded that ‘[t]he irreligious movements of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries assisted in the secularization of society in the sense that they
promoted and accelerated the disengagement of various social institutions and
activities from the legitimation and control of religion’ (1971: 121– 122). Most so-
ciologists who studied these phenomena characterized them as loose-knit or
ideologically ‘diffuse’ (Budd 1967), organizationally ‘precarious’ (Demerath
and Thiessen 1966), frequently short-lived, and of negligible significance overall.
Campbell attributed these judgments to a tendency to approach these phenom-
ena with religious (read: Christian) organizations in mind. This, he argued, is in-
appropriate. It obscures the distinctive social forms and activities through which
such constructs have played secularizing roles. These tend to be task-specific, ed-
ucational, political, or associational (rather than communal). As such they have
more in common with labor unions, political movements, or advocacy groups
than with church congregations or communities. Campaigns against religious
blasphemy laws, challenges to science, or moral legislation and for church-
state separation or rights to privacy and alternative lifestyles have undoubtedly
had some secularizing (and liberalizing or individualizing) effects.
An obvious arena for enhancing secularization has been sports and recrea-
tion. In 1934 religion, i.e. the churches, lost the struggle against Sunday profes-
sional baseball (Bevis 2003). The growing influence of major sports corporations
in the transformation of Sunday is best expressed in the history of the National
Football League’s Super Bowl. It has been played on Sunday since 1967 and it is
now widely recognized as a national secular holiday (MacCambridge 2004). The
Olympic Movement, with its ethos and hymn, can also be envisaged as part of
the international secular realm. Sports compete with religious activities in
time use and under Title IX it emancipates women to the detriment of conserva-
tive religions.
Whether the emphasis is on science, politics or any other area of life, it
seems that secularists support efforts, public or private, that justify their belief
systems and advance society in the direction they believe it should go, which
is almost without exception in the way of progress. In this view, old and outdated
ways of thinking, often entrenched in religion, are just anchors that hold society
back from that progress. Secularists’ relationship to the arts and culture is a key
area of potential strength—and one that challenges the German sociologist Max
Weber’s dictum that the process of secularization in the West was part of the dis-
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enchantment of the world, a process whereby magic and mystery were banished
from the mainstream of our culture (Weber 1905). Such criticism of modernity
and the associated triumph of science and rationalism, maintains that a secular
society and culture has no place for the spiritual, the sublime or the romantic.
Yet a visit to any of the nation’s museums and art galleries dispels this conclu-
sion. These public institutions are secular shrines and places of deep meaning in
contemporary culture. Americans view museums, art galleries and public libra-
ries as places of awe and reverence characterized by silence and decorum. The
secularizing influence of science and natural history museums is obvious, other-
wise there would be no need for a rival Bible-oriented Creation Museum in Ken-
tucky.
Most public museums’ mission statements reflect the heritage of Renais-
sance-style humanism and the Enlightenment, the essential harbingers of secu-
larism. Museums do an excellent job of conveying secular values by stating their
hopes to inspire people of all backgrounds by imbuing them with a greater ap-
preciation for human achievement and diversity. The nation’s cultural institu-
tions espouse pluralistic values and court broad audiences implicitly offering
visitors, from every background a chance to connect with one another through
dialogue and shared experiences with the arts. The impulse to universalize
goes hand in hand with the tendency to secularize. One can see museums as
temples of a sort: temples of culture and memory. Older museums are notable
for their classical i.e. pre-Christian architecture. The contemporary museum is
often heavy on glass, suggesting the absence of boundaries, again a very secular
concept.
Similarly early public expressions of the secular with a clear aim and pur-
pose, both personal and civic, were the higher educational institutions, inspired
by the Enlightenment. Again visually, they tended to looked back to classical
pre-Christian Greek models symbolized in architecture e.g. Doric columns. The
prime example is Jefferson’s University of Virginia 1818, an “academical village”
and “temple of knowledge” inspired by his passion for Palladian architecture
and Greek philosophers. Likewise the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham
was the “spiritual founder” of the entirely secular University College London
(1826) the “godless college” that ended the hitherto Anglican religious monopoly
of university education in England. UCL unsurprisingly was the first to admit stu-
dents regardless of their religion and the first to admit women on equal terms
with men.
Unfortunately, the inability of secularists and secular organizations to assert
themselves as the guardians of high culture and of the heritage of civic cultural
institutions also has linkages to their paucity of language and failure to create a
uniquely secular vocabulary:
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When an atheist feels “awe” when considering the majesty of nature, at present they have
just one term to describe that – a “spiritual” experience. And that term is owned by the re-
ligious. Humanists need new terminology (e.g., a “human” experience) to describe phe-
nomena like this that are secular in orientation else they will cede this ground to the reli-
gious. (Cragun & Kosmin 2011).
5 Future Prospects
Opening up a new field like the study of secularism, which lacks a common ter-
minology and tools of analysis, is a learning process. Analyzing the relationship
of secular identity to boundaries and group membership is a challenge due to
this lack of conceptual clarity. Nevertheless, we have to study secularism not
as the mirror image of religion nor using a theological paradigm. As the contri-
butions to this volume suggest, secularism requires a new conceptual armory so
it can be understood as an intellectual and social force in its own right.
On a practical level, organized secularism tries to keep up and remain rele-
vant to a society and culture that is constantly evolving. Yet alongside new is-
sues, old questions return and this volume highlights the challenges secular or-
ganizations face working out their values and policies on a whole range of
issues. Organized secularism, reflecting the range of agendas of polysecularism
(Shook, this volume), should have an advantage going forward because of its
ability to rationally answer society’s growing bio-medical, environmental and
climate change challenges and the ethical issues created by accelerating scien-
tific and technological advances. Also on the individual level, despite their dif-
ferences of style and approach (Fazzino & Cragun, this volume) secularist organ-
izations do have a firm consensus about personal issues such as gender,
abortion, and dignity in death. This agreement or common purpose provides a
firm basis for alliances among secularist organizations and has the potential
to make them more relevant and influential in the future. Their growing coher-
ence could be accelerated if organized secularism could overcome its main struc-
tural weaknesses, lack of resources due to poor recruitment and fund-raising
(Fazzino & Cragun, this volume). Here secularism stands in marked contrast to
the highly mobilized and remarkably well-funded (often by tithing) Religious
Right. This weakness can be viewed as the secular free rider problem. Here I
should declare an interest not only as the founding director of the first and
still only existing academic research institute on secularism only but also as a
member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Inquiry. Organized secularism
cannot flourish without adequate resources. As with any start-up the solution is
an injection of substantial funds. Somehow, progressive populations such as the
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young, wealthy, socially progressive tech elite of places like Silicon Valley need
to be persuaded that their social, economic, political and personal career inter-
ests lie with support for the secular cause.
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